CC BY
51Greenhouse Gas Emission Scenarios for Russia and Rest of the World*
Alexey KOKORIN, Ph.D., Inna Gritsevich, Ph.D.
World Wildlife Fund (WWF Russia) [email protected]
Dmitry GoRDEEv
Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, Moscow [email protected]
Abstract. The paper explores the reasons behind the evolution of judgments of the energy sector development and the resulting expansion of the variety of projection-based scenarios both for Russia and globally. It shows that there are two types of scenarios depending on the degree of climatic risks accounting: zero and imperative, the latter requiring an abrupt reduction of emissions. The difference is resolved by developing scenarios that optimize overall costs of emission reduction and adaptation to the negative effects. Development of such scenarios involves substantial difficulties, so it is unlikely that Russia's and other countries' targets analyzed in the paper will be significantly changed before 2020. Calculations on the TIMES international model used in Russia for the first time showed that economically optimal development of the country's energy sector leads to the stabilization of CO2 emission at 75% of the 1990 level, and to further reduction to 70% by 2030. Reduction beyond these values requires additional costs, for example, emission charges. However, in Russia there is evidence of non-optimal development in the recent years, leading to the emission growth.
Аннотация. Рассмотрены причины изменения взглядов на развитие энергетики и расширения спектра прогностических сценариев для России и мира. Показано, что сценарии делятся на два типа по степени учета климатических рисков: нулевой или императивный, требующий резкого снижения выбросов. Противоречие разрешается созданием сценариев, оптимизирующих суммарные затраты на снижение выбросов и адаптацию к негативным явлениям. Их построение связано с трудностями, поэтому до 2020 г. маловероятно кардинальное изменение рассмотренных в работе целей России и других стран. Впервые проведенные в России расчеты по международной модели TIMES показали, что экономически оптимальное развитие энергетики страны приводит к стабилизации выбросов СО2 на уровне 75% от 1990 г., а к 2030 г.-их снижению до уровня 70%. Дальнейшее снижение требует специальных затрат, например, платежей за выбросы. Однако есть признаки экономически неоптимального развития России в последние годы, что ведет к росту выбросов.
Key words: Greenhouse gas emissions, scenarios, Russia, climatic risks.
introduction
During the last three years the vision of global energy sector development and, more generally, global economic development has changed quite significantly. The variety of development scenarios for the next 20-40 years has considerably changed and expanded for many countries, because the old concepts fail to account new financial and economic realities and to answer emerging questions. Apparently, translation of development scenarios into greenhouse gas (GHG) emission dynamics curves shows that these can differ fundamentally, with some of them showing growth,
while others demonstrating abrupt reduction. What reasons urged development of new scenarios? Does the difference mean that some scenarios are correct, while the others are wrong, and what might be the “truth” in between? This is the first group of issues discussed in this paper.
In 2012, international climate negotiations of 195 members of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN FCCC) entered a new phase. The focus of attention has shifted from the Kyoto Protocol to a new climate agreement that would come into force in 2020. Preparation of this agreement is to be accomplished by late 2015. Intrinsically, it is a
* Сценарии выбросов парниковых газов в России и в мире в целом
financial and economic agreement that determines how GHG emissions by developing countries are to be limited with financial assistance provided by developed countries both for emission control and adaptation to the negative consequences of anthropogenic climate change. The second part of this paper elaborates on Russia’s prospective commitments for GHG control and reduction.
MAJOR DRIvERS BEHIND MODIFICATION AND ExPANSION OF THE vARIETY OF development scenarios
The global economic crisis became the first cause of the change. Economic growth of 2003-2008 was accompanied by devastating hydrocarbons price growth; however, the crisis did not bring down prices of all raw material resources, it rather determined their wild fluctuations which persist until now. Recovering from the crisis, many countries saw that their old ideas of long-term sustainable growth were incorrect, and re-evaluated projected development rates for the coming decades. Russia was one of these.
Another factor deals with a considerable modification of the fuel and energy balance. A good many countries have made use of the crisis realities to promote transition to low-carbon development, i. e. development based on new technologies with minimal or zero CO2 emissions. The measures they took included aggressive promotion of renewable energy sources; electricity, heat, and motor fuel savings, etc. At the same time, gas production from alternative sources showed rapid growth spurred by high prices, which made these sources economically viable. These changes are pertinent to Russia as well, both in the context of improving energy efficiency and employing renewable energy sources and in the context of changing demand for our export products — primarily gas.
The goals pursued by these countries were diverse: a wish to reduce dependence on imported energy carriers, diversification of energy sources, creation of jobs, promotion of their own technologies; but apart from these some countries really sought to reduce the anthropogenic interference with the climate system, in which the key role belongs to CO2 emissions and the enhancement of the greenhouse effect, as was underlined by Roshydromet (2008) and IPCC (2007).
The third factor is insistent demands by environmental experts, international community, and the most vulnerable countries to reduce greenhouse gas emission to the level that would guarantee that climate change is kept within relatively safe limits. Evaluation of the safe level is not at all an easy task. Today, the “safe level” is assumed at 2oC increase
of the global near-surface air temperature over the pre-industrial average. According to the IPCC (2007), as well as Roshydromet (2008), exceeding this 2oC rise limit will result in enhancement of droughts and other dangerous events. However, for the most vulnerable countries, in particular, for small island states, the “safe level” is much stiffer: 1.5oC. Despite the conventionality of this parameter (because not mean air temperature, but rather its surging and dangerous hydrometeorological events, rising sea level, etc. are responsible for the damage), it was taken as a basis and is the UN-accepted target1, serving as the reference for calculating the necessary reduction of the global emission.
There are many subtleties to this calculation, and besides, it can only be made in terms of probability. According to the IPCC estimates, it would be necessary to attain CO2 stabilization at 450 ppm (with current concentration of about 400 ppm), and the growth of other anthropogenic gases is not to exceed 100 ppm in CO2 equivalent, to give at least 10% probability of not exceeding 2oC; and this would require 50% reduction of the global emission by 2050. According to IPCC (2007), to give 30-50% probability, and also to preserve some possibility of keeping the air temperature increase below 1.5oC, 80% reduction is needed by the middle of this century.
It is important to make a point that there is a wide uncertainty about response time range, in which climate will be reacting to the growing concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere2. Besides, the observed effects are a combination of decades-long natural variations and the entire variety of anthropogenic impacts, of which CO2 emission is only the main one (very important are particulate matter and soot emissions: while the former cools down the atmosphere, the latter warms it up). For this reason one can hardly be dogmatic about feasibility or impracticability of a certain temperature target. At this point, all targets are to be kept in mind and all possibilities need to be explored.
1 All UN FCCC member-states, including each and every large country, officially adopted 2 oC as a target and formalized it in UN documents. See Cancun agreements, December 2010, and Durban platform, December 2011, www.unfccc.int
2 Response of the world ocean to the anthropogenic impact on the atmosphere is very much delayed and uncertain. Achieving a balance may take decades and even hundreds of years, especially for high stabilization levels of 600-700 ppm and beyond. In particular, current aggregate concentration of C02 and other anthropogenic greenhouse gases in CO2 equivalent equal to 450-500 ppm. This concentration correlates to the temperature rise up to a balanced state of approximately 2.5 oC above the pre-industrial level. However, the observed effect is three times lower: the temperature increase is 0.8 oC (see Roshydromet (2008) vol.1 pp. 93-97).
Therefore, back in 2008 G8 adopted general recommendations for at least 50% reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions by mid-XXI century. The G8 Declaration (2009) for leading developed countries confirmed reduction by at least 80%. Such decision is sort of an order for 50% and 80% reduction scenarios for Russia.
The fourth factor deals with revised opinions on the nuclear energy. The Fukushima accident not only affected Japan’s energy policy (although not as much as it seemed two years ago), it accelerated decision-making in a number of other countries. It became clearer, how high the price of nuclear energy is, i. e. of costly safety measures, which become increasingly larger in number. According to the recent International Energy Agency (IEA) WEO (2012), in the context of the entire global energy the nuclear sector is perceived as a relatively small one with a very limited growth potential, primarily existing in China, India, and Russia. And development of nuclear energy provided by fast reactors is at best viewed as a matter of very distant future, not least because nearly all the leading economies have rejected the idea (see IEA Energy Technology Perspectives (2012)).
THREE TYPES OF SCENARIOS AS THREE STEPS TO LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS OF THE ECONOMY’S RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
The above factors inspired the International Energy Agency (IEA), other international and national agencies, large business and even environmental organizations to develop new scenarios. IEA and other organizations develop two types of scenarios, both global and for individual countries, including Russia.
The first type of scenarios — “classic” scenarios — describe the most expected energy and economic development based on current ideas of business and governance. These scenarios implement policies and innovations that are within the current development paradigm. This paradigm suggests low-carbon development, but no concrete emission control targets. CO2 is energy efficiency and renewable energy use indicator, rather than a specific goal. Various CO2 emission charges are often included in the models too, if they help attain primary goals of energy efficiency, renewables or employment. In this case emission charges obviously do not hamper economic development.
Authors of these models realize both the difficulties associated with long-term forecasting and the limitations of today’s vision of future, so normally they consider the next 25-30 years: until 2030 or
2040. Estimations for 2050 are also made, but mostly as an interesting research exercise.
Of global scenarios, those better known and widely used include New Policy Scenario of the IEA WEO (2012), which incorporates the latest optimistic vision of the natural gas use presented by IEA before in the IEA Special Report (2011). Regularly updated BP projections (2012) can also be mentioned. ERIRAS-AC (2013) is a contribution by Russian experts, who published their review of the post-crisis global development until 2040. All these scenarios promise smooth growth of global energy-related CO2 emission for the next 20-25 years, and all of them predict practically the same values: +20 — +25%, see Table 1.
There are new scenarios for Russia as well. In late 2011 IEA published IEA Outlook for Russian Energy (2011) with detailed estimates corresponding to the global “new policy” scenario. In spring 2012, Russian experts made their step forward. Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Science (ERIRAS) published a projection of Russia’s energy sector development until 2035 (ERIRAS-REA (2012)). In ERIRAS-AC (2013) the projection horizon was extended to 2040 and supplemented with the latest data on non-conventional gas and oil sources. For the years to come, these projections are likely to become the major source for official scenarios of the energy sector development. In fact, this effort was similar to the IEA’s “new policy” scenario for Russia, but based on a better knowledge of Russia’s realities and on the opinions of ERIRAS experts and experts of the Analytical Center of Russian government. ERIRAS also has preliminary estimates for Russia for 2050, see Veselov et al. (2012).
In accordance with NIR RF (2013), in 20113 Russia’s CO2 emission was 32.6% below the 1990 level, cumulative energy-related GHG emission was 29.3% below (with energy-related C02 emission 34.2% below), and cumulative GHG emission 30.8% below that level (UN FCCC normally compares emissions to the 1990 baselines, and Russia’s international commitments are estimated that way, too). Let us point out, that these values refer exactly to emissions. For our country it is very important to take account of the role played by forestry (human-induced CO2 emission and absorption by forests). UN FCCC and UN national commitments do not take account of all forests, but only of so-called “managed” forests, which constitute around 85% of all forests in
3 In compliance with the world practice and UN FCCC procedures, data for 2012 will be presented in April 2014.
Table 1. “Classic” scenarios of global and Russian energy sector development.
Type of scenario Global (time period, growth of energy-related CO2 emission) Russia (projection horizon, energy-related CO2 emission compared to 1990)
Scenarios based on current view of governance and business IEA WEO (2012) “New Policy Scenario”: 2010-2035, +23% BP (2012): 2010-2030, +25% ERIRAS-AC (2013): 2010-2035, +20%; 2010-2050, +25% IEA Outlook for Russian Energy (2011) “New Policy”: 2035,-14% ERARAS-REA (2012): 2035,-15% Veselov et al. (2012): 2050, range from +5 to -25% Bashmakov (2009) and Bashmakov & Myshak (2013): 2050, range from 0 to -25% McKinsey (2009): 2030,-27%*
* This research is not a simulative projection of the economically optimal development, but rather an assessment of the potential and economic viability of individual measures accompanied by a cost curve. The given numerical parameter reflects implementation of all economically viable measures for all GHG emissions.
the Russian Federation. According to NIR RF (2013), now they are a large net absorber of CO2, while back in 1990 a reverse situation was observed: a small net emission. As a result, in 2011 overall emission of all greenhouse gases with an account of net absorption of CO2 by forests was 50.8% below the 1990 level. However, economic and energy scenarios do not include “managed” forests, so one has to start out from the energy-related CO2 emission level, see Table 1. 2
Therefore, “classic” scenarios (first type scenarios), covering the period 2011-2035, predict Russia’s energy-related emission growth equal to the lower boundary of the global emission growth range: around 20% (or by 10-15 percentage points from the 1990 level).
The second type of scenarios is based on the prospective development paradigm and the need to attain a certain goal. As a rule, such opinions are already today’s views of the advanced and environmentally conscious part of the international community, yet are not so far shared by officials and the business community. These scenarios assume that prospective developments will determine the need for setting this goal. Models are further used to figure out how to best attain this goal from the economic point of view. And the goal itself is a priori assumed to be imperative. Such goal may be transition to own energy sources (rejection of import), complete transition to renewable energy, or achieving a GHG emission target. As a rule, this is an analysis of possibilities to cut CO2 emission by 50-80% by 2050.
IEA WEO (2012) presents a scenario “450 ppm” which demonstrates how the global energy sector can be developing so that the emission level in 2050 is 50% below the current level. These scenarios analyze technical and economic attainability of a particular goal and assess additional investment demand
for the transition to this development trajectory, see Table 2.
WWF International & Ecofys (2011) arrived at conclusion that by 2050 all the energy in the whole world can be produced from renewable energy sources. GP & EREC (2010) came up with a more moderate estimate of the production technology potential: 80% of primary energy consumption will be produced from renewable energy sources by 2050. For Russia, their estimate is 57% from renewable energy by 2050, and 70% CO2 emission reduction in 2005-2050, as published in GP & EREC (2009). Generally, similar figures for Russia are presented in the recent IEA WEO (2012), where the “450 ppm” scenario shows 47% reduction in 2035 as compared to 1990, see Table 2.
In other words, attainability of abrupt emission decline has been demonstrated. However, this result is not being employed by the developers of “classic” scenarios. The curves in Fig. 1 drift apart. And yet there is no miscalculation on any side. The reason is taking diametrically opposite account of the climate factor. The first type scenarios view the climate risk as negligible. In such scenarios (for example, those by IEA), CO2 emission charges, like, say, in the EU or in China, are merely an additional instrument to address such challenges as energy efficiency improvement, introduction of certain technologies, or development of renewable energy. These charges constitute no additional burden on the economy, so the economy develops without making “deductions” to address climate issues.
The second type scenarios take the climatic risk as an imperative goal: emissions are to be abruptly cut despite economic losses or disproportions in energy mix. CO2 charges are forcefully introduced in all countries, after a certain moment becoming a burden on the economy, that has to make considerable and even huge “deductions” for the sake of emission reduction and addressing the climate issues.
Table 2. Global and Russian energy sector development scenarios that implement a priori set goals for emission reduction.
Type of scenario Global (time period, reduction of energy-related CO2 emission) Russia (projection horizon, energy-related CO2 emission compared to 1990)
Scenarios that implement a priori set goals for GHG emission reduction Attainability of goal -50% by 2050 IEA WEO (2012) “450 ppm scenario”: 2010-2035,-25% GEA (2012): 2010-2035,-17% Attainability of goal -80% or lower for 2000-2050 was presented by WWF International & Ecofys (2011); Deng et.al. (2012) and GP & EREC (2010) Attainability of goal -50% by 2050. IEA WEO (2012) “450 ppm scenario”: 1990-2035,-47% IEP-WWF, see Fig. 4 below: 1990-2050,-50% Attainability of goals -80% or lower for 2000-2050 was presented by GP & EREC (2009)
Discussion of which type of scenarios is “truer” doesn’t seem to make sense. Both types are accurate to the extent their assumptions of the importance of the climatic risk are correct. In the first case, damage caused by climate change is negligible, while in the second it is so huge, that prevention becomes an imperative goal.
From the economic point of view, there is a need for the third type scenarios: elaboration of a longterm economic development strategy to minimize the overall costs of three types of action: GHG emission reduction; adaptation to the new climate conditions; and combating damage caused by climate change. Obviously, positive effects of climate change also need to be taken into account, although we are yet to learn how to make use of them.
% of the 1990 level
It is important to estimate losses and compare them with emission reduction costs, see Fig. 2. IPCC has been for a long time trying to do so, collecting data on the damage, risks, insurance options, and possibilities to prevent disastrous losses. IPCC (2007) Fourth Assessment Report provides a large bulk of information, even more to be presented in the next (Fifth) Assessment Report to be released in 2014. However, so far not much comes out of the attempts to adequately compare the damage with emission reduction costs. A good try was made in The Economics of Climate Change (2006), which contains an absolutely dramatic calculation of how GDP of individual groups of countries will be going down depending on the climate scenarios, see also Kokorin et.al. (2009). However, this report was of such a
1 - range of projections based on “classic” scenarios: estimating the economic optimal development of the economy exclusive of the need for special reduction of the CO2 emission
2 - range of projections based on the second type scenarios: formulating an imperative goal of mandatory reduction of CO2 emission
3 - prospective scenarios of the third type, where an optimal strategy is selected to minimize overall costs of CO2 emission reduction, the costs of adaptation to negative climate conditions, and the damage caused by climate change.
Figure 1. Schematic plot of Russia’s CO2 emission for three types of scenarios (excl. net CO2 absorption by forests).
GHG Costs of Damage from Benefits from Overall costs to
emission adaptation to the negative climate positive climate the economy
reduction + new climate + effects - effects =
costs conditions
Figure 2. Calculation scheme to minimize the overall costs in the third type scenarios.
general nature, that it was rather an illustration to attract attention, than an appeal for concrete economic action. A research by Potsdam Climate Institute published in 2013 appears to be a much more serious effort, having integrated the entire available information on the prospective damage depending on the global temperature growth. However, this was accomplished for only three, obviously most vulnerable, world regions: Africa to the south of Sahara, South-East Asia, and South Asia, see Schellnhuber et.al. (2013).
Starting from a certain limit, net impact of climate change (balance of negative and positive effects) becomes negative even for northern countries. We may have already approached this limit. Evolution of average annual temperature in the territory of Russia between 1976 and 2011 accounts for nearly 1.50C. We now can see a more “nervous’ climate with a large number of temperature jerks (heat waves and “unexpected” devastating frosts), more prominent precipitation (rain showers, snowfalls and snowstorms), strong winds, droughts, and floods. The costs of air conditioning tend to exceed heating cost savings, even if the latter were obtained. Damage caused by devastating floods and deluges exceeds potential benefits that might be brought by a longer vegetation period and higher crops yield. Higher temperatures and weaker ice in the North are by far “compensated” by permafrost melting, increasing number of snowstorms and gales, strong bank and shoreline erosion, etc.
A detailed status report and an analysis of the available information to assess the damage were accomplished in 2011 by a team of Russian climate experts and economists in Macroeconomic Impacts (2011). Somewhat more detailed summaries of the negative and positive effects for the coming 10-30 years were presented by WWF Russia for 11 subjects of the Russian Federation located in the Russian Arctic and the Far East in Kokorin et.al. (2013). Regretfully, the information is presented as text descriptions of the prospective problems, and is difficult to translate into numerical parameters, let alone in the monetary terms. There are quite a few objective reasons for that.
In the first place, there is a need for very longterm (30-50 years and beyond) climate and eco-
nomic projections and plans. Inertia of the climate system is very significant, and our today’s action determines the situation to be faced in 30-50 years’ time, no sooner than that. However, beyond that time the difference may be very substantial, according to the recent Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2012) on extreme weather events. For example, in 50-60 years’ time devastating heat waves may occur either once every 3 or every 7 years. Obviously, both damage and preparation (adaptation) for diverse frequency of weather events will demand diverse investment. Prospective incongruity of climate projections that are based on different emission scenarios can be clearly seen on the interactive map presented on the website of Voeikov Main Geophysical Observatory.
So long planning period is not only about figuring out what is cheaper: to pay three times less today or three times more 40 years later. It is also a new lifestyle and a new economic guidance. So far, many countries, including Russia, are not used to being seriously conscious about such distant future.
Secondly, the globality of the problem. Emission reduction in an individual country is no solution. Only emission reduction by all countries can mitigate climate change. Therefore, there should be a very complex cooperation between the largest economies, primarily China, India, and the U.S., to promote emission reduction in “equal” shares. Quotation marks that enclose the word “equal” are not incidental; they suggest a balance to reflect different levels of economic development and the differences in the economies. This is exactly an issue that is being discussed by the UN FCCC, which in late 2011 came up with a decision that the corresponding new agreement was to come into force only in 20204. This rescheduling reflects objective difficulties, primarily lack of accurate calculations of damage versus emission reduction costs for the largest economies.
Thirdly, climate change is a combination of anthropogenic impact and long-term natural variations, including possible human interference with these variations. This means that global surface air
4 For UN FCCC documents see www.unfccc.int. For a review of the course of negotiations see www.wwf.ru/dimate.
China
Other large developing countries
Other developing countries
Russian Federation
Other economies in transition
USA
EU-15
EU-12 new member-states Japan
Other OECD countries (as of 1990)
International air and ocean transport (deemed extraterritorial)
1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014
Source: data from Trends in Global CO2 Emissions, 2012 Report (2012).
Figure 3. GD2 emission from energy and cement production, which is the largest (~70%), but not the only, component of
global anthropogenic emission of greenhouse gases.
temperature growth is not smooth, intermitting or speeding up at times. The same essentially refers to the number and intensity of dangerous events5. Politicians and incompetent people might then have a wrong impression that the global warming is over, which obviously does not encourage making longterm and costly decisions.
And finally, there is a fundamental problem dealing with complete account of damage. One can estimate the costs of shifting the entire population of a small island state to, say, Australia, including the costs of moving and settling, creation of jobs and infrastructure. But can one assess the costs of extinct wildlife of this island? This problem is directly related to the long-discussed issue of payments for ecosystem services and nature preservation.
Nevertheless, according to the opinion of economists, in particular those participating in the preparation of the next (Fifth) IPCC Assessment Report, there is no other way. Let it be excluding ecosystem services and only for an incomplete set of dangerous events, but the damage is to be estimated for all leading economies and compared to their emission reduction costs. Otherwise costly scenarios, for example, “450 ppm” by IEA or complete transition to renewable energy sources are hanged in the air and treated extremely skeptically by the business community and officials.
INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS FOR greenhouse gas emission reduction
In the 2000-s, the situation with global GHG emission was different from that at the moment of sign-
5 See, for example, materials of Roshydromet’s monthly electronic bulletin “Climate Change” at www.global-climate-change.ru or www.meteorf.ru.
ing UN FCCC and developing the Kyoto Protocol. At that point the main role was played by the developed countries, whereas now the largest developing countries, primarily China and India, are responsible for nearly entire global emission growth, see Fig. 3. According to Agibalov & Kokorin (2010), this has given birth to a new concept of global action, where emission is cut by all countries, but developed economies provide financial and technical assistance to the developing states. This concept backs development of a new climate agreement in the UN, which is to be adopted in late 2015 and to come into force in 2020.
Based on the national situations and proposals for the global agreement, 5 groups of countries can be identified, whose opinions, for the sake of brevity, are presented in a summary Table 3.
Incongruity of opinions presented in Table 3 is so substantial, that a fast consensus is unlikely. Nevertheless, it is very important for Russia to formulate its own targets for the expected term of the new UN FCCC agreement, i. e. for 2020-2030.
possible Russia’s ghg targets for 2020 AND 2030
Under the circumstances, it doesn’t seem to make much sense to discuss the level of GHG emission in our country in 2050 or beyond. A declaration that emission cannot be abruptly reduced would be equally strange, opposing Russia to the developed countries and exposing it to criticism by environmental experts. Therefore, no wonder that in the G8 Declaration (2009) Russia did not object to the common recommendation on emissions reduction: global by 50% and those by developed countries by 80%. However, A. V. Dvorkovich, the Russian Sherpa, pointed out that the range was very wide for Rus-
Table 3. Attitudes of various countries to long-term commitments for GHG emission reduction.
Countries National situations Proposals on emission reduction commitments
Developed countries, including Russia In most countries, emissions are already declining (new technologies introduction rates are ahead of GDP growth). These countries have low-carbon development scenarios until 2030 and 2050, which assume 80% or more emission reduction. However, these scenarios assume certain external prerequisites, including low-carbon development of developing economies, primarily China and India. Russia is undergoing a slow emission growth trend, which is to be replaced with stabilization, as the country develops. It is important, as soon as practicable, to transit from hampering the growth of global emission to the emission reduction in absolute figures. Global emission peak is to be overcome before 2020. General commitment by all countries to halve global emission by 2050 (compared to the 1990, 2000, or 2005 levels, different countries use different years). The majority of developed countries are prepared to cut their emissions by 80% by 2050.
China and India Emissions are growing very fast. These countries are responsible for 80% or more of the global emission growth. They lack optimized economic development scenarios, which would guarantee 50% reduction of the global emission by 2050 (even if developed countries bring down their emissions by 80%). Until mid-2020s, these countries can see no way of reining in the growing emission (production growth is by far ahead of the introduction of new technologies). India’s priority is combating poverty. Only when this challenge has been addressed, the country will be prepared to put low-carbon development first. Vigorously opposed to any numerical parameters of the global emission, including 50% reduction by 2050 or setting any year as the emission peak. For 2020, agree to make emission reduction commitments in specific units (2-3% annual reduction of emission per unit of GDP), but not for emission stabilization. India firmly couples its commitments with external financial aid.
Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, South Korea, Indonesia, etc. Emissions are growing, but there are economic development projections and scenarios that will lead to the stabilization of emissions by these countries in early 2020-s (transition to low-carbon development). For Brazil and Indonesia, emission dynamics are strongly determined by external aid. Occupy an intermediary position between developed countries and China and India. Are prepared to join up the common commitment by all countries for 50% reduction of the global emission by 2050. Willing to make commitments in specific units that will lead to their emission stabilization by 2020.
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, etc. Extremely high per capita emission (yet not high in absolute terms). Fearing that other countries’ low-carbon development may bring oil demand down. Opposed to any numerical emission reduction commitments for states that do not have the status of developed countries in the UN FCCC (i. e. for themselves).
Nearly 100 least developed island/ highland, etc. states Low emissions. Regardless of the economic development dynamics or type, these countries provide no impact on the global emission. Are particularly vulnerable to climate change. Advocate radical and immediate reduction of the global greenhouse gas emission.
sia: in 2050 emission could be 20 or 60% below the 1990 level.
On the other hand, of course, there is a need for GHG assessments and targets for the years to come. On the international level, GHG emissions have become an indicator of a country’s development, energy efficiency, and environmental policy. No development projections can ignore GHG emission levels. This is pertinent to Russia as well; in late March 2013 Russian Prime Minister signed a new Social and Economic Development Projection for the Russian Federation until 2030 (2013), which was prepared by the RF Ministry of Economic Development (MED). This document outlines the following emission trends: in the 2010-s GHG emission will
be slowly growing to reach 75% of the 1990 level by 2020 and then drop to 70% of the 1990 level by 2030. As of 2011, the emission stayed at 69%, for details see the discussion of Table 1 above; see also NIR RF (2013). This projection excludes CO2 absorption by forests and deals only with GHG emission in the Russian economy.
However, in the above projection GHG parameters are sort of separate from the presented macroeconomic scenarios: conservative, innovative, and accelerated. No GHG emission estimation by scenarios was done prior to the projection development. To a certain extent, one may presume that GHG emission (same as energy consumption) is less dependent on the implemented scenario, than other pa-
mln. t CO2 per year 2500
1990 level
*C02-En
BASE
BAU
500
0 ^-----------T-----------1-----------1-----------T----------T-----------1-----------T----------T-----------I—
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
C02-En - Russian energy-sector CO2 emission in 2005-2011 BASE - no-new-technologies scenario (4% annual GDP growth)
BAU - economically optimal introduction of new technologies; correlates to the innovative scenario by MED for 2030 (4% GDP annual growth). A first type scenario (see Table 1), which does not set any specific targets for GHG emission reduction
TAX - a BAU scenario with additional introduction of CO2 charges since 2020, rising from USD 15 to 80 per ton. A second type scenario (see Table 2), which sets a special emission reduction target: 50% of the 1990 level by 2050.
Figure 4. Evolution of Russian CO2 energy-related emission by scenarios; calculations by IEP using the TIMES model.
rameters, including GDP growth rates, consumption of certain products, etc. In the innovative scenario, GDP growth is higher, but since energy efficiency technologies are introduced faster, overall emission dynamics may be quite close to the conservative scenario. Nevertheless, exploring the correlation of GHG emission dynamics with the development of Russia’s entire economy, as well as of individual sectors, and further with individual measures is definitely an important task.
Setting this task is being discussed by the federal government in the context of setting a national GHG target, which, in its turn, is required for detailing our participation in the new UN FCCC international agreement. At the moment of this paper submission (late June 2013), all federal ministries have agreed to the draft government decree specifying the 2020 target as keeping the emission at 75% of the 1990 level. The draft further stipulates that the above target needs to be broken down by sectors of economy.
The authors have estimated Russia’s CO2 emission, and this effort became one of the first steps to addressing the goal. The Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy (IEP) for the first time in Russia used TIMES, a macroeconomic model developed under the aegis of IEA and based on ETSAP database of prices and technologies, which is broadly used worldwide (these analytical tools are combined in the TIAM complex), see Gordeev et al. (2011) and Kokorin et
al. (2011). World Wildlife Fund (WWF Russia) was actively involved in the preparation of primary data for Russia and in the general task setting. The effort also sought to attain an important research goal: it was the first experience of running the TIMES model in Russia. This model always balances demand and supply by all types of products, including energy and financial resources. It does not let a country to “live on credit”, so not all scenarios can be run.
From the modeling point of view, our calculations are in many respects similar to the research accomplished by IEA for Russia in IEA Outlook for Russian Energy (2011). However, an important dissimilarity was using GDP growth parameters equal to those used by the RF Ministry of Economy in the innovation scenario of the Projection (2013): 4% until 2030 (according to IEA, since 2010 average annual GDP growth equals 3%). Beyond 2030, GDP growth rates in our calculations are 3.5%, and beyond 2040 they are 3%. Like in the RF MED’s innovative scenario, we assumed a higher, than IEA, energy efficiency improvement rate.
These calculations were made for the economically optimal development both with (second type scenarios) and without (first type scenarios above) a specific target, see Tables 1 and 2. This paper does not seek to provide a complete description of the modeling results, as there will be special publications on this topic. IEP is carrying on with the
calculations, working with the TIMES model in cooperation with the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (ANE) and other research groups. Let us point out that in 2013 a review paper was published (Bashmakov & Myshak, 2013), which analyzes modeling efforts by all Russian research groups, including IEP and ANE. Therefore, here we shall only provide two of our results, which are most relevant to setting Russia’s national GHG target for 2020-2030.
Firstly, our calculations confirm, that the innovation scenario, which includes active implementation of the energy efficiency and energy savings potential, indeed results in the GHG emission dynamics as shown in the RF MED projection for 2030, see Fig.4. The emission shows moderate growth at the beginning, then comes out on a plateau and finally goes down to 65-70% of the 1990 level. However, in the 2030-s emissions stabilize on this level, and special costly measures are required to further bring them down (for example, emission charges, which are yet to be justified by the estimates of damage caused by negative effects of climate change). Special measures might be taken earlier; for example, introduction of emission charges in 2015 would help to gradually reduce CO2 emissions to 50-60% of the 1990 level, see Fig. 4.
Secondly, our calculations show that if our country’s development is not accompanied by introduction of new technologies, which are already economically viable, we may have to face a substantial emission growth. Figure 4 shows the results of the BAU (“business-as-usual”) scenario, which correlates with the innovation scenario by RF MED until 2030. The BAU scenario does not assume any special measures to reduce emissions, but the private sector shifts to new technologies as they become cost-effective. Along with BAU, a BASE scenario was calculated, in which GDP growth is the same as in BAU (4%), but no new technologies are introduced. Technology shift is prevented by other factors, not described in the model. These may include high business risks, too short business plan periods, outflow of capital, imperfect legislation or law enforcement practices, etc. Russia’s energy-related GHG emission in 2010-2011 prompted us to calculate the BASE scenario (data for 2012 were not available at the moment of completing that work). In 2003-2008, it only grew up by 5%, in 2009 dropped by 5%, in 2010 recovered to reach the 2008 level, and in 2011 rose by another 5%, see Fig. 4. Therefore, in 2011 a substantial diversion from the BAU scenario was observed.
This might have been a result of environmental factors (a colder winter and/or smaller water run-off
of rivers, which affects hydro power plants). However, in a large country like Russia, where a cold winter in one part of the territory is usually made up by a warm winter in the other part, etc., the role of environmental factors is relatively small, and so the reason is more likely the fact that cost-effective technologies are not being introduced. For a combination of reasons, the private sector chose a path, which is closer to the BASE scenario, than to the BAU. Obviously, this situation cannot last long, but at the moment we are facing a devastating emission growth.
The task for the near future is to direct the development along the economically optimal BAU scenario, i. e. remove barriers that are currently pushing the private sector to the BASE trajectory. If this is accomplished, the goal of keeping emissions at, or below, 75% from the 1990 level may be attained. Otherwise, if a shift from BASE to BAU takes place only around 2020, 80% of the 1990 level, or even a little more than that, should be expected. Of course, emission level is not the main problem; far more important is that this development trajectory has no positive perspective, bringing increasingly substantial loss of competitiveness and strong economic perturbations.
CONCLUSION
From the GHG emission dynamics point of view, global and Russian economic and energy sector development scenarios can be split into two groups. While in one group of scenarios the emissions grow, in the other they decline considerably. However, there is no inconsistency between them; the difference is determined by how climatic risks are accounted. In the first case they are viewed as negligible, while in the second they are dominating and requiring emission reduction regardless of costs. Directed by the precautionary principle, environmental organizations and the society insist on the implementation of the second type scenarios.
We will know which scenarios are more correct, i. e. find the truth in between, only when climatic losses and risks are correctly and in full detail calculated for all large countries of the world, including Russia. Damage and costs of adaptation to negative effects of anthropogenic climate change are to be compared with the costs of accelerated reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Then it will be possible to develop models and scenarios of the third type, which would optimize overall costs over several decades or even a longer period.
TIMES, an internationally recognized model, was for the first ever time used in Russia for calculations. The results confirmed that the innovation scenario
of Russia’s development until 2030 prepared by RF MED leads to the stabilization of CO2 emission level. Until 2020 the emission will be growing up to approximately 75% of the 1990 level, and by 2030 it will decline to 70%. These values can be taken as Russia’s GHG targets until 2030. Further emission reduction will require taking special measures, for example, emission charges. Nevertheless, with coordinated emission reduction action by all largest countries, by 2050 Russia can reduce its emission to 50% or even less. This level can be taken as a global action target in the process of developing a new climate change agreement by the UN.
Attaining the above GHG goals requires economically optimal development of Russia’s economy, with energy efficient technologies being introduced as soon as they become cost-effective. However, this has not been the case in the recent years. It is important to explore devastating GHG emission growth in Russia’s energy sector and the entire economy in 2010-2011, and to minimize economic and legislative reasons behind this growth. This should be the core element of Russia’s GHG emission reduction action in the near future.
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