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15УДК 327
THE MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE USA AND EU THE DURING THE FIRST TERM OF GEORGE W. BUSH (2000-2004)
Кандидат исторических наук, доцент кафедры международных отношений, мировой политики и дипломатии Института международных отношений Казанского федерального университета, Казань.
Пеньковцев Роман Владимирович Roman.Penkovtsev@kpfu. ru
Аспирант кафедры
международных отношений, мировой политики и дипломатии Института международных отношений Казанского федерального университета, Казань.
Покудов Захар Васильевич
Annotation. The article analyzes the priority areas of military cooperation between the United States and the European Union during the first term of George W. Bush. First of all, the nature of the bloc interaction between the USA and European countries within the framework of NATO is revealed. Considerable attention is paid to the participation of the United States and European allies in the processes of resolving international and regional security problems, including the fight against international terrorism. Particular emphasis is placed on conducting a coalition anti-terrorist operation against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Keywords: international security, regional security, international terrorism, USA, European Union, NATO, Al Qaeda.
According to Joseph Nye, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, between the USA and the EU appeared a few questions, and he highlights the 6 most important ones. First of all, most of the European democracies began to concentrate on their domestic problems, while international disputes and foreign affairs were not that important to them. That was a logical transition because the Cold War was over and therefore there was a lack of a severe geopolitical competitor, which the USSR used to be. Secondly, the concentration on the domestic affairs stimulated trade protectionism, which amplified the economic competition between the USA and the EU. Thirdly, this turn to domestic affairs also amplified the difference in terms of military potential between the US and its allies in Europe. For instance, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, European participants of NATO were spending 2% of their GDP on military forces, and they were planning to reduce this figure. At the same time, America was spending 3% of its GDP and had been criticizing its western allies for the insufficient investment in the NATO military infrastructure during the period of Cold War. Moreover, according to George Robertson, who was the Secretary-General of NATO from 1999 to 2004, even though Europe spent 2/3 from what America was spending, in terms of military potential
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Europe improved significantly less than America [7, p.56]. This fact emphasized the growing imbalance between two flanks of NATO.
Fourthly, despite shared democratic values, there were lots of cultural differences. For instance, Europeans critically perceived wild-capitalism of the USA while widely supporting the model of welfare state with numerous social benefits. Fifthly, difficulties in terms of achieving a common foreign policy. For instance, in the United States, a foreign policy decision first supposed to be made in the White House and only after it ratified through Congress. Nevertheless, in
Europe it was much more complicated due to the growing numbers of political entities within the EU5 which often had significantly different agendas that made a process of finding common ground, which will represent the whole European Union, much more difficult. Moreover, with the following enlargements of the European Union (the 5th and the 6th) this search for some common ground became even more complicated [7, p.56]. Sixthly, a danger of the "arrogance of power," according to which the U.S. could have made any decision single-handedly without consulting its European allies. It was also connected to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and while during the Cold War the U.S. was relying on support within NATO to get the upper hand in the geopolitical competition, at the beginning of the XXIst century it was not necessary because America considerably exceeded any potential competitor in terms of military industry, economic power, and soft power [7, p.57], Efowever, according to Nye, despite all of those differences the cooperation between the European Union and the United States still supposed to be productive in the XXI century [7, p.59]. Thus, their military cooperation and the enlargement of the European Union and NATO will be analyzed in this article.
After emphasizing the main differences, it is necessary to turn to the analysis. As I have already mentioned, the European Union was about to enlarge. Bfowever, before the future enlargements, which were planned in XX04 and 2007 it is indispensable to mention the EU summit in Nice in 2000. This summit represented the transfer of power to the five biggest European countries: Germany, France, the UK, Italy, and Spain. A decision was made, if any group of countries had 38% of the total population of the EU it would have a right to veto any legislation. This made Germany first among equals while it had the biggest population within the EU and by cooperating with two other countries from the European Union Germany could have blocked any decision of the European Commission. Thus, despite being an economic powerhouse, Germany also considerably ameliorated its political standing [1, p. 170].
Despite this domestic change of the EU, foreign politics and cooperation with its most significant ally - the US, were also changing due to the election of a new American president - George W. Bush. His administration was in a particular political disagreement with the EU. First of all, in terms of missile defense systems. Bush proclaimed that his administration would support the future development of the missile defense system, which most of the European governments saw as a threat to the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, which was supposed to halt any potential armed race. Secondly, the issues of climate change - George W. Bush also threatened to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol. Thirdly, the creation of the international criminal court, which was supported by the most European governments, but the jurisdiction of whichc
American government did not approve, which potentially might have led to certain judicial complications between the U.S. and the EU [2, p.6].
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Despite certain political tension, the economic tension also aroused, and especially in terms of bilateral trade. Europe was not ready to import American genetically modified food, while Bush was quite interested in terms of steel trade, same as Trump nowadays. For instance, by the beginning of the XXIst century there was a global overproduction of steel, mostly because developing countries, such as China and South Korea considered national steel industry essential for a stable economic growth, therefore significantly reducing the import of steel. From the ten biggest steel-producing countries, five were still located in Europe. In the U.S. despite the severe decline of influence steel industry was still providing a considerable number of American workforce with working places and steel producing companies maintained to preserve political lobbying. These steel-producing corporations influence American government to elevate import tariffs on steel and in spring 2002 Bush's administration increased tariffs from 8% to 30%. Most Americans supported it, but simultaneously in England, Germany, France, and Italy this decision was perceived negatively [2, p.40-41].
Nevertheless, despite certain tension, the administration of George W. Bush followed the pattern of Clinton's administration, which was focused on supporting future development and integration of the EU and NATO. For instance, George W. Bush described his vision of the new system of transatlantic security in his 15 June 2001 speech in Warsaw: "all of Europe's new democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the same chance for security and freedom - and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe - as Europe's old democracies have" [5, p.369]. Thus, he invited all countries of Eastern Europe to join Western alliances.
Nonetheless, despite all the political and economic tension between the U.S. and the EU, an infamous event that unified them happened - the September 11 attacks, 2001, when thousands of people, including hundreds of Europeans, were killed. This terroristic act was the first attack on the contiguous American territory since 1812. The European response to this event was immediate and united - absolute support of the U.S. Even in France, where anti-Americanism was present, the headline of Le Monde 13 September 2001 was - "We are all Americans." Tony Blair and Lord Robertson, who was soon to become a general secretary of NATO, reminded to all NATO members about the article 5 of the transatlantic treaty, according to which attack on the one member of these treaty equals an attack on the whole organization. Article 5 of the NATO Treaty was enforced for the first time in the history of the alliance, and the European alliance of the U.S. opposed Al-Qaeda and its supporters in Afghanistan [2, p. l10].
The political establishment of the Russian Federation also immediately supported the U.S, and Russian president Vladimir Putin emphasized grief and sincere condolences of Russian people. Many Russians also supported Americans on a personal level, because they had already been exposed to a wave of terrorist attacks with the most infamous example of Moscow terrorist attack in 1999. Putin prompted support for American military action against Taliban in Afghanistan and opened Russian air space for American humanitarian flights. Russian president also kept into account possible improvement of the relationships between two countries, while Americans were eager to receive Russian intelligence information concerning Afghanistan [2, p.79].
The international coalition against Al-Qaeda under the auspices of the UN and with the leadership of the USA began to form immediately after 11 September 2001 and military actions already took place in Afghanistan in October 2001. Despite full sup-
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port of the European allies it quickly became apparent that their support would decline as longer the war would take. Fortunately for the American high command, Taliban regime in Afghanistan crippled faster than it was expected even by the most optimistic forecasts [2, p.7]. Nonetheless, the American anti-terrorist coalition was not as united as it might seem. According to Donald Rumsfeld, who was Secretary of Defense, between XX01 and XX06, and who said in October 2001, "From time to time, I see references in the press to The coalition5 - singular. And let me reiterate that there is no single coalition in this effort. This campaign involves a number of flexible coalitions that will change and evolve as we proceed through the coming period. Let me reemphasize that the mission determines the coalition, and the coalition must not determine the mission... A month from now, I expect someone somewhere might report that a particular nation is not doing something or has stopped doing something, and the speculation could be Ts the coalition coming apart or unraveling?5 ... Well, let me make clear: No single coalition has 'rav-eled5, therefore, it5s unlikely to unravel55 [4, p.597]. Thus, he emphasized a considerable distinction between the efforts of NATO members, and the U.S., which was responsible for most of the expenses of this operation and military personnel.
Another crucial moment in the Transatlantic relationships happened on 29 January XX02, when George Bush made his annual speech to the American Congress. In this speech, he pointed out the "Axis of Evil,55 which included countries such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, which were, according to Bush, sponsoring terrorism and creating weapons of mass destruction. This speech was shocking for most Europeans because there were not persuasive evidence that Iraq was sponsoring global terrorism. Moreover, the biggest ally of the United States in the Middle East - Saudi Arabia, was much more suspicious in terms of connections to terrorist organizations. However, this speech had a significant symbolic meaning and highlighted a tendency of the American government to turn from the multilateral cooperation with its European allies, which American government followed since the beginning of the Cold war, towards so-called unilateralism, which emphasized serious imbalance, especially in terms of military, between two flanks of NATO, and in which American national interests would play a determining role [2, p.8].
This speech had also highlighted significantly increased strength of the American military power that happened in the 1990s. With the Cold War coming to an end, European country started considerably reducing their military budgets. However, the wheels of the American military machine mostly kept turning. Moreover, after the terrorist attack on September 11, American military budget had been raised considerably and 2,5 exceeded the budgets of the 15 European countries members of the European Union combined. During the 1990s American economy added to itself the economy size of the U.K. and grew by 27 percent, while the economy of the European Union grew only by 15%. All of these created the feeling in American establishment that the USA can lead NATO without consulting with its European allies and making unilateral decisions in foreign affairs [2, p.8-9]. This led to a serious transatlantic crisis, which tension around Iraq only amplified. The UN Resolution 1441, which made the checks of Iraq's possession of the nuclear weapon much stricter and which was perceived as a victory of the transatlantic diplomacy, in fact, was quite ambiguous: it was an alternative for those who wanted to avoid a military confrontation and simultaneously it legitimized military actions, if international inspections of the weapon of mass destruction proved to be unsuccessful. According to Poliak, American establishment decided that a war with Iraq is un-
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avoidable and desirable by spring 2002, while Gerhard Schroder, who was German chancellor at that time, was strongly against the war. These two positions de facto divided NATO in two parts [2, p.23-24].
The American foreign policy by this time was characterized by the so-called Bush Doctrine. This Doctrine was not formed as a single document, but rather it took place in actual foreign policy principles of George Bush's administration. According to Robert Jervis this doctrine consisted of 4 main elements: a common belief that a regime, which has been implemented in a country, will unavoidably influence its foreign policy; perception of new threats, such as terrorism, as something that can be defeated only with a direct military, and if possible preventive, intervention; readiness to act on the military level alone without possible consultations with allies, especially if it is demanded by circumstances, that might be also described as unilateralism; and believe in fact that the peace and international stability which was formed after the end of the Cold War in the 1990s were solely American achievements and relied on its might, and therefore its future existence also depended on American readiness to protect it [3, p.365]. The latest statement is also connected to the idea that American values are universal and that if they would be exported to all countries around the globe the world will eventually enjoy peace and prosperity. Woodrow Wilson first coined this idea at the beginning of the twentieth century and in the end of the Cold War Bill Clinton revived it. This idea also took place in the U.S. national security strategy of 2002, according to which, "The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom - and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise" and that these values "make the world not just safer but better ... a path is not America's alone. It is open to all" [3, p.366].
In addition, to fully understand the Bush Doctrine, it is also necessary to take into account preventive strikes on potentials enemies. This idea was also clarified by George Bush in his speech on June 1, 2002, in West-Point: "Today our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. For rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the U.S. and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the U.S." According to that so-called rogue states cannot be stopped through the policy of containment and have to be stopped through the active military intervention. Nevertheless, how one can determine these states? [3, p.371]
As it has already been mentioned according to the Bush Doctrine, a domestic political regime would determine foreign policy of a state and therefore tough dictatorships, which according to Bush were Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, would threaten their neighbors in the same manner as they are threatening their citizens. Thus, the rough states might create a certain instability in some geopolitical regions, which might, therefore, threaten national security of the U.S. and hence countries mentioned-above had to be stopped by any possible measures, included possible military interventions. Moreover, while talking about possible military interventions America might act single-handedly according to the concept of unilateralism because it could afford to do so based on its military and economic might. According to Jervis, it is possible to trace this concept back to the foreign policy of Ronald Reagan [3, p.373-374]. George Bush himself did not hide
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this intention, which was understood by most of the Americans and misunderstood by most of the European politicians, and in the words of Bush American position was clearly described as, "We are trying to lead the world" [3, p.375]. Moreover,
Bush emphasized American military superiority not only in comparison to possible enemies, but also in comparison to his European allies in his West-Point speech, which has been already mentioned above, "America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge - thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace" [3, p.376].
The Iraq War, which began in March XX03, divided the European Union in two camps. The first camp that was led by France and Germany strongly opposed the war. The second camp with such countries as the UK, Spain, and Italy, supported American actions. To some certain extent, personal connections of George Bush with European politicians influenced their positions. For instance, Tony Blair, who was also a friend of George Bush, was a prime minister of the U.K. and supported American intervention, while Jacques Chirac was a strong opponent not only of the Iraq invasion but of George Bush personally. That is also important to mention that Germany and France in their confrontation against Washington were also supported by Moscow. This split within the transatlantic alliance led to a significant deterioration of the French-American relations, and French export to America, especially of luxury goods such as expensive wine, plummeted. Sometimes this confrontation was funny. For example, a few American restaurants changed the name of a dish famous as French fries to Freedom fries.
Nevertheless, despite this pun, on the international level Washington decided to ignore opposition from Moscow, forgive Berlin, and punish Paris. As a consequence of that, the next French president Nikolas Sarkozy tried to improve French-American relations by spending vacation with George Bush and his family. Nonetheless, despite the fact that within NATO France was opposing the U.S quite often, with perhaps the most prominent example of a complete withdrawal from the western alliance, which Charles de Gaulle undertook in 1966, the specific anti-American stance of France might be understandable in terms of Bush Doctrine, which, debatably, was one of the most controversial national doctrines of American foreign policy, and we might claim that it created some cracks in the before unified western alliance [1, p.179].
The Iraq War led to a few more contradictions between the EU and the US even before the beginning of the military conflict, and the alliance with its forces was divided. For instance, in January XX03 Germany, France, and Belgium refused to provide security guarantees for Turkey if the last would have been attacked by Iraq. According to Serfaty, Iraq was a mistake for Europe long before it became to be a mistake for the U.S., because it highlighted the lack of common ground within the European part of the alliance and we can gradually trace it: in 2002 European countries were scared that they were unable to stop the war in Iraq, in 2003 because they did not form a solid position concerning the military operation, in 2004 because they were playing only a secondary and auxiliary role in the liberation of Iraq they were not able to influence the process of its reformation, which was mostly done by the U.S [8, p.5].
Thus, we can conclude that in terms of military cooperation of the US and the EU the first Bush's presidential term was quite controversial. Despite the fact that both political entities quickly found common ground concerning the response to the terrorist attack of 11 September, after the successful military operation in Afghanistan their
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relationships got rough, which was only highlighted by the lack of consensus about the Iraq War. This dissent was even more fired up with the adjustment of the Bush Doctrine, according to which the U.S. could have used its significantly increased military might without consultation with its European allies. Therefore, in the end of the first Bush's presidential term some cracks had been created in the before unified western alliance [1, p. 179] and we might even argue that these cracks were only widen during his second presidential term. However, it's already a topic for the next article.
Список используемой литературы
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3. Jervis Robert. Understanding the Bush Doctrine. // Political Science Quarterly. - 2003. - №3. - pp. 365 - 388.
4. Jones Erik. Debating the Transatlantic Relationship: Rhetoric and Reality. // International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-). - 2004. - №4. -pp. 595 - 612.
5. Michta Andrew A. NATO Enlargement Post-1989: Successful Adaptation or Decline. // Contemporary European History. - 2009. - №3. - pp. 363 - 376.
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