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acteristics. Trajectories of development in other countries should serve as guidelines for such strategy. Taking into account the experience of other countries significantly reduces the risk of failure. It should be emphasized that in order to establish an effective institutional system of innovation economy it is necessary not be limited to borrowing but mostly rely on the institutional innovations that are generated in parallel with growing institutions adequately to the country's own historical experience.
Moving along the institutional trajectory is defined not only by external factors but also by the internal logic of selfdevelopment: every institution affects mass culture and human capital creating the conditions for the introduction of more efficient forms. The purpose of transitional institutions is not only to serve as “embryos” for more modern and sophisticated forms but to loosen restrictions and facilitate the introduction of effective institutions. Sometimes transitional institutions can perform both functions.
Moving along the planned institutional trajectory rarely happens automatically, so the strategy of cultivation in its pure usually is not successful. The reform strategy should not only provide for a timely change in legislation and government support for new institutions, but also a built-in system of incentives encouraging economic agents to promote or at least not hamper the planned institutional change. In the process of institutional change there is always a danger of a strong lobby that is interested in maintaining transitional institution which has been formed at some stage and preventing further changes. This may result in an institutional trap of partial reforms. An example of such a failed institution is an intermediate scale of income tax introduced in Russia in 2000. This change was supposed to help reduce the shadow activity and increase budget revenues. However, the goal was not achieved: statistics show that in subsequent years the share of income tax collected in the population's income has not changed. Moreover, the flat tax, probably contributed to the growth of inequality and certainly will hamper decrease of inequality in the future, thereby adversely affecting economic growth. However, now it is difficult to abandon it because it is advantageous for the most powerful people, including legislators.
In order to be realizable a strategy must at every stage create demand for further institutional changes by creating respective institutional expectations. Success at each stage will create trust and credibility and make possible using tools of institutional marketing, especially with regard to social institutions.
Nevertheless, even when all these conditions are met success is not guaranteed.
Transitional institutions are not perfect, and hence create opportunities for rent appropriation. It is necessary to
calculate the rate of change in order to not to, on the one hand, introduce new institutions before the easing of restrictions creates appropriate conditions, and, on the other, allow forming lobbying groups with an interest in a deviation from the institutional trajectory.
It is extremely important to create favorable expectations for the results of reforms. The solution to this problem is greatly simplified if the reform projects are created on a regular basis in accordance with certain rules and there are regular channels of discussion in expert circles, and at the grassroots level. In Japan, South Korea, the post-war France, the basis of expectations formation system, building consensus and coordinated action is the system of indicative planning. The same functions are performed by the planning system in China today. In particular, the information that the benefit that agents could get through the imperfections of a transitional institution will be reduced influences the choice of their strategies reducing the likelihood of institutional traps.
In conclusion, it should be noted that successful cultivation or import of new institutions will be implemented in the event that institutional innovation will penetrate to all levels of the institutional system, which develop at different speed, and take root in them for a long time. At the same time there should be appropriate administration of the new rules, processes of monitoring of institutional changes, information support for innovation, and learning new skills.
Thus, generation of new institutions and their implantation requires a certain time, proper use of technological, economic, organizational and managerial knowledge. At the same time it is necessary to take into account the experience of other countries and try to find solutions which could be possible to apply in Russia.
1. Гусарова Л.Ф. Развитие динамического подхода в сфере институциональных преобразований // Вестник СГСЭУ. 2004. №7.
2. Клейнер Г.Б. Эволюция институциональных систем. М., 2009.
3. Манохина Н.В. Институциональный вакуум как атрибут институциональной среды // Вестник СГСЭУ. 2008. №5.
4. Манохина Н.В. Феномен институционального вакуума: сущность, причины возникновения и диагностика // Психология и экономика. 2008. Т.1. №1 - 2.
5. Мирошниченко Н.В. Проблемы и перспективы институционального управления в условиях становления инновационной экономики // Ежегодное издание М.О.Б. Томск, 2010.
6. Нуреев Р.М. Россия: резервы институционального развития // Журнал институциональных исследований. 2009. Т.1. №1.
7. Полтерович В.М., Попов В.В. Стимулирование роста и стадии развития // Модернизация экономики и выращивание институтов. М., 2006. Кн. 1.
УДК 338.24 A. V. Fomin
FAILURE OF THE STATES: THE CAUSES AND MANIFESTATIONS
The paper states the necessity to consider various causes of establishing a failure of the state with regard to state policy resulting in inefficient outcome and fiasco states themselves and their manifestations. The author argues that it is necessary for development of their improving strategy
Key words: fiasco state, bureaucracy, agency relationship, public preferences, law of unintended consequences.
А.В. Фомин
ФИАСКО ГОСУДАРСТВА: ПРИЧИНЫ И ОСНОВНЫЕ ПРОЯВЛЕНИЯ
В статье обосновывается необходимость различать причины возникновения фиаско государства как действий государства, приводящих к неэффективному результату, и непосредственно сами фиаско государства, их основные проявления. Это является необходимым для разработки направлений их нивелирования.
Ключевые слова: фиаско государства, бюрократизм, агентские отношения, общественные предпочтения, закон непредвиденных последствий.
The theory of economics has had fundamental research of the problems related to the failure of the market, but an analysis of state failure has been left in the shadows. This is in sharp dissonance with the practical experience during the last century in different countries. Thus, Russia is constantly faced with serious failures of the state, accompanied by enormous resource losses. In the 20 - 30s of the XX century there was a grand experiment of total nationalization of the economy, in the 1990s there was shock privatization, in the beginning of this century there is a growing shadow business sector and increased corruption at all levels of management.
It should be noted that failures of state as an independent object of study became focus of research only at the beginning of the XX century. Before that they were discussed in the context of the public choice theory. The public choice theory is a branch of economic imperialism where political processes are studied using the methodology of neoclassical economic theory. The theory of failed states was created for countries with developed market economies and democracy, however, many findings are quite applicable to today's Russian reality and allow deeper understanding of the structure, functions and activities of the state as an institution of economy
The achievements of the theory of failed states should be considered in the development of economic policy: they help to understand that state is nonideal, imperfect and often inefficient and very expensive institution, which one can appeal to if there are sufficient arguments and a firm confidence in the exhaustion of market opportunities. The increasing state involvement in business and economic regulation raises new questions about the practice of government decision-making, means new challenges - adoption of laws, taxes, budget allocations, public procurement and other decisions of public authorities, which should really serve the interests of society, not separate individuals, groups and government structures themselves. If the “invisible hand” of the market does not always turn “private vices into public virtue,” then “visible hand” of the state is not always better in doing so efficiently as well. In this paper the author intends to examine the nature, causes and manifestations of failure of state, which is essential for developing ways to improve them.
State failures in the most general sense refer to a state's inability to ensure the efficient allocation of resources and compliance of socio-economic policies with the conception of justice adopted in the society. Synonymous with the term “failure” of state is the term “fiasco” of state, close but not identical in content are the categories of “flaws”, “shortcomings” and “deficiencies” of state regulation. Shortcomings of state arise because of the two main features of this
institution: the mechanism of democratic system, which actually leads to Pareto inefficiency; role of state as mediator - state bureaucracy. Deficiencies of state are not reducible to its shortcomings and characterize the actual cost of maintaining the state apparatus, development of new laws, policies, concepts, etc. The above categories are different in scale, manifestation and depth of penetration into various areas of management, as well as the implications and possibilities of their neutralization and elimination. Government failures are manifested in various spheres (political, legal, economic, sociocultural, etc.), state fiascos as a business entity and economic institution cover a specific area: economy, and in this respect they are part of the integral whole. There are other definitions of fiasco, or failure, of state as an area in which state intervention in economic life leads to a decrease in efficiency due to the distortion of pricing mechanisms and reduction of the efficiency of production resources [5, p. 34]. In fact, all the spheres of economic life where the market mechanism is a more effective regulator of economic proportions than direct government intervention are the spheres of state fiasco.
Some economists define state fiasco in terms of Pareto efficiency [1, p. 12]. Deficiency of state is the inability of the public sector to realize Pareto efficiency. Deficiency (failure) of state is the result of actions that lead to ineffective results. Inefficiency of the public sector (state) means that in this situation, which arose as a result of state action, the Pareto optimum will not be achieved, i.e., changes leading to Pareto-improvement are possible. While holding this approach in high regard, we consider it improper to refer state to public sector because public sector of economy is a set of resources at the immediate disposal of the state, but not the state itself as such.
State under certain conditions can be a neutralizer of market failures, and market, vice versa, state failures, but these offsets and compensations should not substitute government regulation for market self-regulation and vice versa, and can not completely eliminate the problem of state failure.
According to Nobel Laureate James Buchanan, the state, as well as the market, is unable to ensure effective allocation and use of public resources [2]. The approach of Buchanan and other members of the Virginia school is to consider political decisions by analogy with decisions in the sphere of economics. Political decision is a choice of alternatives. Politicians act the same way as entrepreneurs. They are guided by their private interests, such as the desire to get the most votes, to ensure maximum power and influence. In the public choice theory Buchanan proposes two main thesis or two premises of coordination of interests of the electorate and government.
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1. Reaching agreement in the framework of “political exchange” requires detailed elaboration of rules and procedures governing the adoption of laws, forms of control over finances, principles of taxation. This is the “constitution of economic policy.”
2. Practical activity of state bodies and institutions should be based on the established rules and procedures.
According to the Buchanan's approach there are the following “failures of state”:
1. Lack of necessary information for making management decisions. The problem of asymmetric information in market conditions is a problem for all businesses, and state is no exception. Government decisions are often made in the absence of reliable statistics and distortion of information already available. Consciously or not, all participants involved in the political process accept the model of rational ignorance, in which they see no need to get more information. In this regard, there are difficult challenges concerning the definition of the generation of public goods, identifying demand for government services. For example, what specializations and qualifications in the system of higher education should be prioritized, and, therefore, where to invest more money, what is the demand for health services, what amount of these services should be provided on the basis of compulsory medical insurance, for a fee, on the basis of voluntary health insurance. Determining necessary resources to ensure the defense of the country, in particular, various types of military equipment, is even more complex issue requiring a balanced and accurate assessment of external threats and interests of the state and society.
2. Problems in making political decisions. The main points related to the imperfection of political system are manipulation of votes, lobbying, logrolling, imperfect rules, etc. In general, political process can not be completely devoid of these shortcomings, so the action of state and society should aim to minimize such effects.
3. Bureaucracy. According to Buchanan, bureaucratic system is ineffective because of at least three reasons. “The evil of bureaucracy,” firstly, is manifested in the fact that it makes choice not in terms of economic value for people, but by other criteria. Second, bureaucracy creates dependent relationship between powerful people and their subordinates (Buchanan calls it “unjustifiable class distinctions.”) Third, the struggle for access to valuable assets is a wasteful use of society's resources.
4. State can not foresee all the consequences of its decisions. The problem is that often decisions lead to results different from the expected. For example, firms do not always react to the decisions taken by public authorities as expected by the government, the same applies to functioning of markets. The decisions can have long-term consequences, such as encouraging consumption through loans in the U.S. during the last 10 years has led to the building of loan and financial pyramid, which became one of the causes of the global financial crisis in 2008.
5. In the area of public goods state can not ensure efficient resource allocation and management because of the absence of “private interest” that in a widespread corruption leads to a significant increase in the cost and decrease in the quality of public goods.
Thus, state, correcting market failures, of course, is not itself immune to failure and becomes a victim of its own imperfection. Government should not replace market and
market should not fulfill functions of state. Therefore, there is a necessity in the search for new mechanisms to address the identified problems.
The problem of “fiasco” or failures of state regulation can be complemented with those issues that are particularly clearly manifested in transitional period, i.e. in mixed economic systems [4]. These are such state failures as:
- related to the operation of tax system itself. Taxes act as a kind of “fuel” moving the machinery of state. Insufficient, and especially excessive taxation, leads to negative consequences in the market, primarily through the distortion of price signals: shortage of goods, or, conversely, excessive hoarding, inflation, development of the shadow economy, etc. On the other hand, flexible use of taxes is a fine tool of macroeconomic management;
- abuse of power, the use of this tool in the interests of a narrow circle of individuals at the expense of the majority, resulting sometimes in things opposite to the goals and purposes of government regulation.
In addition to these types of failures of government intervention there is a problem of time lags as yet another case of inefficiency: deficiencies of development and implementation of economic policies that create “lag effect” both in the formation and setting of goals, decision making and in choosing tools and methods of regulation. When selecting instruments for implementing the tasks it is necessary to take into account different connection speeds and duration of each instrument of economic policy, different speed of effects. For example, certain time is needed for decision-making in any area of monetary policy - innovation, finance, etc. Solution lags are related to the duration of harmonizing decisions with relevant government bodies such as the State Duma, Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of Finance, Central Bank. Thus, time lag of decision-making in taxation and state expenditure is lasting and depends on the duration of the procedures of discussion and approval in the parliament. The Russian experience shows that time lag of decision-making regarding the development of innovation sector, promotion of innovation enterprises and the execution of decisions is very lengthy. This is evidenced by the presence of institutional and legislative vacuum related to many components of innovation, in particular the protection of intellectual property rights in line with modern realities, commercialization of national innovations and their integration into the global innovations market. All these factors of “delay effect” form the lag of differences and changes in the goals of the state and tools used for their implementation .
Note that causes of failed states are often identified with their manifestations. The following reasons of state failures in regulating economy, some of which are actually duplicated by the above manifestations of failed states (especially the 1st and 3rd paragraphs) [6], are frequently identified:
1. Disparity in ability to get information. People with high incomes are better informed than others, they create pressure groups that influence policy decisions. Getting political rent, these people maximize their profits. Such a disparity in information is due to the phenomenon called “rational ignorance”, it is avoidance of some individuals from participation in voting and elections if the benefits they receive in the event of a favorable for them outcome are lower the costs associated with participation in the voting process .
2. Dishonesty of government officials (state bureaucracy), who, pursuing their private interests, seek to get the most votes at the next election and make decisions that will help them achieve this (so-called populist decisions).
3. Incompatibility in time (the problem of internal and external lags - disparity of time horizons) of the adoption of certain decisions leading to the failure of state. Internal lag is a period of time from the emergence of an economic phenomenon or process to the adoption of relevant response by public administrations. Internal lags are divided into the following types: 1) lag of acceptance (recognition, awareness). This is an internal lag, the occurrence of which is connected with the fact that some time is needed for considering what is happening in any sphere of economic life, and 2) solution lag. This is the time between awareness of the problem and adoption of a decision. External lag is the period of time from the adoption of any measures until their results are displayed. External lags are lags of exposure. Lag of exposure is the period of time during which the object of state regulation is subject to a real transformation under the influence of government measures.
We believe it is necessary to distinguish the cause of state failures and failures themselves and their manifestations. In this context, we have a similar position with L. Khasanova, who identifies several reasons for inefficiency of state [5, p. 35 - 36]. The main reason is the very political nature of government: its universality, huge apparatus, economic power, rich arsenal of means of enforcement, permitting and forbidding character at its disposal. However, implementation of such powerful authority is executed by certain people, and this process may in practice occur legitimately and rationally as well as irrationally and forcibly Abuse of authority (use by officials of entrusted to them powers for protectionism and illegal acquisition of social benefits) and the demons of power (obsession with power, desire to address global challenges while pursuing personal selfish interests) are the real vices of state, adversely affecting government decisions. Another source of state failures and its inefficiency is in the specifics of the economic nature of its activities. Government failures occur because of imperfections in the non-market mechanism of coordinating private costs and benefits of those who make policy decisions with costs and benefits of society as a whole. State economic activity is usually expressed in the activity of state-owned enterprises and agencies related to the production of specific “non-market” products intended “to fill” the absence of market and including management services, net public goods, quasi-public goods, as well as social transfers management.
We intend to express our own opinion on the causes of state failures. At the core of state failures are objective laws, such as the law of unintended consequences and the law of large numbers. The law of unintended consequences in essence says that as a result of any action the desired result is never achieved or achieved at greater costs, there are always unintended effects in addition to those which were planned. This law reflects the tendency of government policy to have unexpected consequences along with expected, such as unemployment benefits may cause an increase in a number of unemployed people who are content with their benefits. The unintended consequences are the outcome of a particular situation, which was not expected by an actor or beyond the scope of this expectation. Unexpected results can be predicted or not, but they should
follow logically, or be a plausible result of the action. Sociologist Robert K. Merton popularized this concept in the XXth century. In his paper “The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action” (1936) Merton tried to apply systemic analysis to the problem of “unintended consequences of purposeful social action” [3]. He stressed that his term “purposive action ... is (unambiguously) interconnected with “deliberate acts” as opposed to “behavior”, i.e. it is related to an action that involves motives and consequently a choice between different alternatives” [3]. Merton also argued that “no overarching statement unambiguously confirming or refuting the practical application of any social planning is guaranteed” [3]. Robert K. Merton named five main reasons of unintended consequences:
1. Ignorance (it is impossible to anticipate all that leads to an incomplete analysis).
2. Error (incorrect analysis of problems, challenges or actions or following habits that worked in the past but may not apply to the current situation)
3. Immediate interest (tasks that can override a far-reaching strategy).
4. Basic moral principles may require or prohibit certain actions even if in the long term this will lead to an adverse outcome (these effects are delayed in time and can also lead to changes in the system of moral values).
5. Self-defeating prophecy (fear of certain consequences compels people to seek solution to the problem before it occurs, thus, if the problem does not occur it is unanticipated.
Unintended consequences can be divided into three general classes: positive and unexpected gain, which is sometimes referred to as luck; negative or false effect, which can be opposite to the expected result; potential source of problems, according to Murphy’s Law. In other words, every cause has more than one effect, and these effects will invariably include at least one unanticipated. For example, the state sets fixed prices for food products in order to fight speculation. However, these measures result in trade deficit, growth of the shadow economy, queues, etc., and that was characteristic of the command economy
The law of large numbers is the principle according to which quantitative patterns inherent in mass public events most explicitly are manifested in a sufficiently large number of observations. Individual phenomena are more susceptible to accidental and irrelevant factors than a lot of them in general. With a large number of observations random deviations are compensated. The general meaning of the law of large numbers is the combined effect of a large number of random factors leads to a result that almost does not depend on chance. With regard to market failure this law states that governmental decisions are executed if they are shared by absolute majority of subjects, serve as guidelines and as acceptable rules of the game for them and fit perfectly into their activities. Of course, this is an ideal situation, and in reality, each economic entity has its own economic interests, goals and motivation, in conformity with which they accept (partially or fully) or do not accept this or that government decisions, which are usually strictly observed by them in their own activities. The deviation in the implementation of government regulations can be different - from implicit opportunistic behavior to explicit illegitimate actions, these deviations become widespread and difficult to extinguish and eliminate. As a result there is one or another failure of the state.
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Consider the main manifestations of state failure which are the most studied in modern economics. So, as major failures of state are considered:
- The problem of identifying social preferences;
- The problem of agency relationships;
- Asymmetric information;
- The bureaucratic monopoly;
- Rent-seeking [16. 16].
One of the problems of a failed state is to identify public preferences. All individuals show a different interest in a particular social product. Acting on the basis of personal preferences, individuals tend to overestimate or underestimate the need for public goods. It is overestimated if the good is very important, the usefulness of this good for society, in this case, could even be overstated. It is underestimated when they want to pay less for this good resulting in an underestimation of this good for society. No one can be punished for incorrect information, and therefore it is difficult for the state to estimate the significance of this or that good for society and decide on the amount of its production. The solution to this problem has been offered by the Clarke tax, who proposed to identify the true public preferences by letting people say how they will benefit from this good, i.e. how much they are willing to pay for it, and thus by calculating to decide on the production of the most beneficial for the majority goods in the right quantities. But this model can not be applied in practice, since it, mainly, contradicts the criterion of balancing the costs of public good with the level of tax revenues and has a number of other practical disadvantages associated with individuals (they may form coalitions, or not be able to pay for the good etc.).
Consider the following failure of the state, which is caused by the so-called agency relationships. They exist when organization or individual (agent) act on behalf of another organization or individual (the principal). Because of asymmetric information between them, sometimes costly control over the actions of the agent by the principal, difference in their goals agency relationship is ineffective. Government democracy itself creates agency relationships within the public sector, due to the fact that government resources are in the hands of a small group of people acting on behalf of the state which is called bureaucracy. Bureaucracy concerns two failures of the state. Often, bureaucrats have better information because of their position (yet another failure of the state - asymmetric information in the public sector). Bureaucrats may use this information for their own interest, and society suffer from lack, incompleteness, or sometimes absence of information. The problem of bureaucracy is that bureaucrats have a privileged place in society (after all, someone has to execute the will of the state), but, like all individuals, they put their personal well-being above public, or often even forget that they must serve to ensure that necessary social product is available. In Russia, and indeed in most countries, this is a fairly common problem, whose solution has not been found because bureaucracy is an integral part of state power, bureaucracy distorts distribution of resources and information and forces society to bear huge losses. The actions of bureaucrats may not reflect their common interest, they can simply inflate the amount of product produced by their offices. Society and politicians may not have good knowledge of each office and do not know how much of the social product is required. This allows for overestimation
which leads to the removal deviation from the point of Pareto efficiency, overproduction and losses to society.
Another state failure is bureaucratic monopoly as an attribute of the bureaucracy, which means that bureaucrat is the only economic player, who is able to determine the scale of production of certain goods (certain public expenditures). Bureaucratic monopoly is similar to natural monopoly To reduce the power of bureaucratic monopoly state creates duplicate, opposing offices, but then society suffers losses due to the maintenance of the backup system and making bad decisions by these offices. Here it is worth mentioning the model of budget maximizing of Niskanen, who proves the possibility of excessive funding of the office caused by asymmetric information existing between the bureau and the agency that allocates funding. This is an exaggerated model, since the bureau does not always have monopoly on the information and not all government officials are aiming to inflate the budget.
To solve contradictions between principal and agent and reduce the losses to society, state can take certain measures to improve agency relationships. These measures include: improving incentives for civil servants, raising awareness of principals; changing preferences of public servants.
One more failure of the state is rent seeking, which is investing in order to obtain benefits, providing rent. Rent-seeking is the cause of bureaucratic monopoly, it occurs due to asymmetric information and agency relationships in the public sector Rent-seeking involves the following costs: costs of obtaining privileges, losses to society because of monopoly granted to interest groups and firms by bureaucrats. Rent-seeking is conducted by the so-called special interest groups - individuals for whom certain activities bring inadequate one-way increment of utility at the expense of losses to society. Instrument of influence of such groups is lobbying, lobbying is an attempt to impose one's position views on society, a desire to present it in the most favorable light and to attract politicians and government officials. There is also a phenomenon of logrolling, which is exchange of votes for favorable decision packages by certain political groups.
Also, there is a failure of the state which is the gap between costs and revenues: excessive and rising costs. Markets link, though imperfectly, the cost of an activity with earned income which ensures that activity. This connection is realized through the prices that consumers pay who have a choice to buy a product or not and if you buy, what product and how much. Non-market activity is devoid of such a link, as revenues generated by it come from “nonprice source” mostly from the state treasury. Thus, there is a kind of “wall” between the real value of non-market services of the state and the costs of their maintenance. After all, consumer is involved in determining their amount and structure rather indirectly through political mechanism weighed down by many imperfections. The gap between costs and revenues means that the likelihood of inefficient allocation of resources increases dramatically. Where revenues ensuring activities do not depend on the cost of its maintenance, more resources than necessary can be allocated for production, or more than required will be produced (for example, the state can provide more control than necessary to compensate for market failures).
As a result, in the production of non-market products, whether regulation, management of transfer payments or
production of public goods, there is a strong and irresistible tendency for excessive costs, or, in other words, the X-inefficiency. Nonmarket production is executed in the framework of numerous production possibilities. If there are technological opportunities to reduce costs, increase productivity, or apply economy of scale effect, then these opportunities will be ignored or, at best, not utilized to the fullest. Changes bring the extra trouble, costs of inaction are absent or extremely small, and the possible gain from implementation of changes is very uncertain. At the same time in non-market production there is also a tendency for increasing excessive costs over time. Those who make decisions in a market economy, have incentives to reduce costs over time due to actual or potential competition or because of opportunities to gain additional profit. In contrast, those responsible for non-market production may have incentives to increase costs (eg, state officials) or to increase output, despite the fact that marginal costs are higher than marginal revenue. Cost function in non-market production is not only higher than the minimum possible, but tends to move up over time. It shows not only the X-inefficiency, but also dynamic inefficiency of non-market production.
We believe that one of the major failures of state is permanently reproducible monopoly of the state institutions on the production of public goods such as defense, maintaining law and order, free education and healthcare, control of environmental pollution, etc., which ensures privileges and accessibility to these benefits for members of the state apparatus, asymmetry (polarization) in the consumption of these goods in comparison with other eco-
nomic entities. The state as an institutionalized entity on capacity behalf of the state apparatus has advantages in the transformation of public goods in private, such as services of state institutions, the results of functioning of social infrastructure (availability of special medical care), access to various resources (information, intellectual).
Thus, the failures of the state are manifested in various spheres (political, legislative, economic, sociocultural, etc.). The failures of the state are inseparable from all activities of the state. Failures of states as business entities and economic institutions involved in a specific area of operation are a part of a bigger set of state failures. It is necessary to distinguish causes of the failures of the state and state failures themselves, their manifestations, which is essential for the development of the ways to neutralize them.
1. Архипова О.В. Анализ провалов государства и провалов рынка в сравнительной форме // Вестник Челябинского государственного университета. 2010. № 27 (208).Экономика. Вып. 29.
2. Бьюкенен Дж. Сочинения /пер. с англ.; гл.ред.кол. P.M. Нуреев . M., 1997.
3. Мертон P.K. Социальная теория и социальная структура. M., 200б.
4. Степанова B.C. Роль государства в экономике современного общества // Сборник научных трудов Северо-Кавказского государственного технического университета. Сер. «Экономика». Ставрополь, 2002.
б. Хасанова Л.В. Провалы государства и проблема эффективности государственного регулирования // Вестник КРСУ. 2008. Т. 8. № 1.
б. URL: http://www.academy35.ru/answers.php?id=9006.
удк 330.33.01 S.Ye. Hodorov
FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008 - 2010 AS A PHASE OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CYCLE
The paper considers modern financial and economic crisis in a global aspect. Global character of the economic crisis is manifested in all levels of the world economic system - cross-border, country specific, regional, municipal, corporate, households and personal. In the context of globalisation international financial stability becomes the major public good which is beyond the national goals and interests. Therefore, it is necessary to put joint efforts in developing common understanding of advantages and dangers of integration.
Key words: financial and economic crisis, globalisation, integration, financial bubbles.
C.E. Xodopoe
ФИНАНСОВЫЙ КРИЗИС 2008 - 2010 годов КАК ФАЗА ГЛОБАЛЬНОГО НИКЛА
В статье рассматривается современный финансово-экономический кризис в глобальном аспекте. Глобальность экономического кризиса указывает на его охват всех уровней мирохозяйственной системы - межстрано-вый, страновый, региональный, муниципальный, корпоративный, домохозяйств и непосредственно человека. В условиях глобализации международная финансовая стабильность становится важнейшим общественным благом, выходящим за рамки национальных целей и интересов. Поэтому необходимо совместными усилиями выработать общее понимание достоинств и опасностей интеграции.
Ключевые слова: финансово-экономический кризис, глобализация, интеграция, финансовые пузыри.
Modern economic and financial crisis is linked to the bal character of the economic crisis is manifested in all
transition from resource-based economy to knowledge- levels of the world economic system - cross-border, counbased economy Researchers describe it as global as it try specific, regional, municipal, corporate, households
is caused by the globalization of world economy The glo- and personal.
