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new type of economy by changing the behavior of economic agents, causing them to develop a new strategy and tactics.
Economic multistructures can be characterized by the following properties: use of advanced technology, volume of industrial production, spending of industrial organizations on innovation, number of innovative companies, structure of investment in fixed assets. In terms of the use of advanced technologies, in Russia only 34% of technologies are in line with the sixth technological structure, 37% - the fourth technological structure, and 29% - the fifth technological structure [6]. In the industrial production in Russia the third technological system accounts for 55%, the fourth technological system accounts for 45%, and the fifth and the sixth technological structures are not present.
Spending of Russian industrial enterprises on innovation is mostly allocated for the third technological system sectors (50.1%), the fourth technological system sectors receive 36.5%, the fifth technological system sectors receive 6.2%. In terms of the number of innovative companies in Russia, only 17.4% belong to the driving sectors of the fifth technological structure, 29.1% - to the driving sectors of the fourth technological structure, 43.3% - to the driving sectors of the third technological structure. There
are no enterprises of the sixth technological structure dealing with innovation in Russia or their share is comparable with a statistical error. Investments in Russia are directed to the driving sectors of the second (6.7%), third (53.8%), fourth (32.4%), and fifth (7.1%) technological structures. The analysis of multistructuralism of the Russian economy shows no tendencies of developing the sixth technological structure.
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2. Белоусов В.И., Белоусов А.В. Технологические уклады и преодоление экономических кризисов. иРІ_: \«\«\л/.каргїаІ-rus.ru/articles/article/175896.
3. Гпазьев С.Ю. Развитие российской экономики в условиях глобальных технологических сдвигов. М.: Национальный институт развития, 2007.
4. Назарова Е.А. Многоукладность экономики и техникоинновационный потенциал экономического развития России // Проблемы современной экономики. 2007. №3 (23).
5. Хаустов Ю.И., Соловьев Б.А., Бочаров В.П. Инновационный процесс в системе общественных отношений. Воронеж: ВГУ, 2001.
6. Яковец Ю.В. Циклы. Кризисы. Прогнозы. М., 1999.
удк 338.24 A. V. Fomin
LIMITS OF EFFICIENCY OF STATE REGULATION AND POSSIBILITY OF INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT
The paper deals with the analysis of deficiencies of state regulation in modern economy and searching for tools to eliminate them. The author suggests using mechanisms of institutional management for elimination of those deficiencies. Special attention is given to specific nature of institutional cultivation.
Key words: state, state regulation, institutions, management of institutions, institutional trajectory, institutional cultivation, institutional designing.
А.В. Фомин
ГРАНИЦЫ ЭФФЕКТИВНОСТИ ГОСРЕГУАИРОВАНИЯ И ВОЗМОЖНОСТИ ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНОГО УПРАВЛЕНИЯ
Данная статья посвящена анализу недостатков государственного регулирования современной экономики и поиску инструментов их устранения. В качестве метода устранения недостатков госрегулирования автором предложено использование возможностей институционального управления. Особое внимание уделяется специфике институционального выращивания.
Ключевые слова: государство, госрегупирование, институты, управление институтами, институциональная траектория, институциональное выращивание, институциональное проектирование.
The state role in economy is still very strong. The history of all human civilizations shows that state has always been “involved” in economy. However, the possibilities and limits of efficiency of state regulation in modern economy can not get an accurate assessment. This is primarily due to its multi-dimensional character and the need to strike a balance between the methods of market and government regulation. Many manifestations of state regulation efficiency, such as social stability in society, in general, do not have clear parameters. Government regulation in general proved to be highly effective. After it was built into the economic mechanism of the capitalist society,
the development of the Western countries is marked by a high economic dynamics, rapid growth of the efficiency of production, more or less moderate unemployment and a noticeable increase in the level and quality of life, mitigating conflicts, and social stability. All of these factors compare differentiate favorably state regulated, socially-oriented modern capitalism from capitalism with free competition.
The XXth century saw especially rapid development of economic activities of the state. During this period three “waves” of nationalization of economy can be observed. One of them was related to the First World War and the
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October 1917 revolution in Russia. The second occurred during the Great Depression in the United States, and as a result of the military fascist regimes. The third wave was related to the events of the World War II and the first postwar decade.
This process continued to develop further. As a result, the state has become the largest industrial employer, owner of transport system, the richest banker, organizer of scientific research, coordinator of all economic activity. These aspects were the main activities of the state at the turn of the XX century.
At the same time, state regulation efficiency is not unlimited. It can not overcome the cyclical nature of capitalist production, which generates a lot of severe economic and social problems at the downside cycle phases. For long periods the state is not able, despite all efforts, to secure sustainable, socially tolerable level of unemployment.
Especially difficult was to maintain a balance of regulation, when shifts in the technological base of production and increased world economic competition have led to the transition from industrial to postindustrial economy. During a period of innovation and change of technological structure the issue of “failures” in state regulation becomes more pronounced and there is a search for new mechanisms to stabilize economic system.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the “failures” of state regulation during the formation of an innovative environment and the search for the mechanisms to eliminate them on the basis of institutional governance.
It should be noted that in developed countries there are three basic models of state regulation (American, West European and Japanese), characterized by different combination of the basic tools of economic policy (fiscal, monetary, public property, etc.). Until now, economic publications by Russian researchers paid little attention to the use of methods of institutional management in conjunction with the traditional tools of state regulation. Some theoretical aspects of institutional management are discussed in the papers of V. Polterovich, B. Kleiner, who develop a theory of institutional change, and also in the papers of D. Novikov, and S.B. Chernysheva, who explore the issues of institutional governance of organizational structures and innovation.
During the recent decades in Russia there has been an intense and focused building of institutions but the results so far can hardly be called satisfactory. In today’s economy social and economic institutions should not be built or designed, but rather be grown or cultivated as crystal [2]. An important task for the Russian economy is the study of how to create, establish and maintain institutions, how they move from one country to another, from past to present, on what principles should a methodology of institution-building be based.
Today we can identify five main problems hindering the development of an effective innovation environment in Russia: 1) the psychology of catching up, 2) the energy trap, 3) the growth of inefficient “quasi innovation” structures (in particular, state-owned corporations), 4) staff shortage in innovative industries, 5) the state’s desire to increase its influence. Anyway, all these problems are the consequence of strengthening the role of government in the economy and the role of inefficient state institutions. To eliminate
these problems is possible through implementation of institutional management and limiting state influence in the economy
According to W. Samuels, D. Hodgson and D. Stanfield, institutional governance comprises the following provisions:
1. Institutional management of economy should not be limited to economic policy only but include the management of social institutions.
2. Institutional management should actively use the ideas and findings of other sciences such as psychology, sociology and anthropology, in order to better analyze and control the institutions and human behavior.
3. Institutions are key elements of any economic system, and therefore the main task is to examine the institutions and processes of their preservation, renovation and improvements for the future use of this information.
4. Economy is an open and evolving system, acting in a natural environment, exposed to technological changes and involved in relations wider than the sphere of material production (social, cultural, political and power relations).
The analysis of the experience of developed countries confirms the leading role of institutional engineering during economic modernization. In general, the efficiency is determined not by transformation models but by institutional structure and efficient state exercising the so-called pump-priming. For example, one of the main features of the German experience of economic reforms which helped the post-war Germany out of the economic crisis was a holistic concept of reform priorities, goals and methods, as well as determination of the government. In Japan during economic reforms after the World War II regulation and management of the economy was carried out within the framework of long-term economic program. The failures of the reforms in Argentina in the first half of 1980ies can be explained by the same reasons: inconsistency of government actions and lack of institutional changes. As a result by the mid-1980s the Argentine economy was in a state of depression. Mexico also faced the problem of institutional structure inefficiency during economic reforms in the 1980-ies and fiscal austerity became the main element of stabilization policy.
One of the main tools of institutional governance is cultivating institutions. Cultivating institutions means state support for natural evolution of existing institutions and targeted adjustment of its characteristics. Basic institution can be transplanted or designed, or may arise during the development of the national institutional environment. The disadvantage of the cultivating strategy is a slow speed of change. The advantages are great opportunities for adaptation and adjustment in the process of natural development of an institution. Often, an institution affects external institutional and cultural environment and contributes to its modernization.
Controlled cultivation is a special case of the transitional institutions strategy which includes design, transplantation and institutional marketing [5]. All four elements can be combined in order to build an institutional path trajectory leading to the formation of a new innovative environment. The strategy of transitional institutions is flexible enough; it makes use of a wide range of tools that allow adjusting development of institutions with the required char-
acteristics. Trajectories of development in other countries should serve as guidelines for such strategy. Taking into account the experience of other countries significantly reduces the risk of failure. It should be emphasized that in order to establish an effective institutional system of innovation economy it is necessary not be limited to borrowing but mostly rely on the institutional innovations that are generated in parallel with growing institutions adequately to the country’s own historical experience.
Moving along the institutional trajectory is defined not only by external factors but also by the internal logic of selfdevelopment: every institution affects mass culture and human capital creating the conditions for the introduction of more efficient forms. The purpose of transitional institutions is not only to serve as “embryos” for more modern and sophisticated forms but to loosen restrictions and facilitate the introduction of effective institutions. Sometimes transitional institutions can perform both functions.
Moving along the planned institutional trajectory rarely happens automatically, so the strategy of cultivation in its pure usually is not successful. The reform strategy should not only provide for a timely change in legislation and government support for new institutions, but also a built-in system of incentives encouraging economic agents to promote or at least not hamper the planned institutional change. In the process of institutional change there is always a danger of a strong lobby that is interested in maintaining transitional institution which has been formed at some stage and preventing further changes. This may result in an institutional trap of partial reforms. An example of such a failed institution is an intermediate scale of income tax introduced in Russia in 2000. This change was supposed to help reduce the shadow activity and increase budget revenues. However, the goal was not achieved: statistics show that in subsequent years the share of income tax collected in the population’s income has not changed. Moreover, the flat tax, probably contributed to the growth of inequality and certainly will hamper decrease of inequality in the future, thereby adversely affecting economic growth. However, now it is difficult to abandon it because it is advantageous for the most powerful people, including legislators.
In order to be realizable a strategy must at every stage create demand for further institutional changes by creating respective institutional expectations. Success at each stage will create trust and credibility and make possible using tools of institutional marketing, especially with regard to social institutions.
Nevertheless, even when all these conditions are met success is not guaranteed.
Transitional institutions are not perfect, and hence create opportunities for rent appropriation. It is necessary to
calculate the rate of change in order to not to, on the one hand, introduce new institutions before the easing of restrictions creates appropriate conditions, and, on the other, allow forming lobbying groups with an interest in a deviation from the institutional trajectory.
It is extremely important to create favorable expectations for the results of reforms. The solution to this problem is greatly simplified if the reform projects are created on a regular basis in accordance with certain rules and there are regular channels of discussion in expert circles, and at the grassroots level. In Japan, South Korea, the post-war France, the basis of expectations formation system, building consensus and coordinated action is the system of indicative planning. The same functions are performed by the planning system in China today. In particular, the information that the benefit that agents could get through the imperfections of a transitional institution will be reduced influences the choice of their strategies reducing the likelihood of institutional traps.
In conclusion, it should be noted that successful cultivation or import of new institutions will be implemented in the event that institutional innovation will penetrate to all levels of the institutional system, which develop at different speed, and take root in them for a long time. At the same time there should be appropriate administration of the new rules, processes of monitoring of institutional changes, information support for innovation, and learning new skills.
Thus, generation of new institutions and their implantation requires a certain time, proper use of technological, economic, organizational and managerial knowledge. At the same time it is necessary to take into account the experience of other countries and try to find solutions which could be possible to apply in Russia.
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5. Мирошниченко Н.В. Проблемы и перспективы институционального управления в условиях становления инновационной экономики // Ежегодное издание М.О.Б. Томск, 2010.
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УДК 338.24 A. V. Fomin
FAILURE OF THE STATES: THE CAUSES AND MANIFESTATIONS
The paper states the necessity to consider various causes of establishing a failure of the state with regard to state policy resulting in inefficient outcome and fiasco states themselves and their manifestations. The author argues that it is necessary for development of their improving strategy
Key words: fiasco state, bureaucracy, agency relationship, public preferences, law of unintended consequences.
