CC BY
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Notes
http://uzbekistan.polpred.com/?ns=4
Prior to that Karakalpakia was part of Kyrgyz and Kazakh republics, as well as the RSFSR. In December 1990 a Declaration on state sovereignty was signed at the republican Supreme Soviet, which envisaged complete independence on the basis of the results of an all-republican referendum. However, in 1993 President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan succeeded in persuading the local political elite to sign an interstate treaty for a term of twenty years on Karakalpakia entering the Republic of Uzbekistan. The document contained a clause proclaiming the right of the autonomy to secede from Uzbekistan through referendum. At present one-third of the republican population is Karakalpaks, one-third - Uzbeks, and one-third - other nationalities (Kazakhs, Russians, Ukrainians, Koreans). http://lenta. ru/articles/ 2014/06/10/karakalpakstan http://lenta.ru/articles/2014/06/10/karakalpakstan http://www.news-asia.ru/view/6514
http://www.zamondosh.com/2014/07/16-terra-group-prime-media-gamma.html http://www.zamondosh.com/2014/07/16-terra-group-prime-media-gamma.htm http://www.news-asia.ru/view/uz/6761
http://total/kz/politics/2014/03/18/president_uzbekistana_predlozhil...
http://www/fergananews.com/articles/8038
Ibid.
http ://www. 12news/2014/07/21
http://www.zamondosh.com/2014/07/16-politicheskaya-situatsiya-v-uzbekistane.html
http ://mfa.uz/ru/press/new/2014/05/1909/
http://noviyvek.uz/novosti/kitay-k-2022-g-zakupit-v-uzbekistane-uran-na-800-mln.html
"Rossiya i noviye gosudarstva Evrazii: ezhekvartalny zhurnal IMEMO RAN," Moscow, 2014, III (XXIV), pp. 92-99
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Boris Volhonsky,
Ph. D. (Hist.), Russian Institute of Strategic Studies HYDRORESOURCES AS A FACTOR OF GEOPOLITICS IN SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
"Water wars" have recently become one of the main subjects in political literature. In the view of many analysts, water will be the main cause for interstate conflicts this century, just as oil and gas were the pretexts for wars in the 20th century.
The well-known Indian scientist and author of the book "Averting Asian Water Wars" Brahma Chellaney wrote that wars in the past had mostly been caused by rivalry for land, whereas wars of today are for the sources of energy. But battles of tomorrow will be waged for water. And this prospect is nowhere more real than in Asia. 1
Today, water resources for economic development come second after oil and gas. Meanwhile, out of all water existing on this earth of ours 97 percent cannot be used without applying rich and energy-intensive technologies for desalinization of sea and ocean water. More than two-thirds of the total volume of fresh water is represented by ice in the polar regions and glaciers, and thirty percent is underground water. It is only 0.3 percent of all fresh water that is technically available for use.
According to the UNESCO report "Water in a Changing World" about 700 million people in 43 countries have water resources at their disposal in a volume lower than the minimal human requirement.2 By 2025 this figure may rise up to three billion, inasmuch as the need for water will be growing in China, India and African countries below the Sahara desert. About 540 million people in North China live under a constant shortage of water. A human being needs twenty liters of water a day as a minimum. However, 1.1 billion people in the developing countries of the world use not more than five liters of water a day.3
The global climate changes and increased deglaciation in recent years have aggravated the problem. Ecological consequences of these processes are felt already today: on the one hand, these are catastrophic floods (for example the great flood in Pakistan in the summer of 2010 which brought great suffering to over two million people), and on the other - depletion of water reserves of rivers and droughts connected with it.
The problems of the use of water are manifested with greater urgency when water streams are shared by several states simultaneously. In such cases the states possessing them, become monopolists, as it were, and are able to regulate and use water flows as they think fit - for irrigation, construction of hydrotechnical projects, etc.
As a consequence, such situations may cause an exacerbation of relations and even conflicts between states: those in the lower reaches come out against the unjust distribution of water resources.
In March 2012 the U.S. National Intelligence published a report on the state of affairs with fresh water resources in different parts of the world. Its conclusions boiled down to an admission that within the next ten years there would hardly be full-fledged water wars, but shortage of water would be growing and, accordingly, the risk of wars would be greater. The most vulnerable regions of the world will be South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa.4
In actual fact, water wars are being waged already now. In any case, the problem of the distribution of water resources is an important component of many international armed conflicts.5
The prolonged and bloody India-Pakistan conflict around Kashmir has a direct relation to water. The sources of practically all rivers flowing on Pakistani territory, including the biggest water artery of the country - the Indus - are in Kashmir, and many of them in the territory controlled by India. A whole system of irrigation channels has been created in British India, which allowed people to use the Indus water for agricultural needs. After 1947 this irrigation system became divided between India and Pakistan, namely, between the Indian state of Punjab and Pakistan's province of the same name. In the very first year of independence of the two states, in the spring of 1948, India demonstrated the effectiveness of the "water weapon" to its neighbor
by damming out water supply to channels on Pakistan's territory (more details of the division of water resources between India and Pakistan can be found below).
Interstate problems connected with the use of trans-boundary water reservoirs and water streams are complex enough, nevertheless, there is no uniform code of laws regulating relations between countries situated in the upper reaches and lower reaches of water streams. The two main international conventions - the Convention on the protection and use of trans-boundary water streams and international lakes of the European Economic Commission of the UN of 1992 (further on -Convention of 1992) and the Convention on the Law of the NonNavigation Uses of International Watercourses adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1997 (further on - Convention of 1997) have a whole number of reservations. The Convention of 1992 is a document of regional importance (56 European and CIS countries are members of the European Economic Commission. The Convention of 1997 comes into force if it is ratified by at least 35 countries, but to date it has only been ratified by 12 states, and there are no prospects of seeing the growing number of its signatories, inasmuch as it was closed for signing in 2008.6
Apart from that, the two conventions set only general rules touching mainly on ecological problems and, to a lesser degree, the problems of managing water resources. Besides, they are of a recommendatory character and do not contain any mechanism of solving international disputes. Thus, there is no uniform legal basis for settling disputes on the rules of using trans-boundary water courses. Neither are there international bodies which would be able to have any tangible influence on the problems of trans-boundary water conflicts.
Accordingly, water disputes can only be settled on the basis of national legislation, as well as bilateral and multilateral agreements on
each concrete water basin. There are more than 260 near-boundary water basins and hundreds of near-to-border reservoirs in the world, but the number of international bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements exceed 300.
In reality, the states-monopolists controlling the sources of international rivers are de facto guided by the Harmon doctrine named after the U.S. Attorney General Judson Harmon who put forward the idea about the absolute territorial sovereignty in 1895. According to this well-known doctrine, each national state has the right to use the waters of international rivers flowing in its territory as it deems fit, without paying attention to consequences for other states and without entering into consultations with it.
However, the paradox of the situation is that one and the same state can be in a position of the monopolist controlling the upper part of the basin of one river, and in a position of a country situated in the lower reaches of another river and suffering from actions of the state controlling its upper part. This is the case of India, which controls the upper reaches of the Indus River and a greater part of the basin of the Ganges River, and thus is able to bring pressure to bear on the countries situated in the lower reaches of these rivers - Pakistan and Bangladesh, respectively. Whereas India itself is dependent on China in terms of its actions in the upper reaches of the main tributary of the Ganges - the Brahmaputra.
Asia is inhabited by about 60 percent of the world's population, which is inadequately supplied with fresh water, and this is why the water problem is especially acute there. This article examines two neighboring regions - Central Asia and South Asia, where these problems have been exacerbating interstate relations for decades.
Naturally, we shall also deal with certain problems connected with the state, which is not part of these two regions, but holds a special
position with regard to them. It is China. Its unique position is due to the fact that the Plateau of Tibet belonging to China is one of the biggest reservoirs of surface fresh water. China comes out as an "upper" country with regard to all neighboring states, and in its water management policy it is de facto guided by the Harmon doctrine. As a rule, it either ignores the interests of the countries lying in the lower reaches of water streams, or solves all related problems on a bilateral basis, even if the given water stream flows on the territory of three or more countries. And the fate of over three billion people living in this part of the world depends on how the problems of the use of water are solved.
Finally, the above-mentioned economic, social, ecological and political-legal problems are especially acute and fraught with serious complications in the future, taking into account the fact that three states of the region - China, India and Pakistan - possess nuclear weapon.
The Rogun Hydropower Plant and Problems
of Relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
From the point of view of the distribution of hydrocarbon and water resources the five countries of Central Asia can be divided into two groups: those rich in hydrocarbons but short of water (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) and those without hydrocarbon resources of their own, but having rich water resources (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). The "upper" countries are interested in using rivers for hydro-energy purposes, and the "lower" countries - for irrigation.
In Soviet time centralized planning made it possible to eliminate disbalance in relations: in exchange for free access of the "lower" countries to hydro-resources, the "upper" countries received hydrocarbon fuel at reduced tariffs. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and a break-up of the former economic ties this
disbalance became especially pronounced: the "upper" countries had to buy hydrocarbon fuel, whereas the "lower" countries get water free of charge as previously.
These problems became especially acute in relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. They were strained enough without water dispute. The President of Tajikistan Emomali Rakhmon always suspects the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov of intentions to destabilize the regime in his country. Although the two countries are members of the same interstate bodies and regional organizations (CIS, SCO, CSTO, EurAsEC), there is a strict visa regime between them, transport connections are hampered, and part of the Tajik-Uzbek border is mined on the Uzbek side.
Their relations have especially aggravated after Tajikistan has announced plans to build the Rogun hydropower plant on the Vakhsh River, one of the main sources of the Amudarya, and also a series of hydropower plants on the tributaries of the Amudarya - the Pyandzh and the Zeravshan.
The Rogun project was started back in 1976. After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. the contract on building the hydropower plant was given over to the Russian company "Rusal" on the basis of a intergovernmental agreement between Tajikistan and Russia. In 2005, Tajikistan's parliament denounced the agreement with the Russian Federation on further construction, and then accused the Russian company of inaction. Along with this, the company's offer to purchase a Tajik aluminum plant at which it wished to use the energy of the plant was turned down.7
The main reason for a break-up of the contract was that according to the first draft project, it was planned to build an earth-fill dam 285-meter-high. The contract was broken after "Rusal" refused to
fulfill the demand of the Tajik side to complete the construction of the dam up to the height of 325 meters.
The 40-meter increase of the dam's height created a direct threat to Uzbekistan's agriculture (primarily cotton growing), which largely depends on summer irrigation using the Amudarya water. Taking into account the planned surface area of the formed reservoir, the volume of water in it with a dam of such height will increase by about three cubic kilometers, which is equal to the average run-off of the Vakhsh River in fifty days. Thus, Tajikistan will have additional levers for manipulating the run-off and political blackmail.
President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov gave more impressive figures. In October 2010, while explaining the reasons why Uzbekistan opposed the construction of the Rogun hydropower plant, he stated that the filling process of the reservoir might take eight years, thus the people of Uzbekistan would have to live without water for eight years. "What will our agricultural workers have to do all these years?" These words of Uzbekistan's President were cited by the information agency "Kazakhstan Today."8
Most political and economic analysts agree that the dispute about the expediency to build the Rogun hydropower plant will hardly be settled on a bilateral basis. Tajikistan cites numerous reasons "for," believing that the plant construction is in line with its national interests and rejects all accusations that it poses a threat to Uzbekistan. Whereas Uzbekistan cites as many reasons "against," emphasizing the need for water to irrigate fields on its territory, as well as possible ecological consequences connected, among other things, with the fact that the construction area is seismically unsafe and the collapse of the dam as a result of an earthquake may lead to a catastrophe with many casualties and irreparable economic losses.
Since it does not seem possible to settle this question on a bilateral basis, experts of the World Bank were invited to help solve it at the end of 2011, and the main work on the construction of the dam was suspended. However, as one expert noted, no matter what conclusion was made by the World Bank - pro-Uzbek or pro-Tajik, another side would not agree with it. This is why, in his view, the final document would have a very vague character, which would allow each side to interpret it in its favor.9
Confirmation of this view was provided by a new exacerbation of relations between the two countries in March 2012, when Uzbekistan unilaterally stopped gas supply to Tajikistan. In turn, the latter accused the Uzbek authorities of "consciously provoking social tension in Tajikistan," having reminded of the "transport blockade," including the delay of cargo shipment for the Rogun construction project, stoppage of electricity supply to Tajikistan from Turkmenistan, and refusal to clear mines along the Uzbek-Tajik border and reopen the border-crossing points.
Relations between other Central Asian countries concerning the problem of the use of water are not so hostile as Uzbek-Tajik ones, however, there are quite a few controversial aspects. For example, after the exceptionally cold winter of 2007 - 2008, when the water level in Kyrgyzstan's biggest Toktogul reservoir dropped by half, Bishkek sharply reduced the run-off of water to the territories of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. This led to a conflict between the authorities of these countries, who demanded to reduce the run-off in winter time and increase it in summer. Conflict has reached such stage that Tashkent began to threaten Bishkek with cutting off gas supply. It is feared that the construction of the Kambaratin hydropower plant on the Naryn River in Kyrgyzstan, which is one of the main sources of the Syrdarya River, can lead to a big shortage of water and irreversible ecological
consequences in the lower reaches of the river in Ferghana Valley and in Kazakhstan.
The exacerbation of the water problem is also due to the general political instability in the region, and the situation in Afghanistan. Among the factors contributing to the aggravation of the problem are also irrational methods of agricultural development, when considerable volumes of water are simply wasted or returned to stream flows and reservoirs full of harmful substances used in agriculture. It is also necessary to take into account great corruption accompanying the construction of hydro-installations. The situation becomes more complex due to the fact that of all Central Asian countries it is only Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan that have joined the water Convention of 1992.10
India-Pakistan Dispute over the Use
of Water in the Upper Reaches of the Indus
The India-Pakistan conflict on the Kashmir issue has been the longest of all interstate conflicts, in which the problems of water play a no small role. Most rivers feeding the main water artery of Pakistan -the Indus River - originate in Kashmir.
In the late 19th - early 20th century the province of Punjab (unified prior to the India-Pakistan conflict) had a ramified network of canals and dams enabling the country to use the water of five tributaries of the Indus for land irrigation. Two of these tributaries, just as the Indus itself, cross the lands of the former princedom of Jammu and Kashmir. After the events of 1947-1948 a number of major dams built on three tributaries of the Indus were on the territory of the Indian part of Punjab. In the spring of 1948 the government of the Indian state of Punjab shut off water supply of channels irrigating fields in the Pakistani province of Punjab. The conflict was solved peacefully, but it
was vividly shown to Pakistan that it greatly depended on its neighbor as far as the use of water was concerned.11
In 1960 a treaty was signed on division of the water resources of the Indus by India and Pakistan, with mediation of the World Bank. According to the treaty, India received the right to use water of three tributaries of the Indus, and Pakistan - two tributaries and the Indus it
self.12
In literature about the problem of using the water of trans-boundary streams the India-Pakistan treaty of 1960 is often viewed as a good example: both parties observed it even in the period of open armed conflicts. However, in recent time voices have been heard in India demanding to revise it because it has become unfit to the changed reality.
It should be noted that in the six decades of independence the per capita provision of fresh water in India and Pakistan has sharply dropped: in India from 5,000 cubic meters a year to 1,800 cubic meters and in Pakistan from 5,600 cubic meters to 1,200 cubic meters. It should be mentioned that the index of 1,000 cubic meters is universally considered critical, after which there is acute shortage of water.
Against the backdrop of the diminishing hydro-resources and the threat of chronic shortage of water to Pakistan, the plans of building a hydro-installation complex Baglihar on the Chinab River in the Indian part of Jammu and Kashmir have caused serious anxiety in Pakistan. This is only one of a whole series of hydro-projects to be built in Jammu and Kashmir, nine of which should be put up on the Chinab River used by Pakistan under the 1960 treaty.13
Bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan on the Baglihar construction plans early this century were fruitless, and in 2005
Pakistan turned to the World Bank for mediation. However, the problem is still unresolved.14
Another major project also started by India in the basin of one of the rivers given over to Pakistan includes the construction of the Tulbul system of dams and flood-gates for improving the shipping conditions on Wular Lake fed by waters of the Jhelum River. Work on the project was started in 1984, but it was suspended in 1986 due to Pakistan's objections. India announced that it did not wish to continue endless fruitless discussions and intended to apply to international arbitration.15 Recently, in connection with the forthcoming withdrawal of the western coalition forces from Afghanistan and the beginning of active interaction and rivalry of world powers and neighboring states for the spheres of influence in postwar Afghanistan, a new aspect has emerged in the range of problems of the India-Pakistan dispute on sharing the water reserves of the Indus River. One of the main tributaries of the latter - the Kabul River - originates in Afghanistan, and at first glance has no connection at all with the India-Pakistan water dispute. However, India in postwar years has clearly defined its interests in Afghanistan and actually competes with China for the right to be considered the main foreign investor in that country's economy. One of the projects started by Afghanistan with financial and technical support of India is the construction of a hydro-installation on the Kabul River, which will be able to influence the volumes of the Indus water run-off and have a negative impact on Pakistan's economy.17
The problems of the use of water in the Indus basin are important not only for India-Pakistan relations, but they are also a source of exacerbation of domestic problems in both countries. In India there is the constant friction between the states of Punjab and Haryana. The problem is more difficult for Pakistan, inasmuch as its entire territory lies in the Indus basin, and the life of practically each citizen of the
country depends on this river. The central authorities of Pakistan have always given all preferences to two provinces - Sind and Punjab which have been in constant rivalry for the spheres of influence. Naturally, this cause displeasure and irritation of inhabitants of other provinces who begin to put forward their demands to the government, right up to openly separatist ones, as the case has been of the most economically backward province of Balochistan.
Chinese Plans to Turn Tibetan Rivers
and the Reaction of India and Bangladesh
In the Indus basin India is the "upper" country, as it were, capable to dictate its conditions to the "lower" country - Pakistan, but when the basin of the Ganges River is concerned, India is in a dual situation. On the one hand, it controls a greater part of the river basin and is the "upper" country with regard to Bangladesh situated in the Ganges delta. The Farakka Barrage built in the early 1970s in the state of West Bengal in less than twenty kilometers from the border with Bangladesh was meant for removing silt and sediments in the Hoogly River (one of the main arms of the Ganges in its delta) with a view to improving the navigation conditions in the port of Calcutta. However, this dam has reduced the flow of river water to Bangladesh, thus giving access of salt sea water to stream flows and agricultural plots in lowlands near the seashore, which caused natural discontent of the Bangladesh authorities.18
On the other hand, one of the biggest tributaries of the Ganges -the Brahmaputra - takes its origin from the other side of the Himalayas on the Tibetan Plateau, thus both India and Bangladesh are dependent on the economic activity of China, as far as water resource management of this river is concerned.
In recent years China has begun the active implementation of the water transfer project from south to north (the "South - North" project). It envisages the construction of a network of channels - Eastern, Central and Western along which part of the run-off of the Yangze, Huaihe, Huanghe and Haihe rivers will be transferred in the northern direction for irrigating lands in Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous district. The total length of channels will be 1,300 kilometers, and up to fifty million cubic meters of water will be pumped along them annually.
China, being a natural monopolist, is not party to any international convention (at a General Assembly session it voted against the Convention of 1997), as well as to any regional multilateral agreements on the use of resources of trans-boundary streams. For example, China does not take part on a permanent basis in the work of the Commission on the Mekong River set up in 1995 by Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.
China prefers to settle all problems with its neighbors exclusively on a bilateral basis. Incidentally, there is no agreement between India and China on sharing trans-boundary stream flows.19 This fact by itself causes poorly concealed discontent of India. Brahma Chellaney and the Carnegie Center expert Ashley J. Tellis write that China's unique status as a source of the trans-boundary rivers flowing across the biggest number of countries in the world, as well as all its disputes for water with almost all states situated along the course of these rivers have serious consequences for its main neighbor in the south-west - India.20
In November 2010, China officially announced the beginning of work on spanning the Brahmaputra River in Shannan district of Tibetan Autonomous region some 30 kilometers away from the border with India. The dam to be built should become the foundation for the erection of a hydropower plant of 510 megawatt capacity. The Indian press reported that there would be more than just the hydropower plant
(that would be the lesser evil, inasmuch as the water used for electricity would return to the river). There was talk of the possibility to use the Brahmaputra water for filling the western channel, the most problematic and expensive one within the framework of the "South -North" project, and China's plans to turn off 200 cubic meters of water
annually.21
At the beginning of 2013 the Indian press reported that in addition to the dam already being built China intends to erect another three dams on Brahmaputra River, which aggravated previous water disputes.22
Bangladesh has also expressed concern over China's plans. However, its former representative at the UN mission in Geneva Harun-ur-Rashid noted that according to reports, China did the same to India what the latter had done with its trans-boundary rivers to Bangladesh. China did not consider it necessary to consult, discuss or sit at a negotiation table with India on the question of the suggested transfer of waters from the Tibetan Plateau. And he added: "There should not be one rule for India and China, and another for India and Bangladesh."23
The Chinese official position is that there will be no transfer of water of the Brahmaputra, inasmuch as it is fraught with unpredicted ecological consequences and can harm bilateral relations. Hence, Chinese authors do not deny the fact that there are plans of spectacular construction of hydro-installations in the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra River.
As noted by certain authors, China should be worried over possible ecological consequences of such grand projects as the "North -South" no less than the countries situated in the lower reaches of the river.24 All the more so since the negative ecological consequences of such big project as the "Three Gorges" ("Sangxia") on the Yangzi River are felt already now. According to China's Ministry of land
resources, the number of landslides in the vicinity of the project has grown by 70 percent after water reached its maximum level in 2010. One million four thousand people had to be moved to other places from the construction district, and another one hundred thousand will have to be resettled within the next three to five years. Apart from that, hydrologists warn about the danger of cascade rockfalls, inasmuch as the hydroelectric complex is in a seismically dangerous district.25
Conclusion
The above-said emphasizes the need to work out universal rules, which should be mutually acceptable and binding for both the "upper" and the "lower" countries. These rules should be evolved on a multilateral basis. The position of China is the main stumbling block in this respect, because it is a natural monopolist and the "upper" country with regard to all its neighbors without exception, preferring to resolve all issues on a bilateral basis and from the position of force.
Apart from the above-mentioned problems of China's relations with its neighbors, it should be noted that there are spectacular plans of the transfer of waters of trans-boundary rivers for the needs of hydro-energy, oil, and other industries, irrigated agriculture, and cattle breading in Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous District, which may have negative consequences for China's neighbors in the north-east and north - Kazakhstan and Russia.
These plans touch such rivers as the Ili and the Black Irtysh on the territory of China, Kazakhstan and Russia.
Due to the changed bed of the Black Irtysh River Russia is short of over two cubic kilometers of water a year, which will have a bad effect on Omsk, Kurgan and Tyumen regions of the Russian Federation. According to pessimistic forecasts, the bed of the Irtysh River in the territory of Kazakhstan may become a chain of bogs and
stagnant-water lakes by 2020. This will have catastrophic consequences for the economy and ecology not only of Kazakhstan, but also the Russian regions of West Siberia.
There is a multilateral format within whose framework this problem could be solved with due account of the interests of all parties concerned. This is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). All countries mentioned here are either full-fledged members of this organization, or have the observer status as India and Pakistan.
Recently, the critics of SCO have time and again spoken about its weakening potential, claiming that it is necessary only for China in order to establish its domination in Central Asia.26 However, if SCO had included the question of evolving a convention on the use of water in Asia in its agenda, it could have given a fresh impetus and new meaning to its existence. In the future, this convention could be joined by ASEAN countries, which have serious differences with China on the problem of sharing the hydro-resources of the Mekong River. Such regional convention could subsequently become the foundation for a legally binding world convention.
India and Pakistan joining SCO as full-fledged members should not turn this organization into an arena of a new confrontation. On the country, it should contribute to the watering-down of the existing problems between them, including in the sphere of the use of water.
This is why it is only coordination of efforts of all parties concerned that will prevent the gloomy forecasts about "water wars" to come true.
Notes
Chellaney B. Averting Asian Water Wars. - Japan Times, October 2, 2008: http://www.japantime.co.jp/text/eo20081002bc.html.
Water in a Changing World. - The United Nations World Water Development Report 3 (WWDR 3). Paris: UNESCO, 2009.
Problema presnoi vody: globalny kontekst politiki Rossii [Problem of Fresh Water: Global Context of Russia's Policy]. Moscow, 2011, pp. 7-8; http://www.. mgimo.ru/files2/y06_2011/190229/IMI_Water.pdf.
Quinn A. U.S. Intelligence sees global water conflict risks rising. - Reuters, March
22, 2012; http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/03/22/climate-water-brahmaputra-id
INDEE82L0DU201203222?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&utm_source=fe
edburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+
reuters%2FINtopNews+%9628News+%2F+IN+%2F+Top+News%29.
See: Solovyev V. Volhonsky B. Nepreodolimiye mezhdurechya [Insurmountable
Interfluve]. Kommersant - Vlast, No 37 (741), 24.09.2007; http://www.
kommersant.ru/Doc/806999.
Porblema presnoi vody: globalny kontekst politiki Rossii [Problem of Fresh Water: Global Context of Russia's Policy], p. 32.
Kozhantayeva U. Vodniye resursy Tsentralnoi Azii nikak ne mogut podelit [Water Resources of Central Asia Cannot Be Divided] - Delovaya nedelya, 11.05.2008; http://eurasianhome.org/xml/t/digest.xml?lang=ru&nic=digest&pid=2765&s=h53x q1455wvuwxnruig3h4mg.
Inhabitants of Uzbekistan will have to live without water eight years in order to fill
Rogun reservoir - Karimov. - Kazakhstan Today. 08.10.2010; http://www.kt.
kz/index.php?lang=rus&uin=1253258757&chapter=11153525867.
Grozin A. What will the conflict between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan lead to? - Press
conference, 11.04.2012; http://lenta.ru/conf/grozin.
Rysbekov Yu. O dvukh "vodnykh" Konventsiyakh of OON. - Navstrechu 6-mu Vsemirnomu Vodnomu Forumu - sovmestniye deistviya v napravlenii vodnoi bezopasnosti [On Two "Water" Conventions of the UN - For the 6th World Water Forum - Joint Actions for Water Security]. International conference, May 12-13, 2011, Tashkent; http://cawater-info.net/6wwf/conference_ tashkent2011/ files/ discussion_not_2_wat_conv_rus.pdf.
Belokrenitsky V. Pakistan - India: konfrontatsionnaya stabilnost? [Pakistan - India: Confrontational Stability?] Mezhdunarodniye protsessy. Vol. 4, 2006, No 2 (11); http://www.intertrends.ru/eleventh/003.htm.
Zhmuida I., Morozova M. Vodniye voiny v Pakistane [Water Wars in Pakistan] -Institute of the Middle East. 29.11.2007; http://wwwtimes.ru/rus/stat/2007/29-11-07.htm#top.
Robert G. Wirsing and Christopher Jasparro. Spotlight on India River diplomacy: India, Pakistan, and the Baglihar dam dispute. - Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. May 2006; http://www.apcss.org/Publications/ APSSS/InduaRiver Diplomacy. Wirsing.Jasparro.pdf.
Dr. Gopal Siwakoti 'Chintan'. Trans-boundary River Basins in South Asia: Options for Conflict Resolution. - International Rivers. Kathmandu, 2011; http://www. internationalrivers.org/files/TransboundaryRiverBasins.pdf.
Gargi Parsai. India for arbitration of Tulbul row. - The Hindu, March 30, 2012; http:// www.thehindu.com/news/national/article3259314.ece.
Waslekar S. The Final Settlement. Restructuring India - Pakistan Relations. Mumbai: Strategic Foresight Group, 2005, p. 59.
Abdul Rauf Iqbal. Water wars and navigating peace over Indus river basin. -Institute for Strategic Studies, Research&Analysis National Defense University
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17
Islamabad, Pakistan. Monograph Vol. 1, Issue ii, 2010, p. 7; http://www. ndu.edu. pk/issra/issra_pub/Monograph_vol_i_Issue_II.pdf.
18 Harun ur Rashid. Proposed Diversion of Brahmaputra River by China. -http://www.sydneybashi-bangla.com/Articles/Harun_ Diversion%20of%20 Brahma putra%20River%20by%20China.pdf.
19 Chok Tsering. Changing Discourse on the Diversion of the Brahmaputra. - Institute of Peace&Conflict Studies. India - Articles,#3492, 18 November 2011; http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/changing-discourse-on-the-diversion-of-the-brahmaputra-3292.html.
20 Brahma Chellaney, Ashley J. Tellis. A Crisis to Come? China, India, and Water Rivalry. - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, September 13, 2011; http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/13/crisis-to-come-china-india-and-water-rivalry/54wg.
21 Hari Bansh Jha. Diversion of the Brahmaputra: Myth of Reality? - IDSA Comment. August 9, 2011; http://www.idsa.in/dsacomments/ Diversion offthebrahmaputraMythorReality_hbjha_090811.
22 China to construct three more dams on Brahmaputra River. - Times of India, January 2013; http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/China-to-construct-three-more-damson-Brahmaputra-river/articleshow/18257155.cms.
23 Harun ur Rashid. Proposed Diversion of Brahmaputra River by China.
24 Tashi Tsering. China's Plans to Divert Water on the Tibetan Plateau; http://www.asiapacificmemo.ca/chin-plans-to-divert-water-on-the-tibetan-plateau.
25 Dangers from China's Three Gorges Dam may force another 100,000 people to be displaced. - Associated Press, April 18, 2012; http://www.washingtonpost. com/world/asia_pacific/dangers-in-chinas-3e-gorges-rgion-may-force-anothet-100000-people-to-be-displaced/2012/04/18/glQAsrYPT_story.html.
26 See, for example: the section "SCO as an Instrument of Economic Expansion of China in Central Asia." - Countries of CIS and Baltic Region in China's Global Policy. Moscow, 2013, pp. 86 - 90.
"Gosudarstvo, obshchestvo, mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya na musulmanskom Vostoke," Moscow, 2014, pp. 530-542.
Sergei Abashin,
political analyst
MIGRATION FROM CENTRAL ASIA TO RUSSIA: MODEL OF A NEW WORLD ORDER
Migration of a large number of people from Central Asia to Russia has become a surprise to experts and politicians. In Soviet times, the reluctance of the Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyz to change their place
