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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Marat ILIYASOV
Master's Degree in Political Science from Vilnius State University
(Tbilisi, Georgia).
INSTABILITY IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS: REASONS, FACTORS, AND IMPLICATIONS
Abstract
The Northern Caucasus is the most unstable area of the Russian Federation. Violence broke out there almost as soon as the U.S.S.R. collapsed and continues until this day.
The explosiveness of the Northern Caucasus, according to scholars, is determined by such factors as ethnic and religious diversity. However, deeper analysis shows that they can only be supplementary stimuli for the instability. The same applies to economic issues. They may fuel
conflict in the region, but they cannot be reasons themselves. The volatility in the Northern Caucasus originates in the Chechen nationalist movement for liberation. However, Moscow put a lot of effort into depicting it as a terrorist movement. Refusing to recognize any other point of view, the Kremlin created a vicious circle, which cannot be broken until the real target is addressed. Thus the violence in the region is likely to reemerge even after successful quelling of the current insurgency.
Introduction
No one is likely to argue with the statement that ".. .since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Northern Caucasus has emerged as the most volatile area of the Russian Federation."1 Moreover,
1 A. Matveeva, The North Caucasus: Russia's Fragile Borderland, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, Research Paper, 1999, p. 1.
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it is still in a situation of stable instability. To be more precise, violence in the region is mainly associated with the national republics, especially three of them: Daghestan, Chechnia, and Ingushetia. This eastern part of the Northern Caucasus, particularly Chechnia, is considered the hub of the anti-Moscow activity that has been going on since the beginning of the first Chechen war in 1994.
The situation in the western part of the Northern Caucasus is different. Most experts agree that "in the 'Olympic' territories, the sociopolitical situation is relatively calm."2 This part of the region is also considered to be more integrated with Russia than the traditionally unstable East, which in Russia's National Security Strategy until 2020 is officially identified as a place for fighting international terrorism.3
The revival of the Circassian nationalist movement might become another threat to Russian domestic security. It could undermine not only Kabardino-Balkaria, but also the western republics of Karachay-Circassia and Adigey,4 which are officially excluded from the North Caucasian Federal District.5
However, it seems that the Kremlin does not evaluate such a scenario as real trouble, paying more attention to the militant Islamist movement that appeared in Kabardino-Balkaria under the influence of the Chechen war. Other North Caucasian republics suffered from the spillover effect even earlier than Kabarda, which is separated from the eastern part of the region by the only Christian republic, North Ossetia-Alania. The latter appears in the news tabs mostly as a target of guerrilla action.
Since all processes in the eastern and central part of the Northern Caucasus somehow relate to Chechnia, the main focus of the analysis spins around this republic. Nonetheless, the level of explo-siveness and reasons for instability in other republics are also analyzed.
Ethnic Diversity as a Potential Cause of Tension
There is a whole set of problems in the Northern Caucasus that relates to the domestic and national security of the Russian Federation. Researchers designate:
■ ethnic-based tension between neighboring peoples;
■ territorial claims against one another;
■ historical grievances and injustice of the federal center;
■ Islamization or radicalization of local Muslim communities;
■ economic-based unfairness and arbitrariness of local authorities;
■ nationalist movements or struggle for independence.
2 W. Gorecki, Managers Instead of Governors-Generals? Moscow's New Tactics in the North Caucasus, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, 2010, p. 1.
3 See: R. McDermott, Russia's National Security Strategy, The Jamestown Foundation, 19 May, 2009, available at [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35010].
4 Adighes, Kabardins, and Cherkess regard themselves as Circassians (see: M. Light, "Migration, 'Globalised' Islam and the Russian State: A Case Study of Muslim Communities in Belgorod and Adygea Regions," in: Europe-Asia Studies (University of Toronto), Vol. 64, Issue 2, pp. 195-226).
5 The North Caucasian Federal District includes 6 national republics and the Stavropol Territory, but in this research it makes more sense to exclude Stavropol and include Adigey. In this case, the territory of the Northern Caucasus would constitute almost 119 000 square kilometers with approximately 7 million people, most of whom confess Islam.
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The latter was a core factor that undermined stability in the region after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. However, this analysis also examines all the other aspects mentioned.
The first of them is ethnic diversity, which experts usually consider to be a factor promoting instability. That is why some analysts refer to the region as the Caucasian Balkans. This category was formulated by Zbigniew Brzezinski. The former advisor of President Jimmy Carter considered the Caucasus to be part of a wider area that he called the Eurasian Balkans, a region which is specifically known for the large concentration of energetic resources, instability, and inclination toward fragmentation.6
Technically, this category can also be applied to the eastern Northern Caucasus. Daghestan is known for its ethnic diversity (over 40 ethnic groups), Chechnia and Ingushetia for hydrocarbon energy resources, and all three republics for instability. However a closer analysis reveals the flaws in this approach.
The mountain-dwellers, as we know, used to live together for a very long time sharing joy and sorrow. They established their own state several times, but never succeeded in creating a melting pot or one nation for the whole region and eventually remained fragmented, although not because of dis-sention or bickers.7 In other words, the local inhabitants have learnt how to coexist peacefully without assimilating one another. All of their efforts to achieve statehood were mainly determined by the common threat, but they failed basically because of military debacles.
Another noteworthy and contradictory fact is that the North Caucasians never fought one another in large-scale wars. Local skirmishes among neighbors occurred quite frequently, but they never led to ethnic confrontation until the Soviet period. Moreover, it was even hard for the Soviets to instigate hatred between people, a feeling that is totally alien to the Caucasians. A very eloquent example is the relations between local inhabitants and newcomers like the Cossacks (in the 15th-16th centuries) or the Alans (in the 8th-9th centuries). These people settled alongside the North Caucasians, established friendly relations, and eventually adopted not only their style of clothing, but also modus vivendi, modus operandi, and many traditions. Later examples show that representatives of some nationalities were accepted as a part of Chechen society. They established their own teips (clans) in Chechnia.8 Historians agree that the free lifestyle attracted many people of different nationalities to Chechnia, especially from suppressed Russia.9
The Soviet Union's policy toward minorities can be blamed for the later ethnic tension in the region. Changed by Moscow, the borders became a real time bomb in the region. Some other seeds of instability were also sown. An interesting and at the first glance effective formula of coexistence for the North Caucasians was invented at that time. Uwe Halbach's study provides a good example of how it works nowadays in Karachay-Circassia. It says that the main post in the republic (the president's) is reserved for Karachays, who constitute 40% of the republic's population. Russians (34% of
6 See: Zb. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1997.
7 Historians refer to medieval Daghestan as a mainly mountainous common territory of the Vainakhs (Chechen and Ingush people) and Daghestanis. The modern state (as people perceive it today) in this territory appeared in the late 18th century. Chechen Sheikh Mansur Ushurma managed to unite the majority of North Caucasians in order to repulse Russian aggression. One morg partly successful attempt to unite the Northern Caucasus was made in the middle of the 19th century. Daghestani-born Imam Shamil was the head of the theocratic state Imamate, which included the mountain territories of Chechnia and Daghestan. At the dawn of the 20th century, the northern part of the Caucasus was united into one confederative state again. The Mountain Republic under the presidency of Chechen Tapa Chermo-ev existed for almost year. The last attempt to create a state for all the North Caucasians was declared by Islamist leader Doku Umarov in 2007.
8 Chechen historian Mairbek Vachagaev distinguishes teips that originate from Russians, Tatars, Turks, Jewish, Circassians, etc. (see: M. Vachagaev, "Chechensky teip: vchera i segodnia," 2008, available at [http://www.chechen.org/ cheteip/13-chechenskijj-tejjpvchera-i-segodnja.html]).
9 As scholar Moshe Gammer emphasized, people of all religions felt really free in the Imamate (see: M. Gammer,
Shamil. Musulmanskoe soprotivlentie tsarizmu: Zavoevanie Chechni i Dagestana, KRON-PRESS, Moscow, 1998).
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population) usually delegate the head of parliament, and Circassians (19%)—the head of government. 10 Unfortunately, this formula became a tool for helping the Kremlin to implement the divide et impera policy. The level of ethnic tension increased dramatically when competition over major posts started. For example, the Balkars started to blame the Kabardins for occupying all of them in Kabardino-Balkaria. Nor are the other republics, apart from homogeneous Chechnia, Ingushetia, and North Ossetia, free from an ethnically based struggle for power either. However, this does not mean, as some authors claim, that clashes will necessarily happen if Russia withdraws from the Northern Caucasus. As historical examples show, the North Caucasians are able to regulate their affairs by themselves.
The ethnic hatred in the Northern Caucasus that analysts point to is nothing more than a derivation of conflicts started because of other reasons. One of them is the conflict over territory. This source of current violence, as well as many other problems in the Northern Caucasus, can be traced back to the Soviet period.
Clashes over Territory and Wealth Division
Since 1991 at least one territorial dispute11 that turned into an armed conflict occurred in the Northern Caucasus. The Ingushes and Ossetians clashed over the Prigorodnyi District in 1992. Six days of continued fighting over Ingush lands transferred to the Ossetians in 1944 resulted in several hundred deaths and several dozen thousands of internally displaced people (mostly Ingush). Osse-tians death and other tolls were several times lower.12
It should be emphasized that the question of regaining the Prigorodnyi District was vitally important to the Ingush people. They even decided to break away from the independence Chechnia declared and remain a part of the Russian Federation. The Ingush never succeeded in fulfilling their dream though.
After the violence broke out on 31 October, 1992 and Russia demonstrated its support of the Ossetians, the Ingush lost all hope of returning to their lands by lobbying this question in Moscow, unless the situation changed in Russia. Moreover, they realized their role in that conflict. As later confirmed by former president of Ingushetia Ruslan Aushev, the violence was triggered targeting Chechnia. Foreseeable Chechen participation in the conflict would be justification to attack de facto independent Chechnia.13 Official Grozny cunningly refused to interfere in the conflict and the question of the Prigorodnyi District remains unresolved.
10 See: U. Halbach, Russia's Internal Abroad, the North Caucasus as an Emergency Zone at the Edge of Europe, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Research Paper, Berlin, 2010, p. 23.
11 Ethnic stability in the region was undermined during Soviet rule when the borders of the republics were rehashed after the deportation of 4 nations. In November 1943, Karachays and, in February-March 1944, Balkars, Chechens, and Ingush were deported to Central Asia and Siberia. After returning to their homeland in 1957, they found the land of their ancestors occupied by others, which provoked ethnic tension and clashes. Since that time, Chechnia has disputable territories with Daghestan and Ingushetia, while the Balkars are reclaiming a district that was transferred to the Kabardins. There is also a divided nation problem in Daghestan. Lezghian irredentism became a potential source of conflict after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Current initiatives of the federal government that consider a possible unification of republics, for instance Adigey and the Krasnodar Territory, are also leading to ethnic tension (see: N.J. Melvin, "Building Stability in the North Caucasus. Ways Forward for Russia and the European Union," SIPRI Policy Paper (Bromma), No. 16, 2007, p. 26).
12 See: Russia: The Ingush-Ossetian Conflict in the Prigorodnyi Region, Human Rights Watch, Helsinki, 1996,
p. 1.
13 See: R. Aushev's Interview on Radio Liberty, available at [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EvAayw7_g0].
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Having neither borders nor blood relations with Chechnia, the Karachay and Balkar people avoided such a dramatic scenario. Nevertheless, ethnic war is looming in both Karachay-Circassia and Kabardino-Balkaria. The reasons for this are slightly different than for the conflict between the Ingush and the Ossetians, but they are also related to territorial arguments. Dr. Zeinel A. Besleney put it this way: "The Soviet policy of dividing nations and then forcing them to live within the same administrative unit with ethnically unrelated national groups is the most important factor for the presence of deep ethno-political divisions and social unrest in the Northwest Caucasus."14 The same can be said not only about the Karachay and Balkars who have kinship relations, speak the same language, and want to live in one administrative unit, but about the Circassians too. The latter nation is separated by the administrative borders of three republics and is not willing to share political power with the Karachays and Balkars.
Tension among nationalities within the borders of one republic has not only a territorial, but also an economic background. The Balkars15, as well as others, are striving to have representatives at least at the republican level in order to gain access to federal funding, which is considered to be the main source of revenue throughout the entire region.
The Northern Caucasus is notorious for its dependence on money transfers from the center. Official numbers say that the national republics are subsidized by more than 50% and, as some researchers claim, this helps to calm the situation. Alexey Malashenko, an expert on Caucasian issues, estimates that ".almost 90% of the revenues of Ingushetia and Chechnia's budgets come from direct subsidies from Moscow; 78% in the case of Daghestan; 76% in the case of Karachay and Circassia, and 60% in the case of North Ossetia."16 Unemployment figures, which also soar very high, show the importance of support from the center. All the aforementioned figures also demonstrate how much different clans and ethnic groups are interested in power, which has become a bone of contention. According to Russian official statistics, unemployment rates reach 50.3% in Ingushetia and 33.9% in Chechnia, while the average rate in Russia is approximately 10%.17 Unofficial numbers are much higher, about 70% in Chechnia, according to J.B. Dunlop and R. Menon.18 About half of all companies in Chechnia and Ingushetia are on the brink of bankruptcy, while the average wage in the state service (about 20% of employed) is lower than anywhere else in Russia (about 10 000 rubles a month).
Thus, in the ranking of Russia's 88 regions, as estimated by J. B. Dunlop and R. Menon, ".in terms of the standard of living the Northern Caucasus would be at the very bottom."19 The situation is exacerbated by the large number of young people in the region (youth bulge) and the gap between the demand for jobs and their availability. The average age of unemployed people in these republics is 22-25 years, while in Russia, it is 34-35.
Everything mentioned above also corresponds to the Human Needs Theory. According to this theory, in order to live and attain well-being, certain basic human needs must be met. Violence occurs if certain individuals or groups do not see any other way to meet their needs.20 "People tend to be-
14 Z.A. Besleney, "Ethnic Unrest in the Northwest Caucasus," 2002, available at [http://www.kafkas.org.tr/english/ tarih/circassian_karachai_essay_.html].
15 Unification with the Karachays, as they imagine it, might provide them with more opportunities.
16 "Kavkaz ustal ot khaosa," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 17 November, 2009, available at [http://www.ng.ru/ng_politics/ 2009-11-17/11_kavkaz.html.
17 [www.gks.ru]. There are similar numbers for the other North Caucasian republics too.
18 See: J.B. Dunlop, R. Menon, "Chaos in the Northern Caucasus and Russia's Future," Survival, Vol. 48, No. 2, Summer 2006, p. 101.
19 Ibid., p. 105.
20 See: H. Kok, "Reducing Violence: Applying the Human Needs Theory to the Conflict in Chechnia," The Journal of Turkish Weekly, 2007, available at [http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/308/reducing-violence-applying-the-human-needs-theory-to-the-conflict-in-Chechnia.html].
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come resentful and disposed to violent political action when they share a sense that they have been deprived of economic opportunities or political advantages enjoyed by other groups."21
However, the traditionally strong support within families in the Northern Caucasus diminishes this factor. As Arbakhan Magomedov, a professor from Ulyanovsk State University, said, official statistics do not reflect the real situation. "The highly developed shadow economy occupies an enormous space in the republic's life and the income generated there is almost never included in official accounts."22
In other words, poverty in the Caucasus would not force people to take up arms, but it is fair to say that economic factors sometimes can become decisive for some hesitant people. It is also clear that most North Caucasian people no longer see Russia as a mediating and supervising arbiter. The political establishment (especially of smaller nations) does not believe that Moscow can ensure a fair mechanism of power-sharing. Nor do the ordinary people trust the juridical system and prefer to resolve their problems by other means, the most desperate of which is to take up arms. This option is especially attractive for the youth.
Islamization and Radicalization of the Northern Caucasus
It is impossible to analyze the last bout of radicalization in the Northern Caucasus without putting it into the context of both Chechen wars. In 1991, the breakaway republic decided to go its own way after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Chechen politicians claimed that it was the only way to forget historical grievances and establish new relations with Russia.
The war broke out in 1994 after three years of Chechnia's de facto independence.23 Since that time this suffocated but unresolved armed conflict has been the main stimulator of unrest in the region. This protracted war with a three-year hiatus24 underwent many changes. The situation in which neither side was able to take over forced them both to change tactics. Russia tried to transform the armed conflict into an internal Chechen confrontation and shift responsibility for the war onto pro-Russian Chechen forces—the policy was later called Chechenization. This policy did not help to suppress the rebellion, but it defocused the attention of the international community. Moscow stopped being a target of constant criticism of the atrocities in Chechnia.
The other side also started restructuring. Chechen fighters decided to extend the frontline into neighboring republics. Trying to attract more supporters they transformed the Chechen struggle for independence into an Islamist movement based on the most radical ideology of Salafi jihadism.25 The
21 T.R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1970 (quoted from: D. Sagramoso, "Violence and Conflict in the Russian Northern Caucasus," International Affairs, No. 4, 2007, p. 690).
22 A. Magomedov, "Daghestan and the Russian State: 'Stable Instability' Forever?" The Northern Caucasus Crisis, Russian Analytical Digest, No. 70, 21 December 2009, pp. 9-14.
23 The 1994-1996 war, which was called an Operation for Reinstating Constitutional Order, resulted in withdrawal of the Russian troops from the republic. The sides signed the Khasaviurt agreements (1996) and a Peace Treaty (1997), documents that are considered actual recognition of the independence of Ichkeria. The issue of Russia's official recognition had to be decided by a referendum in Chechnia before 2002.
24 The second war started in 1999, neglecting the Peace Treaty signed two years earlier by the Russian and Chechen presidents. It was called a counter-terrorist operation. Officially the war ended in March 2009. However, resistance is not over and, moreover, the guerrillas' activities have spilled into neighboring republics, the territories of which have also becooe a stage for warfare. The situation has remained unchanged since that time.
25 The media usually refers to the representatives of Salafi jihadism as Wahhabis. The term Salafi jihadism was coined by French political scientist Gilles Kepel. According to him, it combines ".. .respect for the sacred texts in the most literal form ... with an absolute commitment to jihad" (G. Kepel, Jihad. The Trail of Political Islam, I.B. Tauris&Co, London, 2006).
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newly declared goal was liberation of the whole region and establishment of an Islamic state named "The Imarat of the Caucasus" between the Black and the Caspian seas.26 International recognition was not on the guerillas' agenda any more. Moreover, following the Salafi approach, they identified all non-Muslim communities as potential or real enemies.
The logic was simple—Ingush, Daghestanis, Circassians, and other peoples will not fight for Chechen independence. The common platform and objective for unification were obvious. For centuries resistance to the Russian invaders in the Northern Caucasus was endorsed by religion, and it showed up again. However, at first glance, the logical step was in fact neither necessary nor politically useful for the Chechen side. The number of young people willing to participate in the struggle against injustice actually did not change after declaration of the Imarat. As can be judged from the official Russian data provided by the Federal Intelligence Service (FSB—Russian abbreviation), the number of rebels has been fluctuating at about the same level since 2006. Every year the head of the FSB reports about more or less 250-300 "exterminated rebels."27 The period before is considered a full-fledged war in Chechnia when the success of the FSB and military operations was estimated at thousands of eliminated fighters.28
Therefore, it seems that support of the resistance corresponds more to other factors. As M. Falkowski noted: "The anti-terror methods used by siloviks (a common term used to describe the Russian defense and security structures, such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the military, the FSB.—M.I.) injure civilians more than anyone else, which adds to the instability instead of eliminating it."29
Furthermore, residents of the Northern Caucasus feel as if they are second or even third class citizens in Russia. Everywhere in the Russian Federation, apart from the homeland, they face the risk of racist attacks and harassment from the police. Moreover, the number of hate-related crimes in Russia is soaring. "The Moscow Human Rights Bureau estimated that about 170 xenophobic attacks occurred in Russia in 2010, leaving 39 people dead and about 213 injured."30 The negative attitude of the Russian nationalists is shared by the ordinary people. The research completed by the Levada Center in 2006 shows that 58% support the "Russia-for-the Russians" slogan.31
Basically, Russian policy itself is to be blamed for aggravating the situation and for the everlasting turmoil. Trying to conceal war crimes, Russia restricted access of Western NGOs to the conflict zone, thus limiting opportunities for the self-realization of young people. Moreover, the authorities promote the perception of Western culture as cheap mass production, especially in the Northern Caucasus. Bearing in mind the very difficult economic situation, massive unemployment, overpopulation, nepotism, corruption, and poverty, the youth has two main paths to follow. Searching for appeasement on the Internet, in online games, sports, etc. does not always lead to self-ful-
26 The changes started under successor of President of Chechnia Aslan Maskhadov. Although Sheikh Abdul-Kha-lim Sadulaev included other North Caucasian republics as part of the newly formed frontline, he did not change the main objective of the Chechen fighters. The independence of Chechnia as an objective was neglected the year after his demise in 2006. Nonetheless, Doku Umarov's declared transformations that were not accepted by the Chechen politicians who are seeking for recognition of Chechen Republic internationally.
27 See: FSB annual reports at [http://www.agentura.ru/dossier/russia/fsb/].
28 There is no reliable data about the death tolls in Chechnia in the first years of the second war. Russian sources tend to diminish civilian losses and exaggerate their military success. However, it can be definitely inferred that the size of resistance has been steadily declining. Analysts also point to Daghestan which, judging from the numbers of killed guerrillas and terrorist attacks, became a leader of "terrorist activity" after 2010 in the Northern Caucasus. However, for different reasons (e.g. Chechnia ought to act as an example of stability for other republics), the real numbers can be distorted. Therefore, these trends are not examined.
29 M. Falkowski, "Chechnya: Between a Caucasian Jihad and 'hidden' Separatism," Policy Briefs, CES, January 2007. p. 44.
30 J. Nichol, "Stability in Russia's Chechnia and Other Regions of the Northern Caucasus: Recent Developments," Congressional Research Service, 13 December, 2010, p. 18, available at [http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34613.pdf].
31 J.B. Dunlop, R. Menon, op. cit., p. 102.
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fillment, therefore joining the armed resistance seems a right option. Many youngsters prefer the latter because sacrificing themselves in jihad makes much more sense than living such a miserable life without any real goal.32
The arbitrariness of the local authorities also provokes young people to choose this path. Maciej Falkowski writes, ".people are deprived of a dignified life. by the current Chechen regime, doomed to living in poverty and marginalized."33 Moreover, Ramzan Kadyrov's (Moscow-appointed head of the Chechen Republic) soldiers ".terrorize people ... by methods such as execution without a court verdict, hostage-taking, kidnapping, torture, and imprisonment in illegal jails."34
Islamic ideology, which rejects this kind of attitude and behavior and proposes returning to the "golden age of the Caliphate," seems attractive to young people. Growing up under the influence of the two Chechen wars, they are deprived of any other way of dealing with injustice apart from armed resurgence. Since Russia is blocking access to any democratic alternative and has failed to offer its own,35 Islamization seems to be the only option for the North Caucasian youth for the time being.
The Perspective of Nationalism
The partial Islamization and radicalization of society does not mean the end of the nationalist movement leaders, which the Chechens are in the Northern Caucasus. Apart from them, no nationality in the region has clearly stated the aim of forming an independent state. Nevertheless, as D. Sagramoso pointed out, ".most of the North Caucasian national groups remain eager to run their own affairs, thus creating a problem for Russia's internal political and administrative organization."36
As for the Chechens, they were ready to sacrifice themselves defending this idea and proved it. The cost of the two wars is just incomparable in socioeconomic terms (up to 250 thousand killed). Of course, the Chechen nationalistic movement suffered a huge blow after Doku Umarov denounced Ichkeria37 in favor of the Imarat in 2007. After that step, it could be said that compared to other nationalist movements that managed to build their political wings from the military (Palestine Liberation Organization, Irish Republican Army), the Chechens regressed. Nonetheless, as Maciej Falkowski pointed out, "the ethos of national liberation is strongly rooted in Chechen society."38
The decision to transform the ultimate goal of the resistance corresponded to Russia's efforts to demonstrate it as a terrorist movement. The Russian media used to trumpet that it had ".found instructions for piloting Boeings in rebels' shelters," "Osama bin Laden's Chechen bodyguards,"
32 Most researchers suggest that the main source of recruits for resistance is the large army of unemployed youth. However, the whole picture is more complicated. After the attack on the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria Nalchik in October 2005, the Ministry of Internal Affairs presented a social portrait of the 166 assailants. 87% of them were young men of about 30 years old, 20% had advanced schooling or a university education, and only 1.2% had failed to complete basic education (see: U. Halbach, op. cit., p. 18).
33 M. Falkowski, op. cit., p. 52.
34 Ibid., p. 56.
35 Gennady Gudkov, the then deputy chairman of the Russian State Duma's Committee on Security and a retired colonel of the FSB, has predicted that Russia could lose the Northern Caucasus not because of Islamic fundamentalism, but because of the central government's inability to forge a coherent policy (see: J.B. Dunlop, R. Menon, op. cit., p. 107).
36 D. Sagramoso, op. cit., pp. 681-705.
37 The official names of the republic are Noxjiyn Pajxalq Noxjiyjo (Chechen language) and The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (English).
38 M. Falkowski, op. cit., p. 61.
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"Chechen fighters in Afghanistan" etc.39 Thus, it became grounds for accusing Doku Umarov of collaborating with the FSB.40 In 2011, the Imarat Caucasus was entered on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations, but it was already separated from the Chechen government in exile, which continued to condemn terrorist methods of warfare and seek recognition of Ichkeria. Thus, Moscow has not succeeded in delegitimizing the Chechen fight for independence.
There are several more aspects that determine the recurrent transformation of Islamists or rebirth of nationalism. As Norwegian researcher Julie Wilhelmsen pointed out, Islam initially did not play a significant role in the ideology of Chechen separatism and it is doubtful that religion plays a dominant role now. "On a general level, the strengthening of religious faith during a war is effected by a well-known mechanism: when in trouble people turn to God. In the Chechen case it also served as a means of organizing and politicizing."41
However, Adat norms42 used to be and still are more important for the Chechens than Shari'a law. The ideas of radical Islam actually are quite alien to them. This became obvious when the Chechens rejected the path of Salafism in the period between the two wars (1996-1999). For most people it was unacceptable to change the nation's long-living traditions. As N.J. Mervin noted, "The Salafi movement's intolerance of national cultural traditions limited the scope of its expansion."43
The national factor plays a significant role even among the North Caucasian militants themselves. Propagandistic talk about one Islamic nation loses its viability when radicals come down to the operational level. Jamaats44 in the region are formed mainly on a national basis and usually function within the territory of the national republics. This approach was determined by an awareness of the local landscape and the attitude of the local people. Even those who support the rebels are not willing to be "liberated" by another nation, only by their own. In other words, only Circassians are allowed to kill Circassians (Nalchik, 2005) and Daghestanis to execute Daghestanis. As N.J. Melvin put it, insurgency in the Northern Caucasus is now divided into local, largely autonomous groups.45
Despite all the efforts of the Russian authorities to eradicate nationalism in Chechnia (and to some extent in the whole region), it is really doubtful they will achieve this. There are two factors that will not allow it.
■ The first is the national character, which can be explained by famous Russian scientist Lev Gumilev's theory of ethnogenesis.46 Gumilev's theory corresponds with the youth bulge
39 "Amerikanskie terakty pridumany v Chechne," 2001, available at [http://www.utro.ru/articles/200109241413303 7162.shtml]; V. Abarinov, "Bylo li zakonnym ubiistvo Usamy bin Ladena?" 2011, available at [http://www.svobodanews. ru/content/transcript/24107828.html]; "V Afghanistane ubity arabskie i chechenskie boeviki," available at [http:// voinenet.ru/novosti/operativnaya-informatsiya/25373.html].
40 Islamist movements used to be established and utilized by the Russian special services in order to divide Chechen society. The first one was set up by Beslan Gantemirov (Russian FSB colonel) in 1991. In 1998, the Salafi movement provoked fights with Chechen governmental forces. Later Islamist movements allowed Russia to accuse Chechens of being terrorists, which was especially effective after the 9/11 attacks. The myth was dispelled by the Chechen refugees in Western countries. Not one terrorist attack was organized by Chechens, whereas the Salafis were supposed to be fighting all the Western governments too.
41 J. Wilhelmsen, "Between Rock and Hard Place: The Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement," Europe-Asia Studies (Carfax Publishing), Vol. 57, No. 1, January 2005, pp. 35-38.
42 The word "Adat" means a rule. Researchers usually refer to it as a set of cultural norms, values, and customs obligatory for all members of a particular community, in other words, a kind of unwritten constitution.
43 N.J. Melvin, op. cit., p. 19.
44 The term jamaat means religious community in peace time and a group of fighters in war.
45 See: N.J. Melvin, op. cit., p. 4.
46 In a few words, the theory of ethnogenesis describes the history of nations encompassing biology, geography, and some other sciences. Each and every nation, according to this theory, goes through a certain cycle that lasts about 1,500 years and can be divided into 5 stages of about 300 years each if no force-majeure situation occurs. Ethnicities are
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theory; the focal point of both is what he called passionarity, which can be described as the level of vital energy characteristic of any ethnic group and is mainly a feature of youth. Endorsed by demographic changes and the center's weakness, it makes possible even the uprising of local elites. They may lose their allegiance and start supporting national liberation ideas.
■ The second aspect that influences survival of the nationalist movement is the large (at least 150 thousand) Chechen diaspora in Europe. Expelled from the home country by unbearable war atrocities and repressions, these people mainly remain adepts of the idea of an independent Chechen state. Not surprising. The Russian government, as Andrey Piontkovsky pointed out, "proved" to the Chechens that they are Russian citizens by attacking and destroying their cities, and abducting and torturing their relatives.47 In other words, "Russia was engaged in total warfare against citizens it claims as its own."48 Resistance has been seen as the only way to preserve national identity, culture, and language in the homeland. Moreover, the Chechen population does not exclude the fact, and this opinion was securitized by Ichkeria's politicians, that if resistance fails, they face mass deportation as they did in 1944, or something even worse.49 Thus independence and recognition of the state for Chechens is the only way to avoid recursion of the tragedies that happened in 1944, 1994-1996, and 1999-... "In particular, the vital lesson that Chechens have learnt is that being a part of Russia makes them vulnerable to arbitrary rule and oppression."50
To sum up, the main issue in the Northern Caucasus for Moscow is that it should still be associated with the Chechen nationalist movement. Its potential has not been destroyed or even critically diminished, thus a new round in the conflict requiring recognition of the independent Chechen state is likely to occur in the near future.
Conclusion
An analysis of the security situation in the Northern Caucasus shows that violence in the region is associated with the eastern part of the region. However, under the influence of the Chechen war and the spillover effect, which has already undermined stability in Kabardino-Balkaria, the western republics related to it are also hanging in the balance.
born, grow, mature, decay, and fade away to be reborn again. The stage of history or development of an ethnicity strongly correlates with the number of people devoted to an idea (passionarity). In other words, they are people whose biochemical energy is overwhelming and allows them to sacrifice themselves for the sake of an idea. Passionarity, as Lev Gumilev stated in his seminal book Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere of the Earth, works against the basic instinct of self-preservation. Although passionarity can be judged as a scientifically unfounded concept, for Gumilev, it is a force of nature which drives history. The level of passionarity changes along with the development of a nation.
47 See: A. Piontkovsky, "North Caucasus: One War Lost, Another One Begins," March 2011, available at [http:// www.opendemocracy.net/print/58533].
48 B.G. Williams, "Commemorating the Deportation in Post-Soviet Chechnia," History and Memory (Indian University Press), Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring-Summer 2000, pp. 101-134.
49 Actually, it is hard for the Chechens to imagine something worse than deportation, which was recognized by the European Parliament as an act of genocide in 2004. As B.G. Williams stated, deportation has had the most lasting impact on the Chechens' collective memory. "It became a part of national identity. Forgetting the evocative trauma becomes an act of betrayal to the community." Russia is identified as a successor of the Soviet Union, the state regarded by Chechens as a real enemy (B.G. Williams, op. cit., pp. 101-134).
50 I. Akhmadov, "The Russian-Chechen Tragedy: The Way to Peace and Democracy. Conditional Independence under an International Administration," The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, 2004, Central Asian Survey, 2003, Vol. 22, Issue 4, p. 27.
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The history of the Caucasus confirms that the ethnic diversity of the region does not relate to the level of its explosiveness. People used to live together in peace and harmony for centuries here. As the analysis shows, ethnic hatred is supposedly associated with Soviet rule. Basically, it is based on territorial arguments between peoples. Stability was undermined by the Kremlin, which changed the existing borders of the republics in order to divide and rule.
The situation has changed now. Russia's rule is mainly based on regular money transfers and military force, but Moscow has already lost its credit and role of arbiter for most of the North Caucasian people in terms of peacekeeping and just division of wealth and revenue. Frequent reference to the armed forces has created a vicious circle. The arbitrariness of the local and federal government (siloviks) fuels resistance, while Moscow's efforts to justify its military activity and atrocities in the Northern Caucasus have led to radicalization and self-deception.
The Chechen national liberation movement continues to be the main engine of resistance in the Northern Caucasus. Even radicalized, it still determines the possibilities of conflict resolution and appeasement of the region. Thus resurgence is likely to continue until the real target is addressed. Even if Russia succeeds in slowing it down, there is a great chance that violence will reemerge in the Northern Caucasus sooner or later, unless the real reasons for conflict are finally recognized and addressed.
