CC BY
21
Section 6. Political science
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20534/ESR-17-5.6-58-60
Dr. Huseynov Yusif, Doctor in International Relations, The Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations
Geneva, Switzerland E-mail: huseynoff@live.com
IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR
Abstract: The Republic of Azerbaijan understands its importance in playing an important role in the energy diversification policy of European countries. This role is very important to Azerbaijan because the energy cooperation promotes and stimulates the continuing development of its national economy. Also, cooperation with European countries promotes the important status of the country in the Caspian basin region. In light of this, the country is developing its own strategy to play the most critical role in the energy diversification policy of the European Union.
Keywords: Azerbaijan, Russian Federation, European Energy Security, geopolitics, diplomacy.
Introduction
When looking at the successful implementation of the BTC crude oil and SCP natural gas pipelines, it becomes clear why the
same energy corridor has received so many pipeline proposals to bring more natural gas reserves from the Caspian basin [4]. Azerbaijan has been the main player in the Caspian basin region to contribute to the European Union's energy diversification policy and since 2011 it has received many proposals to select from as means of transporting its natural gas reserves. Currently, Azerbaijan, with its Shah Deniz Stage II, plans to become one of the main contributors for the European Union's energy diversification strategy [8]. Natural gas, which will be produced from the second stage of the Shah Deniz field in the Caspian Sea, will travel more than 3500 km in distance to reach the European gas market. This 3500 km long journey is called the Southern Gas Corridor and it is expected that with the enhancement of the existing energy infrastructure and construction of the new pipelines, this corridor will contribute to the security of European energy [7].
If the energy routes in the Southern Gas Corridor are adequately diversified, this will result in the assurance of stable and affordable imports with secured energy infrastructure. Therefore, the European Union, within the framework of its energy diversification policy, has identified and has supported new energy routes since the fall of the Berlin wall. This policy is mostly aimed at reducing the reliance of EU countries on a single energy supplier [3]. In the last two decades, natural gas reserves have become the main target of the European consumers. Due to many of its positive characteristics, the European Union has been following the policy of reaching new rich natural gas producing countries. The Caspian basin, Levant basin, and Middle Eastern regions have been at the center of attention within the agenda of expanding European natural gas imports.
Eastern and central European Union countries are heavily dependent on a single natural gas supplier in high percentages [3]. Therefore, new natural gas corridors would not only help the European Union, but it would also provide other European countries with the opportunity to diversify their energy imports. The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) aims to fulfill this policy of the EU countries and deliver natural gas reserves from the countries of the Caspian basin [13]. Currently, the SGC consists of one existing natural gas pipeline and in addition to this two natural gas pipelines have been further proposed and are currently under construction. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE), also known as the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), is the already existing gas infrastructure that the SGC will use as its starting point. The TANAP and TAP projects are currently being constructed and they will be in their active phase of completing the project in less than a few years. At the completion of the first phase of the SGC, it will have the capacity to transport approximately 16 bcm of natural gas. When considering the potential supplies from the energy-rich Central Asian countries, it is likely that the SGC could easily increase the volume of the transported natural gas up to 80 bcm per year by 2019 [13].
Diversification policy of the Energy Routes
The European Union has developed a strategy to ensure the security of its energy imports through the SGC corridor in accordance with its diversification policy. The energy corridor is considered to be the most valuable alternative energy corridor for the EU gas market and provides an alternative route that bypasses Russia and also reduces the European Union's dependence on Russia's supplies [14]. All Western countries have supported this approach of the European Commission. The European Union's vision for this energy corridor has been to create a major access point into the regions containing Caspian natural gas reserves. However, the European Union considers
IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR
the SGC not only to be the secured access corridor to Caspian gas, but also a very important mechanism by which to build strong relations with all of the countries along the corridor and negotiate their partnership in the European Union's energy policy [5]. To some extent, this would create a common energy strategy on a multilateral level. This strategy has already begun to be implemented within the alliance of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The already existing energy pipelines that run between these countries has significantly helped to establish the experienced teamwork needed for further energy cooperation in the future. Azerbaijan, in collaboration with Turkey and Georgia, is already playing an active role in the EU's energy security because of its involvement in the BTC and BTE pipelines, which demonstrate the commitment of the country to facilitating future development in the Southern Gas Corridor [10]. Abbasov made the following statement concerning the realization of the Southern Gas Corridor.
"Southern gas corridor is accepted and decided to develop under this declaration. We are not afraid, and we are committed to building this Southern Gas Corridor because we have previous practices, and experience. We know that we can do it. There are many countries within the Southern Gas Corridor, but Azerbaijan is most likely the only country that is taking serious action on developing this corridor" [1].
Azerbaijan has the desire to see advancement of the Southern Gas Corridor because this will lead to the opportunity to secure energy exports and also strengthen its role in the energy security of Europe. However, Sek argues that the "EU's plan was always to stop the monopolistic roles of the suppliers and that's why diversified infrastructure especially in the gas sector, made this policy an important contribution and attention for the European energy security" [12]. It is further contended that step-by-step Europe is becoming closer to a level of infrastructure diversification in which security and certainty are assumed. On a final note, he says that the countries of Eastern Europe are the most concerned by the situation and are desperately striving to secure the future energy supplies entering their territory.
Jarosiewicz states that the Southern Gas Corridor will soon be the fourth most important ofEurope's diversified gas routes. It is via this gas corridor that the EU energy market can access alternative energy sources from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan via Azerbaijan [6]. It is also suggested that Turkey's relationship with the European Union's is going to be defined as a new kind of partnership in the context of the transit route. This will involve Turkey playing the role of an "energy bridge" between Azerbaijan and the European continent via Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. The implementation of the Southern Gas Corridor over the huge geographical distances is drawing the attentions of the European Union as well as the United States. The United States supports the energy route diversification policy of the European Union it is also showing an interest in the region as a result of economic, political, and social issues.
The Southern Gas Corridor has challenged the interests of Russia and the state company Gazprom. This is because Russia is
afraid to lose its dominant position in the gas markets of Europe. Furthermore, the project is seen as a threat to the political interests that Russia has in the Caspian basin, South Caucasus, and Central Asian regions [6]. However, as a result of the crowded interest from various companies seeking to take part in the project, some countries have proposed their own pipeline projects. Examples of these include ITGI, TAP, TANAP, and the Trans-Caspian. As such, the European Union has decided to back any project under the condition that it satisfies the demands of Europe's energy security. The Nabucco consortium has agreed to propose Nabucco-West, which offers a shorter version of its original [6].
In response to the abovementioned turn of events, Richard Morningstar, the previous US state department special envoy for Eurasian energy states that the Nabucco project is the most efficient form of infrastructure [11]. Alternative options will only be considered if Nabucco is seen as commercially unviable. These other options include small pipelines, such as ITGI (Italy — Greece — Italy), TAP (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline), and TANAP (Trans-Anatolian Pipeline), which can be subsequently developed when gas volumes increase [2]. The commissioner of the European Union, Guenther Oettinger, indicates that Azerbaijan is going to be playing a pivotal role as both a transit country and a gas supplier. Within the geo-strategic context of these "gas games", it is believed that Azerbaijan's position is accurate [9].
Conclusion
A significant level of interest is being given to the position of individual countries and their involvement in the Southern Gas Corridor. Some European countries have been negotiating on the specifics ofpipeline projects directly with Azerbaijan, while the European Union and the United States assess the route in its entirety. As such, all projects are evaluated based on what they can provide for Azerbaijan's future. TAP, ITGI, Nabucco, Nabucco West, as well as other proposed pipelines have lodged proposals to carry natural gas to the European continent from Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan's geographic location and its existing transportation infrastructure make it a major transit country in the Southern Gas Corridor. This status of the country provides an important opportunity for the transportation of energy reserves from Central Asia to mainly European markets. Based on the research, the main pipelines from the South Caucasus region, namely the Baku-Tbili-si-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (SCP) natural gas pipeline, are considered to be important elements of the backbone of European energy security because they serve to provide alternative routes and because they increase the levels of cooperation with energy-producing countries from the Caspian basin region. This cooperation has mainly been concentrated on the supply of the natural gas to European markets from the Azerbaijani section of the Caspian Sea. But this experience has opened up the chapters for the Central Asian countries to transport their own energy reserves via Azerbaijan.
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