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8Institutions for cooperation between academic
communities and governments in nation-wide planning: market economies vs the USSR
Dmitry V. Didenko
Doctor of Science in Economics, Candidate of Science in History, Leading Researcher, Professor Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Moscow, Russia E-mail: didenko-dv@ranepa.ru
Abstract. In this paper, the author defines the approaches to the analysis of interactions between representatives of academic and expert communities, and government authorities within national economy planning. These approaches are based on the theoretical literature, country and comparative studies, official electronic resources of government, academic, and expert organizations of a number of countries with market economies. The paper presents relevant country cases of institutionalized practices with such interactions. The author proposes the classification of subjects through the prism of economic science and political power, as well as effectiveness criteria of their interaction. By comparing these market economy practices with those of the USSR, the author outlines a number of historical models of the institutional interactions while shaping economic policy.
Keywords: development economics, institutional economics, political economy of knowledge, think tanks, bureaucracy, competitive relationships.
JEL codes: P11, P21, P41
For citation: Didenko, D. V. (2021). Institutions for cooperation between academic communities and governments in nationwide planning: market economies vs the USSR. Journal of regional and international competitiveness, 5(4), 69-81. https://doi. org/10.52957/27821927_2021_4_69
DOI: 10.52957/27821927_2021_4_69
Acknowledgements. This research was funded by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research under the project number 19010-00680 "A research into the institutional mechanism of interaction between academic research and economic management in the USSR (mid-1950s - late 1980s) in light of strategic planning development in the public sector of Russia's economy". The article is based on the author's papers presented at the conferences "Modernization of Russia: priorities, problems, and solutions" organized by Plekhanov Russian University of Economics and Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences (December 2020), "Planning in the Market Economy: The Memories of the Future (in commemoration of the centenary of the Gosplan establishment)" organized by Free Economic Society of Russia and Vitte Institute for New Industrial Development (March 2021). The author is grateful to the participants of these conferences for their interesting questions and useful comments. The author thanks A.V. Safronov for sharing his views when discussing the paper draft and its sources. The author accepts full responsibility for all of the contents and all remaining shortcomings of this article.
Introduction
In modern Russian public administration practice, we can observe the restoration of certain instruments specific to the USSR economy (strategic planning system, expansion of state investment in the economy and the state's share in the economy). But unlike the USSR, modern Russia is a country with a market economy, in which state management structures do not control the results of economic entities and do not try to distribute the bulk of the resources. The formation of the strategic planning system in the Russian Federation in the prevailing market economy sector determines the importance of studying the relevant experience of foreign countries.
The USSR / Russian Federation are compared to those in which the tools of indicative planning, development planning, program management of the national economy were extensively used. These are selected Western European countries between the two World Wars and after World War II (France, the Netherlands, Sweden), major East Asian countries (Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan , India).
The purpose of this paper is to show cases of institutions that influence the efficiency of interaction
© Dmitry V. Didenko, 2021 69
between different social actors through the prism of research and government to solve the problems of managing national economy of catching-up development, in which technology of its planning have been applied extensively and systematically.
To fulfill the purpose, the following objectives are set:
• Describe historical cases of interaction between representatives of government and academic community in planning in market economies.
• Identify and classify actors of interactions at different levels in various countries.
• Describe, summarize, and typologize the rules and practices of interaction between representatives of academic community and public authorities in development, adoption, and implementation of recommendations on economic policy in the countries under consideration.
• Provide a brief description of the historical models of the considered institutional interactions.
Main Part
In the development economics paradigm, planning can be seen as a key tool for implementing catch-up development strategies of individual countries, a means of overcoming institutional "traps of underdevelopment"". The classic version refers to the early stages of industrialization, but lagging behind the leaders can also happen at later stages of industrial development as a result of adverse effects of systemic economic crises, public policy failures, military conflicts, and social upheaval.
The immediate tasks of planning in the light of development economics most often are:
• Increase the level of savings and investment.
• Identify and implement strategic changes in the structure of industrial economy.
• Concentrate limited resources on priority areas.
• Regulate external relations tightly to support national industry.
• Establish a social and political structure of society that promotes accumulation.
In light of institutional economics, planning comes down to concentrating decisions about the allocation of scarce resources in a single center to reduce the costs of conflicts of interest, competition, and incomplete information across multiple economic agents (Didenko, 2019). Thus, planning institutions act as regulators and restraints of competition and reduce transaction costs associated with it. On the other hand, as the reviewed examples of market economies show, institutional competition takes place between planning subjects, both on the part of state structures and the academic and expert community.
In formulating approaches to the analysis of interactions between representatives of the academic and expert community and public authorities in planning, we draw on the works (Campbell & Pedersen 2014, 2015) containing political economy analysis of the role of academic and expert communities in public policy making under certain "knowledge regimes"". Earlier works (Johnson, 1982; White & Wade, 1988) introduced one of the key concepts we use, the "developmental state"".
Since there is a consensus among the proponents of planning that it should be based on scientific approaches, methods, and recommendations, the relevant management structures need the support of academic and expert knowledge to make such decisions. For this purpose, research units, academic and expert councils are formed within government structures. But as the national economy and management processes become more complex, such support is increasingly being provided through outsourcing to specialized, trusted, and to some extent state-affiliated academic, expert, and analytical structures ("think tanks").
Thus, scholars and experts become subjects of the political market. At the same time, from the neo-institutional theory of political markets (Afontsev, 2010; 2017), it follows that political decision makers (hereinafter referred to as PDM) who demand the expertise of scholars may to some extent ignore their evidence-based recommendations aimed at maximizing public welfare, and the economic policies pursued by PDM do not meet the criteria of optimality.
The most important criteria of efficacy and efficiency of interaction between institutions, which ensure the implementation of the above objectives in the light of the development economics, can be formulated as follows:
• Growth of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and human development index (HDI) as key indicators of economic and social development in relative terms (reducing the gap with the leader, the world average).
• Maintaining institutional sustainability.
• Ensuring the ability of the institutional system to evolve.
From the standpoint of these criteria, in the reference countries, the interaction between representatives of the academic community and state authorities in indicative planning, development planning, program management of the national economy turned out to be more effective than in the USSR economy. This is evidenced, in particular, by the relative dynamics of their key economic and social development indicators (see Fig. 1, 2). Most of the countries in our sample which widely applied various tools of planned market economy regulation were relatively successful in pursuing catch-up development. At the same time, the preference for directive planning methods in the USSR provided only temporary successes in the implementation of catchup modernization.
Figure 1. GDP per capita of the sample countries compared to the USA
Figure 2. HDI of the sample countries compared to the USA
Source: calculated by the author according to (MPD, 2018); at Source: calculated by the author according to (Prados de la
the 1990 PPP
Escosura, 2015); on the historical HDI
The following cases of institutions where the interactions took place show signs of efficacy and efficiency against other criteria.
On the brink of and after World War II, indicative planning was widely implemented in Western Europe as a response to lagging dynamics relative to the United States, which had shown an earlier recovery from the "Great Depression" and had not experienced such a severe recession as a result of the war. And the decline of the economy in the mid-1940s also affected neutral countries (including Sweden), although to a lesser extent.
Among the countries of Western Europe, indicative planning in the system of instruments of "dirigisme" economic policy has been applied in France most consistently and for a long time. Its main feature is a focus on macroeconomic performance, with minimal government intervention in decision-making at the micro level. That said, the French approach to planning included an initial prioritization of policy choices, which prompted questions about the extent to which it was scientific (Wickham, 1963).
The first 4-year plan (1947-1950) was developed under the slogan "Modernization or Decline", popularized by Jean-Paul Monet, who headed the General Planning Commission ((Commissariat général du Plan) ) (Kindleberger, 1967). This new agency and the Public Treasury (Trésor Public) subsequently consisted of a small number of professionals working both on a full-time and part-time basis. The first plans included investment, production, price indicators. The practice whereby the draft plan was submitted to advisory councils with scholar participation was established by the mid-1960s. At the planning stage, the Economic and Social Council (Conseil économique et social) was also involved, with broad representation of interest groups, including academics. Academic expertise was provided by the Center of Consumer Research (Centre de Recherches et de Documentations sur la Consommation) and the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques) (Kindleberger, 1967). In 1982, the planning system in France was complemented by the National Planning Commission (Commission
nationale de la planification) with advisory functions.
An important stage was the introduction of econometric modelling in 1971-1975, which took place simultaneously with the USSR, where some materials were published from joint academic events with French economists. This applied research work was commissioned by the Commissariat général du Plan and executed by the Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques. The systematization of forecasts and the analysis of the effects of economic policy became important areas of its activity.
Among the Western European scholars, a notable case is the work of J. Tinbergen (the first winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1969), who established the new body of interaction between the academic community and public authorities, the Central Planning Bureau (Centraal Plan Bureau), in the Netherlands between 1945 and 1955. This body was an advisory think tank to the Ministry of Economy, but its forecasts became normative, limiting the budgetary powers of the Ministry of Finance (Bos, 2008). These predictions were based on Tinbergen's dynamic models of macroeconomic policy in business cycles as fluctuations around a secular trend (De Wolff & Van der Linden, 1988). In 1955, he returned to academia, heading the development programs at the Netherlands School of Economics (Nederlandse Economische Hogeschool). Currently, the Centraal Plan Bureau is one of the two think tanks (the other being the macroeconomic part of the national central bank) that develops forecasts that form the basis for fiscal policy decisions. At the same time, public funding accounts for at least 80% of its budget.
Another case of interaction between academic knowledge and state regulation of the economy is represented by the work of G. Myrdal (Nobel Prize winner 1974). Throughout much of his life, he acted as both a public intellectual and a politician, designing and building Sweden's national model of a welfare state and an interventionist, full-employment state. In the 1930s, he combined parliamentary and academic activities; from 1945 to 1947, he was Minister of Trade of Sweden; from 1947 to 1957, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) (Myrdal, 1975). In this position, he contributed to the global trend of 1930s-1960s of economic planning transition from the national to the international level. The economic research at the UNECE secretariat was mostly applied; G. Myrdal managed regular academic exchanges with scholars from the "Eastern bloc" countries (Stinsky, 2018). The views of G. Myrdal are characterized by an Enlightenment-style technocratism; the belief that a shift in power toward experts and planners as social engineers are a strategic path toward solving the key problems of his modern, crisis-ridden capitalist society.
Among East Asian countries, Japan was the first to successfully catch up. The main factor of the "Japanese miracle" in the literature is the establishment of an effective "developmental state", the main role in which was assigned to the bureaucracy (in the Weberian sense), formed and functioning according to meritocratic principles (Johnson, 1982). In this system, the main ministries with authority that engaged the expertise of scholars were the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Japan's Economic Planning Agency.
Japan's public administration system has an extensive and sustained network of advisory councils involving scholars. At the same time, the literature notes that the demand from the authorities is often determined not so much by the need for their competence in special scientific knowledge, as by the use of public trust: well-known academics serve as the "showcase" of power structures and their "public relations" tool (Tsurutani, 1986). This is largely a consequence of the high social prestige of academic knowledge, which, in turn, determines that an important social function of scholars is seen as an integral expression of the public interest rather than of individual groups. At the same time, an important tool for advisory board members to influence the economic policy-making of their respective entities is their informal recommendations regarding the hiring and promotion of junior research staff (Tsurutani, 1986).
In South Korea, the role and importance of the developmental state came into sharper form in the face of stiff institutional competition with North Korea, which had imported the institutions of a centrally administered economy from China and the USSR, and in the most rigid form. Following the change of South Korea's political regime and the ascension to power of authoritarian President Park Chung-hee (1962-1979), authoritative and powerful bodies were established to draft and oversee the implementation of seven five-year
plans of the "developmental state" (1962-1992). First and foremost is the Economic Planning Board, which coordinated the ministries in the financial and economic bloc since 1961 (Aymes, 2014). The competing institution was the secretive Presidential Council for Heavy and Chemical Industry Planning (1973). The planners chose the technology to develop these industries in closer cooperation with entrepreneurs than with economists and engineers (Luedde-Neurath, 1988).
The Korea Development Institute was established in 1971 and occupied a central place among research centers (Mo, 2005) Its head was proposed by the head of the Economic Planning Board and appointed by the President of South Korea. This center served as a source of economic policy expertise and advice by employing predominantly foreign-educated Koreans and paying world-class scholars. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, government agencies began to establish their own research and analytical units, largely reserving the industry portion of expertise for themselves (Aymes, 2014).
China is the largest national economy that has been most successful in making the transition from prescriptive planning to development planning. It should be noted that during the period of directive planning, China was relatively successful in social development (narrowing the gap in historical HDI) with relatively stagnant economy (see Fig. 1, 2). The human capital accumulated during this period, the restored institutional capacity of the state, along with the newly rebuilt environment ensuring the quality of functioning of market institutions, became important sources of China's growth during the period of economic reforms (Popov, 2014; Van Leeuwen et al., 2015).
Since the late 1970s, the functioning authoritarian ideocratic regime has shifted in the economic sphere from trying to replace market signals with state intervention to managing these signals . This was also reflected in the renaming of the central government's planning body . At the same time, the initial period of reforms featured consolidation its powers and building the technological and institutional quality of the system of planning bodies, which in the pre-reform period was thought as poor (White, 1988).
While preparing and approving five-year plans, which takes more than 2 years, there are several rounds of discussion involving various stakeholders (including research institutes, individual scholars). At the same time, 'scientization' is declared as one of the three basic principles of planning, along with democratization and institutionalization (Hu, 2013).
In addition, in recent decades, China has witnessed the institutionalization of the system of research centers for economic policy making. Their employees have become advisers to top government leaders, starting with Jiang Zemin. Let us illustrate the interaction between government, business, and academia with the China Center for International Economic Exchange (CCIEE) - a research center that operates under the direction, supervision, and scope of the National Development and Reform Commission. It is not only a PR project aimed to improve the perception of the PRC abroad. Public intellectuals, especially those with degrees from abroad, are seen as almost equal partners, candidates for government positions (Li, 2009). At the same time, party-state figures seek academic positions before and after they leave office. There is an intellectual pluralism in China's economic policy-making with a number of political constraints.
In Taiwan, the role of historical legacy and foreign expertise has become quite distinct. The evolution of planning institutions was determined by the continued political power of the Kuomintang, which was strongly influenced by socialist ideas. Before 1949, this party established planning institutions in mainland China's controlled territory, later restructured by the communist regime. Key agencies (Economic Planning and Development Council, Ministry of Economic Affairs) partly inherited the expertise of scholars and specialists from the Republic of China (on the mainland until 1949). Moreover, engineers rather than economists dominated among them (Kirby, 1990). Economists have had a larger role in shaping monetary policy, but a smaller role in industrial policy (Wade, 1988). Also, Taiwan, more so than South Korea, which was also under U.S. military control, had a greater role for U.S. experts and scholars than for local specialists (Moore, 1988).
In India, back under British colonial rule in 1938, a National Planning Committee was set up and chaired by J. Nehru, who later became the Prime Minister of India. After independence from Great Britain (1947), the formation of national economic planning institutions continued. Established in 1950, The India
Planning Commission, also headed by Prime Minister J. Nehru, became a ministry with mega powers, while bringing in specialist scientists to serve on a special committee. The Committee for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) has played a significant role in shaping economic policy (Maiti, 2013).
A major statistician P.C. Mahalanobis became an advisor to the government and the founder and director of the Indian Statistical Institute, which functioned as a think tank for developing plans for the national economy. In 1955-1967, he was also part of the leadership of the Planning Commission. He based the development of India's second five-year plan (1956-1961) on a two-sector growth model with increasing the rate of accumulation (similar to the model by G.A. Feldman (1928), which contributed to arguments in favor of the rapid industrialization of the USSR). After promoting the computers imported from Western Europe, the USA, and the USSR in planning, Mahalanobis argued for the priority of civilian over military objectives (Menon, 2018).
The development and approval ofplans in India was practiced under a democratic system, with significant involvement of the media and parliament. With the implementation of pro-market reforms in the 1990s, the role of the Planning Commission, transformed as of 2015 to the National Institution for Transforming India (NITI Aayog), has been substantially modified. NITI Aayog's function as a "think tank" of industry expertise has recently been strengthened .
Thus, in all of the countries under review, planning systems have shown the ability to reform, avoiding dismantling or chaotic disintegration. Having largely addressed the challenges of recovery growth and catchup development, state planning institutions have been substantially modified by strengthening the functions of applied research centers, strategic analysis, and industry expertise to support economic policy decision-making.
Thus, above we have set out the study results for the practices of extensive and systematic use of planning tools in market economies at national level, primarily, the interaction of representatives of the academic and expert community and public authorities. When comparing them with similar institutions in the USSR, a question comes to mind: could the economy with directive planning be transformed into a more flexible model, similar to what happened, for example, in China?
We believe that Soviet planning practices could evolve towards models with greater institutionalization of competitive relations between the various actors of economic management and with stronger feedback loops.
In particular, as an example of indicative planning, development planning, program management of the national economy (as opposed to directive operational planning), we can consider the attempts of interaction between scholars and managers in prospective planning and long-term forecasting of the Soviet economy development (The CPSU Program, 1961, 1986 editions, drafts of the Integrated Programs of Scientific and Technical Progress).
However, due to the sub-optimal configuration of the political market, which is beyond the scope of this paper, this evolutionary potential has not been realized.
Based on the above cases of institutional interactions, the following main actors can be identified.
• On the part of the academic community:
- Individual prominent famous scholars.
- Scholars in the role of top civil servants and advisers to the top branch bureaucracy.
- Universities.
- Professional organizations of the academic community.
- Organized research groups within government agencies.
- Expert and advisory councils under state structures.
- Research and expert units within government agencies.
• On the part of public authorities (PDM):
- Top political leadership.
- The top economic bureaucracy.
- Top branch bureaucracy (departmental leadership).
- Mid-level economic bureaucracy (state and dependent corporations).
In any political regime, PDMs are divided into public politicians (who serve as the highest political authority) and administrative servants (the bureaucracy in Weber's sense). Typically, public policy-makers use individual well-known scholars as advisors who, in turn, enlist the services of their teams, to varying degrees of institutionalization. In our models, we shall limit ourselves to the state apparatus, especially since the nature of its relationship with public politicians does not vary that much across political regimes. At the same time, the relationship of the bureaucracy with the academic community along professional lines varies greatly.
To build on the above narrative, taking into account the practices of interaction between scholars and the bureaucracy in the USSR (Mitrokhin, 2020; Safronov, 2019, 2020), below is a brief description of the main historical models of institutional interactions between economic science and political power. Note that in all of the presented models, both cooperative and non-cooperative, and often conflicting, natures of interaction between cooperating and competing subjects are possible.
Extra-centralized model - the model presented in the economy of the USSR in the 1930s-mid-1950s. (Fig. 3). It is a rigidly hierarchical and least institutionalized model, in which ad hoc interactions with minimal rule compliance (due to their vague definition or lack thereof) prevail.
Institutional competition between groups of scholars is minimized, as the authorities view scholars solely as a type of civil servants and minimally allow organizations expressing their special interests. The competition of scholars in this model is uninstitutionalized (the means are ideological charges; the consequences of losing are super-hard). In a mobilization economy, where primitive directive planning techniques are applied, only those representatives of academic knowledge who work within the higher structures of the state apparatus are involved in the formation of economic policy. The remaining scholars are engaged in basic and applied research of branch scale, popularization of academic knowledge, and education. The discussion of economic policy issues is completely closed and takes place through key economic departments and divisions of the state apparatus.
Source: composed by the author
Figure 3. Extra-centralized model
Centralized model - the model introduced in the USSR economy in the mid-1950s-1980s. (Fig. 2). This model has the key attributes of the previous one, but in a softened form and, what is fundamentally important, it has the precursors of a quasi-market of expertise in the field of economic policy - "think tanks" (research institutes), the demand for intellectual services weakly expressed by the ruling party, government, and departmental (branch) bureaucracy. The Academy of Sciences, as a professional organization of the academic community, begins to act as an important subject. The bureaucracy allocates areas of activity between research institutes, which overlap time to time, creating the potential for competitive relations between different representatives and institutions of the academic community. At the same time, these relationships are becoming more orderly and more subject to rules: ideological accusations become rare, often fail, and the consequences for the losers are relatively moderate. Nevertheless, the bureaucracy still prefers to attract competent scholars it trusts to work in the higher structures of the state apparatus.
Source: composed by the author
Figure 4. Centralized model
Hard quasi-market-based model - the model of market signal management under an authoritarian regime (South Korea in the 1960s-1980s, Taiwan in the 1950s-1980s, China since the 1980s).
This model, like the centralized model, maintains a high degree of centralization and hierarchy. However, with the increasing complexity of the economic system, an economically motivated bureaucracy becomes an important actor on the demand side of academic and expert knowledge. Large and in-demand think tanks are emerging due to this demand. These think tanks interact with both the top state and departmental (branch) bureaucracies. They can be either affiliated with government agencies through affiliation relations or legally independent, but economically dependent on the available government contracts. The role of professional organizations of the academic community can be different: it is generally lower than in the centralized model, but higher than in the more market-oriented models with hybrid and democratic political regimes. In the competition between think tanks and individual representatives of the academic and expert community, international experience and connections become an important factor. The exchange of personnel between academic and governmental structures takes place in both directions. In contrast to the centralized model, mechanisms are created to align interests with large economic entities, providing an effective for the national
economy set of their combinations. The strong feedback loops in such a system lead to an iterative process of reviewing plans and other economic policy decisions.
Source: composed by the author
Figure 5. Hard quasi-market-based model
Soft quasi-market-based model - a market economy model with strong government regulation in a hybrid regime (Japan in the 1950s-1980s, India in the 1950s-mid-1960s, post-Soviet Russia).
The parliament and other democratic institutions determine stronger feedback between political market actors than under an authoritarian regime. In this model, a wide range of combinations of economically and politically rational solutions is possible while matching the interests of different groups. There are also strong think tanks and organized research groups, which are staffed by research and higher education professionals, and the state authorities (which can also be staffed by think tanks). These centers may have varying degrees of legal affiliation with state structures, but in fact act as quasi-state centers. This model allows for a broader discussion of economic policy issues, involving think tanks close to political parties.
At the same time, they often engage the broader academic and expert community late in the decision-making process. The role of professional organizations in this community is also weak. At the same time, the expert and advisory councils under the branch departments often act as their "public relations" vehicle, the members of these councils influence the work of the departments through informal mechanisms.
Thus, in post-Soviet Russia, the leading universities, academic institutions, expert and analytical centers send their feedback to the Federal Assembly and publish their comments and recommendations on draft budget. The latter is actually the basic operational document of short-term planning in the public sector of the Russian economy for up to three years. However, the suggestions from scholars are only taken into account to a small extent during the amendment process. But even leaving this issue aside, it shall be recognized that this procedure creates an institution that can evolve with changes in the political market.
Soft state-led market-based model - a market economy model with strong state regulation under a democratic regime (the Netherlands, France in 1950s-1980s).
Source: composed by the author
Figure 6. Soft quasi-market-based model
The presence of research and expert units in state structures is combined with a wide range of state (former planning and coordinating bodies of executive power), quasi-state, and party think tanks. Think tanks, other academic institutions and universities, and the state apparatus exchange their employees. The developed democratic institutions of the political system are combined with a diverse landscape of competing entities generating applied knowledge to shape an active state economic policy (which has received the not entirely accurate designation of "industrial policy", in its various versions). Openness presupposes several rounds of discussion with opposing structures, a high degree of competitiveness of proposals, and subtle mechanisms of reaching consent between distinct (but not opposing) interests of economic units. However, for all its pluralism and inclusiveness, this model follows the principle of hierarchy and the coordinating role played by the bureaucratic structures of the state apparatus, which acts as the principal customer of academic expertise.
Conclusion
The economic policy is shaped at the intersection of political and economic rationality in the interaction between scholars and state structures in all of the countries considered. Their cases show that it is possible to implement planning adequately such an economy, in which the functioning of the interaction institutions between the political and economic stakeholders is sufficiently established. Implementation of an active and proactive economic policy to ensure catch-up development of a national economy relied on the established institutions for interaction between the academic and expert community and the government in its design and adjustment.
To a greater extent, this can be said about countries with prevailing market mechanisms of economic regulation. To a lesser extent - about the centrally administered economy of the USSR, where academic assessment of economic decisions was rigidly embedded in the hierarchical system of PDM; and only in the second half of the 1950s and 1960s, a network of autonomous think tanks started to emerge. With all the shortcomings of their interaction with state structures in post-Soviet Russia, they make an institutional basis for the subsequent more active use of modern tools and technologies of current and strategic planning of the
national economy.
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Figure 7. Soft state-led market-based model
Source: composed by the author
As a follow-up to the research program of studying practices of wide application of national economy planning tools of the market type, it seems important to consider the following lines further:
• Generalization and typology of rules and practices of interaction in development, adoption, and implementation of economic policy recommendations.
• Determining which of these rules and practices contribute to the reproduction of a country's market system, which leads to its improvement, and which give rise to problems, contradictions, and conflicts.
Their solution is fundamentally important in searching for an answer to the current question: which planning institutions could prove workable in modern Russia.
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Received 10.09.2021 Revised 20.11.2021 Accepted 10.12.2021
