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25INFORMATION WARFARE OF THE NEW FORMATION
Gagik Harutyunyan * , Sergey GrinyaevHrachya Arzumanyan*"
The dynamism of modern developments prompts geopolitical actors to develop new military-political concepts and technologies of their application as soon as possible. However, innovations in this area in no way imply abandoning old concepts, as the former enrich the latter and facilitate shaping a complex and effective new overall strategy. This pattern is especially evident in concepts of information warfare (IW), and therefore, the analysis of evolution of approaches to IW appears quite topical. Without referring to Martin Libicki's canonical definitions of first-generation IW, a pivot point to be taken in this analysis is going to be the perspective of RAND Corporation experts that consider IWa self-contained activity, regardless of whether there are ongoing military actions or not. Effectiveness and efficiency of new formation IW under this logic are often significantly higher than those of the traditional wars in past.
Second-generation warfare"
Carl von Clausewitz, a prominent military theorist, at a time noted that "War is the continuation of politics by other means." Modern realities are different to such extent that it can be stated that "politics is the continuation of information war by other means." The main goal of modern IW is to reduce spiritual and intellectual resources of the adversary's society to a critical level, after which that country loses autonomy and is unable to resist the political will of the influencer in any significant way [1, 2]. In this context the objectives of "second-generation IW" are noteworthy, including:
* Executive Director, Noravank Foundation, (Yerevan).
" General Director, The Centre of Strategic Estimations and Forecasts (Moscow). """ Political Science PhD, Military and National Security Expert, (NKR).
• Establishing an immoral atmosphere in the adversary's society and developing a negative attitude towards own cultural legacy;
• Manipulation of society's conscience and civilizational orientation of country's population groups to create political tensions and chaos;
• Destabilizing relations between political parties, provoking violence against opposition in order to create confrontations, lack of trust, sowing suspicions and intensifying political struggle;
• Reducing the information security level of government structures and prompting wrong decision-making in governance;
• Misinformation about the work of government agencies, compromising and discrediting the governing bodies;
• Instigating social, political, ethnic and religious strife;
• Discrediting international reputation of the country and damaging its cooperation with other countries;
• Harming vital political, economic, defense and other interests of the state;
• Embedding own cultural "code" in the consciousness of the adversary's society through manipulation technologies.
It is easy to notice that "second-generation IW" concepts are reminiscent of some strategems of Sun Tzu [3]. In this IW spiritual and ideological factors become more than important, and in this context all of the listed items deserve attention and analysis. Remarkably, authors of concepts of such warfare note that application of these technologies in society may often lead to unpredictable effects, which is vividly demonstrated by current developments in the Greater Middle East.
At the same time, given the uncontrollable information flows, it is practically impossible to use bans for protection from a number of information-generated threats emerging domestically, such as "developing a negative attitude towards own cultural legacy." Information struggle of such nature is defined as "culture war." In this area only clear ideas about cultural legacy in the society of a given country can be effective. It is also important to note that many of the items listed above were reflected in the events related to modern "color revolutions" [4].
Noopolitik: "victory" and"defeat"
Implementation of the "second-generation IW" strategy is the integral part of the concept of Noopolitik1. This approach is widely used in modern international practice, gradually replacing many of the elements of traditional politics. Noopolitik is the rationale basis describing the multifaceted character of modern warfare: "soft power", hybrid and total war and others, since all of these imply to one or another extent the systematized, mutually complementing and well thought out application of virtually all military, political and societal technologies. In particular, Noopolitik allows creating attitudes in the society toward other countries, shape new system of values and other things that are beneficial for the influencer.
In the new generation IW, the notions of "beginning" and "end" of war, "victory" and "defeat" receive alternative meanings, because actions against the "defeated" continue to be carried out through practically the same technologies. The notion of "defeat" has also changed radically. If in traditional "hot" wars, such as WWII, the defeated party would have to sign capitulation, give up territories, reduce its army, while the economy experienced downturn and knowledge-based technologies were taken away from the country, in modern wars the defeated often do not even realize they have been defeated. In this context, the "defeated countries" can be identified based on the S. Rastorguev's principles [5], particularly the following signs:
• In the defeated country the "sum" of knowledge and information shrinks constantly, and elements of state - national - societal system are destroyed. Such a methodical primitivization of society as a whole makes the defeated country harmless for the victor.
• Knowledge and science based technologies are carried away from the country, but not in a manner that happened in the past2. The fundamental difference is that the "external managers" might change the development priorities of the defeated country, replacing it with so-called "dead-end ideas". For instance,
1 Noopolitik: translated as politics based on consciousness, knowledge or simply "smart" politics (voog -"noos" is Greek for "intelligence").
2 For example, after the World War II the victors took away from Germany equipment and technology documentation from thousands of plants and research centers (the volume of the latter alone was more than 100 trains). Often using methods characteristic to intelligence services, many highly qualified specialists were moved from the country, most of whom then worked in military-industrial structures of the USA, UK and USSR [6].
one of the primary objectives can be turning a country that had advanced technologies in the past into a "tourist destination." An intense campaign in this direction then would be carried out in the media, "public discussions" are organized, and so on. In such "tourist" economy the defeated country would strive to get rid of the technological legacy that appears obsolete and export its equipment, perhaps, even as scrap metal. Obviously, in a "tourist destination" there is no place for scientists, technologists and other specialists, who would then emigrate. Sometimes the new "development programs" are implemented under a disguise, focusing on the change of the "non-advanced industrial economy" into a "service economy." However, a society deprived of its scientific/technological and industrial potential would be able to provide services only to the tourism business at the best [7]. One of the primary effects of the mentioned programs is the qualitative change in the demographic patterns of the country's population, since the proportion of those who possess knowledge and skills decreases, while that of commercial hospitality and entertainment service providers increases [8].
• In the context of intentional decrease of scientific and technological potential, specific activities are also implemented in the defeated country to limit the opportunities of research structures [1]. For example, in some of the postSoviet countries a complex operation named "Silver Key' was carried out with general objective to "prompt" the scientific institutions to conduct nonproductive research (such program is specifically called False Aim). Grant policies are another tool, which induces the researchers to do "imitation" work and solve non-topical problems. Interestingly enough, this program was called Spoilt Weapon, perhaps meaning spoiling the researchers, considering the grant sizes to attract them.
• The defeated country embarks on achieving objectives that were not characteristic to it in the past, and stem from the interests of the victor. Worded differently, common resources of the defeated country are used not for development and protection of own interests, but for meeting the requirements of the victor.
• Through appropriate technologies, the society of the defeated country is "helped" to shape a new "national memory" and create new mythologemes. For instance, if the defeated country is a post-Soviet republic, then a negative
attitude toward Soviet historical and cultural past is formed, and even those episodes of struggle against Soviet system are glorified that involved groups collaborating with the Nazi. This principle is used to shape and introduce new concepts and ideologemes that correspond to the worldview and value perceptions of the victor.
Implementation of the mentioned technologies brings the defeated country into the algorithm of the victor's strategy and turns into an element of the latter's value system. In such situation the defeated society not only does not realize its defeat, but may even perceive it as a victory, or at least, as an "integration" with advanced countries. Such reaction has been clearly observed especially in societies where so-called "color revolutions" happened.
Overton window
In the context of the mentioned realities the defeated countries become more sensitive to information influences used in the global information space, which also facilitate the "integration" of such country into the victor's algorithms. The method of "persuasion" proposed by Joseph Overton of the Mackinac Center called Overton window suggests that any ideas can be implemented and even legally effectuated. According to this method there is a so-called "window of discourse" in the society for any idea. Within this window an idea can be discussed or openly supported. By moving or expanding this window the "sheaf of opportunities" can be changed to an extent that an idea vehemently rejected by public in the past may appear in the agenda of actual policy as a result of consistent and disguised information operations. As soon as the public starts to perceive it as an important problem, the idea can be turned into a law. Thus is not a primitive brain-wash, but a more sophisticated technique.
One example of an effective implementation of Overton window is the legalization of LGBT relationships in the USA and EU. In the past, the Christian churches had a negative attitude towards this issue, while the public at large did not care much and considered it nothing, but a marginal behavior. However, consistent and increasingly intensive information operations filled the information space with a multitude of "scientific" arguments, literature and movies on the topic. A special
emphasis was placed on the fact that totalitarian rulers of the Third Reich and USSR were intolerant to homosexuals and persecuted them. As a result the issue became topical in the society, with subsequent legalization and transition to the area of human rights. After that everything else was just "routine paperwork". Overly enthusiastic TV coverage of same-sex weddings is very common these days. Moreover, in the modern information space those who do not accept such relationships are the ones considered marginal. Legalization of "soft drugs" took almost the same path, and today these drugs are freely sold in some countries and even are viewed in the context of human rights.
Many experts contend that big transnational corporations played a significant role in legalization of both soft drugs and LGBT. Revenue from sales of narcotics and sexual services constitutes trillions of dollars, and legalization of soft drugs and homosexuality expands the markets of the businesses and increases their profits. At the same time, development of these industries also bears some ideological overtones, since creation of these new consumption opportunities simplifies control over such societies.
Third generation information warfare
The doctrine of so-called effects-based operations (EBO) should also be considered as one of the theoretical and methodological developments in the area of IW. The objective of this concept is to influence the adversaries through special operations in a manner that they change their behavior towards a more desirable one for the influencer. In this context, both an individual effect and combination of those can be described as an information/psychological weapon in its own right. That is why expert community defined EBO as "third-generation IW [8].
The EBO concept emphasizes that planning and execution of military operations should involve the following factors among the crucial objectives:
• The operations must cause effects that result in influence on behavior of the adversary desirable for the executor of operations, which is preferable than the defeat of its armed forces.
• The caused effects should impact not only the military situation, but also the political, social, economic and other conditions.
• The caused effects should impact not only the adversary, but also allies and neutral countries.
Worded differently, the EBO doctrine can be defined as a combination of operations aimed at shaping the behavioral model of the adversaries, allies and neutral forces regardless of whether there is war, crisis or peace.
In the EBO concept physical destruction of an adversary is just one of the methods and instruments of the war goals attainment, in the frame of a more widely implemented policy of coercing the adversary to follow a certain line of behavior. From this perspective EBO must be perceived as a type or system of military thought, rather than a new form of warfare, and it implies an ability to think in categories of national security, which requires going beyond of the scope of military.
General Giulio Douhet, an Italian military theorist had offered a number of considerations in his renowned treatise The Command of the Air, which are relat-able to the concepts of the modern EBO:
1. Modern war does not allow differentiation between the military and civilian population;
2. Advantages of speed and height of aviation warfare leave no possibility to defend against an aerial offensive strategy;
3. The state and society must be ready to mass bombardments of the adversary's cities, government facilities and industry. To strike first and strong means to destroy the morale of the adversary's civilian population, leaving no other chance for its government, but to sue for peace;
4. To achieve that, first of all an independent air force is required, armed with long-range bombers that are constantly combat-ready.
Unsurprisingly, these viewpoints prompted the general in 1915 to propose a buildup of a force of 500 bombers for total bombing of Austria. Douhet's doctrine had a large influence on development of air force and strategy of using aviation as an independent class of military. There are many examples of its use during the WWII. Under the direct orders from Hitler and in accordance with the prescriptions of Douhet, Luftwaffe bombed the English town of Coventry to ruins, taking lives of 600 peaceful civilians. Bombardment of Dresden by the Allied Anglo-American forces in 1945 resulted in deaths of 25,000 people. However, the most impressive example of EBO so far was the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that killed about 240,000 peaceful civilians. This prompted the Japanese government
to surrender, and as a short-term additional effect, also impacted the behavior of another anti-Nazi coalition ally, the USSR. In long-term, the effect of using nuclear weapons shaped the whole logic of the post-war world politics.
Another classical EBO example from the information perspective was US State Secretary Colin Powell's operation in the UN during the debates on justifiability of American military intervention in Iraq, when he demonstrated a flask with "bacteriological weapon obtained by US intelligence services in Iraq". Later it turned out that it was some harmless white powder, but the "effect" already worked. This example is not unique in diplomatic practices, but its effect is remarkable by the fact that after US invasion of Iraq, a situation of "controlled chaos" began to shape in the Middle East, which became an "effect" at a global level. In other words, a small "effect" produced a bigger one.
Currently the approaches related to EBO are used virtually in all areas of strategic planning. This, in turn, allows referring to not only the concept and methodology of operations planning, but also the thinking based on achieving effects, which implies the following propositions:
• In order to achieve operative and strategic results, it is necessary to combine all actions and steps taken (political, diplomatic, economic and military);
• A constant evaluation of caused effects is needed, along with adapting the plans and actions to the combat situation and realities of the conflict, as necessary;
• A long-term prospect consideration and assessment of the effects and its corollaries is required.
Thus the EBO is essentially an analytical form of warfare, attempting to not only plan, implement and evaluate operations, but also foretell processes and possible retaliation actions of the adversary. It has to be noted that the culture of forecasting (including dozens of meticulously developed methods) is currently a component of implemented strategies, in particular, in military, political and information areas [2]. In this context the Chinese definition of strategy as "capturing the future" seems quite appropriate.
June, 2016
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