CC BY-NC
45INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY OF POST-SOVIET UNRECOGNIZED STATES*
**
Vladimir Kolosov
Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences
ORCID: 0000-0003-2817-9463
© V.Kolosov, 2022
DOI: 10.20542/2307-1494-2022-1 -67-91
Abstract The article studies internal and external sovereignty of unrecognized or partially recognized post-Soviet states through the use of empirical analysis of quantitative data and critical analysis of subjective factors. It analyzes statistical and other information that reflects the demographic and socio-economic situation, foreign economic relations of such entities, and their impact on neighboring countries and regions. This is combined with the critical study of public opinions and popular identities based on surveys and 13 focus groups conducted in the fall of 2020 in Transnistria and Abkhazia. In all post-Soviet de facto states, the population has noticeably decreased (except for Nagorno-Karabakh before the 2020 war). The reason for the outflow of residents was the inability of such entities to provide citizens with decent incomes and their poor performance in economic competition with neighboring countries and regions, reflected in the dynamics of the key indicators per capita in terms of purchasing power parity. However, the economic and demographic situation cannot explain the sustainability of such entities. Strong political identity of citizens and their loyalty to the ruling regimes serve as the main basis for, and essential elements of, internal sovereignty. Participants of surveys highly value independence. They believe that it presumes economic independence, improved well-being, and the development of full-fledged international relations that helps to strengthen external sovereignty. Some respondents expressed disappointment with the fact that these goals have not been achieved in the course of 30 years. The geopolitical vision of the world by residents of post-Soviet de facto states is "Russia-centric", although Russia is far from being idealized. In conclusion, the risks that Russia faces in connection with post-Soviet de facto states and with Moscow's involvement in the respective conflicts are assessed.
Keywords post-Soviet unrecognized republics, de facto states, internal sovereignty, external sovereignty, identity, risks for Russia
*
The publication summarizes some of the results of the Russian Science Foundation's project No. 19-17-00232 "Post-Soviet unrecognized states: viability factors and risks for Russia" that was hosted by the Institute of Geography of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2019-2021. Project participants included S.V.Golunov, A.A.Gritsenko, M.V.Zotova, M.S.Karpenko, N.L.Turov, and A.V.Sheludkov. A.V.Crivenco (Tiraspol) and N.V.Bagapsh (Sukhum) were also involved in certain stages of the work. The author expresses his deep gratitude
to them for their cooperation and for shared ideas.
**
Vladimir Kolosov is Deputy Director and Head of the Center of Geopolitical Studies of the Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences.
Колосов Владимир Александрович - заместитель директора и руководитель Центра геополитических исследований Института географии РАН.
Название Внутренний и внешний суверенитет постсоветских непризнанных государств
статьи
Аннотация В статье внутренний и внешний суверенитет непризнанных или частично признанных постсоветских государств исследуется с помощью эмпирического анализа количественных данных и критического анализа субъективных факторов. В ней анализируется статистическая и другая информация, которая отражает демографическую и социально-экономическую ситуацию в таких де-факто государствах, их внешнеэкономические связи, а также их влияние на соседние страны и регионы. Также предпринят критический анализ общественного мнения и идентичностей на основе социологических опросов и исследований 13 фокус-групп, проведенных в Приднестровье и Абхазии в конце 2020 г. Во всех постсоветских де-факто государствах (за исключением Нагорного Карабаха вплоть до войны 2020 г.) наблюдалось значительное сокращение населения. Причиной его оттока стала неспособность этих образований обеспечить своих граждан приемлемым уровнем доходов и успешно конкурировать в экономической сфере с соседними странами и регионами, что отражено в динамике ключевых индикаторов в расчете на душу населения с учетом паритета покупательной способности. Однако, опираясь лишь на экономические и демографические показатели, невозможно объяснить устойчивость и жизнеспособность таких непризнанных или частично признанных республик. Основой и ключевыми составляющими их внутреннего суверенитета служит сильная политическая идентичность их граждан в сочетании с лояльностью правящим режимам. Результаты проведенных опросов показывают, что их участники высоко ценят независимость своих республик. Она, по их мнению, предполагает экономическую независимость, растущее благосостояние и развитие полноценных международных контактов, которые должны способствовать укреплению внешнего суверенитета. Некоторые респонденты выражали свое разочарование тем, что эти цели так и не были достигнуты за более чем 30 лет. Геополитическое мировоззрение жителей постсоветских де-факто государств является россиецентричным, хотя Россия ими отнюдь не идеализируется. В заключении проведена оценка тех рисков, которые стоят перед Россией в связи с проблемами постсоветских де-факто государств и вовлечением Москвы в соответствующие конфликты.
Ключевые постсоветские непризнанные республики, де-факто государства, внутренний
слова суверенитет, внешний суверенитет, идентичность, риски для России
I. Introduction
The formation of new states through secession is a long and often painful process with an unclear result. Nevertheless, the number of states in the world is slowly but steadily increasing: in 1991, there were 166 United Nations member-states, and now there are already 193. In the course of 30 years since 1991, secessionist movements of different degree of activity, distinguished by specific processes of their genesis, operated in 75 countries.1 In many states, powerful political movements are seeking broader autonomy for their regions. The fragmentation of the political space will undoubtedly continue at different territorial levels of states, their regions and other territories.
The reason for the emergence of uncontrolled territories (UT) is most often an acute ethnic conflict that leads to a civil war, in which foreign powers are often involved. An important factor is economic interests of those local leaders, who appeal to ethno-
cultural identities and claims for social and territorial justice. In theoretical terms, the emergence of UT is a result of the selectivity of the globalization processes. These processes deepen contrasts between countries and regions and affect the interplay of integration and disintegration trends in the political space. This, in turn, actualizes and increases the role of borders as either barriers, or sites of contact, prompting debordering or re-bordering processes. The fragmentation of political spaces is facilitated by the uncertainty of the prospects of individual countries and regions, social and political turbulence, asymmetric and asynchronic development of neighboring territories, mass frustrations, and identity crises. Forced obedience to international norms and rules, imposed by the world's most powerful players, causes protests in many countries and regions. Diverse and far-reaching social transformations are associated with the intensified territorial mobility of citizens. As a result of international migration processes, the boundaries of cultural and everyday life experiences of people become increasingly blurred, and the collective memory of the former territorial communities is losing its unity and integrity.2
Millions of people marginalized by the existing territorial division of labor and ousted of the modern economy by rapid technological progress are extremely dissatisfied with their situation. Toughened "negative" identities, based on opposing oneself to "the Other" (who is usually represented by a neighboring ethnic or cultural community or by a neighboring country), create the grounds for irreconcilable conflicts. In such cases, old, "sleeping" identities are resurrected or new identities are constructed and acquire their political subjectivity. Attempts are being made to reinterpret, reconstruct, and politicize common history, cultivate a victim complex, real and imaginary historical grievances, and pursue aggressive "politics of memory". Political discourses become increasingly emotional and "catastrophic" that often leads to political-territorial splits (for example, in Ukraine).
The unsettled status of those six polities that emerged in the post-Soviet space in close proximity to the borders of Russia poses both political risks and threats to international security. This is clearly manifested in a series of event leading to Russia's recognition of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics (DNR and LNR)3 and in the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine that began in February 2022. Since these two republics are not recognized by any other country, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia are recognized by just a handful of states, these entities are referred to as "unrecognized states". The objective of this article is to consider the changes in their internal and external sovereignty since the beginning of their de facto independence.
II. Measuring internal and external sovereignty
The viability of a modern state is determined by four key characteristics: first, the internal legitimacy of the regime (the loyalty of citizens) and, consequently, the control of its territory and the monopoly on violence; second, external legal status (recognition); third, the ability to perform basic functions (ensure the security of citizens, form an economic space, collect and distribute tax revenues through the budget, guarantee a certain set of public services etc.); fourth, the ability to build institutions for representing various interests and mediating between civil society and the government.
Most scholars separate internal and external vitality factors that contribute to strengthened or, conversely, weakened internal and external sovereignty. At the same time, this division is conditional. Some factors (for example, the involvement of a patron state) may simultaneously contribute to strengthening of both internal and external
sovereignty. Also, internal sovereignty can be converted into the external one and vice versa.4
Considering the viability of unrecognized states, some authors focus on the international context and material factors - first of all, on the military, political and economic support by an external patron. This support usually determines geopolitical orientation of the new states and lack of alternatives for this orientation. Support by a patron state plays a crucial role in the viability of the post-Soviet de facto states, whose residents, especially ones from the poorest segments of the population, see Russia as the main source of economic assistance, investment, and the destination for out-migration.5 Other authors point to strong civic identities in unrecognized states. Indeed, most citizens of such republics are ready to make tangible sacrifices for the sake of de facto independence, categorically rejecting re-integration to their parent states. The high level of support for the nationalist elites in some cases can be also explained by increased ethnic homogeneity. Some scholars argue that ethnic self-identification, especially pride in one's own ethnicity and adherence to linguistic and religious practices, correlate well to citizens' approval of their government's policies and to their faith in the favorable prospects for their republic.6 The third group of researchers, noting the importance of identities, focuses on those common experiences that solidify these identities and on specific identities and collective traumas, experienced by the inhabitants of the unrecognized republics as a result of prolonged armed conflicts with parent states. This factor is widely exploited by local elites in constructing their "politics of memory" that impede re-establishment of relations with parent states.7 Finally, some scholars concentrate on local political cultures, contradictions between clans that represent different territorial, ethnic and socio-professional groups of the population, interactions between leaders and citizens, and mechanisms for building consensus on fundamental issues.8
Many authors also argue that external sovereignty depends on the economic self-sufficiency of unrecognized states, the degree of their dependence on a patron state and of diversification of their foreign economic relations, participation in international political contacts and other forms of interaction with the outside world, and the geopolitical picture of the world in the minds of their citizens.
An important sign of the internal legitimacy and viability of unrecognized states is democratization of their domestic politics and increased compliance with normative criteria.9 Mobilization of citizens in the face of an external threat inevitably weakens over time. This threat usually emanates from a parent state that is trying to return a breakaway region to its bosom either with the help of military force, or through an economic blockade, sanctions, and other restrictive measures. The entities' authorities are then forced to seek the support of citizens in elections, which are not necessarily of a formal nature.10 Glorification of the combatants for independence cannot remain the main ideological instrument for such regimes forever, so the authorities are forced to look for a replacement for historical and other identity markers and for ways to diversify external relations and informal diplomacy, while carefully distancing themselves from an external patron.11
This study relies on two key approaches: empirical analysis of data and critical analysis of subjective factors. The first approach focuses on analyzing statistical and other information that reflects the demographic and socio-economic situation in unrecognized states, their foreign economic relations, and the impact on neighboring countries and regions. The critical approach involves an analysis of political discourses, public opinion, practices and moods of people, identity and institutions that create the
foundations of statebuilding and legitimate governance, and the respective entities' ability to maintain internal integrity and exercise sustainable control over the territory.
In order to collect primary information about the post-Soviet unrecognized states, several expeditions were organized to Moldova and Transnistria (the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic / PMR), Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR), the Republic of South Ossetia (RSO) and the Russian regions bordering de facto republics -the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and the Rostov Region. During these trips, about 100 expert and in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted. Informants included: (1) heads of Russian diplomatic missions; (2) officials of parent states, unrecognized republics, and Russian border regions: members of governments, ministers, parliamentarians, heads of regional and municipal administrations; (3) reputable scientists, journalists, employees of museums and other cultural institutions; (4) heads of NGOs; (5) entrepreneurs; (6) civic activists and ordinary residents.
Large amounts of relevant official statistical data for 2009-2019 were collected to analyze the demographic processes, socio-economic conditions and foreign trade of unrecognized states, and their cross-border disparities with parent states and neighboring territories, including border regions of Russia. Gaps in and unreliability of much of the statistical data, especially for the LNR and DNR, made it necessary to find alternative ways to assess demographic and socio-economic changes.
In the fall of 2020, seven focus groups were held in Abkhazia and six in Transnistria. Recruitment and moderation were carried out by professional sociologists from the Center for Social and Marketing Research (Krasnodar) and the Renaissance Agency (Tiraspol). The scenarios (guide) for the focus groups were developed by the project participants and accounted for specific features of the researched regions and the need to compare the data obtained. The questions of the guide were related to the daily life of the population, the frequency and directions of and motives for traveling outside the republics, family and other ties with foreign countries, the value of independence, and attitudes towards the respective patron state, Russia, and other international players. The composition of focus groups was based on the criteria that marked differences in social attitudes, according to the results of mass surveys of 2009-2010 and 2014: gender, age, ethnicity, and place of residence of the respondents. These selection criteria made it possible to compare between the opinions of those who were socialized mainly after the collapse of the Soviet Union and those who were socialized during the Soviet era; to compare opinions of representatives of the key ethnic groups (e. g. the Abkhazians, Mingrelians, and Armenians in Abkhazia and the Russians, Ukrainians, and Moldovans in Transnistria) and of gender groups (men and women). Opinions of residents of different regions were also compared. For Abkhazia, the selected regions were Sukhum(i), relatively prosperous "tourist" north-western regions and "poor" southeastern regions. For Transnistria, the distinction was made for respondents from the cities of Tiraspol, Rybnitsa, Dubossary, and Bendery; the latter is located on the right ("Moldovan") bank of the Dniester and has close connections to Chisinau.
Considering specific indicators of internal sovereignty and stability of unrecognized states, and viability of their claims, one can mention, first, the ability to "keep" one's population, reflected in the dynamics of its numbers and migration. The population dynamics has a noticeable effect on internal political situation and internal sovereignty of unrecognized states. The mobility of their citizens and the frequency of their trips to Russia (the patron state for all post-Soviet de facto states but Nagorno-Karabakh), as well as to the parent state and other countries, soften the situation on the labor market. These trips have a significant impact on daily life and residents' attitudes towards the domestic economic and political situation. Second, shifts in the structure of a domestic
economy, the correlation between modernization and archaization processes, and resources for and contrasts of internal development are important. Finally, internal sovereignty is determined by the value of independence from the perspective of citizens, their identities, popular attitudes to political institutions, the level of support for the ruling regime, and the representation of different ethnic groups in legislative and executive institutions.12
III. Is population dynamics a mirror of internal sovereignty?
Depopulation distorts the sex and age structure, causes further reduction in the birth rate and an increase in mortality, and changes the socio-professional and ethnic composition of the population. The outflow of the working age people compromises the institution of the family, accelerates the demographic and economic crises. Coupled with economic factors, depopulation and intensive external migration undermine the domestic legitimacy of political regimes, promote social stratification, and have a demonstrative effect by prompting residents to compare living conditions in their own country with those in potential migration recipient countries.
In Transnistria, the population has declined as a result of demographic losses caused by natural reasons and emigration. Demographic crisis in Transnistria is more pronounced than the one in Moldova. Demographic losses resulting from natural decline in the intercensal period (2004-2014 for Moldova and 2004-2015 for the PMR) amounted to 31800 people in the PMR and in 29700 in Moldova. The difference, however, can be partially explained by a higher share of urban population in the PMR as compared to Moldova (70 vs. 38 percent): in rural areas the birth rate is higher. Still, the calculation of migration losses for the intercensal period shows that while, in 2004-2014, the migration outflow from Moldova was more active, later, the exodus of the working age population from the PMR accelerated. Every year, about a quarter of its economically active population travels abroad to obtain jobs (75-80 percent go to Russia). Almost 200 thousand residents of the PMR acquired the Russian citizenship. The outflow of a qualified, young and active part of the population worsens the structure and quality of labor resources. However, in 2017-2019, for the first time in years, a small positive migration balance was recorded in the PMR. Relatively low housing prices and cheaper public services make Transnistrian cities attractive to some residents of Moldova, primarily pensioners.13
In Abkhazia, the collapse of the USSR and the conflict with Georgia dramatically intensified migration processes, which became a key factor in cardinal changes in the ethnic composition of the Abkhazian population. Most of the Kartvelian community emigrated to the mainland Georgia and Russia, with the exception of the inhabitants of the historical Samurzakan (Gal(i) district within the pre-1994 borders) who subsequently returned to their homes. During the war, a significant part of other communities left Abkhazia. As a result, according to official data, the Abkhazians again became the majority of Abkhazia's population, for the first time in many years. According to the 2011 census, the Abkhazians made 50.8 percent, Georgians 19.3 percent, Armenians 17.4 percent, and Russians and Ukrainians - 9.9 percent of the Abkhazia's population. The highly diverse ethnic mosaic and compact settlement of ethnic groups remain hallmarks of the republic, and the success of statebuilding heavily depends on the interethnic harmony. It is threatened, first of all, by the uncertainty of Abkhazia's policy towards the Mingrelian population.
In South Ossetia, as in Abkhazia, the outflow of residents during the critical phase of the conflict with Georgia in 1991-1992 led to a sharp decline in population.
Deformation of the age and sex structures, difficult socio-economic and living conditions, and lack of medical care contributed to a dramatic decrease in the birth rate and an increase in mortality. According to optimistic estimates by Office of State Statistics of the Republic of South Ossetia, in the 1990s, the average natural decline accounted for -0.8 percent / year. The postwar reconstruction contributed to the return of some refugees, improved demographic indicators, and made possible population growth up to 57000 people (2019). However, sustainable natural growth has only been observed in Tskhinval(i), while the remaining areas have still been losing population.14 The growing inflow of the population is partly explained by the increase in the number of Russian military personnel and their family members who are also registered as residents if they stay for more than 11 months. The conflict with Georgia led to major changes in the ethnic composition of the South Ossetian population. In 1989, the Georgians accounted for 29 percent of the population of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region (the Ossetians - for 66.2 percent). By 2015, the share of the Georgians in RSO declined to 7.4 percent, while the share of the Ossetians increased to 89.9 percent. Areas that, in 1991-2008, were under South Ossetia's control lost from 50 to 98 percent of the Georgian population. Nowadays, the proportion of the Georgians is the highest in the Znaur(i) district (9.5 percent) and especially in the Leningorsky (Akhalgor(i)) district (55 percent) that until August 2008 was controlled by the Georgian authorities.15
By the May 1994 ceasefire agreement, the number of residents of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) had decreased by almost 50000 compared to 1989. Such a decrease was the result of losses in the war with Azerbaijan and of the "population exchange" with it. Almost all Azerbaijanis were forced to leave the NKR. At the same time, 30-40 thousand Armenian refugees from Baku and other cities of Azerbaijan came to the unrecognized republic. As a result, the population of Artsakh became ethnically homogeneous (with ethnic Armenians accounting for over 99 percent). The republic's demographic situation was stable and favorable. Since the late 1990s, the birth rate was kept at the level of 15-20, the death rate - at 8-9, and the natural increase - at 7-10 per thousand inhabitants. The number of labor migrants (about 4000) was relatively small. As of January 1, 2019, 148000 inhabitants lived in the NKR.16 Following the 40-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020, the republic lost a sizeable portion of its territory. The Minister of Labor and Social Affairs of Nagorno-Karabakh assessed the population of the republic at about 120000 (which seems to be an exaggeration). The extreme precariousness of the current situation is causing further population outflow.17
It is extremely difficult to assess the demographic dynamics of the DNR and LNR. According to official data, at the end of 2020, the permanent population of the DNR was 2247 thousand people (only 6.3 percent fewer than before the conflict), and of the LNR -1431 thousand (9 percent fewer). These data are based on the extrapolation of the 2001 All-Ukrainian Population Census and account for the natural and migration movement, according to the information provided by the Civil Registry Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Ukrainian statistics calculates the number of resident population using a similar methodology and provides similar figures: 2245 thousand people in the areas of the Donetsk region not controlled by Kyiv and 1440 thousand people - in uncontrolled areas of the Lugansk region. The results of the census, conducted in two republics in October 2019, should have brought some clarity to this question, but they were never published. In the current situation, the estimation of the size of the population actually living on the territory of the LNR and DNR is possible only by indirect methods and/or expert assessments, including those made on the basis of changes in the night illumination of the territory, estimated from satellite imagery, which highly correlates with the populations numbers. The fall in illumination has affected not only Lugansk,
Gorlovka, Debaltsevo, and the northwestern outskirts of the Donetsk agglomeration, but also the interior districts of the DNR and LNR. After a slight recovery growth, night illumination stabilized in April 2016 at 40-50 percent of prewar levels for the LNR and at 50-60 percent - for the DNR.
Due to the fact that a significant part of the populations of the DNR and the LNR works on a rotational basis in neighboring countries while regularly returning to their homelands, it is impossible to single out the most reliable estimate of the number of inhabitants permanently residing in the republics. Rather, it is possible to provide estimates of a wide range. Thus, the population of the republics ranges from 1.6 million to 3.3 million people (from 0.93 million to 2.012 million inhabitants in the DNR and from 0.686 million to 1.285 million in the LNR). The study of satellite images of night illumination allows us to slightly correct this range for 2019 to 1.45 million - 1.99 million (according to calculations made by A.V.Sheludkov).
The reduction of the population of unrecognized states can be interpreted as the fact that the people are "voting with their feet". However, the relative stability of most of such entities suggests that strong internal sovereignty can be maintained independently from the outflow of residents.
IV. Economic competition with neighboring countries and regions
The internal sovereignty of unrecognized states to a large extent depends on their capacity to provide the population with jobs, decent incomes and public services: these are conditions for such an entity to compete successfully with a parent state for the loyalty of its population. The post-Soviet de facto states have experienced serious economic problems, caused not only by the lack of political status (that narrowed the range of opportunities for foreign economic and financial activities), but also by limited internal resources. Post-Soviet unrecognized states are small and can be called "microstates". Due to the small size of the domestic market, they cannot have a wide range of economic sectors. Also, their economies have suffered greatly from the crisis of transition to the market economy, consequences of armed conflicts, and isolation. These economies are distinguished by large external debts and state budget deficits; their trade flows face logistic difficulties and problems of transit; substantial parts of their GDPs are formed by loans and transfers by labor migrants from abroad. The forced use of complex logistical and financial schemes in foreign trade, corruption, the merge of government and business, and the clan struggle strongly affect unrecognized states' economies. Their budgets are critically dependent on financial receipts from a patron state, which, as a rule, covers substantially more than a half of expenditures. Support from a patron state can take various forms, including payments of pensions and benefits, investment programs, supplies of fuel and raw materials at preferential prices, and mediation in external relations. In many cases, a patron state supplements with its institutions, resources, and infrastructures those areas in which de facto statebuilding was not completed due to a lack of resources (e. g., border and customs control, the monetary and financial system, communications, elements of the healthcare system etc.). Integration with the patron and delegating some state functions to it strengthen the defense potential of an unrecognized state and increases its ability to control external borders and satisfy the basic needs of the population. The flip side is growing economic and political dependence on the patron, up to the movement towards full incorporation.
The main result of economic transformation processes in unrecognized states was deindustrialization accompanied by simplification of the structure of the economy and exports. However, with the help of patron states, such entities managed to restore or
establish production in some industries and at leading enterprises. Despite occasional successes, in terms of GDP per capita (corrected by purchasing power parity and per capita industrial output), post-Soviet de facto states lag behind not only the parent, patron, and other neighboring countries, but also their peripheral border regions.
The PMR's economy was strongly affected by the sharp contraction of the domestic market after the collapse of the USSR, crises in its relations with Moldova, and numerous political restrictions. Transnistrian producers are forced to go through customs clearance twice in the PMR and Moldova, often sending their goods for export in a roundabout way. Unsettled relations with Moldova make the PMR of unattractive to external investors. The PMR cannot borrow funds from international organizations, so many of its fixed assets have become morally and physically obsolete. Transnistrian enterprises are not able to open correspondent accounts in foreign banks.
These conditions manifested themselves in signs of crisis in the Transnistrian economy and society. They included the extreme instability of macroeconomic indicators, state budget deficit (that fluctuated from 20 to 40 percent of the PMR's expenditures in the 2010s), formation of part of the GDP through borrowing and remittances from migrants, and large external debt that is several times higher than the GDP. The share of material production in the structure of value added decreased from 60-64 percent in the 1990s to 30-35 percent in 2010-2017. Industry remains the most important sector of the economy, but its contribution to GDP decreased from 64 percent in 1996 to 31 percent in 2017. It is dominated by low value-added industries for which there are no competitive advantages in the region: ferrous metallurgy, thermal power, and textile industry. The structure of the economy and exports has become simplified and the production of a number of goods has been lost. The weak development of small and medium-sized businesses and the dependence of large enterprises on external supplies and markets in difficult geopolitical conditions have exposed 60-70 percent of industrial production to high risk. Nevertheless, positive changes have also taken place in the industry: labor productivity has increased while resource intensity has decreased.18
Paradoxically, a region with favorable agro-climatic conditions imports more food than it exports. The production of crops with low added value prevails. The share of cereals in the sown area is 55-60 percent, industrial crops - 35-40 percent, while the share of orchards and vineyards is negligible.
Despite the fact that the PMR has a small territory, there are sharp contrasts between its urban and rural areas, especially between the Tiraspol-Bendery agglomeration and the agrarian north. About 60 percent of industrial production is concentrated in the metropolitan agglomeration, including the city of Dnestrovsk where Moldavskaya power station is located. Another 34 percent is accounted for Rybnitsa.
The economic prospects of the PMR are limited by the small size of its domestic market making the economy dependent on external conditions. However, the decisive factor now is the PMR's complicated relations with Moldova that has finally chosen the path of integration with the West and even more tense relations with Ukraine whose leadership is afraid of opening a "second front" by Transnistria. The basis of social stability in the republic is reduced prices for Russian gas and pensions and benefits paid to those residents who have the Russian citizenship. As a result, Transnistria, formerly the most developed part of the Soviet Moldova, lost its advantage over the parent state.
Armed conflict with Georgia, long-term economic blockade, and sharp population decline have had a decisive influence on the current state of the economy of Abkhazia. The results included degradation of its production potential and the simplification of the sectoral economic structure. The economy of Abkhazia is dominated by a service sector, which is partly due to the great importance of the resort and tourist complex that receives
over a million tourists per year, almost exclusively from Russia.19 Wholesale and retail trade account for about 40 percent of GDP, public services (administration, education, healthcare etc.) - for 22 percent, and transport and communications - for 7 percent.
The share of industry in the Abkhazian economy is 12 percent. The process of reindustrialization began after 2008, when growing tourist flow from Russia contributed to a strong demand for food industry products, primarily wine-making ("Wines and Drinks of Abkhazia LLC") and brewing. Thanks to the Russian investments, it was possible to modernize some old industrial plants (Sukhum(i) hydroelectric power station and brewery) and to build some new plants, producing polymer pipes ("Sukhum(i)", pasta "Bzyb"), and other items. The construction of facilities for the Sochi Olympics drove production of building materials.
Hydropower has played an important role since Soviet times. The Inguri hydroelectric power station (1300 MW) on the border of Abkhazia and Georgia is jointly operated by them. The low cost of electricity has become an incentive for the emergence of mining farms for the production of cryptocurrencies. However, the energy sector has been in a state of crisis due to depreciation of fixed assets.
The development of agriculture (that accounts for 3.3 percent of GDP) is largely determined by demand from Russia. The key industry is crop production (cultivation of citrus, feijoa, persimmon, and grapes). 85 percent of gross agricultural output is produced in small subsidiary plots. The lack of cooperation causes local crises of overproduction.
In the recent years, the Russian aid, including subsidies and an investment program, accounted for 50-60 percent of the state budget revenues. The main funds are directed to the revitalization of the social sector, infrastructure, and the energy sector. However, the effectiveness of distributing the aid has declined. There is a noticeable decrease in the growth rates of the main socio-economic indicators and, most importantly, in real per capita incomes. The leadership of the republic has not yet been able to reduce the shadow economy (which is estimated at about half of GDP), to protect investors from hostile takeovers and criminals, and to solve the problems of infrastructure renewal that is negatively affected by the lack of investments.20
The economy of South Ossetia also experienced dramatic consequences of the collapse of the USSR, the hostilities of the 1990s and 2000s, and the economic blockade. In the 1990s, all industrial plants and social and transport infrastructures were destroyed. Timid attempts at postwar reconstruction were interrupted by armed conflicts in 2004 and 2008. The revival of the South Ossetian economy was facilitated by large-scale aid programs by Russia, launched after Moscow recognized the republic in 2008. As in the case of Abkhazia, as a result, a structurally weak economy has emerged, with its key sectors dependent on state demand and investment. Public administration and social spending account for 70 percent of the South Ossetian GDP, while industry and construction account for just 14 percent. Reindustrialization has become a new trend: old food industry enterprises have been modernized (e. g., the "Bagiat" mineral water plant) and the new ones (such as the "Ironsan" winery and the "Naturplant" bottling plant) have been built, and a woodworking plant is being restored. The activities of the main plants of the Soviet era ("Emalprovod", "Elektrovibromashina") that produce non-core products have been partially resumed. Yet the main project that has changed the structure of the industry was the restoration of clothing production at the former Tskhinvali underwear knitwear factory ("BTK-4") in 2013. In 2017, it accounted for 70 percent of the republic's industrial production. The export potential of agriculture is extremely limited.21
The aid from Russia plays a decisive role in the viability of South Ossetia. In 2019, Russian subsidies (7.4 billion rubles) provided 84.2 percent of the revenues of the
republic's budget. Additional 4.5 billion rubles were allocated for 2020-2022 as part of the Investment Program for the Promotion of the Social and Economic Development of the Republic of South Ossetia. Authorities believe that the prospects for increasing economic self-sufficiency are related to the development of the agro-industrial complex and tourism. The lack of investment, as well as customs and phytosanitary barriers on the border with Russia, are seen as the main obstacles for development of the national economy.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are comparable in terms of per capita GDP at purchasing power parity, but they are 4-5 times inferior to the per capita GDP of Russia, 2-3 times - of the GDP of Georgia, and 1.3-3.2 times (Abkhazia) and 1.6-4.1 times (South Ossetia) inferior to the GDPs of these states' adjacent regions. In terms of retail trade (an indirect indicator of the standard of living), Abkhazia lags far (2-3.5 times) behind neighboring Russian and 1.5 times behind adjacent Georgian regions, despite periodically growing demand in the tourist season. South Ossetia is 5-10 times behind adjacent Russian and Georgian regions. This can be attributed to the poverty of the local population that largely survives thanks to the Russian aid. Despite the recovery of their economies after the recognition by Russia, the industrial potentials of the two entities remain weak. Abkhazia and South Ossetia still lag noticeably behind the neighboring regions of Georgia and Russia in terms of industrial production (on average, 3-5 times). Due to the growth of its exports to Russia, in terms of per capita agricultural production Abkhazia is comparable to the neighboring republics of the North Caucasus and to the adjacent regions of Georgia.
Lagging behind Abkhazia in terms of economic development, RSO is ahead of it by 40 percent in terms of official average wages, due to larger Russian financial injections, the high proportion of people employed in the public sector, and contracts performed by construction organizations under the Russian investment program. Thanks to social transfers from Russia, both republics are ahead of neighboring regions of Georgia in terms of per capita income.22
In the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), the long-term struggle to secede from Azerbaijan, including the armed conflict of the early 1990s, caused enormous damage to the economy and led to its restructuring. During the Soviet period, NKAO was a peripheral agrarian region. In the mid-1980s, the processing of agricultural raw materials accounted for 54 percent of its industrial output, and viticulture and winemaking - for about a half of the entire economy. Another 24 percent of industrial output was provided by light industry enterprises (textile, clothing, and footwear). Hasty privatization exacerbated the consequences of hostilities. Economic growth started only in the 2000s. The economic policy of the NKR was based on tax cuts, attraction of foreign investments (mainly from the Armenian community in Russia and Western countries), and implementation of state programs for the development of key industries and individual regions.
These measures made it possible to partially overcome the negative economic impact of the lack of external legitimacy, economic and transport blockade by Azerbaijan, and high transport and banking costs. All external interactions, including export-import operations, are carried out through Armenia. As a result, Artsakh's GDP began to grow in the 2010s by 10-11 percent annually - much faster than in Armenia. A de facto shared legal space emerged between Armenia and the NKR and the absence of a customs border with Armenia gave the NKR the opportunity to take advantage of the vast Eurasian Economic Union market and to enjoy other advantages of the Eurasian integration. The structure of the republic's economy has changed significantly. In 2018, agriculture and forestry accounted for only 11 percent of GDP, while industry and energy
- for 29 percent, and construction - for 10 percent. Thanks to foreign investments, mining (that did not exist in the Soviet NKAO) has become the main industry (and comprised 55 percent of industrial output in 2018). Electric power industry has become another new specialization and its contribution to industrial production has reached 21 percent. Over the past ten years, 15 small hydroelectric power plants with a total capacity of 52 MW have been built. Surplus electricity has been exported to Armenia. Also, Artsakh's traditional specialization, the agro-industrial complex was restored and accounts for 12 percent of industrial output.
Some sectors of the NKR's economy were highly dependent on exports. On the basis of the former silk factory, garment productions were created, which received orders from such Italian fashion houses as "Versace" and "Armani" who exported their goods through Armenia. Major improvement in the quality of the Karabakh wines allowed local winemakers to export their products to Russia, some countries of Europe, and North America. Canned fruits and vegetables from Artsakh were also successful in foreign markets. Overall, a third of the products of the agro-industrial complex was exported. However, economic growth did not lead to a corresponding increase in the incomes of the population, as the profits of mining enterprises were allocated outside the region.
Budget revenues and expenditures were balanced only thanks to the Armenian subsidies. Although they were constantly decreasing, in 2018 their share in the Artsakh budget was about 50 percent (compared to 66 percent in 2010). At the same time, GDP per capita and the average salary in the NKR in terms of purchasing power parity were significantly higher than in two out of three neighboring peripheral marzes (provinces) of Armenia; in 2019 the NKR surpassed both Armenia and Azerbaijan by per capita GDP.23
The 2020 war has had catastrophic consequences for the economy of the NKR. Its GDP fell by 30 percent in 2021 and its exports have been halved. The restoration of Azerbaijan's control over the mountainous territories deprived the NKR of a significant part of its water resources and of 29 out of 36 hydroelectric power stations. Some of electricity needed by Artsakh is now imported through the Lachin corridor. Karabakh managed to keep part of the quarries near Mardakert, but lost mining enterprises in the Kalbajar region. The NKR also lost three quarters of arable land and half of the livestock, almost all vineyards, and most of the agricultural machinery. The production in the agricultural sector decreased by 54 percent. As a result, Armenia has to cover 90 percent of the NKR's budget.24
Even well before the war, Ukraine's Donbass had experienced such serious problems of socio-economic development as depopulation, outdated economic structure, and moral and physical depreciation of fixed production assets. As of 2019, the gross regional product (GRP) of the Donetsk Oblast decreased by 43 percent comparing to 2013, while the GRP of the Lugansk Oblast decreased by 52 percent. It was not only destruction resulting from hostilities, but also the trade blockade by Ukraine (introduced in March 2017) that contributed to this dramatic fall. The deplorable state of the DNR's and the LNR's economies resulted not only from such understandable factors as the extreme lack of investment, absence of a full-fledged banking system, and forced use of complex logistical and financial schemes in foreign trade. In fact, these factors were supplemented by the lack of transparency of the budget, hostile takeovers, corruption, and the virtual absence of functional state institutions and of legal protection of property. These specific factors led to the formation of numerous "gray areas" in the two economies, the merge of power and business, and the exacerbated struggle between informal clans.
One of the key consequences of the economic crises in the DNR and the LNR has been further conservation and archaization of the structure of the two economies.
Donbass has become a hyper-industrialized territory which is rare in the contemporary world: in the DNR, industry accounts for 46 percent of GDP; if production and supply of electricity, gas and water is counted, the share of industry reaches even 58 percent (in 2013, it was just 31.8 percent for the entire Donetsk region). Structurally, the dominance of traditional industries has increased, which is clearly reflected in the structure of exports: as of 2019, ferrous metals accounted for 61 percent of the DNR exports, while exports coal and other mineral products - for 22 percent. In the LNR, these products accounted for 42 percent and 19 percent of exports, respectively. At the same time, the shares of the tertiary sector are very low in the two breakaway republics, especially given the high level of urbanization. This resulted from low incomes, isolation, and the outflow of a significant part of skilled specialists.25
Traditional heavy industries of the self-proclaimed republics of Donbass suffered greatly from the consequences of hostilities and the blockade. While in 2013 the coal production in Donbass amounted to 37.8 million tons, in 2018 it fell to 19.5 million, of which the DNR and LNR accounted for about 12 million. In 2019, five out of 15 main ferrous metallurgy plants were closed or nearly stopped their operations, while most of the rest functioned intermittently at 20-30 percent of their capacities. The industry experienced serious problems with the supply of iron ore and sales. In response to the blockade, the DNR and LNR nationalized large metallurgical plants and put them under the control of "Vneshtorgservis CJSC", a "gasket" company registered in South Ossetia. One of its tasks was to reduce the risk of sanctions against the Russian companies that bought goods from Donbass. "Vneshtorgservice" was accused of misappropriation of capital and regular salary delays, which caused rallies and strikes.26 In 2021, metallurgical plants began to be transferred to another owner - "Financial Assets JSC".
The range of engineering products narrowed due to the rupture of cooperation ties and difficulties in marketing. Some enterprises (Lugansk Engineering Plant, "LokomotivService", Krasnoluchsky car assembly plant etc.) moved their production to Russia, while others switched to the products that are in demand at the local market, such as buses ("Donetskgormash") and military equipment (Novogorlovsky Machine-Building Plant). Production in the chemical industry also declined. Due to the proximity to the front line, large-capacity production facilities of the "Stirol" company (the main producer of mineral fertilizers, based in Gorlovka in the DNR) were mothballed.
An alternative to economic degradation is the increased integration of the two republics into Russia's economy. Even before 2014, Russia was the main foreign trade partner and importer of products from the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, although the Russian share in their turnover was gradually falling. In November 2021, President Vladimir Putin announced recognition of certificates of origin issued in the DNR and LNR and the admission of their companies to the Russian public procurement on a par with the Russian companies. Simultaneously, the export and the import quotas for the two republics have been canceled. Thus, the D/LNR informally became members of the Eurasian Customs Union, which strengthened their dependence on Russia while increasing their budget revenues. These developments will likely provide the DNR and the LNR with a certain impetus to modernize, although the two republics will still not be able to solve the problem of economic restructuring without large investments.
The economies of the DNR and the LNR are weakly connected to each other: their bilateral trade accounts for only 7-12 percent of their foreign trade turnovers. It is noteworthy that, until recently, customs control between them was maintained.27
Overall, serious economic problems, not completely resolved with the help of patron states, pose risks for the internal sovereignty of unrecognized / de facto states. It is especially true for the PMR, which is in tough competition with its parent state and
other countries. Yet, as post-Soviet developments demonstrate, the economic factor has not been decisive.
V. Deficit of external sovereignty
The unrecognized states have faced an acute deficit of external sovereignty, which makes them vulnerable to external interventions and limits the range of options for using external resources for statebuilding. The desire to prove their compliance with international standards has become one of the key political priorities for such entities alongside with the struggle for survival, security, and internal sovereignty. There are contradictions between ensuring security on the one hand (which requires political mobilization of citizens and suppression of opposition), and achieving international recognition on the other, which often depends on the upgrade of a political system, including its democratization.28
Despite their isolation, the life of post-Soviet unrecognized states heavily depends on the nature of interactions with the outside world. Disruptions of cross-border communications and blockades by parent states dramatically complicate their transport connections and foreign trade. Due to the lack of a political status, such entities often carry out their foreign trade relations through their patron states, supplying their products to foreign markets under the latter's trademarks. Patron states are also the main trading partners of post-Soviet de facto states (accounting for 70-95 percent of their trade turnover).
Thus, foreign trade relations of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia are limited. Food is largely imported into both countries from Russia. The turnover with Russia makes up to 95 percent of South Ossetia's foreign trade. Foreign economic relations of Abkhazia are hardly much more diversified: its main foreign trade partners are Russia (more than 70 percent of turnover) and Turkey (8 percent). In both cases, the foreign trade balance of the republics is negative. As the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) was launched in 2015, the terms of Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's foreign trade with Russia worsened, due to more stringent rules for the clearance of goods moving across the border (in fact, the border of the EAEU), the unpreparedness of the business communities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to apply the norms of the customs code of the EAEU, and the non-recognition of these states by other participants of the Eurasian Economic Union.
In the early 2020s, the trade with Russia accounted for 77 percent of the foreign trade turnover of the DNR and over 80 percent of that of the LNR. Through Russia, trade was also carried out with other countries, including Ukraine.29 Russia's support involved not only direct subsidies to the DNR and the LNR, but also purchasing of goods, preferential gas prices etc. In fact, Russia has become the only importer of the products from the DNR and the LNR, and the main exporter to the two NS. Deficit industrial raw materials have been coming to the DNR and the LNR from Russia.
The only exception concerning the dominant role of a patron state in the foreign trade of post-Soviet unrecognized or partially recognized states was the PMR. Due to its geographical location, Russia accounted for less than 30 percent of its foreign trade in the late 2010s.30 Also, Transnistrian producers are forced to go through customs clearance twice and send goods for export through the territory of Moldova.
Transport communications of such entities with parent states are completely blocked (except for the PMR), and connections are made through the patron state (Russia or Armenia): e. g., through the Lachin corridor to and from Nagorno-Karabakh; the Transcaucasian Highway (TransKAM) connecting North and South Ossetia through the Main Caucasian Range; and the Sukhumi Highway in Abkhazia. Noticeably, the
emergence of breakaway entities has forced their neighbors to adapt their transport systems to new geopolitical realities.
Migration and cross-border mobility of the populations of unrecognized states is caused primarily by their limited economic self-sufficiency and low standard of living. Insufficient salaries and pensions force people to look for additional sources of income in neighboring states - shift work or benefits. Unsatisfactory quality or unavailability of some consumer goods and services also force residents to go in search of them to a neighboring state. The direction of cross-border trips is determined by geographical proximity, border regime, working conditions, citizenship of the respective state, and family ties. In most cases, trips are directed to the border regions of patron or parent states. The significance of cross-border mobility for such entities may be so high that the closure of borders in 2020-2021 because of the pandemic and for political reasons has become an acute problem, causing frustration among the local populations. Still, authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia perceive trips to Georgia as the result of purposeful Georgian attempts to integrate citizens into the Georgia's economic and cultural space and hence as a threat to the Abkhazian and South Ossetian sovereignty. Since the beginning of the pandemic, South Ossetia has almost completely closed its border with Georgia.31 As for the border between the NKR and Azerbaijan, there were almost no cross-border contacts at all.
Cross-border flows involving breakaway entities and Russia are highly asymmetric. The traffic across the respective borders of the DNR and the LNR is shaped mainly by their residents working or shopping on the Russian side, while Russia's residents have almost stopped crossing this border.32 On the contrary, Russian tourists prevail among those who cross the border with Abkhazia. The flow across Russia's border with South Ossetia is not very intense. The border is crossed for such purposes, as maintenance of family ties and purchase of cheaper goods and services by South Ossetian residents on the Russian side.
V. Identity and internal sovereignty
Economic stagnation has a powerful effect on the lives of ordinary people in unrecognized states; in some cases people mostly care about material stability than geopolitical issues.33 Still, the economic and demographic situation alone cannot explain the sustainability of such polities. Four out of six post-Soviet de facto states exist for over 30 years each, in spite of low economic viability, which suggests that the main reason for their survival is a strong identity and high loyalty of citizens to the ruling regimes as the essential elements of internal sovereignty. Many authors note that the four "oldest" post-Soviet unrecognized states can hardly be regarded as pawns in the geopolitical games of their patron states. Leaders who were not supported by patron states periodically managed to come to power. Attempts have been made to create a civic identity that would integrate all ethnic groups. Some electoral campaigns were really competitive. In Abkhazia, opposition candidates won the presidential elections of 2004, 2014, and 2020; in South Ossetia - the elections of 2001 and 2017 (although the victory of the opposition candidate in 2011 was voided). Generally, political parties and opposition media do exist in unrecognized states.34
At the same time, democracy in post-Soviet unrecognized states is far from being exemplary. In Abkhazia, both formal (e. g., Abkhaz ethnicity of those who are eligible to run for president) and informal political discrimination based on ethnicity take place. Clans play an important role in political life of Abkhazia and South Ossetia while
administrative resources are actively used in electoral campaigns. In the PMR, political life is dominated by the interests of a powerful local business group, the "Sheriff" holding.
However, most residents of such polities believe that their republics go in the right direction.35 As the focus groups discussions, held in the fall of 2020, demonstrated, most of the Transnistrians and Abkhazians do support the independence of their republics. Their commitment is based on ideas about a specific identity, culture and values, and emotional connection with their native land. For the ethnic Abkhazians, independence is a matter of survival for their ethnic group. In both republics, independence is associated with the growth of prosperity and possibility of developing full-fledged international contacts based on recognition.
According to participants of the mentioned focus group, true independence is impossible without economic self-sufficiency. In Abkhazia, almost all respondents were convinced that the republic needed to become economically more independent from Russia. The hypothetical incorporation into Russia was perceived extremely negatively.
Most of Abkhazian participants have a complicated multi-layered identity: ethnic, political, cultural, and geographical ("old" urban residents / villagers / recent urban dwellers) overlap in different combinations. As a result, local supra-ethnic "urban" identities emerge, mostly in Sukhum(i), which distinguishes its residents with different ethnic backgrounds from their kin relatives outside the city. The Sukhum(i)'s supra-ethnic identity is a solid foundation for building a civic identity.
However, the distinctions between the prewar residents of Sukhum(i), built into the system of a multicultural Soviet Russian-speaking city, and the natives of Abkhaz villages, who have retained traditional ethno-cultural characteristics, have not yet been erased. Ethnic identity remains the most important for the majority of residents. Most of the villages are still ethnically homogeneous.36
Abkhazia relies on a high degree of loyalty of three out of four main ethnic groups -the Abkhazians, the Armenians, and the Russians. The vast majorities of respondents belonging to these groups trust the president and parliament. The highest correlation between ethnic and civic layers of identity is among ethnic Abkhazians. The Russian community has a divided civic identity. Being predominantly native and citizens of Abkhazia, Russians feel they are part of its people, but they equally feel their political and cultural connection with Russia.
The formation of the civil identity of the Mingrelian population is the most problematic. In the late 2000s, most of the residents of the Gal(i) district received the Abkhazian citizenship, but it was impossible to check whether they kept Georgian passports in violation of Abkhazia's legislation. In the mid-2010, most of them were deprived of their Abkhazian passports because they did not give up their Georgian citizenship. Instead of Abkhazian passports, they received residence permits, which allowed them to retain many rights, but excluded participation in political life. Thus, the authorities made it clear that for them the Georgian citizenship of the Gal(i) Mingrelians a priori implied political loyalty to a hostile state.
Many focus group participants in Abkhazia, especially the younger ones, are in favor of good neighborly relations with Georgia, while older people recall with nostalgia the Soviet era, when there was no border with the parent state. However, everyone calls the recognition of Abkhazia and signing of an agreement on the non-use of force (which Tbilisi has been refusing to conclude for many years) as indispensable conditions for restoring relations with Georgia. According to one of the respondents, "the instinct of self-preservation repels the Abkhaz from the Georgians". Georgia is perceived as a puppet state dependent on the United States. Respondents accused Georgia of
hypocritical attempts at reconciliation for the sake of reintegration, pointing to Tbilisi's desire to shift the blame for the outbreak of the conflict onto Russia's imperial policy.
Similarly to the Transnistrians, the majority of Abkhazian respondents share the official opinion that living standards in their republic are higher than in the parent state, while at the same time noting the higher incomes in Tbilisi and other large cities of Georgia, good healthcare system, and "order". Such an assessment, which contradicts the reality, is the result of poor awareness and anti-Georgian rhetoric in the media.
The geopolitical vision of the citizens of Abkhazia is "Russia-centric". Russia is far from being idealized, but it is respected and appreciated. Respondents value its security guarantees and economic assistance, thanks to which investment projects are being implemented. Having acquired the Russian passports, residents of Abkhazia can receive Russian pensions and social benefits. While emphasizing that Russia is a great and "leading" country, many respondents, however, especially residents of Sukhum(i) with higher education, are aware of economic and foreign policy difficulties of the "big brother".37
As in the PMR, in Abkhazia the European Union (EU) does not play a significant role in geopolitical visions of citizens, despite its economic attractiveness. It is perceived as the patron of the parent state, and the attitudes towards the EU are largely negative.
The Transnistrian identity also relies on the lingering nostalgia for the Soviet era and especially on the cultural hegemony of Russia, implemented through the education system, media, political contacts, migration ties, non-governmental organizations etc.38 According to a poll conducted after the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine, a relative majority of respondents was in favor of joining Russia, while a sizeable minority believed that the PMR should be independent. The pro-Russian orientation of the Transnistrians was also expressed in strong support for Russian foreign policy and military presence.39
Focus groups showed the contradictory attitudes of the Transnistrians towards Moldova. On the one hand, they recognize cultural similarities and close interdependence with the parent state. On the other hand, they argue that more than thirty years of separate existence, differences in values and geopolitical orientations, and the entry into active life of those generations who grew up in de facto different states outweigh the importance of a common past. The main watershed for the Transnistrians is formed by Moldovan nationalism, language policy, and Moldova's potential reunification with Romania. Moldova is perceived as a poor, unstable, and corrupt country. Participants of focus groups emphasized intolerance of some Moldovans towards the Transnistrians as pro-Russian separatists; this intolerance apparently grew in connection with the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. Almost all respondents blame politicians and corrupt elites for their unwillingness and inability to find compromises. They see the intrigues of large external players as the main reason of the "divorce" between Moldova and Transnistria, emphasizing that there are no conflicts between ordinary people.
Mentally, Russia is the closest country to the Transnistrians: it is the main direction of migration from the republic, thanks to the recognition of Transnistrian diplomas among other things. The respondents were well aware that Russian assistance is vital to the PMR. Older generations and ethnic Russians are especially grateful to Russia. They highly value Russia's place in the world as a "powerful country" and associate themselves with it. At the same time, some citizens, especially young people with higher education and residents of Bendery, did not believe in the possibility of joining Russia or in that the incorporation would bring higher standards of living to Transnistria. They saw Russia as internally weak, because, in their opinion, the poverty of most of its regions is hidden behind the brilliance of the capitals. The EU countries looked more attractive to them. As a rule, this group of respondents did not believe in the possibility of achieving
true independence. They expressed dissatisfaction with corruption, censorship in the media, and monopolization of power. They believed that earlier or later the PMR would be forced to return to Moldova. According to other surveys, conducted in the 2010s, the Transnistrians had the lowest level of trust in the heads of their republic among residents of the four "old" post-Soviet unrecognized states (slightly above 30 percent, regardless of ethnicity).40 Thus, a stratum of more educated, active, and mobile citizens has formed in Transnistria alongside with a noticeable erosion of sovereignty values. The reasons include the fatigue of restrictions, dissatisfaction with the low standards of living, uncertainty of perceived future, and weakness of social elevators.
VII. Conclusion
The results of statebuilding in the post-Soviet unrecognized states are ambiguous. On the one hand, these polities managed to create a more or less complete set of state institutions, including tax and customs services, establish a monopoly on the use of force, and maintain law and order on their territories. Bodies of representative and legislative power at various levels have been established, and regular elections have been organized. Most importantly, systems of social representation have been created, historical narratives are disseminated through educational institutions and media, and state ceremonies and holidays have been established. This allowed such entities to preserve a high level of internal sovereignty, the value of independence in the mass consciousness, and specific civil and ethnic identities distinguishing oneself from the parent state. The cornerstone of the state ideology is the constant opposition of an unrecognized republic to a respective parent state and (in most of cases) to the West and the emphasis on one's own achievements in certain domains. The Transnistrian authorities, for example, often refer to favorable tariffs for municipal housing and services, while the DNR and the LNR refer to the advantages of their health care systems and the availability of high-tech medical care. Thus, notwithstanding the difficulties of everyday life, the populations of such entities remain generally loyal to the ruling regimes.
On the other hand, not all post-Soviet unrecognized or partially recognized states fully control the claimed territories. Abkhazia and South Ossetia managed to reach the borders of the respective Soviet parastate formations only as a result of an armed confrontation between Russia and Georgia in 2008, the LNR - as a result of about 130 days of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine. But the very existence of Nagorno-Karabakh and the preservation of the Armenian minority in Azerbaijan are under threat. Not a single post-Soviet unrecognized state has succeeded in becoming economically competitive in comparison with its parent state and in raising one's own population's income even to the level of this parent state, thereby substantiating one's claim to independence. Not a single breakaway entity can do without the economic assistance of its patron state, let alone reduce dependence on it. It is no coincidence that all postSoviet de facto states (with the exception of Nagorno-Karabakh until 2020 and, to some extent, Abkhazia) have lost a significant part of their populations during the years of de facto independence, and that many of their residents of different ages are nostalgic for the Soviet period. According to the polls, most respondents in the PMR and South Ossetia even recognized the Soviet system as preferable, while respondents from Abkhazia and the NKR nevertheless preferred the period of de facto independence.
Not a single post-Soviet de facto state has been able to increase its external sovereignty. Sluggish negotiations with parent states have reached a dead end, while foreign relations are almost completely focused on the patron state. The geopolitical
situation that developed after February 24, 2022 actually made pointless the attempts of unrecognized or partially recognized states to diversify interactions with the outside world.
The phenomenon of de facto post-Soviet states, against the backdrop of global trends towards the expansion of uncontrolled territories, entails numerous risks for Russia. External (macro-regional and global) risks lie, first, in the possibility of drawing Russia into a direct armed conflict, which happened in 2022 in the Russia-Ukraine context.
A particularly difficult situation has developed in Nagorno-Karabakh. On the one hand, the mediation mission of Russia made it possible to stop the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in November 2020. The Russian peacekeeping contingent is deployed along the new line of contact and the Lachin corridor. Under the control of Russian border guards, Armenia started the restoration of transport communication through its territory between the western regions of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan' autonomy. On the other hand, Turkey enhanced its influence and became a key political actor in the South Caucasus. The Treaty on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance between Turkey and Azerbaijan (2010) and the Shusha Declaration, signed by the heads of the two states in 2021, created the legal basis for establishing Turkish military bases and Ankara's intervention in a possible new armed conflict. The leadership of Azerbaijan has declared its intention to completely take control over the remaining territory of Nagorno-Karabakh after the expiration of the five-year agreement with Armenia and Russia in 2025. Baku dictates the terms of reconciliation without giving any guarantees to the Armenian side (for example, denying autonomy for Karabakh and establishing its customs posts along the way through the Armenian territory via Zangezur). Baku threatens to close the Lachin corridor guarded by the Russian peacekeepers. The Armenian society is divided, and part of it is in favor of revising the results of the 2020 war. Under these conditions, it will be extremely difficult for Russia to play the role of an equidistant arbiter in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Still, it should keep actively promoting the search for a sustainable compromise.
For Russia, its support of breakaway entities is an obstacle to the normalization of relations with many post-Soviet states, including its allies in the EAEU. At the same time, possible settlement of conflicts around post-Soviet de facto states would deprive it of its usual levers of influence on neighboring states and provide conditions for their entry into the NATO. A complete "withdrawal" of Russia from such entities would cause irreversible damage to its international influence.
The uncertainty of the political status of post-Soviet unrecognized or partially recognized states, some of which exist for thirty years, implies the risk of the emergence of new similar polities in the post-Soviet space. For instance, the 2020 turmoil in Kyrgyzstan created for some time a situation of anarchy, which regional political clans potentially could use to proclaim "independence" of their fiefdoms. The long existence of breakaway republics, against the backdrop of the broader, global trend of political fragmentation, increases the risks of destabilizing the entire system of international relations and regional security. Amidst Russia's confrontation with the West, the recognition of such entities may turn into another serious international problem.
The nationwide risks of deterioration of the internal situation in Russia in connection with the post-Soviet unrecognized or partially recognize states include the following:
(1) Political instability in such entities, terrorist threats, arms trafficking, penetration of criminal elements, and involvement of the Russian citizens in armed clashes;
(2) An extreme degree of political destabilization, for example, due to an economic blockade or an aggravated conflict with the parent state, may provoke the Russian intervention, with obvious domestic and international repercussions;
(3) Possible negative impact of conflicts involving de facto states on interethnic relations in Russia: hundreds of thousands of the Russian citizens and migrants identify themselves with kin ethnic groups from unrecognized states and their parent states' populations (for example, about 1.7 million Armenians, of which approximately 1.2 million are Russian citizens, and, respectively, 1.2 million and 0.6 million Azerbaijanis reside in Russia);
(4) Growing burden on Russia's budget.
There are some relevant risks that Russia can manage only indirectly. These risks include: degradation or slow economic development and inefficient use of funds provided by Russia. Appropriation and embezzlement of these funds destabilize the socio-political situation in unrecognized states, cause dissatisfaction among the population, and lead to repeated requests for Russian support, which aggravates the problem. Along with this, Russia's demands for more efficient spending also generate discontent in the breakaway republics and are interpreted as political pressure. Also, there is a risk of declining legitimacy of the authorities in the eyes of the population as a result of the growth of authoritarian tendencies, failures in statebuilding and the developing civic identity. Finally, a more negative image of Russia may form against the background of its low economic attractiveness and weakened "soft power". The potential results for unrecognized states are eroded sovereignty, weakened identities, and even the readiness of political elites to fully or partially change their geopolitical orientation.
Neighboring Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the DNR, and the LNR has had contradictory consequences for the adjacent Russian regions. On the one hand, it contributes to the spread of illegal cross-border activities, such as illegal car business and smuggling. The tense situation in breakaway republics leads to migratory pressure on the Russian borderlands. Conflicts affect the investment attractiveness and increase the peripheralization of the border areas, including the loss in their importance for international transit. In addition, the risks of military escalation provoke governmental reactive security measures that complicate activities of local populations and businesses.
On the other hand, the neighborhood with unrecognized states gives some impetus to the local economies. The low level of development of services in such entities encourages their residents to take advantage of medical, commercial, banking, entertainment, and recreation infrastructures of the adjacent Russian border regions. Due to this demand, the Russian regional markets are expanding.
Some risks for Russia, caused by its proximity to and its support for unrecognized or partially recognized post-Soviet states, are associated with the discrepancy between the broader area of Russia's special security interests and the Russian state borders. The former run along the southern borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are recognized by Russia and host Russian military bases. Therefore, Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's prospects directly relate to vital interests of the Russian Federation: ensuring security, creating favorable conditions for sustainable growth, and increasing the competitiveness of the economy.41 In order to reduce external and domestic risks, especially those that can affect its border areas, Russia must avoid deterioration of interactions with regional powers, and even more so, the loss of allies. At the same time, non-interference in internal affairs of partner states does not mean refusing to use historically established factors of "soft power" in policy towards de facto states, such as the Russian language and the role of the Russian science and culture.
One of the strategic ways to gradually resolve conflicts is to restore communications and trade relations between neighboring polities. Russia tried to promote its plans to revive the railway communication through Abkhazia's territory, and now, in accordance with a tripartite agreement with Baku and Yerevan, has committed itself to assist in the restoration of communications between Nakhichevan' and the rest of Azerbaijan's territory via Armenia. However, there has never been such a successful experience in the post-Soviet space. The failure of such plans also poses a risk. Finally, a big political risk is the removal and isolation of unrecognized or partially recognized states from the negotiation processes.
ENDNOTES
1 Попов Ф.А. География сецессионизма в современном мире - М.: Новый хронограф, 2Q12 [Popov F.A. Geography of Secessionism in the Contemporary World. - Moscow: Novyi Khronograf, 2Q12].
2 Beck U. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. - London: Sage, 1992.
3 "DNR" and "LNR" are abbreviations of "Donetskaya narodnaya respublika" and "Luganskaya narodnaya respublika", respectively.
4 Berg E. Bridging the divide between parent states and secessionist entities: a new perspective for conflict management? // Space and Polity. 2Q18. V. 2Q. No. 3. P. 15-29; Caspersen N. Unrecognized States: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Modern International System. - Cambridge: Polity, 2Q12; Bakke K., Linke A., O'Loughlin J., Toal G. Dynamics of state-building after war: external-internal relations in Eurasian de facto states // Political Geography. 2Q18. V. 63. P. 159-173; Post-Soviet Secessionism: Nation-Building and State-Failure after Communism. Eds. M.Minakov, G.Sasse, D.Isachenko. - Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2Q21.
5 Pegg S. De Facto States in the International System. Institute of International Relations. The University of British Columbia Working Paper No. 21. - Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1998; Berg E., Kuusk E. What makes sovereignty a relative concept? Empirical approaches to international society // Political Geography. 2Q1Q. V. 29. No. 1. P. 4Q-49.
6 O'Loughlin J., Kolosov V., Toal G. Inside the post-Soviet de facto states: a comparison of attitudes in Abkhazia, Nagorny Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria // Eurasian Geography and Economics. 2Q14. V. 55. No. 5. P. 423-456; O'Loughlin J., Kolosov V. Building identities in post-Soviet "de facto states": cultural and political icons in Nagorno- Karabakh, South Ossetia, Transdniestria, and Abkhazia // Eurasian Geography and Economic. 2Q17. V. 58. No. 17. P. 691-715; Dembinska M. La fabrique des États de facto: ni guerre ni paix. - Montréal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 2021; Shesterinina A. Mobilizing in Uncertainty: Collective Identities and War in Abkhazia. - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2Q21.
7 Blakkisrud H., Kolst0 P. Dynamics of de facto statehood: the South Caucasian de facto states between secession and sovereignty // Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 2Q12. V. 12. No. 2. P. 281-298.
8 See, for example: Ó Beacháin D. Electoral politics in the de facto states of the South Caucasus // Caucasus Analytical Digest. 2Q17. No. 94. P. 3-7.
9 Pegg S. De Facto States in the International System; Pegg S. Twenty years of de facto state studies: progress, problems, and prospects // Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. [Online resource]. July 2Q17. URL: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/162543596.pdf (accessed 16.Q7.2Q22).
1Q Маркедонов С.M. Де-факто образования постсоветского пространства. - Ереван: Институт Кавказа, 2Q12 [Markedonov S.M. De Facto Polities in the Post-Soviet Space - Yerevan: The Caucasus Institute, 2Q12]; Dembinska M. Op. cit.
11 Bakke K., Linke A., O'Loughlin J., Toal G. Op. cit.
12 Ibid.; Merle T. Les États de facto: modélisation à partir des cas de la périphérie de la Russie. Thèse pour obtenir le grade de docteur de l'Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne. - Reims: l'Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne, 2021.
13 Kolosov V., Crivenco A. Impact of depopulation on political life and legitimacy of unrecognized states (a case study of Transnistria) // Regional Research of Russia. 2021. V. 11. No. 2. P. 266-275.
14 Багапш Н.В. Динамика этнодемографической ситуации в Меджудском ущелье Южной Осетии (18862015 гг.) // Вестник антропологии. 2020. Т. 50. № 2. С. 225-271. [Bagapsh N.V. The dynamics of ethno-demographic situation in the Medzhud Gorge of South Ossetia (1886-2015) // Anthropology Bulletin. 2020. V. 50. No. 2. P. 225-271.]
15 Себенцов А.Б., Карпенко М.С., Гриценко А.А., Туров Н.Л. Экономическое развитие как выход для «государств де-факто»: постконфликтная динамика и видение перспектив в Южной Осетии // Известия РАН: Серия географическая. 2022 (в печати). [Sebentsov A.B., Karpenko M.S., Gritsenko A.A., Turov N.L. Economic development as a challenge for "de facto states": post-conflict dynamics and a vision of prospects of South Ossetia // Proceedings of the Russian Academy of Sciences: Geography Series. 2022 (forthcoming)].
16 Kolosov V., Zotova M. Multiple borders of Nagorno-Karabakh // Geography. Environment. Sustainability. 2020. V. 13. No. 1. P. 1-8.
17 Как и чем живет Карабах после войны // Росбизнесконсалтинг. [By what ways and means Nagorno-Karabakh lives after the war // Rosbiznesconsulting]. 13.11.2021. URL: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/13/11/ 2021/6183a8279a79470efb09bbd3 (accessed 16.07.2022).
18 Optimization of the Territorial Organization of the Economy of Transnistria as a Factor in Ensuring Sustainable Development of the Republic. Phase II. Model of Sustainable Development of Transnistria. Report on Research of the Regional Studies Research Laboratory. - Tiraspol: Transnistrian State University, 2018.
19 Голунов С.В., Зотова М.В. Въездной туризм в постсоветских де-факто государствах // Известия РАН: Серия географическая. 2021. Т. 85. № 5. С. 699-713 [Golunov S.V., Zotova M.V. Inbound tourism in post-Soviet de facto states // Proceedings of the Russian Academy of Sciences: Geography Series. 2021. V. 85. No. 5. P. 699-713].
20 O'Loughlin J., Kolosov V., Toal G. Inside Abkhazia: survey of attitudes in a de facto state // Post-Soviet Affairs. 2011. V. 27. No. 1. P. 1-36; Муханов В.М., Новиков В.В. К вопросу об инвестиционном климате в Абхазии и перспективах его улучшения // Международная аналитика. 2015. № 1. С. 49-62 [Novikov V.V. On the investment climate in Abkhazia and prospects for its amelioration // International Analytics. 2015. No. 1. P. 4962]; Антон Кривенюк: «экономики Абхазии не будет без кардинальных изменений» [Anton Kriveniuk: "There will be no Abkhazian economy without cardinal changes"] // EurAsia Daily. 06.04.2019. URL: https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2019/04/06/anton-krivenyuk-ekonomiki-abhazii-ne-budet-bez-kardinalnyh-izmeneniy (accessed 16.07.2022); Заводская Е. Хатуна Шатипа: "доминирует импорт и экономика не создает рабочие места" // Эко Кавказа. [Khatuna Shatipa: "Imports dominate and the economy creates no jobs" // Ekho Kavkaza]. 04.10.2019. URL: https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/30199587.html (accessed 16.07.2022).
21 Sebentsov A.B, Karpenko M.S., Gritsenko A.A., Turov N.L. Op. cit.
22 Kolosov V., Zotova M. "De-facto borders" as a mirror of sovereignty: the case of the post-Soviet non-recognized States // Historical Social Research. 2021. V. 46. No. 3. P. 178-207.
23 Ibid.
24 By what ways and means Nagorno-Karabakh lives after the war.
25 Экономика Донецкой Народной Республики: состояние, проблемы, пути решения. Ред. А.В.Половян, Р.Н.Лепа, Шемякина Н.В. - Донецк: Институт экономических исследований, 2020 [The Economy of the
Donetsk People's Republic: Condition, Problems, and Pathways to Solutions. Eds. A.V.Polovyan, R.N.Lepa, N.V.Shemyakina. - Donestk: Institute of Economic Studies, 2020].
26 Программа социально-экономического развития Луганской Народной Республики на 2020 год: проект Правительство ЛНР. Луганск, 2019. [Program of the Socio-Economic Development of Lugansk People's Republic for 2020: A Draft. Government of LNR, 2019]. URL: https://sovminlnr.ru/docs/2019/12/26/12.pdf (accessed 16.07.2022); Mykhnenko V. Causes and consequences of the war in Eastern Ukraine: an economic geography perspective // Europe-Asia Studies. 2020. V. 72. No. 3. P. 528-560.
27 The Economy of the Donetsk People's Republic.
28 Caspersen N. Op. cit.; Bakke K., Linke A., O'Loughlin J., Toal G. Op. cit.; Маркедонов С.М. Постсоветские де-факто государства: траектории борьбы за суверенитет // Мировая экономика и международные отношения. 2021. Т. 65. № 12. С. 79-89. [Markedonov S.M. Post-Soviet de facto states: trajectories of struggles for sovereignty // World Economy and International Relations. 2021. V. 65. No. 12. P. 79-89.
29 The Economy of the Donetsk People's Republic.
30 Blakkisrud H., Kemoklidze N., Gelashvili T., Kolst0 P. Navigating de facto statehood: trade, trust, and agency in Abkhazia's external economic relations // Eurasian Geography and Economics. 2021. V. 62. No. 3. P. 347371; Berg E., Vits K. Transnistria's European drive: a means to what end? // Geopolitics. 2022. V. 27. No. 3. P. 852-874.
31 Kolosov V., Zotova M. "De-facto borders" as a mirror of sovereignty.
32 Zotova M.V., Gritsenko A.A., von Lövis S. Friends or foes? Changes in cross-border practices and attitudes toward neighbors along the Russian-Ukrainian border after 2014 // Etnograficheskoye оbozreniye [Ethnographic Review]. 2021. No. 1. P. 124-144.
33 O'Loughlin J., Sasse G., Toal G. Will Russia recognize the independence of two eastern Ukraine republics? Here's what people there think // Washington Post. 17 February 2022.
34 Kolst0 P. The sustainability and future of unrecognized quasi-states // Journal of Peace Research. 2006. V. 43. No. 6. P. 723-740; Caspersen N. Op. cit.; Pegg S. Twenty years of de facto state studies; O'Loughlin J., Kolosov V., Toal G. Inside the post-Soviet de facto states; Dembinska M., Campana A. Frozen conflicts and internal dynamics of de facto states: perspectives and directions for research // International Studies Review. 2017. V. 19. No. 2. P. 254-278.
35 O'Loughlin J., Kolosov V., Toal G. Inside the post-Soviet de facto states; O'Loughlin J., Sasse G., Toal G., Bakke K.M. A new survey of the Ukraine-Russia conflict finds deeply divided views in the contested Donbas region // Washington Post. 12 February 2021.
36 Багапш Н.В. Этническая идентичность в Абхазии и парадигмы ее институционализации: от советского прошлого к настоящему // // Этнографическое обозрение. 2021. № 5. С. 113-129 [Bagapsh N.V. The ethnic identity in Abkhazia and the paradigms of its institutionalization: from the Soviet past to the present // Ethnographic Review. 2021. No. 5. P. 113-129.
37 Колосов В.А., Зотова М.В. Экономическое развитие и внутренний суверенитет Приднестровья и Абхазии: 30 лет фактической независимости // Международные процессы. 2023 (в печати) [Kolosov V., Zotova M. Everyday life and international sovereignty of Transnistria and Abkhazia: 30 years of de facto independence // International Processes. 2023 (forthcoming)].
38 Marandici I. Multiethnic parastates and nation-building: the case of the Transnistrian imagined community // Nationalities Papers. 2020. V. 48. No. 1. P. 61-82.
39 O'Loughlin J., Kolosov V., Toal G. Inside the post-Soviet de facto states; Bakke K., Linke A., O'Loughlin J., Toal G. Op. cit.
40 O'Loughlin J., Kolosov V., Toal G. Inside the post-Soviet de facto states.
41 Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации. Утверждена Указом Президента РФ от 30 ноября 2016 г. № 640 [Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Approved by Presidential Degree no. 640 on November 30, 2016]. URL: http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&firstDoc=1&lastDoc= 1&nd=102416644 (accessed 16.07.2022).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bagapsh N.V. (2020). Dinamika etnodemograficheskoi situatsii v Medzhudskom ushchel'ye Yuzhnoi Osetii (1886-2015 gg.) [The dynamics of ethno-demographic situation in the Medzhud Gorge of South Ossetia (1886-2015)]. Vestnik antropologii [Anthropology Bulletin]. V. 50. No. 2. P. 225271. DOI: 10.33876/2311-0546/2020-50-2/255-271.
Bagapsh N.V. (2021). Etnicheskaya identichnost' v Abkhazii i paradigmy yeyo institutsializatsii: ot sovetskogo proshlogo k nastoyaschemu [The ethnic identity in Abkhazia and the paradigms of its institutionalization: from the Soviet past to the present]. Etnograficheskoye obozreniye [Ethnographic Review]. No. 5. P. 113-129. DOI: 10.31857/S086954150017418-9.
Bakke K., Linke A., O'Loughlin J., and Toal G. (2018). Dynamics of state-building after war: external-internal relations in Eurasian de facto states. Political Geography. V. 63. P. 159-173. DOI: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.06.011.
Beck U. (1992). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage. 272 p.
Berg E. (2018). Bridging the divide between parent states and secessionist entities: a new perspective for conflict management? Space and Polity. V. 20. No. 3. P. 15-29. DOI: 10.1080/13562576.2018.1457341.
Berg E. and Kuusk E. (2010). What makes sovereignty a relative concept? Empirical approaches to international society. Political Geography. V. 29. No. 1. P. 40-49. DOI: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2010.01.005.
Berg E. and Vits K. (2022). Transnistria's European drive: a means to what end? Geopolitics. V. 27. No. 3. P. 852-874. DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2020.1833859.
Blakkisrud H., Kemoklidze N., Gelashvili T., and Kolst0 P. (2021). Navigating de facto statehood: trade, trust, and agency in Abkhazia's external economic relations. Eurasian Geography and Economics. V. 62. No. 3. P. 347-371. DOI: 10.1080/15387216.2020.1861957.
Blakkisrud H. and Kolsto P. (2012). Dynamics of de facto statehood: the South Caucasian de facto states between secession and sovereignty. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. V. 12. No. 2. P. 281-298. DOI: 10.1080/14683857.2012.686013.
Caspersen N. (2012). Unrecognized States: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Modern International System. Cambridge: Polity. 224 p.
Dembinska M. (2021). La fabrique des États de facto: ni guerre ni paix. Montréal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal. 296 p.
Dembinska M. and Campana A. (2017). Frozen conflicts and internal dynamics of de facto states: perspectives and directions for research. International Studies Review. V. 19. No. 2. P. 254278. DOI: 10.1093/isr/vix010.
Golunov S.V. and Zotova M.V. (2021). V'yezdnoi turizm v postsovetskikh de-fakto gosudarstvakh [Inboud tourism in post-Soviet de facto states]. Izvestia RAN: Seriya geograficheskaya [Proceedings of the Russian Academy of Sciences: Geography Series]. V. 85. No. 5. P. 699713. DOI: 10.31857/S2587556621050125.
Kolosov V. and Crivenco A. (2021). Impact of depopulation on political life and legitimacy of unrecognized states: a case study of Transnistria. Regional Research of Russia. V. 11. No. 2. P. 266-275. DOI: 10.1134/S2079970521020064.
Kolosov V. and Zotova M. (2020). Multiple borders of Nagorno-Karabakh. Geography. Environment. Sustainability. V. 13. No. 1. P. 1-8. DOI: 10.24057/2071-9388-2020-04.
Kolosov V. and Zotova M. (2021). "De-facto borders" as a mirror of sovereignty: the case of the post-Soviet non-recognized States. Historical Social Research. V. 46. No. 3. P. 178-207. DOI: 10.12759/hsr.46.2021.3.178-207.
Kolosov V. and Zotova M. (2023). Ekonomicheskoye razvitiye i vnutrennii suverenitet Pridnestrov'ya i Abkhazii: 30 let de-fakto nezavisimosti [Economic development and internal sovereignty of Transnistria and Abkhazia: 30 years of de facto independence]. Mezhdunarodnyie protsessy [International Processes]. Forthcoming.
Kolst0 P. (2006). The sustainability and future of unrecognized quasi-states. Journal of Peace Research. V. 43. No. 6. P. 723-740. DOI: 10.1177/0022343306068102.
Marandici I. (2020). Multiethnic parastates and nation-building: the case of the Transnistrian imagined community. Nationalities Papers. V. 48. No. 1. P. 61-82. DOI: 10.1017/nps.2019.69.
Markedonov S.M. (2012). De-fakto obrazovaniya postsovetskogo prostranstva [De Facto Polities in the Post-Soviet Space]. Yerevan: Caucasus Institute. 180 p.
Markedonov S.M. (2021). Postsovetskiye de-fakto gosudarstva: trayektorii bor'by za suverenitet [Post-Soviet de facto states: trajectories of struggle for sovereignty]. Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyie otnosheniya [World Economy and International Relations]. V. 65. No. 12. P. 79-89. DOI: 10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-12-79-89.
Merle T. (2021). Les États de facto: modélisation à partir des cas de la périphérie de la Russie. Thèse pour obtenir le grade de docteur de l'Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne. Reims: l'Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne.
Minakov M., Sasse G., and Isachenko D., eds. (2021). Post-Soviet Secessionism. Nation-Building and State-Failure after Communism. Stuttgart: Ibidem. 242 p.
Mukhanov V.M. and Novikov V.V. (2015). K voprosu ob investitsionnom climate v Abkhazii i perspectivakh yego uluchsheniya [Concerning the investment climate in Abkhazia and prospects for its amelioration]. Mezhdunarodnaya analitika [International Analytics]. No. 1. P. 49-62. DOI: /10.46272/2587-8476-2015-0-1-49-62.
Mykhnenko V. (2020). Causes and consequences of the war in Eastern Ukraine: an economic geography perspective. Europe-Asia Studies. V. 72. No. 3. P. 528-560. DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2019.1684447.
Ô Beachâin D. (2017). Electoral politics in the de facto states of the South Caucasus. Caucasus Analytical Digest. No. 94. P. 3-7.
O'Loughlin J. and Kolosov V. (2017). Building identities in post-Soviet "de facto states": cultural and political icons in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Transdniestria, and Abkhazia. Eurasian Geography and Economic. V. 58. No. 17. P. 691-715. DOI: 10.1080/15387216.2018.1468793.
O'Loughlin J., Kolosov V., and Toal G. (2011). Inside Abkhazia: survey of attitudes in a de facto state. Post-Soviet Affairs. V. 27. No. 1. P. 1-36. DOI: 10.2747/1060-586X.27.1.1.
O'Loughlin J., Kolosov V., and Toal G. (2014). Inside the post-Soviet de facto states: a comparison of attitudes in Abkhazia, Nagorny Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. Eurasian Geography and Economics. V. 55. No. 5. P. 423-456. DOI: 10.1080/15387216.2015.1012644.
O'Loughlin J., Sasse G., and Toal G. (2022). Will Russia recognize the independence of two eastern Ukraine republics? Here's what people there think. Washington Post. February 17.
O'Loughlin J., Sasse G., Toal G., and Bakke K.M. (2021). A new survey of the Ukraine-Russia conflict finds deeply divided views in the contested Donbas region. Washington Post. February 12.
Pegg S. (1998). De Facto States in the International System. Institute of International Relations, The University of British Columbia. Working Paper no. 21. Vancouver: University of British Columbia. 26 p.
Pegg S. (2017). Twenty years of de facto state studies: progress, problems, and prospects. In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. July. [Online resource]. DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.516. URL: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/16254 3596.pdf (accessed 16.07.2022).
Polovian A. V., Lepa R. N., and Shemyakina N. V., eds. (2020). Ekonomika Donetskoi Narodnoi Respubliki: sostoyaniye, problemy, puti resheniya [The Economy of the Donetsk People's Republic: Condition, Problems, and Pathways to Solutions]. Donetsk: Institute of Economic Research. 260 p.
Popov F.A. (2012). Geografiya setsessionizma v sovremennom mire [Geography of Secessionism in the Contemporary World]. Moscow: Novyi Khronograf. 671 p.
Sebentsov A. B., Karpenko M. S., Gritsenko A. A., and Turov N. L. (2022). Ekonomicheskoye razvitiye kak vyzov dlya "gosudarstv de-fakto": postkonfliktnaya dinamika i videniye perspektiv v Yuzhoi Osetii [Economic development as a challenge for "de facto states": postconflict dynamics and a vision of prospects of South Ossetia]. Izvestia RAS: Seriya Geograficheskaya [Proceedings of the Russian Academy of Sciences: Geography Series]. Forthcoming.
Shesterinina A. (2021). Mobilizing in Uncertainty: Collective Identities and War in Abkhazia. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 258 p.
Zotova M.V., Gritsenko A.A., and von Lövis S. (2021). Friends or foes? Changes in cross-border practices and attitudes toward neighbors along the Russian-Ukrainian border after 2014. Etnograficheskoye Obozreniye [Ethnographic Review]. No. 1. P. 124-144.
