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ВЕСТН. МОСК. УН-ТА. СЕР. 27. ГЛОБАЛИСТИКА И ГЕОПОЛИТИКА. 2020. № 4
Доктор Александр Рар
научный директор Германо-российского форума,
Берлин, Германия
ГЕРМАНИЯ-РОССИЯ: ВОЗМОЖЕН ЛИ НОВЫЙ «OST-POLITIK»? (Доклад на Международном научном конгрессе «Глобалистика-2020: Глобальные проблемы и будущее человечества»)
Dr. Alexander Rahr
Scientific Director of the German-Russian Forum,
Berlin, Germany
GERMANY- RUSSIA:
IS A NEW OST-POLITIK FEASIBLE?
(Report at the International scientific congress
"Globalistics-2020: Global issues and future of humankind")
It is difficult to promote a better relationship between Germany and Russia in nowadays tense times. Since the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict five years ago, Russia has once again become an adversary of the West — and vice versa. But in no other European country, the majority of the population in opinion polls is so much in favor of improving relations with Russia — as in Germany. Unlike many other EU states, Germans want a common Europe with — and not against — Russia. And in Russia, despite its bloody common history, Germany is the most favorite European country.
Russia does not make it easy for its sympathizers in the West. It is difficult to support Russia, if the Russian government relies solely on its own national interests. Foreign and domestic political thinking in Russia also seems to have something revanchist about it for Germans. The West does not like Russia's desire to be a great power again by all means. Many had hoped that Russia, as the loser of the Cold War, would turn to — and subordinate itself to Western liberal values. Some say: how safe could life be in Europe if Russia did not always disturb.
Nevertheless, NATO's eastward enlargement is the mother of all today's faults and conflicts. We know the long series of conflicts in which the West and Russia have been stuck for years. They are not harmless; their consistency is not taken into account. The West now stands on the view that Russia can be brought back to its senses over time. According to the view in the West, the liberal model of democracy is without alternatives for the Russians. Is it really
the case? We are at the beginning of a new world order that, for the first time in human history, will be determined not by the West and its enlightenment ideas, but by non-European powers: the increasingly nationalist US and Russia,
an ambitious China, and other powers.
* * *
The German-Russian Petersburg Dialogue was launched at the turn of the millennium to bring together the civil societies of the two countries through dialogues in several fields. And, after the end of the Cold War, to reconcile once and for all. At the first meeting of the St. Petersburg Dialogue in 2001, it was announced that relations between Russia and Germany had never been as good as they were at that time. In his speech to the German Bundestag, Putin had just declared the Cold War finally over, and proposed a deeper strategic partnership for Germany.
Russia wanted to sell Germany its resources and buy German technologies for its urgent modernization. At the time, Putin was considered one of the most popular foreign politicians in Germany. Conversely, the Germans became the favorite people of the Russians in Europe — this was documented by the sociological surveys. There was great trust between the leaders of both countries. The German chancellor and the Russian president had a better relationship than the German leader with the US president. When the US began its regime-change policy in the Middle East with a war of aggression against Iraq, Germany, Russia,
and France opposed it. NATO was on the verge of division.
* * *
Let us go back another ten years in development: The Iron Curtain is falling, the Soviet Union is falling, Western and Central Europe are united, Germany is being reunited, post-communist Russia is withdrawing all its military troops from Eastern Europe, Russia is knocking on the doors of the EU and NATO. The German question has been resolved once and for all, and the reunified Germany has become Europe's engine of integration. A short time later, Germany becomes the strongest economic power in Europe and thus a leader in the EU. Russia, meanwhile, has no place for itself in Europe. For NATO and the EU, the country is too big, alien, for some still threatening. An important opportunity is being missed to create a Greater Europe of all European nations.
Let's go back half a century to the 1970s. There was a Cold War, Europe was divided after World War II, the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR, were fighting for world domination. But in West Germany the Eastern policy arose. The precursor to the later successful CSCE process. Instead of mutual threats, Germany believed in a policy of change through trade. Through economic ties with the Soviet Union, Germany sought, through political trust, a rapprochement with its communist adversary. The iron curtain had to be gradually softened. An energy alliance became the core of Eastern policy.
The advanced industrialized country of West Germany supplied technologies to the Soviet Union, and the USSR supplies the Federal Republic of Germany with natural gas. Pipelines ripped the first holes into the Iron Curtain.
Today the energy alliance lies in ruins, like the whole of Eastern policy. How could this happen? In his speech to the Bundestag in 2001, President Putin reaffirmed his country's interest in deepening the energy alliance with reunified Germany. A few days before his historic speech in the Reichstag, he had offered the United States a joint anti-terrorist alliance against Islamism. Islamic terrorists carried out the largest terrorist attack on the US on 9/11. Nothing, nothing at all, was realized from this speech. Why?
There are differing views on the reasons why the opportunities offered by the global partnership between Germany and Russia have not been seized. The West criticized Russia for its drift away from democracy. Russia argued that saving the state from disintegration was more important than democracy and human rights. Putin introduced an authoritarian style of leadership in Russia, creating a new power vertical focused solely on the president. From then on, there was hardly any opposition. Russia hoped that Germany could continue to play a legal role for Russia in the West. Peace proposals came from Moscow, for example to build a common area from Lisbon to Vladivostok.
In the West: ignoring Russian proposals. Russia should no longer be given priority. Russia lost the Cold War and would have yet to earn its place in the European family through liberal reforms and democracy. Russia waved off disappointed. It no longer wanted to be held accountable to the West. Why, the Russians wondered, have we concluded the Paris Charter, the Charter of Human Rights and other treaties that push us into a teacher—student relationship? Instead of slipping into the Western value system, Russia sought its future identity in its old, pre-revolutionary history. Russia continued to see itself as a great power, demanding shaping power for world politics and the European security architecture. Russia established a zone of influence, which at its core contradicted Western principles of the post-Cold War order.
Before such a Russia, the collective West turned away — and began to scold. NATO and the EU had meanwhile expanded to Central Eastern Europe. The new Member States came to the West with anti-Russian sensitivities and fears. After all, they were occupied by the Soviet Union for 45 years.
Germany, along with France, had become the European Union's firm leader. In order not to jeopardize its status and because the priorities of German policy were now to consolidate the EU, the German government decided to align its policy on Russia with a whole European, in concrete terms, this meant that the policy could only be discussed with the Central European countries, and their concerns should be taken seriously as a matter of priority. Reconciliation with Russia was treated as second-ranking. A fallacy that would take revenge later.
Historical reconciliation with Russia became less important for Germany than the cementing of the new historical community of destiny with the new NATO and EU member states. For the latter, an eastern policy towards
Russia was not up for debate. Poles, Baltics and Czechs reminded the Germans of the Hitler—Stalin Pact in 1939 and their 45 years of Soviet occupation. They declared the German attempt to build a future Europe not against but with Russia a naive utopia.
At the same time, the US also took serious steps to consolidate the Transatlantic Community in terms of security policy. The aim was to prevent the beginning of global change in the world order from a monopolistic architecture dominated by the West to a more polycentric international system of states. Instead of following the concept of a common Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok, which had serious sympathizers in the West and East, the collective West opted for a different concept. In the 21st century, Europe should rest exclusively on the two Western pillars of NATO and the EU.
An OSCE that had played a mediation role between the opposing blocs during the Cold War was no longer needed. The Americans unilaterally withdrew and left the Treaty on the Limitation of Missile Defenses and built these facilities on the ground of the new NATO member states in Eastern Europe. Russia retooled accordingly. In order to maintain the Western position in a changing world, the West extended NATO and the EU as far as possible to Eastern Europe. Ideally, the former republics of the lost Soviet Union should also be included in the consolidated EU Europe.
NATO and the EU became communities of values and thus ideological. NATO was no longer a defense alliance, but the bearer of freedom, enlightenment and human rights. This created contrasts with neighboring states that did not have a liberal value system.
* * *
When Barack Obama became president in the US with a new global human rights agenda, Germany believed it was an opportunity to work with him to build a new universal liberal order of values. Russia, not a member of NATO or the EU, felt deprived of any say in building a 21st-century Europe — and strongly opposed it.
A few years later, the German-Russian partnership ended as quickly as it had begun. Germany in all its forms renounced any ambitions to hold a middle-power function in post-Cold War Europe. Under the new Chancellor Angela Merkel, Germany summoned the transatlantic community of destiny. Playing a German legal role for Russia in the West — the reunified Germany was no longer ready for this after Schroeder's departure.
In this context, Putin's second major speech on German soil became famous and notorious: in 2007 at the Munich Security Conference, where he warned the world of a new Cold War if the West continued to seek hegemony over NATO and US missile defense. Thank God, Chancellor Merkel kept a sense of proportion when she prevented NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia at the last moment at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008.
Nevertheless, since the mid-2000s, Germany has moved further and further away from Russia. In the past, the Soviet Union was respected as a great Euro-
pean power. It was clear to everyone that a pan-European peace could only be achieved with, and not against Moscow. Suddenly, Russia, which, as we know, had liberated itself from communism in 1991, was seen as the loser of the Cold War, a regional power with a non-democratic regime that some even described as illegitimate.
In June 2008, the new young President Dmitry Medvedev spoke in Berlin. He called for a US-EU-Russia security dialogue on the future European security architecture. Chancellor Merkel approached Medvedev, establishing the so-called Meseberg process. Russia and the EU should try to resolve territorial conflicts in the post-Soviet area together. But the EU did not support Merkel's plan — because it did not want to give Russia a say on European security issues. Then the disaster happened. To the Russians' incomprehension, Germany announced the modernization partnership with Russia because Russia was becoming "increasingly undemocratic". Germany wanted to wait until Russia returned to democracy.
Russia, however, did not even think of going down the road to predetermined Europe of values. Europe, with its liberal value system, had become alien to the Russians. At that time, a dialogue on a common European peace order would have been necessary. Moscow called for the security dialogue. For the West, however, it had become unimportant. This should take particular revenge in the Ukraine crisis. The German leading media and think-tanks waved to the position of accusing Russia, while elder statesmen such as Helmut Schmidt, Egon Bahr and Hans-Dietrich Genscher warned in vain against the creation of an enemy image of Russia.
The West-Russia conflict has become increasingly inevitable. It finally erupted in intensity over the question of Ukraine's affiliation. Even before that, Russia no longer allowed NATO — and EU eastward enlargement — to fall into its sphere of influence. The Georgian war, triggered by the heated Georgian leader Saakashvili, was the last warning sign. The West replied that Russia was no longer a shaping power in Europe. The misguided Western policy of eastern expansion ended in disaster in Ukraine in 2013. Russia and the EU suddenly faced each other as warring parties in Ukraine. Merkel understood the dangerous situation and tried to moderate a peace process together with France. So far, unfortunately, without success, because Germany does not see its role in the Minsk peace process as a mediator, but as the patron saint of Ukraine.
Germany, like the entire West, is on the position of punishing Russia for violating international law. With a self-critical and insightful Russia, one then wants to enter into a dialogue again. In reality, Germany, like the West, is ignoring the seriousness of the situation on the EU's eastern border with Russia. Russia, especially after its military success in Syria — where Russia has regained its great power status — sees itself challenged by the West, and will not shy away from an arms move to defend its strategic interests. Russia is autonomous enough to defy Western sanctions pressure. Germany, like the US and some Central European countries, can, of course, meet the Russian challenge with deterrence
and containment. This would be the reason if Russia were to threaten NATO territory. But that is not the case. Russia, like the US in Cuba in the 1960s, defends its security sphere.
* * *
In order to maintain peace on the continent, the West must no longer treat Russia as a country and nation with "worse morals" and "false values". The teacher—pupil principle, which has settled in the minds of Western politicians, must give way to another concern. A value-oriented foreign policy that NATO and the EU have relied on for years, and which should define Europe's new identity, is unrealistic in a world where the US is abandoning the liberal community of values, China is rolling out East Asia, the Middle East, and Africa with its neo-Confucius ideology, and Turkey and Russia are joining forces to create a "different Europe" in the Eurasian region.
The domination of Europe and the West over the world has lasted 500 years. It has brought many horrible wars to the world, but it has also brought the Enlightenment and created free societies. But now, whether we like it or not, the post-enlightenment era is dawning, when it will again be about interests, not values. Europeans will make up only 4% of the world's population by 2050.
In future scenarios, Russia is a natural ally of the West in the inevitable north-south conflict. The five biggest challenges facing Europe and Russia are: combating impending pandemics, mass migration, terrorism, disintegration of globalization and climate protection. There is only one way: to work the project of a common area from Lisbon to Vladivostok, which would open up a common Europe with the great non-EU powers of Great Britain, Russia and Turkey.
Presenting other states with human rights issues may lead to applause at home. But on the strategic issues that exist for Europe's security, this is hardly progressing. To hope that Putin will one day be overthrown by the Russian people and that Russia will then return to the days of Gorbachev is a dangerous illusion.
While Germany still relies on an influential Europe of values as a model for the world, the world order has long since changed for Russia. It is no longer the US and the EU that set the tone, but the new power centers of Asia with which Russia forges alliances. Times have really changed. Today, as transatlantic relations become increasingly brewing because of the policies of new US President Donald Trump, Germany will have to abandon its promise to stand alongside America forever.
The two Anglo-Saxon powers, the United States and Britain, are leaving Europe and becoming a different part of the West. Germany's hope that French President Emmanuel Macron will become a new Obama, with whom the Western community of values can be saved for a better future, is a pious wish. The people of Europe are suddenly waking up in a changing geopolitical situation. The traditional us protection and nuclear power is gone, the EU is weakened after the financial, migration and now coronavirus crisis, while the second
global nuclear power, Russia, is still there and more influential than it was a few years ago.
This means that the EU will have no choice but to have an independent dialogue on European security with Russia, for the first time since the end of
World War II. From a position of strength, such a dialogue will hardly work.
* * *
But things are going to change in the 2020s. Merkel stated recently that the Russia sanctions were "unpleasant". During the Corona crisis, states should work more closely together to consider lifting mutual sanctions. Indirectly, the chancellor appealed to Russia and Ukraine to be more conciliatory in the ministerial process regarding the peace process in Eastern Ukraine. Merkel wants to see positive results. Afterwards she is prepared to restart a dialogue with Russia on a joint European space from Lisbon to Vladivostok.
From today's point of view, it can be said that Germany will emerge best from the Corona crisis of all the states of Europe. There is no doubt that Germany will not only be able to maintain its leading role in the European Union, but will be able to enlarge it. The German economy will be the strongest one in Europe after the Corona crisis, the German social-market model will become model for other states, who suffered more during the Corona crisis. It is too early to predict whether Germany could step into America's shoe in taking up the leadership of the West. But it is not totally unrealistic.
After Brexit, European security policy has become less Anglo-Saxon. Britain always regarded itself within Europe as the second victorious power of the Second World War and the most important architect of the European post-war order, alongside the United States. Now Germany is replacing Britain in this respect.
Germany, together with France, will soon start to develop a new concept of the future of European security policy — less for a transatlantic Europe, as for a continental Europe. As a result, the EU would take a different geopolitical stance. The biggest stumbling stone in the direction of building a more sovereign Europe are the East European states. For them, only NATO remains as the ultimate pillar of Europe, not the EU. These new members of the West are reluctant to accept a non-American leadership in Europe. These countries may resist Germany.
A further weakening of US leadership in world politics, which becomes obvious in the aftermath of the Corona crisis puts Germany and its European allies in a difficult security situation. The American nuclear umbrella, which still remains key for European security, would have been supplemented by anything similar. However, French nukes cannot replace US deterrence. On the other hand, Europe, without America, may become less vulnerable for theoretical enemy attacks from outside. Current geopolitical rivalries, in which Europe as part of the West is being largely involved, could disapp ear — if the US quits the Euro -pean security architecture.
Europe will revoke its own sovereign diplomacy, making it a global player in its own rights. One major corner stone of the new European diplomacy would
be the improvement of the relations with Russia, the largest country on the European continent.
The EU will not leave the NATO organization, nor will it confront the US on global matters. But the EU will seek its independent role in world politics. Particularly, the EU is supposed to lift sanctions against so-called foes of the West, including Iran and Russia. The EU will not participate in a trade war with China and offer different perceptions how to solve instabilities and develop other preventive measures to stop wars in the Middle East and Africa. Germany will put a major focus on Russia.
