CC BY
17
Economics //TW Austrian Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 11-12 (2016)
< BAiTWEST >
SdB*ELMTTS
- ISSN 2310-5593 (Print) / ISSN 2519-1209 (Online) -
УДК 338 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20534/AJH-16-11.12-104-112
V. V. SHLYCHKOV1
1 Kazan National Technical University named after A. N. Tupolev
ABOUT SOME ASPECTS OF INCREASING EFFICIENCY OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY
Abstract
Objective: to examine historical and social-economic reasons for choosing a raw way of development of the Russian economy; to analyze the results of structural reforms in Russia.
Methods: methodological framework of the research was based on ensuring the unity of logic and historical approaches; the authors have used methods, which are widely employed in research activity: descriptive, analysis and synthesis, deduction and induction, generalization, observation, forecasting and etc., as well as methods of interindustry analysis, expert judgments; combination of these methods allowed the authors to ensure accuracy of the research and validity of its conclusions.
Results: this work demonstrates historical transformations in Russian economic system and also illustrates comprehension of necessity to modernize national economy, as well as lack of consensus among economists, experts and scientific society in finding ways and methods of solving this problem.
Scientific novelty: analysis of different sources and expert opinions, which was performed in this work, allowed us to determine that, the main vector of modernization in the Russian economy is to carry out a large-scale industrialization of industrial production and to create new work places related to the VI technological way.
Practical relevance: According to research results, the author forecasts possible consequences of emerging trends in modernization of Russian economy in a medium and long-term perspective.
Keywords: economic restructuring, VI technological way, modernization of industry, social assistance, strategy of national economic development.
Thanks to specific character of its geopolitical location, presence of vast territories and world's greatest stocks of natural resources, Russia has been developing over centuries primarily as agricultural state, economic system of which was based on agricultural production and extraction of mineral resources. Taxes and incomes, which were collected from export of raw material, for a long time allowed to replenish treasury and to a greater or lesser extent of efficacy to perform state duties in the field of defense, foreign policy, maintenance of public order and etc. And if Russian state always played an important role on a political stage ofEurope, it could never objectively claim the status of being the world center of economic growth in matters of running the national economy.
Presence of considerable labor supplies and relevant availability of huge natural resources created natural competitive advantages for Russian economy on the 19th century emerging international market, but at the same time it reduced motivation for developing its own industrial production. While the leading Europe-
an countries in conditions of increasing competition strived to improve technologies, raise labor productivity and deploy every piece of land in economic turnover, Russia dynamically developed thanks to acquisition of new territories in Ural, Siberia and the Far East. Investments into agricultural production, trade and export of raw materials brought the guaranteed considerable incomes for investors during a short period of time, what allowed without much effort to attract circulating assets for financing of similar projects. At the same time, building of new industrial enterprises was connected with considerable risks and demanded other approaches for estimation of economic development perspectives and presence of qualified engineering personnel, and most significantly — quite large-scale and long-term investments. In these conditions Russian capital chose a less expensive "raw" variant of national economic development, concentrating its recourses on the branches that are typical for the agrarian society. Foreign investors were guided by the same
< iAgTWEST >
SCBJCEUHrTTS
reasoning, profitably investing their capital into trade, development of mineral recourses and construction of transport infrastructure for their export.
Russian industrial enterprises, which were constructed since the end of the 19th century within the framework of industrialization, performed manufacturing process generally on the basis of borrowed European technologies, and were almost fully targeted at domestic consumption and did not provoke strong competition for West European manufacturers on the international market. Consequently, until the second half of the twentieth century Russians seldom were at the cutting edge of scientific-technological revolutions that occurred in the world; and certain achievements in some fields of science and industry did not influence the general level of development of national economy that prior to socialist industrialization in the 30-s developed within the framework of the second technological way and on the eve of the Second World War was in need of urgent modernization and structural reformation.
All economic reforms in Russia were commonly carried out "from above" not so much under strong pressure of internal contradictions as that of external factors. As a rule, invited foreign specialists acted as change agents, and their aim was to implement the cutting-edge European scientific and technological achievements into Russian economy. At the same time, since the beginning of the 17th century European governments consecutively began to carry out the policy of economic growth containment in regard to Russia, regarding it solely as a supplier of raw material recourses; and they were interested in technological weakness of the potential competitor and probable military adversary.
The fundamental social and political changes, which occurred in the world during the last 300 years, did not fundamentally change attitude of leading and now world economies towards Russia, which, the same as at the time of Peter I, they wanted to see primarily as raw source of its own economic development. In conditions of globalization of world economy, a famous status "Great energetic power" that was assigned to Russia at the beginning of the 21st century, although in a seemingly attractive form for Russians, actually confirms its role as an appendage of the world economy, and the policy of economic sanctions and technological restrictions, performed by USA and Western European governments in relation to our country, clearly demonstrates their actual goals and true intentions.
The contemporary Russian economy, a historical path of which began in 1991, already has a considerable experience in reformation and modernization. The independent Russian state, which emerged within the former RSFSR's boundaries, laid in the basis of its economic model a heritage of the Soviet administrative system in the form ofworn-out basic production assets, largely outdated technologies, lack of resources for capital contributions (investments), considerable external debts and etc. The only liquid assets of the Soviet heritage were Russian land, forests, water and world's largest explored reserves of natural resources, including "blood" of the modern economy — hydrocarbons. At the time when the possibility of existence of Russia as an independent and sovereign state remained doubtful, "energy and raw materials" scenario and use of natural competitive advantages of the gas-and-oil power again became an optimal way for the national economy development. The transition to a foreground development of the oil-and-gas sector, which was forced under these circumstances, only intensified a raw orientation of the Russian economy, however, the revenues, which were obtained on foreign markets, could ensure that the social obligations towards population were performed by authorities and a political situation was stabilized.
Transformation of the Russian economic system was inseparable from transformation of the country's socio-political structure, refusal from dominance of Communist ideology in society, including the Marxist economic dogmas and tenets, existing both in scientific theory and economic practice. The economic bloc of Russian Government under the leadership of E. T. Gaidar, selecting "Westernization" as a strategic development direction [1, p. 54], transferred the Russian economy to market basis, introduced the institution of private property, carried out privatization of state property, created a fundamentally new banking system and independent financial institutions and etc. The economic model, which was created for a short period of time and involved great expenses, allowed to stabilize a socio-economic situation in the country and to stop the processes of state decentralization, however, because of initially limited capacities it could not provide a further progressive development, and most of reforms (energy, pension system, small business support, antimonopoly policy, etc.), which are traditionally held in Russia "from above", depleted their positive inner message by the early 2000-s and did not achieve the stated goals.
< EASTWEST >
SdB*ELMTTS
The change of the country's head, which happened in 2000, resulted in a review of national development priorities and a significant adjustment of socio-economic policy. Since 1991 both society and political elite gradually developed the understanding that rejection of ideological and military confrontation with the West did not automatically made Russia an equal partner of the leading economically developed countries, geopolitical interests of which are a priori aimed at achieving the superiority over any potential competitor. In fact, this confrontation was only transformed into new forms of competition, since the Russian economy, which took the market path of development, turned into a serious opponent for the West, whose behavior on the global international market is no longer burdened by Marxist-Leninist dogmas and is defined by pragmatic understanding of its own economic and political interests. At the same time, economy of the new Russia, not fully using its potential, already began to demonstrate a positive development trend and a growing influence on the global economy, what caused a response of "partners" in the form of activation of the containment policy, financial sanctions and restrictions on economic activities. Moreover, having estimated the results of the cold war in their own way, Western countries on the rights of the "winners" tried to assign to Russia the role of "regional state" and source of raw materials for international economy, as well as to take a full control over the Russian domestic market, having reached in this way a significant progress.
The situation when "share of imported equipment and technologies in metallurgy — 75%, in fuel-and-energy complex and timber industry — 70%" and "agriculture almost entirely depends on imports of seeds, pesticides, veterinary products, equipment for poultry farms and livestock breeding complexes" [2] clearly demonstrates success of our "partners" in struggle for the Russian market and failure of the current model of the national economy to ensure economic and thus, as a final result, political sovereignty.
Economic sanctions, which were imposed on Russia in 2014, undoubtedly played a negative role in slowdown of the national economy, restricting the direct access to external investment resources and the latest technologies for Russian economic agents [3; 4]. However, sanctions would not be so painful, if the current economic model did not initially involve system internal contradictions, and if it would have necessary immunity against negative external influences and large adaptive
capacities, which can be ensured only by a high degree of economic and technological self-sufficiency.
Nowadays authorities and most of Russians have full understanding of necessity for national economic modernization, but in our society there is no consensus in finding ways and methods of solving this task, in establishment ofpriorities and determination of strategic reformation vector. In addition, there are no common approaches to this problem within Russian economic society, where contradictory and sometimes mutually exclusive viewpoints in regard to prospects for state economic development exist simultaneously. At the same time, the idea of restructuring the Russian economy and releasing it from raw and, first of all, oil-and-gas dependence is supported by most of experts and scientists, regardless of their commitment to any given scientific schools and movements.
Russian economic science, despite existing contradictions (maybe thanks to them), continues to develop and is ready to offer alternative models of economic growth. The economic community has been discussing over the last years "Strategies of interactive modernization" by academician of Russian Academy of Sciences V. M. Polterovich, "Strategies of advanced development of Russia in conditions of global crisis" by academician of Russian Academy of Sciences S. U. Gla-zyev, the development strategies developed by academician R. I. Nigmatullin and etc. We think that, after discussion and certain adjustments, each of the above-mentioned scientific concepts can constitute at least a part of the scientific foundation of the new economic development strategy of the country, and collective efforts of Russian economists will allow consequently to formulate the unified theoretical and methodological approaches to reformation of national economy. However, lack of any real public demand and political will of the country's leadership does not allow to transfer this process from the realm of scientific debate to practical implementation.
Nowadays the strategy "Innovative Russia-2020" and its slightly modified version "New strategy 2020", assumed as a basis of the economic policy, do not quiet adequately reflect the economic realities and need at least a serious correction with account of changed external economic and political factors. Moreover, it is necessary to invite for this work the widest possible range of scientists and experts, who deal with problems of economy not only at the federal level, but also in regions and mu-
< IASTWEST >
SCBJCEUNrTTS
nicipal entities, because exactly here the vast majority of economic agents conduct their business activity.
However, it must be born in mind that the Government's economic policy does not quiet effectively stimulate regions for conduct of structural reforms and modernization of industry, giving them a relative freedom of behavior in this, as a matter of fact, non-alternative process. Today the economically weak subjects successfully compensate their economic inactivity at the expense of considerable financial subsidies from federal centre and sometimes harmfully for development of real sector of their economy direct the lobbying efforts towards increasing this assistance in the future. At the same time, systematic and diligent work on modernization of economy of foremost regions leads just to the increase of their tax base and, thus, the amount of payments towards federal center, because the current budget mechanism does not provide them with any preferences in the course of replenishing the treasury with additional incomes, obtained through improving the "quality" of economy [5; 6].
As for municipal authorities, the existing fiscal and tax systems almost do not motivate them for introduction of innovations; and the amount of tax revenues to local budgets does not have any direct connection with the technological level of enterprises that run economic activities on their territories. Moreover, development of production with a large amount of manual labor in a small Russian town has more economical advantages for local authorities than creation of a small innovative enterprise, as it allows to employ more workers and to reduce the unemployment rate in this municipal entity. The land tax, collected nowadays, is the basis for local budget formation and its volume is calculated on the cadastral value of land; however, the existing correction coefficients to business activities of economic agents significantly affect its final amount. So, if in the city of Kazan the land will be allocated for organization of trade or public catering, its owner will annually pay 0.4% of its cadastral value as a tax. At the same time, if any production will be created on the land of similar location and size, its owners will pay to the local budget the standard rate — 1.5% of its cadastral value, what obviously does not motivate economic agents for the production activity.
After comprehensive analysis of socio-economic situation in the country, the invited experts must submit two papers to the society's approval — the new "Economic strategy of Russia for the period up to 2040"
and the document elaborated on its basis "Program of development of Russian economy" for the same period. "Strategy" must be removed from false economic recipes and become a scientific-theoretical justification for practical steps of participants of modernization process of the existing economic model, distinguishing a special role of the state as the main coordinator and moderator of socio-economic transformations. The strategy should clearly and specifically determine goals and tasks of reforms, methods and mechanisms for their achievement, as well as a strategic vector of the Russian economic development and establish target values that allow an objective monitoring of the process. Under conditions of limited resources, it is extremely important to correctly set priorities of development, understanding in advance that "desire to preserve all industries will lead to decrease of national standards of living" [7].
The fundamental provisions of the new economic strategy, coordinated at the level of expert community, should be submitted for nationwide discussion and undergo the procedure of public hearings with subsequent legal registration not in the form of RF President's Decree (as it was in 2012), but in the form of a full-fledged law adopted by the Federal Assembly and signed by the RF President. The government should take full advantage of its ideological apparatus and organize discussions on economic issues in federal and regional mass media with participation of the most authoritative experts and public opinion leaders, as it was done in the matter of reunification of Crimea with Russia. Meanwhile, the phrases, quite often used by our colleagues, such as "The intense discussion has developed in society concerning ways of modernization of the economy" do not correspond to realities, because the problems of macroeconomics, excluding the exchange rate dynamics and probably the future of pension reform, are not included in the priorities of most of Russian citizens and their discussion still remains the prerogative of a relatively small group of specialists.
As for informative content of the new "Strategy", we think that it should be focused on the domestic market development and be based on a large-scale industrialization of industrial production and technological modernization of the entire national economy. One of the main goals of economic policy should be exactly the formation of a competitive economic system, based on hightech workplaces related to the VI technological way; and the actual number of these created workplaces will act
Austrian Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 11-12 (2016)
< BAiTWEST >
Economics
as an indicator of readiness of individual sectors, specific enterprises, regions, municipalities and economic agents for modernization of their production and reception of investments. At the same time it is necessary to establish the unified federal methodology that certifies the compliance of technologies and workplaces with the VI technological way in order to eliminate inevitable attempts of abuse, made by individual subjects, who unreasonably seek to obtain privileges and preferences of participants of modernization process [8].
We must accept the fact that the V technological way was not mastered by the Russian economy, and at the present time, when during modernization the world's leading economies "throw off" their productions to other countries, there are significant risks to take the beaten path and for the sake of immediate benefits to open our market for actually outdated technologies and equipment. A similar situation already occurred in our history, when since 1945 the reliable captured German machine tools and equipment of III technological way had been taken as basis of development of the Soviet industry for many years. Meanwhile, Western countries actively started the transition to IV technological way and on its basis performed the construction of new enterprises, which in the medium term gave them considerable competitive advantages in the economic competition with USSR and countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
Today, life itself suggests the answers to many controversial questions. Thus, in conditions of economic sanctions imposed on Russia, there is no more point in developing the discussion about priorities of import substitution or export-oriented way of Russian economic development. We think that in this case one option does not completely exclude the other one and there is the opportunity to find a compromise in determining the vector of its development. If under realization of the import substitution policy the domestic producer will be given the task of production output, qualitative characteristics of which will exceed the best world samples in all main indicators, in fact we will talk about creation of the final product that can successfully compete on the foreign market. Of course, in conditions when national security and defense of the country require extraordinary measures for substitution of supplied foreign components during production of military equipment or issue of medicines essential for the population, the state should focus its efforts on solving such problems
as a top priority. However, following a comprehensive audit and identification of specific items for import substitution and within the framework of already scheduled work, the Russian economy will be able to find an optimal balance between the demands of domestic market and its foreign economic interests.
It is necessary to take the list of 27 critical technologies as the basis of work on import substitution [9] and already today to formalize the requirement of using only domestic components and parts during development and production of new types of products necessary for ensuring the national security, including food, energy, information products and etc. This will allow within 5-7 years (average time of implementation) to gradually eliminate tension in solving the problem of import substitution and in the future to transfer to export-oriented economic policy, realizing that in the global information society, tastes and demands of consumers on domestic and foreign markets will virtually be formed by the same rules and trends, in parallel with a focus on qualitative indicators of "top" examples of the world leaders of the corresponding industries.
As for "Program of development of the Russian economy", it should become the main economic document of the country, a kind of "road map" on the way of national economic development; and considering the state system of Russia it should consist of federal, regional and municipal sections and contain the list of specific steps, which are carried out on certain territories in all sectors and types of economic activity. Activities, which underwent the strong preliminary selection and were included in the "Program", should be aimed at modernization of the economy and development of corresponding productions and territories, proceeding from a comprehensive assessment of their socio-economic potential and, primarily, investment opportunities. Specific sources and amounts of funding, deadlines and effective forms of control should be defined for each item of the "Program".
At the same time "Program" should be free from manipulation with economic terms and be written in the most accessible language; and its internal content should be focused on the comprehension by the vast majority of economic agents. This will allow any concerned subject, after recognition and formulation of his own interests, to find a place for application of his resources and entrepreneurial skills within the framework of a large-scale national process of modernization of the Russian economy.
< IASTWEST >
StBJCEUHÍTÍS
The development of these two fundamental documents will require involvement of a significant number of qualified professionals, improvement of the quality of scientific-analytical work and serious efforts from the entire economic community. We think that today the Russian economic science has the potential necessary for solving this highly complex scientific-practical problem; and the expert community can cope with it within 3-4 years with proper instructions and financing from the political leadership of the country.
Thus, it is necessary to undertake initial steps in economic reformation already today without waiting for elaboration of methodological bases of modernization management process. First of all, maintaining a social orientation, we should transfer to an active economic policy, creating conditions for a permanent increase in the level of economic activity of agents, focusing them on obtaining a positive effect from their activities already in a short-term perspective. The government must direct its efforts towards maintenance ofconsumer spending and investment activity of business, abandoning plans to increase the tax burden, and conducting the policy of tax incentives and subsidization of investment projects, providing financial support for credit institutions of "the second tier" (small and medium-sized regional banks), which directly work with enterprises of the real economic sector.
According to government's forecasts, the Russian economic crisis will continue until 2017 and the further transition to sustainable development of the national economy will be impossible without investments into its modernization and creation of new high-tech production facilities. Some experts think that the current level of investments in the amount of 14 trillion rubles per year can not provide a sustainable growth of the Russian economy in the future and needs an annual increase of 10% or 1.5 trillion rubles for solving this problem [10]. At the same time it is necessary to change the "quality" of investment resources, a considerable part of which should be converted into "long-term" money, which will allow to credit infrastructure projects with a payback period of more than 15-20 years.
As for sources of investments, in conditions of restrictions of foreign borrowings, the main investor of the Russian economy still remains the state itself, which, unfortunately, does not always effectively use its resources. The accumulated gold and foreign exchange stocks and reserve funds, in our view, can play a much bigger role in modernization of the economy, if their significant pro-
portion will come to the real sector of the economy in order to finance the major projects, which are recognized as the locomotives of socio-economic development of the country and have a significant multiplicative effect.
In addition, it is necessary to carry out institutional modernization and to restore public confidence in state institutions and economic policy. The survey of 1,200 entrepreneurs from 16 municipal entities of the Republic of Tatarstan falling under the category "small business", held in April, 2015 by the information-analytical centre "Expert" (city of Kazan), showed that more than 65% of the respondents have significant claims against the state as the main regulator of all social and economic processes, pointing at the inefficiency of its institutions and the current economic mechanisms. Despite numerous statements of the authorities about state support for private initiative in the economy, according to the respondents, the pressure of bureaucracy on businesses only increased in recent years, corruption remained at the same level and its new forms emerged, and the existing economic mechanisms do not provide all economic agents with equal access to distributed resources and state-municipal orders. Real dominance of "manual" control at all levels of Russian governmental authorities only confirms the weakness of state institutions and the lack of unified and effective system of national administration.
Moreover, the Russian state is not regarded as an efficient owner and careful host by 82.3% ofthe respondents. Certain detected cases of ineffective spending billions of rubles from the budget, widely discussed in society, clearly demonstrate the fact that during 24 years of the modern Russian history we failed to create an effective economic model and to establish a system of objective control in order to exclude irrational use of resources and abuse of power. Corruption and numerous cases oflack ofany officials' liabilities for mismanagement and even undisguised stealing make our state in the eyes of the citizens weak and unable to ensure not only a constitutional "equality of all before the law", but also a basic social justice. It is very difficult to find a logical explanation for results of the meeting between the head of "RUSNANO" Anatoly Chubais and representatives of the faction "United Russia", which took place in State Duma on May 22, 2015, during which they discussed results of check-up of the corporation activities, performed by the Counting Chamber of the Russian Federation for the period 2007-2012. Having recognized the inefficiency of investing the company's
< EAiTWEST >
funds in amount of tens ofbillion rubles (not considering 6 billions of administrative costs), and having established the fact that "system of control over expenditure was absent; assessment of the market was inadequate, managers appeared to be ineffective and were dismissed by 60%"
[11], the head of "Rosnano" asked deputies to support his request about allocating more than 50 billion rubles of subsidies for the corporation in 2016-2020 within framework of the state support for nanotechnology and the provision of state loan guarantees in amount of 100 billions. It seems to be quite strange that, on the background of detected and publicly recognized "successes" in development of the first 196 billion rubles from the budget, Anatoly Chubais's team of "professionals" in the same personnel again claim the right to independently command another tranche for nano-development of Russia, which according to media reports will be provided by the Government of the Russian Federation in the near future
[12]. It is hard to imagine a situation in which owners of any transnational corporation approved the similar "positive" results of economic activities of the management team and easily gave it additional financial resources for a new "distribution". It seems to us, that in the similar situation in the West neither past achievements nor private friendly relations would not be able to protect such "successful managers" at least from a shameful resignation, and the perspective of criminal prosecution would become a natural result of evaluation of their activity. But the Russian realities are such that the state authorities, responding to violations of public interests and sometimes their laws, do not always timely take appropriate counter measures, sometimes demonstrating selectivity and inconsistency of the policy, avoiding public discussion of "inconvenient" problems in every possible way.
We think that today in Russia only the institution of presidency has a significant level of trust and public support, while Government, most of ministries and agencies, deputy corps, judiciary system and etc. are subjected to strong criticism from society for low efficiency of their activities. It is possible to restore public trust towards state institutions only through their fundamental modernization, establishment of efficient public control of their activity, and considerable rotation of public officials. As long as any personnel decision is based not on patriotism and professional skills of the applicant for a public position, but on its affiliation with a certain community, it is unlikely to restore the trust of citizens towards state apparatus and to estab-
lish a constructive cooperation between society and state institutions.
At the same time it is necessary to recognize that public support, being a social phenomenon, has a specific and measurable economic value. In this case at the cost of restoration of lost public trust, business processes will be activated and the range of economic agents will be expanded, and the Russian economy will have a relatively new investor — our citizens and households, the total savings of which can fundamentally change the general investment climate. According to the RF Ministry ofEconomic Development as of 01.11.2016, the volume of deposits, which Russian physical persons possess on domestic bank accounts, amounts to 23.4 trillion rubles [13]. Moreover, some analysts think that the volume of cash savings, which the Russians have on "hands", is estimated to be 3 trillion rubles and 200-240 billion USA dollars in a foreign currency, and the total volume of financial assets, possessed by the population, is estimated to be 700 billion dollars, which is almost two times higher than the official gold and exchange currency reserves of Russia [14]. According to the academician A. G. Aganbegyan, 700 billion dollars, owned by Russian citizens, are allocated in offshore companies or on foreign bank accounts [15, p.12].
Today, the population's financial resources work for national economy in the best case through mechanisms of allocating funds on bank deposits and come to the real sector of economy with account of credit institutions' costs and profits. If the state will be able to convince its citizens in its efficiency and reliability, fairness of the judiciary system and predictability of actions of political leadership, it will be possible to expect a gradual upturn of citizens' economic activity, development of new forms of interaction between business and government, formation of a full-fledged Russian stock market, the presence of which always serves as an evidence of stability and steadiness of national economy.
In the case of establishment of the favorable investment climate in Russia, 150 billion dollars, which are located in the accounts of offshore companies associated with the Russian economy, and the exported income from reinvestment into the title companies in the amount of more than 300 billion dollars may become the additional source of economic growth [16, p. 21]. The return of even a part of these funds to the full economic turnover can dramatically affect the growth rate of the Russian economy and minimize negative effects of the economic sanctions imposed on the country.
Austrian Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 11-12 (2016) /rTW Economics
< iAgTWEST >
SCBJCEUNrTTS
- ISSN 2310-5593 (Print) / ISSN 2519-1209 (Online) -
References:
1. Bataykin P. A. Razrabotka i realizatsiya bikheovioriststskoy paradigmy regulirovaniya sovremennoy rossyskoy ekonomiki. - M.: Ekonomika, 2014. - 298 s.
2. Evgeny Primakov nazval glavnye nedostatki nashey ekonomiki. - URL: http://rn.rg.ru/2015/04/02/barrel-site. html.
3. Smirnov V. V., Kadyshev Ye. N., Kadysheva O. N. Potentsial prodovolstvennogo importozameshcheniya regio-na//Ekonomika i predprinimatelstvo. 2016. № 2-2 (67-2). S. 399-405.
4. Timofeyev R. A., Bataykin P. A. Klyuchevye voprosy politiki torgovo-ekonomicheskikh sanktsy v sovremennykh usloviyakh rossyskoy ekonomiki//Vestnik ekonomiki, prava i sotsiologii. 2016. № 1. S. 91-94.
5. Shlychkov V. V., Vedin N. V., Khasanova A.Sh. A Quarter Century of Reform of the Russian Economy: Is it Wandering in a Maze or Jogging in Place?//Indian Journal of Science and Technology. December 2015. Vol 8 (S10). DOI: 10.17485/ijst/2015/v8iS10/84883.
6. Kulish S. M. Analiz osobennostey razvitiya regionalnykh khozyaystvennykh sistem//Segodnya i zavtra Rossyskoy ekonomiki. 2016. № 75-76. S. 109-113.
7. Porter M. Mezhdunarodnaya konkurentsiya: Konkurentnye preimushchestva stran. - M.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1993. - 896 s.
8. Shlychkov V., Nestulaeva D. Economic science and evolution of economic agents' expectations formation pro-cess//Asian Social Science. 2015. T. 11. № 19. C. 82-89. D0I:10.5539/ass.v11n19p82.
9. Perechen kriticheskikh tekhnologiy Rossiyskoy Federatsii (ot 7 iyulya 2011 goda) - URL: http://kremlin. ru/supplement/988.
10. Glazyev S.Yu. O strategii razvitiya rossyskoy ekonomiki./Nauchny doklad. - M.: NIR, 2006. - 132 s.
11. Volobuyev A. Za chto Anatoly Chubays uvolil dve treti menedzherov "Rosnano". - URL: http://lenta.ru/ar-ticles/2015/05/25/rosnano
12. Salmanov O., Rozhkov A. "Rosnano" prosit eshche 50 mlrd rub.//Vedomosti. - 03.02.2015. - № 3763.
13. Monitoring i analiz sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Rossyskoy Federatsii i otdelnykh sektorov eko-nomiki//Minekonomrazvitiya monitoring 28.11.2016 g. - URL: http://economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sec-tions/macro/monitoring
14. Marketing v Rossii 2016. Spravochnik Gildii Marketologov. - M.: Gildiya marketologov, 2016.
15. Aganbegyan A. G. O prichinakh zamedleniya sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya strany i vozmozhnostyakh perekhoda k operezhayushchim tempam rosta//Aktualnye voprosy ekonomicheskoy strategii Rossii. - M.: Iz-daniye Gosudarstvennoy Dumy, 2014. - 64 s. - S. 4-12.
16. Ivanter V. V., Porfiryev B. N., Shirov A. A., Moiseyev A. K. Ekonomichesky rost i ekonomicheskaya politika v Rossii//Aktualnye voprosy ekonomicheskoy strategii Rossii. - M.: Izdaniye Gosudarstvennoy Dumy, 2014. -64 s. - S. 13-26.
Information about the authors
Shlychkov Valeriy Vladimirovich, doctor of economic sciences, professor of Economic Theory Department Kazan
National Research Technical University named after A. N. Tupolev
420111, Kazan, st. Karl Marx, 10; tel. +7 (843) 231-01-91
E-mail: shlichkov_valery@mail.ru
ORCID: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3307-2153
