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MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION
IGOR DOBAYEV. RADICALIZATION OF ISLAMIST NONGOVERNMENTAL RELIGIOUS-POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND WAYS AND MEANS TO OPPOSE IDEOLOGY OF TAKFIR-JIHADISTS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.1 //
The article was specially written for the bulletin Russia and the Moslem World.
Keywords: the radicalization, Islamists circles, "takfir", "jihad", Muslim countries, "Imarat", "jamaats".
Igor Dobaev,
Dr.Sc. (Philosophy), Professor,
Expert of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don
The process of the radicalization of Russian Islam has passed through several stages:2
1. The first stage: the 1970s - early 1990s. Young people's groups of Salafi orientation emerged in Daghestan under foreign influence. Their leader was the man later known as Magomed Kyzylyurtovsky. The special services of the Russian Federation follow their activity and stem it.
2. The second stage: the early 1990s - 1994. Daghestan Salafite groupings become legalized, more and more Islamists circles were formed where their members studied such concepts
as "takfir" and "jihad" in their specific "Wahhabi" interpretation. At the time cultural centers were opened at the embassies of certain Muslim countries, which were engaged, apart from other activities, in distributing Islamist literature in Russia. At the same time similar literature was published in Russia, for instance by the "Santlada" Publishers in Daghestan. Missionaries, preachers and teachers of Muslim disciplines from abroad began to arrive in Russia. Simultaneously, young Russian muslims were leaving the country for abroad in growing number to get an Islamic education. Daghestan was the main territory of Islamization during these two periods.
3. The third period: December 1994 - early 2000s was characterized by the domination of Chechnya in the radicalization process of North Caucasian Islam. The Chechen wars, just as the three-year interval between them, were accompanied by the concentration of foreign mujahedins, mostly Arabs, in this republic. They received a serious ideological, financial and other assistance from foreign Islamist centers. Special study centers functioned in Chechnya to train militants. The biggest one was at Serzhen-Yurt settlement in Shali district headed by the notorious terrorist Emir Khattab, a man close to the "al Qaeda" leader Osama bin Laden. In 1998 radical Islamists headed by their leader Magomed Kizilyurtovsky arrived to Chechnya from Daghestan, where foreign, Chechen and Daghestani Salafites, as well as their fellow-thinkers from other North Caucasian republics formed a sort of an armed union with such a strong basis that they dared start an aggressive campaign in Daghestan in 1999, which was crushed.
4. The fourth period: from September 1999 to 2007 coincided with the second Chechen war, defeat of the armed units of separatists and their switchover to a guerilla war. At that time Chechnya was the epicenter of the concentration of radical Islamists, whose leaders propagated secular separatist projects, such as the proclamation of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. During that period the idea of "jihad" spread throughout the
entire territory of the North Caucasus. Its main feature was the spreading of radical Islamist ideology, the institutionalization of their own non-governmental religious-political organizations and groupings, emergence and enlargement of the infrastructure of "jihad" (secret warehouses, dug-outs, bins, etc.), engagement in specific political subversive and terrorist acts, including places far beyond the bounds of the North Caucasian region. The structure of militants' units acquired a network character.
In the fourth period the North Caucasian Wahhabis were represented by moderate-radical and ultra-radical elements, whereas during the second Chechen campaign the local Salafites took to religious-political extremism and terrorist activity under the camouflage of Islamic faith. Nevertheless, there were still moderate radicals in the area, although in a smaller number. However, the authorities, unable or unwilling to distinguish between moderates and ultra-radicals were taking harsh measures against both of them. Such approach curtailed the already small section of moderate radicals, who were gradually going over to extremist positions.
5. The fifth period: 2007-2013-2014. The new leader of the existing Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Doku Umarov, announced the completion of the nationalist plan of building the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and simultaneously published the new geopolitical project - "Imarat Kavkaz". According to it, the new state - "Imarat Kavkaz" was proclaimed on the Islamist principles in the North Caucasus, which would be ruled like the Islamist states of the past (Caliphates). In turn, apart from the existing central institutions of power and management, "Imarat" included the republics of the North Caucasus and would subsequently include other regions of Russia. In turn, these parts of "Imarat" consisted of sectors where primary Islamist cells, or "jamaats," existed which were, in essence subversive-terrorist groupings, in other words, Islamist gangs.
6. The end of the first decade - beginning of the second decade of this century: the growing influence of "Imarat" and its
leaders on other Muslim territories of Russia - along the Volga, in the Urals and West Siberia, primarily, Tatarstan.
7. In the past five to six years more "Islamist enclaves"3 emerged in non-Muslim parts of the country, which grouped around new mosques built there. Similar processes have taken place in the United States and certain West European countries some time earlier.4
8. After the neutralization of Doku Umarov at the end of 2013, most network structures, which were parts of "Imarat" and had sworn allegiance to "al Qaeda" of Osama bin Laden joined the terrorist giant - the "Islamic state". Many Russian Islamists have gone to Syria to join the ranks of the Islamic state militants to fight Bashar Asad's troops. The radical Islamist movement on the territory of the North Caucasus is deteriorating and turning into criminal gangs, smaller in size and more autonomous. After making rapid pinpoint strikes they go underground or disintegrate.
Despite this, the terrorist movement in the region has not been suppressed, which calls for additional measures aimed at its complete eradication. As is known, the range of these measures includes the following elements: improvement of the antiterrorist legislation; strengthening of the special services and law-enforcement agencies; undermining of the economic basis and financial channels of the terrorists; ideological and propaganda work among the various strata of Russian society. Unfortunately, these measures are too weak and ineffective.
Nevertheless, the problem is now better understood and more measures are being taken to solve it. After the adoption of the Concept of opposing terrorism in the Russian Federation in October 2009, more attention was paid to prevention of terrorist activity. The National Anti-terrorist Committee has time and again emphasized this point.
It should be admitted that this work is far from adequate, despite the already existing state system of opposing terrorism in the Russian Federation. In detailed examination of various plans
of ideological counter-offensive it becomes evident that quite often the measures proposed deal with a certain amorphous mass of the country's population. Moreover, they are usually addressed to ordinary law-abiding citizens far removed from the ideology and practice of terrorism. At the same time there is a definite shortage of proposals concerning vulnerable categories of young people and bearers of the ideology of religious-political extremism. There are practically no centers of Islamic studies in the country set up and maintained by the state, especially in the South of Russia. Neither are there orders for such investigations, and this is why they are carried on rarely and randomly, more often on the initiative of individual scholars. Naturally, such works are rare and far between and are done mostly by Daghestani scholars in the North Caucasus.5 Besides, one should take into account that religious-political terrorism is localized mainly in the youth medium, mainly in the North Caucasus. However, means to oppose it are scattered all over the country, often far removed from young people. It goes without saying that in such conditions there is little hope that such measures will be effective. This is confirmed by the practical experience of the past several years.
A broad information and propaganda campaign has been launched in the country. Thousands of conferences and round-table discussions are arranged, a great many pamphlets, books and various collections are published, the mass media contain many articles and videos, and films and clips are made in a great quantity - all this is keynoted by anti-terrorist spirit. However, the terrorist war in the North Caucasian region of Russia (and not only there!) does not die down. It should be admitted that we have not been able to create an adequate system of opposing terrorism in the information sphere so far.6
It is to be hoped that the present Comprehensive plan of informational opposition to terrorism in the Russian Federation for 2013-2018 will lead to a qualitative leap forward in the ideological confrontation with this dangerous enemy.
Meanwhile, we have to admit that the present information, educational and ideological work, which is underway in the Russian Federation, is far behind the requirements of the day and needs qualitative changes. And we should talk not only of informational opposition to terrorism, but also of opposition to the ideology of terrorism. The main task facing us in this field is, along with strengthening the struggle against concrete manifestations of terrorism, to raise effectiveness of opposition to the ideology of terrorism and put up reliable barriers on the way of its penetration in public consciousness.7
One of the aims of this struggle is to compromise the ideological doctrine of radical Islamists, which is far from flawless from the point of view of Islamic orthodoxy, and, as a result, to free the potential supporters and followers of Takfir-jihaddists from the latter's pernicious influence, thus reducing the social basis of support of terrorists and cut off the replenishment of their units.
There are two important factors which should not be ignored: it is the "Islamic" factor in the formation of ideological doctrines of radical Islamists and the "youth" character of the terrorist and religious-political movements in certain regions of Russia, primarily in the North Caucasus. It is quite evident that the attractiveness of the ideology of radical Islamism, especially among young people, is high enough. However, both these factors should be regarded in close unity and interdependence, inasmuch as in practice they support and help each other.
At the same time it should be admitted that there is no full-fledged government policy of a proper education of the younger generation in the country so far, although there is understanding that the young people who have matured in the years of "troubled times" should not be left without public charge.8
The North Caucasian young people have grown in the conditions of permanent fighting around them in one or another form, feeling hardships of social and income inequality, against the backdrop of growing difficulties of self-realization. They
often fall under the influence of extremist religious propaganda and also of "authoritative" people, that is, criminal elements, and this is why they need special care and attention of the state. The situation requires serious systematic daily work among young people and their education with due account of the specificity of ethnic variety and multilingualism. For this purpose it is necessary to begin the training of special teachers with an emphasis on the unbreakable unity of the North Caucasus within the Russian Federation and aversion to all and sundry forms of violence. Apart from that, a program should be evolved to draw creative, sport, military-patriotic and youth associations of the North Caucasian republics to participation in all-Russia and regional festivals, contests, local lore units' activities, etc., which should strengthen ties between young people of different parts of the Russian Federation.9
The religious factor of the current situation in the Caucasus should not be ignored either. Certain scholars of Islam directly speak of the endogenous radicalism in Islam, as well as of the objectively existing connections between separate currents in Muslim faith and terrorism, asserting that excessive political correctness closely linked up with political interest does not give the Russian leadership the possibility of being completely open in this question.10 Today, there are many people in the North Caucasus, who, arms in hand, are fighting for creating an Islamic state and freeing the lands of Islam. They do not try to help solve this problem by simply increasing the number of jobs or building friendly relations between people.
The religious factor does exist and act. In Islam, just as in other religious, there are radical currents and trends which strive to establish very harsh rules of life and behavior. Ideologists of radical Islamism literally "hammer" in young people's minds the idea of the need to wage "offensive jihad" against the "infidels", "apostates", and "hypocrites", and the fight against them in the specific conditions of the North Caucasus often assumes the character of vendetta. Thus, local pre-Islamic customs (adats)
merge with the specific features of Islam and even with criminal activity.
There is no doubt that growing religious-political extremism in the North Caucasus is facilitated not only by the crisis of all secular ideologies of the present period, but also the ideological foundations of traditional Islam in the region, which needs thorough modernization. This problem should be tackled in many aspects coordinated with one another.
During the 1990s - 2000s the country's leadership placed big hopes on the authority of representatives of traditional official Islam. However, the social alienation and political passivity of "official Islam", along with its theoretical weakness, shortage of well-educated scholars of Islam and Muslim traditions have only increased the chances of Islamists in their ideological rivalry in the struggle for winning the Muslim population, primarily, young people.11 Despite the fact that many representatives of the Muslim clergy who are despised and hated as "hypocrites" by radical Islamists have been brutally murdered by terrorists, it should be admitted that their sermons proved ineffective in opposition to the man-hating ideology of Takfir-jihadists. However, the confrontation of the Wahhabis with representatives of "official" Islam does not confine to ideological struggle. Wahhabi ideology claims that those who do not adhere to it are the "enemies of Islam," and it calls on its supporters to wage a sacred war against them, that is, jihad. A true Wahhabi must hate all enemies of Islam, and his hatred should take concrete practical forms.12 Among the "enemies" marked as "hypocrites" are representatives of "official" Islam and the most active of them are under constant observation by radical Islamists.
It is common knowledge that terrorist activities are the most widespread and strongest in the North-East Caucasus (Daghestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia) where "official" Islam is dominated by the Sufi orders (Tariqahs). However, it should be noted that Sufism has been unable to rebuff Salafite ideology in this sub-region, and heated arguments and discussions between
these two trends have been going on for many centuries. Moreover, as shown by the statistical data of terrorist acts of religious-political nature, more and more Islamic young people join the ranks of the Salafites. This is directly connected not only with insufficient opposition to religious extremism of Tariqah ideology, but also with the fact that Sufism itself gives birth to Salafism.13
Inasmuch as "official" Islam is striving to draw closer to the state as much as possible, in which it definitely succeeds, opposition to the "official" clergy becomes opposition to the state.14 This is why, in Z. Abdulagatov's view, the state should establish contacts with all Islamic confessions. Openness toward all currents, even to those which are rivals to "official" Islam, is an effective way to oppose their radicalization.15 This idea is supported by the heads of the National Anti-terrorist Committee (NAC). "Intra-confessional confrontation which now exists in a number of North Caucasian republics is a very dangerous phenomenon. It is high time to find common points with ideologists of moderate Wahhabism (Salafites), all those who are ready to oppose terrorism. It is necessary to prevent the reproduction of terrorists. A part of the Muslim clergy which is ready to work with young people and prevent them to enter into armed conflicts with the authorities, which is prepared for theological dialogue and discussion of all disputed questions, is our ally..."16
However, everything is not so simple. There are doubts concerning expedience of work with moderate Islamists. For one, experts from the Center of Situational Analysis at the Russian Academy of Sciences believe that contacts between the authorities and Salafites are fraught with negative consequences for the development of relations with followers of traditional Islam. For example, an attempt of the authorities of Daghestan to hold negotiations with certain more radical ("forest") Islamists has resulted in the latter's demand to appoint their representatives to high posts in local administrations.17
There is no doubt that in order to oppose radical Islamists at an intellectual level we need well-educated specialists in Islam who are rare and far between in Russia. Serious concern is caused by shortcomings in training the Muslim clergy in Russia, textbooks are written on the basis of medieval scholastics, there are practically no secular experts on Islamic theology, and the number and quality of specialists in the Arab language and experienced translators and interpreters from that language is inadequate.
It is evident that with a view to opposing religious-political extremism the state and society should pay more attention to the system of religious education. It is necessary to evolve our own model of Islamic education, which could help us take the initiative from foreign Muslim universities and centers in the sphere of full-time and virtual education. Students from Russia study Islam in its most radical forms in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan and North African countries, and are subjected to anti-Russian ideological indoctrination. Quite a few leaders of the armed underground, for example A. Astemirov and M. Mukoyev from Kabardino-Balkaria, have studied at the Central Islamic University of Saudi Arabia, a state dominated by Sunna Islam of the Wahhabi trend.
Russian young Muslims continue to go abroad to get an Islamic education. There are two channels for doing this - official and private. Those going via the former channels receive stipends and have an opportunity to solve their social problems because they go abroad in accordance with agreements signed between the spiritual boards of Muslims of Russia and concrete educational institutions. Moreover, at present the position of most spiritual boards of Muslims is that it would be better to get a higher Muslim education in Russia first, and only then to go abroad to improve it at prestigious universities on the basis of official agreements. Meanwhile, most young men wishing to get Muslim education abroad go there through private channels, more often on personal invitations. They do not get stipends and
social services and this is why easily fall under the influence of local radicals. In all, the number of those who have received Islamic education abroad after the disintegration of the Soviet Union exceeded 10,000.18 Despite the fact that beginning from 2007 three Muslim study centers have been working in the North Caucasus (in Makhachkala, Nalchik and Grozny) they are unable to compete with their foreign analogues.
Moreover, the system of Islamic education in Russian regions is up to now one of the powerful sources of the formation of fundamentalist consciousness among Muslim young people.19 As it is noted by the well-known Daghestani scholar I. Shamov, "the curricula of Islamic educational institutions in Daghestan do not include history, geography, mathematics, literature, foreign languages, biology, computer ABC, etc. In short, there is nothing which makes a member of society an educated parson and society - a developing one".20 The ideology of opposition cannot but pay close attention to the content of text-books and curricula of the Russian Islamic educational institutions. The state and society should strictly inspect all Islamic educational establishments, especially those which are not subordinated to government bodies. It is necessary to evolve curricula for religious educational institutions at all levels of Islamic education, and religious and secular experts and scholars should take part in this work.
Control over strict adherence to approved curricula should be a special subject matter of the government.21
Apart from the creation and improvement of Muslim education in Russia, it is also, necessary to carry on a stable information policy on Islamic problems, including the publication of printed matter (periodicals, study aids, and analytical material), opening of the Internet sites, and actions opposing the various undertakings of radical Islamists. Incidentally, the authorities should pay greater attention to their publishing and distribution activity. There is a considerable number of Muslim books and pamphlets of subversive character
in Russian retail trade, as well as in mosques and Islamic educational institutions, which contain extremist ideas. This situation is connected with the shortage of Russian theological and legal literature connected with Islamic problems. At the same time one can find works by foreign authors, ideologists of radical Islam, including such extremist authors as al-Wahhab, al-Maududi, S. Qutb, al-Umar, al-Fauzan, Bashamil, al-Shakk, and others. It is necessary to emphasize that subversive Islamic literature gets into the country not only from abroad. Up to recently, part of it has been published on Russian territory (for instance, the "Badr" Publishers printed such literature in Moscow and Moscow region). Naturally, such literature should be banned.
Cyberspace calls for special attention, that is, the activities of all and sundry telecommunication networks of the Internettype. Virtual area is full of Islamic sites, forums and discussions of extremist character. All terrorist acts are registered and lauded on the sites of terrorists calling for "worldwide jihad", as well as in social networks. The activity of certain subjects of cyberspace has a well-pronounced anti-Russian character. Accordingly, opposition to this "ideological subversion" should be of a specific nature. Meanwhile, Russia has not evolved effective means and methods to prevent the use of the Internet for spreading terrorist ideology so far.22
Work to discredit the ideology and practice of radical Islamists is poorly prepared and carried on. The existing opportunities to do this are used absolutely inadequately. Effective propaganda against the Wahhabis virtually does not exist, their activities are not countered. On the contrary, bodies of power and management sometimes create a heroic halo around these "fighters for pure faith" ("mujahids") and "martyrs" ("shahids"). Inefficiency of the propaganda work of the state facilitates the stepping up of the activities of radical Islamists.
The secular authorities, scholars and representatives of "official" Islam do not mean a thing for the terrorists. The only
moral yardstick for them is the young imams "from the forest" preaching jihad. It should be said that these imams are well trained and have a gift to convince people.23 Whereas we continue to use expensive but ineffective means.
There is no doubt that we should take measures to strengthen, materially and organizationally, the existing organizations connected in one way or another with Islam - the Fund of support of Islamic culture, science and education, and the Group of strategic views called "Russia - the Islamic World". Similar approach is necessary to structures which have no support from the Federal Center and regional authorities so far. We mean, first of all, such organization in the South of Russia and the North Caucasus as the "Center of Islamic Studies" at Daghestan State University, and other similar organizations.
Special attention should be paid to training a new generation of scholars of Islam who know the realities and languages of Russian and foreign Muslims, primarily, Arabic. For this purpose a program of regular broad investigations should be worked out on a broad range of Islamic subjects on the basis of cooperation between scholars at the Federal Center and regions under the aegis of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the leading institutes and universities of Russia with an adequate material support of the government. It would be expedient to set up a research center for informational opposition to terrorism, all the more so since this initiative has already been put forward by the National Anti-terrorist Committee of the Russian Federation.24
At the same time it is necessary to uphold the secular character of the Russian state and its equal attitude to all religions and confessions. A modern state can achieve successes in civil construction only on the basis of the values common for representatives of all religions and cultures; moreover, it is only a secular state that can ensure genuine personal freedom of conscience.
Apart from that, it is very important to evolve an effective youth policy in the Russian Federation, taking into account its
regional specific features. At present young people in the North Caucasus form the main breeding grounds for spreading extremist ideas and their further implementation. Youth policy should be based on a reliable ideological platform for which purpose it is necessary to form a modern national ideology. Besides, the elaboration of a youth policy should be tied up with a comprehensive solution of the problems of modern North Caucasian society, and first and foremost, social and property inequality, corruption, embezzlement, nepotism, etc. In other words, for solving youth and Islamist problems it is necessary to use a broad range of measures combining "broad" and "narrow" approaches in opposition to terrorism at the national level and foreign influence increasing it.
Naturally, the above-mentioned proposals and considerations do not cover all measures which should be used to oppose the ideology of terrorism and lower the effectiveness of the factors breeding conflicts, but, in our view, they are the first on the priority list. It is only by joint efforts of the authorities and civil society that the struggle against terrorism could become more effective on the information field.
Notes
The article has been written on the grant to Southern Federal University for research on the subject - "Trans-conflict regions as a phenomenon of geopolitical rivalry: social risks and adaptation resources to humanitarian challenges".
I. Dobayev. Radikalizatsiya islama v sovremennoi Rossii [Radicalization of Islam in Modern Russia]. Moscow - Rostov-on-Don. "Sotsialno-gumanitarniye znaniya" Publishers. 2014. P. 227-251.
O musulmanskikh anklavakh." See: Yu. Milovanov. Anklavizatsiya territorii Severo-Kavkazskogo regiona: soderzhaniye protsessa i problema issledovaniya // Nasiliye v sovremennoi Rossii [On "Muslim Enclaves." See: Yu. Milovanov. "Enclavization" of Territories of North Caucasian Region: Essence of the Process and Problems of Investigation // Violence in Modern Russia]. Rostov-on-Don, 1999.
See: I. Dobayev. Ekstremistskiye gruppirovki v SShA: Islamsky faktor [Extremist Groupings in the U.S.A.: Islamic Factor] // "Mirovaya ekonomika i
1
2
3
mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya. Moscow. 2007. No 1.; I. Dobayev. Islamizatsiya Evropy: mif ili realnaya ugroza ?[Islamization of Europe: Myth or a Real Threat?] // "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya". Moscow. 2008. No 4; I. Dobayev, A. Dobayev, V, Nemchina. Geopolitika i terrorizm epokhi postmoderna [Geopolitics and Terrorism in the Post-Modern Epoch]. Rostov-on-Don. YuFU Publishers. 2015. P. 177-224. See: Z. Abdulagatov. Islamskoye soznaniye v globalizatsionnykh protsessakh: problemy adaptatsii [Islamic Consciousness in Globalization Processes: Problems of Adaptation]. Makhachkala. 2011; by the same author: Osobennosti sotsializatsii sovremennoi molodyozhi i sotsialniye deformatsii v molodyozhnoi srede [Specific Features of Socialization of Modern Youth and Social Deformities in Youth Medium]. Makhachkala. 2011; E. Kisriyev. Islam i vlast v Dagestane [Islam and Power in Daghestan]. Moscow. 2004; S. Muslimov. Religiozno-politichesky ekstremizm glazami dagestantsev [Religious-political Extremism as Viewed by Daghestanis]. Makhachkala. 2011.
A. Przhezdomsky. Informatsionnaya sfera stala polem boya s ekstremizmom i terrorizmom [The Sphere of Information Has Become a Battlefield with Extremism and Terrorism] // FSB za i protiv [FSS pro and contra]. 2010. No 11. E. Ilyin. Aktualniye problemy protivodeistviya vovlecheniyu molodyozhi v terroristicheskuyu deyatelnost [Pressing Problems of Opposition to Drawing Young People in Terrorist Activity]. Electronic version. October 12-14. Rostov-on-Don / / National Anti-terrorist Committee [Official site]. URL.: http://www.nak.fsb.ru.
A. Przhezdomsky. V epitsentre protivostoyaniya ideologii smerti: intervyu sovetnika predsedatelya Natsionalnogo antiterroristicheskogo komiteta )Elektronny resurs) [In the Epicenter of Opposition to the Ideology of Death / / (Electronic version). Official site of the National Anti-terrorist Committee. URL.: http://www.nak.fsb.ru
A. Przhezdomsky Informatsionnaya sfera stala polem boya s ekstremizmom i terrorizmom [The Sphere of Information Has Become the Battlefield with Extremism and Terrorism.
Z. Abdulagatov. Osobennosti sotsializatsii soveremennoi molodyozhi i sotsialniye deformatsii v molodyozhnoi srede [Specific Features of Socialization of Modern Youth and Social Deformities in the Youth Medium]. Makhachkala. 2011. 40 p. Islam v Rossii: ugrozy radikalizatsii [Islam in Russia: Threats of Radicalization // Rossiiskaya gazeta. 2012. April 4. S. Muslimov. Op. cit., P. 37-38. Z. Abdulagatov. Op. cit., 43 p. Ibid., p. 55. Ibid., p. 56.
A. Przhezdomsky. Op. cit.
5
6
7
8
9
10
17 Islam v Rossii: ugrozy radikalizatsii [Islam in Russia: Threats of radicalization] // Rossiiskaya gazeta. 2012, April 4.
18 Ibid.
19 S. Muslimov. Op. cit., 21 p.
20 I. Shamov. Religiya ili svetskoye prosveshcheniye [Religion or Secular Education] // Dagestanskaya Pravda. 2001. June 8.
21 Z. Abdulagatov. Op. cit., 50 p.
22 E. Ilyin. Op. cit.
23 A. Sidorov. Zelyonoye znamya s dvuglavym orlom [Green Banner with Double-headed Eagle] // Interfax. 2009. August 31.
24 E. Ilyin. Op. cit.
NATALIA SEDYKH. PREVENTIVE ANTI-TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE YOUTH ENVIRONMENT: ITS STATE AND WAYS OF IMPROVING // The article was specially written for the bulletin Russia and the Moslem World.
Keywords: "digital generation", Internet, modern technologies, religious and political extremism, "jihad"
Natalia Sedykh,
PhD (Sociology), Associate Professor, Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don
It is known that the replenishment of the ranks of terrorists occurs at the expense of representatives of the so-called "digital generation" mainly, including in modern Russia. The Internet is the leading way of interaction and the main factor of influence on the process of forming their opinions, opinions, beliefs. As a result, terrorist threats are intensified and new risks are created. These risks tend to increase, as they are a product of advanced modern technologies, including mass media. Thus, the development of the movement of the world "jihad", which entailed an intensification of terrorist threats, is a consequence of global informatization of social space. Total "jihad" appears effective continuation of Islamism -ideological trend in Islamic thought of modern times. Islamism is based on the idea of the need to assert the dominance of a
