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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Rauf GARAGOZOV
Ph.D. (Psychol.), leading research associate at the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus
(Baku, Azerbaijan).
“FORCING GEORGIA TO ACCEPT PEACE”1 OR WHY POLITICIANS SHOULD TAKE THE SPECIFICS OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY INTO ACCOUNT
Abstract
The author reveals some of the reasons why the Russian public unanimously supported Moscow’s actions in the military conflict with Georgia in August 2008. The Russian audience demonstrated a high degree of unanimity mainly because the way the Russian leaders interpreted the conflict and the way the media
covered it mirrored some of the Russian people’s deeply rooted convictions, their collective memory and identity. The author has made an attempt to use his analysis of all types of narratives to prove that the collective memory factor should be taken into account in politics and conflict management.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
The Russian-Georgian-South Ossetian conflict that flared up on the day the Olympic Games opened in Beijing sent stormy and far from unanimous responses across the world. This was largely due to the lack of reliable information about what was going on in this remote mountainous region, as well as to the fierce information war between the Russian and Georgian media against the background of the West’s fairly vague ideas about the region’s history and culture.
The West and Russia could not agree on what had really happened; the wide range of opinions in the West, which on the whole backed Georgia,2 was amazingly different from the nearly unanimous approval of the Russian public that closed ranks behind its leaders. This is amply testified by the recent public opinion polls in Russia.3
According to VTslOM the most frequent answers to the question—Who is to blame for the conflict?—were: “the Georgian government” and the “American government.” Fourteen percent of the
1 This was the term the Russian side used in its official statements to describe its military actions in Georgia between 8 and 12 August, 2008.
2 For more detail on the response of world public opinion to the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia, see [http://www.svobodanews.ru/Transcript/2008/08/14/20080814230808927.html], 14 September, 2008
3 See, for example, the returns obtained by the Levada Center and the All-Russia Center for Public Opinion Studies (VTslOM) collected immediately after the conflict, available at [http://www.svobodanews.ru/Transcript/2008/08/21/ 20080821125927110.html], 14 September, 2008.
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polled believed that the Russian troops should be withdrawn from the conflict zone; 72 percent thought that they should stay contrary to Georgia’s demands because “order and peace should be established there; Russia alone can protect South Ossetia: if it pulls out more aggression, chaos, and genocide cannot be excluded.”
According to the Levada Center,4 71 percent sided with South Ossetia and a meager 2 percent with Georgia. Forty-six percent, or nearly half of the polled, believed that South Ossetia should finally join Russia; 34 percent believed that it should develop as an independent state, while 4 percent thought that it should remain part of Georgia.
This is a very different level of unanimity from Soviet times when the Soviet public “unanimously” supported all the decisions of the Communist Party and the government. We should bear in mind, however, that in the Soviet past the government used the ramified party and administrative machine as a lever of administration and control. Today, Russia has no such tool.
This means that the level of unanimity the Russian public demonstrated with respect to the key aspects of the conflict and, what is more important, what the respondents said about the motives that had driven the conflicting sides are very important. They are primarily related to the specific features of the Russians’ collective memory and identity. I would like to introduce my analysis of these specifics with an overview of opinions other academics have offered about the high level of unanimity in Russia’s public opinion.
Why were Russians Unanimous in their Assessment of the Russian-Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict?
Even a casual observer will ask himself why the public was unanimously on the side of South Ossetia and the Russian leaders against Georgia? Boris Dubin, a well-known sociologist from the Levada Center, offered the following opinion: “We are witnessing the process of symbolic consolidation ofpublic opinion against an enemy image and against a threat.’”
Observers more or less agree that the Russian political elite has been painstakingly presenting Georgia as an enemy with the help of the state-controlled media.6 L. Sedov, an analyst from the Levada Center, has pointed out that the recent polls revealed that the respondents described Georgia as one of Russia’s enemies.7
Without going into the reasons why the Russian political establishment has chosen this road (this merits a separate article) and without assessing the degree to which the opinions offered by the sides fit the realities of past and present I shall investigate the reasons for the high degree of unanimity of the Russian public in an ambiguous situation. Here are several opinions that deserve our attention.
Sociologists point out that the Russians are unable to critically assess the information supplied by the media, the absolute majority of which (according to many observers) are engaged in propaganda and serve the government rather than supply objective information.8
4 See: [URL: http://www.levada.ru/press/2008081202.html], 14 September, 2008.
5 From the interview of B. Dibin to Radio Liberty of 21 August, 2008, available at [http://www.svobodanews.ru/ Transcript/2008/08/21/20080821125927110.html], 14 September, 2008.
6 Ibidem.
7 From the interview of L. Sedov to Radio Liberty of 17 August, 2008, available at [http://www.svobodanews.ru/ Transcript/2008/08/17/20080817140027850.html], 14 September, 2008.
8 From the interview of B. Dubin to Radio Liberty.
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Today the media play an important role in all countries; Russia is no exception in this respect. A poll revealed that most of the Russian public totally relies on the state TV channels for information.9 It is common knowledge that propaganda is most effective when it either corresponds to what the audience thinks or when it adds a new idea to the already accepted ones.10
We wonder why the Russian public was so gullible this time? According to the same research project, Russians are very skeptical about freedom of the press in their country. Indeed, a mere quarter of them (25 percent) are convinced that journalists are free to cover events.11 We all know that since Soviet times the people have always been able to read “between the lines” and have never trusted the government. This means that the thesis that the Russian audience completely trusts information supplied by the Russian media and that this accounts for its unanimity should be specified somewhat.
The following looks more plausible: the Russian public uncritically accepted the information supplied by the media and the political leaders because it described or interpreted the events in a special way. Certain aspects of Russian consciousness make it vulnerable to a certain type of information. The nation cannot critically assess information that contains enemy images, speaks of a sudden attack, suffering, and heroic victory. This is rooted in the collective memory of the Russians and their collective identity. More on this below.
Certain Specifics of the Russian Collective Memory and Identity
The very concept of collective memory is multidimensional and ambiguous. Here I will rely on the collective memory concept developed by American academic J. Wertsch within the framework of the sociocultural approach,12 which treats all manner of historical narratives as cultural tools of sorts for promoting collective memory. The process is greatly affected by certain features of historical narratives that form the collective memory of an ethnonational group. The American academic has identified the schematic narrative template as one of these features, by which he understands certain generalized schemes or models used as foundations for all sorts of narratives and interpretations of historical events that differ in different cultures. According to J.V. Wertsch, Russian culture is dominated by the narrative template “triumph over an alien force:” “This is a narrative template that may be instantiated using a range of concrete characters, events, dates, and circumstances, but its basic plot remains relatively constant and contains the following items:
“1. An ‘initial situation’... in which the Russian people are living in a peaceful setting where they are no threat to others is disrupted by:
“2. An early trouble or aggression by an alien force, or an agent, which leads to:
“3. A time of crisis and great suffering, which is:
“4. Overcome by the triumph over the alien force by the Russian people, acting heroically and alone”.1
9 For more detail of the results of the poll “Trust in the Media” ordered by BBC, The Reuters and the Media Center of the United States, see: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/news/newsid_4967000/4967852.stm], 14 September, 2008.
10 See: D. Kinder, D. Sears, “Public Opinion and Political Action,” in: Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. by G. Lindzey, E. Aronson, Vol. 3, Random House, New York, 1985, pp. 659-741.
ii
12 See: J.V. Wertsch, Voices of Collective Remembering, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.
[URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/news/newsid_4967000/4967852.stm], 14 September, 2008.
See: J.V. We
1 Ibid., p. 93.
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Templates are formed under certain conditions and are products of several circumstances: political, religious, sociocultural, historical, and even psychological. The state and the Church, two institutions of power that control the writing and study of history, play an important role in creating, preserving, and reproducing such templates.14
Over time the templates planted in the mass consciousness through various forms of cultural and historical socialization might develop into a collective experience pattern. By this I mean the stable and structuralized ideas of a group about its past, actions, and the motivations of heroes and actions of alien forces.
The pattern may blend with other elements of collective experience and, to borrow from A.L. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn, may be made explicit in individual and group behavior.15 Its ability to blend with various elements of collective experience explains the amazing ability of the narrative template to reproduce itself in new conditions and new generations (even in those that escaped the traditional programs of historical brainwashing). This adds stability to patterns, an inalienable element of group identity.
The Russian narrative template of “triumph over an alien force” became a pattern of collective experience and an inalienable element of Russian identity. Without going into details I shall say that political elites can use the collective memory patterns for their own aims.16
Mobilization of the Masses by Reviving Narrative Templates
If and when specific narrative templates find their way into history textbooks, the media, and political speeches they may revive corresponding patterns of collective memory and identity which, in the final analysis, mobilize the masses.17 When specific narratives resurface in the public consciousness and group discourse (which interprets historical events in full accordance with certain schematic narrative templates) they activate the corresponding collective memory pattern and, at the same time, may stir up conflicts. In this sense, interpretations of the Russian-Georgian-South Ossetian conflict in the Russian media and speeches of the Russian leaders are highly illustrative of the above.
I have already written that for several years the Russian media have been presenting Georgia as an enemy; there is no need here to analyze the materials of the Russian press. I shall limit myself to the text that served as the starting point for the most popular Russian media when interpreting the latest events in Georgia. I have in mind President Medvedev’s statement about the situation in South Ossetia on 8 August, 2008. It offered the official point of view about the conflict.18 Here is the full text of
14 See: R.R. Garagozov, Metamorfozy kollektivnoi pamiati v Rossii i na Tsentral’nom Kavkaze, Nurlan Publishers, Baku, 2005; idem, “Collective Memory and the Russian ‘Schematic Narrative Template’,” Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, Vol. 40, No. 5, 2002, pp. 55-89.
15 See: A.L. Kroeber, C. Kluckhohn, “Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions,” Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology & Ethnography, Cambridge, Harvard University, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1952, pp. 181-198.
16 See: R.R. Garagozov, Metamorfozy kollektivnoi pamiati v Rossii i na Tsentral’nom Kavkaze; idem, “Collective Memory: Patterns and Manifestations. Part 2,” Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2008, pp. 3-97; idem, “Collective Memory: Patterns and Manifestations. Part 1,” Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2008, pp. 13-98.
17 See: R. Garagozov, “Collective Memory in Ethnopolitical Conflicts: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5 (41), 2006, pp. 145-155.
18 [http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/08/1553_type82912type82913_205032.shtml], 14 September,
2008.
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the statement and my commentaries on it that point to the components of the specifically Russian schematic narrative template “triumph over an alien force.”
The following passage opened the statement:
“PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA DMITRY MEDVEDEV: As you know, Russia has maintained and continues to maintain its presence on Georgian territory on an absolutely lawful basis, carrying out its peacekeeping mission in accordance with the agreements concluded. We have always considered maintaining the peace to be our paramount task. Russia has historically been a guarantor for the security of the peoples of the Caucasus, and this remains true today.”
The above perfectly fits the first component of the Russian schematic template: “the Russian people are living in a peaceful setting where they are no threat to others.” In this particular case this is confirmed by “its (Russia’s.—Tr.) peacekeeping mission” and “maintaining the peace to be our paramount task.” The president went on to say:
“Last night, Georgian troops committed what amounts to an act of aggression against Russian peacekeepers and the civilian population in South Ossetia. What took place is a gross violation of international law and of the mandates that the international community gave Russia as a partner in the peace process.”
This fully coincides with the second component of the Russian schematic template according to which peace “is disrupted by an early trouble or aggression by an alien force, or an agent.” In the statement this amounts to “an act of aggression against Russian peacekeepers and the civilian population.” From this it follows:
“Georgia’s acts have caused the loss of life, including among Russian peacekeepers. The situation reached the point where Georgian peacekeepers opened fire on the Russian peacekeepers with whom they are supposed to work together to carry out their mission of maintaining peace in this region. Civilians, women, children, and old people are dying today in South Ossetia, and the majority of them are citizens of the Russian Federation.”
This completely coincides with the third component of the Russian schematic narrative template: “which leads to a time of crisis and great suffering;” no comments are needed.
The president concluded his statement with:
“In accordance with the Constitution and the federal laws, as President of the Russian Federation it is my duty to protect the lives and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they may be.
“It is these circumstances that dictate the steps we will take now. We will not allow the deaths of our fellow citizens to go unpunished. The perpetrators will receive the punishment they deserve.”
The concluding passage of the presidential statement expressed assurance that the aggressor would be punished. This fully coincides with the last component of the Russian narrative template: “the Russian people acting heroically and alone triumph over the alien force.” Here this tallies with: “.. .as President of the Russian Federation it is my duty to protect the lives and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they may be. We will not allow the deaths of our fellow citizens to go unpunished. The perpetrators will receive the punishment they deserve.”
The above confirms that the very first official statement of the Russian leader about the Russian-Georgian-South Ossetian conflict followed the Russian schematic narrative template. It should be said that the later statements of the Russian leaders about the conflict followed the same pattern. This was the official point of view faithfully copied by the main Russian media when dealing with the conflict and it reproduced, in one form or another, the key components of the Russian schematic narrative template. In this way information about the Georgian conflict offered in line with the Russian
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schematic narrative template “triumph over an alien force” was welcomed by the Russian mass consciousness, which is characterized by the corresponding collective memory pattern.
C o n c l u s i o n
Politics and politicians should take the specifics of collective memory into account. In this particular case the Russian political establishment skillfully exploited the specifics of Russia’s collective memory and identity to rally the nation. The Georgian political leaders, on the other hand, ignored the traditional images and ideas typical of Russia’s collective memory and identity and, acting as they did, played into the hands of the Russian leaders.
State monopoly on the media typical of today’s Russia makes it possible to use the press for propaganda purposes. In this case such impressive success was partly achieved because it coincided with the deeply rooted ideas of the broad Russian audience.
