From friendship to enmity Soviet-Iranian Relations (1945-1965) Текст научной статьи по специальности «История и археология»

B. K. Ye§ilbursa

Bursa Uludag University, Bursa, Turkey behcetyesilbursa@yahoo.com

From friendship to enmity Soviet-Iranian relations (1945-1965)

Abstract. On 26 February 1921, the Soviet Union signed a «Treaty of Friendship» with Iran which was to pave the way for future relations between the two states. Although the Russians renounced various commercial and territorial concessions which the Tsarist government had exacted from Iran, they secured the insertion of two articles which prohibited the formation or residence in either country of individuals, groups, military forces which were hostile to the other party, and gave the Soviet Union the right to send forces into Iran in the event that a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation there, use Iran as a base for operations against Russia, or otherwise threaten Soviet frontiers. Furthermore, in 1927, the Soviet Union signed a «Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality» with Iran which required the contracting parties to refrain from aggression against each other and not to join blocs or alliances directed against each other's sovereignty. However, the treaty was violated by the Soviet Union's wartime occupation of Iran, together with Britain and the United States. The violation was subsequently condoned by the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 29 January 1942, which permitted the Soviet Union to maintain troops in Iran for a limited period.

Requiring restraint from propaganda, subversion and hostile political groups, the treaty would also appear to have been persistently violated by the Soviet Union: for example, the various radio campaigns of «Radio Moscow» and the «National Voice of Iran»; the financing and control of the Tudeh party; and espionage and rumour-mongering by Soviet officials in Iran. Whatever the Soviet's original conception of this treaty may have been, they had since used it one-sidedly as a treaty in which both countries would be neutral, with one being «more neutral than the other». In effect, both the 1921 and 1927 treaties had been used as «a stick to beat the Iranians» whenever it suited the Soviets to do so, in propaganda and in inter-governmental dealings.

During the Second World War, the treaty between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Iran, dated 29 January 1942 - and concluded some 5 months after the occupation of parts of Iran by allied forces, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were entitled to maintain troops in Iran, but the presence of such troops was not to constitute a military occupation. Nonetheless, Soviet forces in the Northern provinces used their authority to prevent both the entry of officials of the Iranian Government and the export of agricultural products to other provinces. The treaty also required military forces to be withdrawn not later than six months after «all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or on the conclusion of peace, whichever is the earlier». This entailed that the Soviet Union should have withdrawn its forces by March 1946, six months after the defeat of Japan. Meanwhile, however, there emerged in Iranian Azerbaijan, under Soviet tutelage, a movement for advanced provincial autonomy which developed into a separatist movement under a Communist-led «National Government of Azerbaijan».

In 1945, Soviet forces prevented the Iranian army from moving troops into Azerbaijan, and also confined the Iranian garrison to barracks while the dissidents took forcible possession of key points. At the same time, Soviet troops prevented the entry of Iranian troops into the Kurdistan area, where, under Soviet protection, a Kurdish Republic had been set up by Qazi Mohammad. In 1946, after Iran had appealed to the Security Council, the Russians secured from the Iranian Prime Minister, Qavam es Saltaneh, a promise to introduce a bill providing for the formation of a Soviet-Iranian Oil Company to exploit the Northern oil reserves. In return, the Soviet Union agreed to negotiate over Azerbaijan: the Iranians thereupon withdrew their complaint to the Security Council, and Soviet forces left Azerbaijan by 9 May 1946.

In 1955, when Iran was considering joining a regional defensive pact, which was later to manifest itself as the Baghdad Pact, the Soviet Government threatened that such a move would oblige the Soviet Union to act in accordance with Article 6 of the 1921 treaty. This was the «big stick» aspect of Soviet attempts to waylay Iranian membership of such a pact; the «carrot» being the conclusion in 1955 of a Soviet-Iranian «Financial and Frontier Agreement» by which the Soviets agreed to a mutually beneficial realignment of the frontier and to pay debts arising from their wartime occupation of Northern Iran.

The Soviets continued their war of nerves against Iranian accession to the Pact by breaking off trade negotiations in October 1955 and by a series of minor affronts, such as the cancellation of cultural visits and minimal attendance at the Iranian National Day celebrations in Moscow. In a memorandum dated November 26, the Iranian Government openly rejected Soviet criticisms. Soviet displeasure was expressed officially, in the press and to private individuals. In the ensuing period, Soviet and Soviet-controlled radio stations continued to bombard their listeners with criticism of the Baghdad Pact, or CENTO as it later became.

In early 1959, with the breakdown of the negotiations for a non-aggression pact, Iran-Soviet relations entered into a phase of propaganda warfare which intensified with the signature of the bilateral military agreement between Iran and the United States. The Soviet Union insisted that Iran should not permit the establishment of foreign military bases on its soil, and continued to

threaten Iran despite the Shah's assurance on this issue. Consequently, the Iranians denounced Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 treaty, on the basis of which the Soviet Union was making its demands. Attempts by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to improve relations met with little success until September 1959, when Russia offered massive economic support on condition that Iran renounced its military agreements with the United States.

This offer was rejected, and, as relations continued to become strained, the Soviets changed their demand to one neither for a written agreement that Iran would not allow its terrain to be used as a base of aggression nor for the establishment of foreign missile bases. The publication by the Soviet Union of the so-called «CENTO documents» did nothing to relieve the strain: the Soviet Union continued to stand out for a bilateral agreement with Iran, and the Shah, in consultation with Britain and the United States, continued to offer no more than a unilateral assurance.

In July 1962, with a policy of endeavouring once more to improve relations, the Shah maintained his insistence on a unilateral statement, and the Soviet Government finally agreed to this. The Iranian undertaking was accordingly given and acknowledged on 15 September. The Instruments of ratification of the 1957 Agreements on Transit and Frontier Demarcation were exchanged in Moscow on 26 October 1962 and in Tehran on 20 December, respectively.

Key words: Russian Revolution, Soviet Union, Iran, Soviet-Iranian Relations.

For citation: Yeçilbursa B. K. From friendship to enmity Soviet-Iranian relations (1945-1965)// History and modern perspectives. 2020. Vol. 2. №1. P. 92-105.

Йешилбурса Б. К.

Улудагский университет, г. Бурса, Турция e-mail: behcetyesilbursa@yahoo.com

От дружбы до вражды. Советско-иранские отношения (1945-1965)

Аннотация. 26 февраля 1921 года Советский Союз подписал «Договор о дружбе» с Ираном, который должен был проложить путь к будущим отношениям между двумя государствами. Хотя русские отказались от различных коммерческих и территориальных уступок, которые царское правительство требовало от Ирана, они добились включения двух статей, которые запрещали формирование или проживание в любой стране отдельных лиц, групп, вооруженных сил, которые были враждебны другой стороне, и дал Советскому Союзу право направлять войска в Иран в случае, если третья сторона попытается провести там политику узурпации, использовать Иран в качестве базы для операций против России или иным образом угрожать советским границам. Кроме того, в 1927 году Советский Союз подписал с Ираном «Договор о гарантиях и нейтралитете», в соответствии с которым договаривающиеся стороны должны воздерживаться от агрессии друг против друга и не вступать в блоки или альянсы, направленные против суверенитета друг друга. Однако договор был нарушен во время оккупации Ираном Советского Союза вместе с Великобританией и США. Нарушение было впоследствии одобрено заключением Трехстороннего договора о союзе от 29 января 1942 года, который позволил Советскому Союзу держать войска в Иране в течение ограниченного периода времени.

Требуя воздержания от пропаганды, подрывной деятельности и враждебных политических групп, договор также, по-видимому, постоянно нарушался Советским Союзом: например, различные радиокомпании «Радио Москва» и «Национальный голос Ирана»; финансирование и контроль партии Туде; и шпионаж и распространение слухов советскими чиновниками в Иране. Какой бы ни была первоначальная концепция Советского Союза в отношении этого договора, они с тех пор использовали его в одностороннем порядке как договор, в котором обе страны были бы нейтральными, причем одна была «более нейтральной, чем другая». По сути, договоры 1921 и 1927 годов использовались как «палка для победы над иранцами» всякий раз, когда это подходило Советам, в пропаганде и межправительственных отношениях.

Во время Второй мировой войны договор между Соединенным Королевством, Советским Союзом и Ираном от 29 января 1942 года, заключенный примерно через 5 месяцев после оккупации частей Ирана союзными войсками, Соединенного Королевства и Советского Союза имел право на сохранить войска в Иране, но присутствие таких войск не должно было представлять собой военную оккупацию. Тем не менее, советские войска в северных провинциях использовали свои полномочия для предотвращения как въезда чиновников иранского правительства, так и экспорта сельскохозяйственной продукции в другие провинции. Договор также требовал вывода военных сил не позднее чем через шесть месяцев после того, как «все военные действия между Союзными державами и Германией и ее партнерами были приостановлены в результате заключения перемирия или заключения мира, в зависимости от того, что наступит раньше». Это повлекло за собой то, что Советский Союз должен был вывести свои силы к марту 1946 года, через шесть месяцев после разгрома Японии. Между тем, однако, в иранском Азербайджане под советской опекой

появилось движение за продвинутую провинциальную автономию, которое превратилось в сепаратистское движение под руководством коммунистического «Национального правительства Азербайджана».

В 1945 году советские войска не позволили иранской армии перебросить войска в Азербайджан, а также ограничили иранский гарнизон казармами, в то время как диссиденты захватили ключевые пункты. В то же время советские войска предотвратили ввод иранских войск в район Курдистана, где под защитой Советского Союза Кази Мохаммед создал Курдскую Республику. В 1946 году, после того как Иран обратился в Совет Безопасности, русские получили от иранского премьер-министра Кавама эс-Салтанеха обещание внести законопроект, предусматривающий создание советско-иранской нефтяной компании для эксплуатации северных нефтяных запасов. Взамен Советский Союз согласился вести переговоры по Азербайджану: после этого иранцы отозвали свою жалобу в Совет Безопасности, и советские войска покинули Азербайджан к 9 мая 1946 года.

В 1955 году, когда Иран рассматривал вопрос о присоединении к региональному оборонительному пакту, который позднее должен был проявиться как Багдадский пакт, советское правительство угрожало, что такой шаг заставит Советский Союз действовать в соответствии со статьей 6 договора 1921 года. Это был аспект «большой клюшки» советских попыток продвинуть иранское членство в таком пакте; «Морковь» - это заключение в 1955 году советско-иранского «Финансового и пограничного соглашения», в соответствии с которым Советы договорились о взаимовыгодном перераспределении границ и выплате долгов, возникших в результате их военной оккупации Северного Ирана.

Советы продолжили войну нервов против присоединения Ирана к Пакту, прервав торговые переговоры в октябре 1955 года и приняв ряд незначительных оскорблений, таких как отмена культурных визитов и минимальное посещение празднований Национального дня Ирана в Москве. В меморандуме от 26 ноября правительство Ирана открыто отвергло критику СССР. Советское недовольство было выражено официально, в прессе и частным лицам. В последующий период советские и контролируемые Советом радиостанции продолжали бомбардировать своих слушателей критикой Багдадского пакта, или CENTO, каким он стал позже.

В начале 1959 г., когда переговоры о ненападении были сорваны, ирано-советские отношения вступили в фазу пропагандистской войны, которая усилилась после подписания двустороннего военного соглашения между Ираном и США. Советский Союз настаивал на том, что Иран не должен разрешать создание иностранных военных баз на своей территории, и продолжал угрожать Ирану, несмотря на заверения шаха в этом вопросе. Следовательно, иранцы денонсировали статьи 5 и 6 договора 1921 года, на основании которых Советский Союз выдвигал свои требования. Попытки Генерального секретаря Организации Объединенных Наций улучшить отношения не имели успеха до сентября 1959 года, когда Россия предложила масштабную экономическую поддержку при условии, что Иран откажется от своих военных соглашений с Соединенными Штатами.

Это предложение было отклонено, и, поскольку отношения продолжали обостряться, Советы не изменили свое требование ни на письменное соглашение о том, что Иран не позволит использовать свою территорию в качестве базы агрессии, ни для создания иностранных ракетных баз. Публикация Советским Союзом так называемых «документов CENTO» ничего не сделала для снятия напряжения: Советский Союз продолжал выступать за двустороннее соглашение с Ираном, а шах, по согласованию с Великобританией и США, продолжал предложить не более чем одностороннюю гарантию.

В июле 1962 года, проводя политику, направленную на то, чтобы еще раз улучшить отношения, шах продолжал настаивать на одностороннем заявлении, и Советское правительство согласилось с этим. Обязательство Ирана было соответственно дано и подтверждено 15 сентября. Документы о ратификации Соглашений о транзите и демаркации границ 1957 года были обменены в Москве 26 октября 1962 года и в Тегеране 20 декабря соответственно.

Ключевые слова: русская революция, Советский Союз, Иран, советско-иранские отношения.

Для цитирования: Йешилбурса Б. К. От дружбы до вражды. Советско-иранские отношения (1945-1965) // История и современное мировоззрение. 2020. Т. 2. №1. С. 92-105.

The 1921 treaty

On 26 February 1921, the Soviet Union signed a «Treaty of Friendship» with Iran which was to set the course of future relations between the two States. While renouncing various commercial and territorial concessions which the Tsarist government had exacted from Iran, the Russians secured the insertion of two articles (Articles 5 and 61) prohibiting the formation or resi-

1 Extract from: Treaty of Friendship between Iran and USSR dated 26 February 1921. Artile 5

The two High Contracting Parties undertake

(1) To prohibit the formation or presence within their respective territories of any organizations or groups of persons, irrespective of the name by which

they are known, whose object is to engage in acts hostility against Persia or Russia, or against the Allies of Russia.

They will likevise prohibit the formation of armed troops within their respective territories with the aforementioned object.

(2) Not to allow a third Party or any organization, whatever it be called, which is hostile to the other Contracting Party, to import or to convey in transit across their countries material which can be used against the other Party.

(3) To prcvent by all means in their power the presence within their territories or within the territories of their Allies of all armies or forces of a third Party in cases in which the presence of such forces would be regarded as a menace to the frontiers, interest or safety of the other Contracting Party.

Article 6

If a third Party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armad intervention in Persia, or if such Power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if a Foreign Power should threaten the

dence in either country of individuals, groups, military forces etc., hostile to the other party, and giving Russia the right to send her forces into Iran, if a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation there, use Iran as a base for operations against Russia, or otherwise threaten her frontiers2.

The Treaty was restricted in sense by the letter of Theodore A. Rotstein, (Soviet Ambassador in Iran), and on the basis of which the Majles ratified the Treaty. Although the Russians do not consider the Rotstein letter an integral part of the Treaty and have never published it, it was contained in the version of the Treaty registered with the League of Nations by the Iranians in 1922 and there is clear reference to it in the Second Protocol to the Treaty of 19273.

The 1927 treaty

Russia's intention of ensuring that she would have nothing to fear from Iran was given further expression in the «Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality» signed in 1927. Articles 2 and 3 of this Treaty, which require the contracting parties to refrain from aggression against each other and not to join blocs or alliances directed against each other's sovereignty, may well have been technically violated by the Soviet Union's wartime occupation of Iran, in concert with Britain and the United States. However, the technical violation was subsequently condoned by the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 29 January 1942, which permitted the Soviet Union to maintain troops in Iran for a limited period4.

Article 4, requiring restraint from propaganda, subversion and hostile political groups, would also appear to have been persistently violated by the Soviet Union: instances of this are the various radio campaigns of «Radio Moscow» and the «National Voice of Iran», the financing and control of the Tudeh party, and espionage and rumour-mongering by Soviet officials in Iran. Whatever the Soviet Unions' original conception of this treaty may have been, they have since used it one-sidedly as a treaty in which both countries would be neutral, but one would be more neutral than the other. In effect, both the 1921 and 1927 treaties have been uaed as a stick to beat the Iranians whenever it suited the Russians to do so, in propaganda and in inter-Governmental dealings5.

The soviet occupation of Azerbaijan (1945-46)

During the Second World War, Great Britain and the Soviet Union were entitled, under the Treaty between the United Kingdom, the USSR and Iran, dated January 29, 1942 - and concluded some five months after the occupation of parts of Iran by allied forces -to maintain troops in Iran, but the presence of such troops was not to constitute a military occupation. Nonetheless, Soviet forces in the Northern provinces used their authority to prevent both the entry of officials of the Central Government and the export of agricultural products to other provinces. The treaty also required military forces to be withdrawn not later than six months after «all

frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its Allies, and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the mintary operations necesaary for its defence. Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger has been removed.

2 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963.

3 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Bruce R. Kuni-holm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1980, pp. 130-210.

4 FC051/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Kuniholm, Op. Cit., pp. 140-203, 304, 383-398.

5 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Kuniholm, Op.

Cit., pp. 140-203, 304, 383-398.

hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or on the conclusion of peace, whichever is the earlier.» This meant that the Soviet Union should have withdrawn its forces by March 1946, i.e. six months after the defeat of Japan. Meanwhile, however, there grew up in Iranian Azerbaijan, under Soviet tutelage, a movement for advanced provincial autonomy which developed into a separatist movement under a Communist-led «National Government of Azerbaijan.»6

In 1945, Soviet forces prevented the Iranian army from moving troops into Azerbaijan, and also confined the Iranian garrison to barracks while the dissidents took forcible possession of key points. At this time, also, Soviet troops prevented the entry of Iranian troops into the Kurdistan area, where, under Soviet protection, a Kurdish Republic had been set up by Qazi Mohammad. In 1946, after Iran had appealed to the Security Council, the Russians secured from the Iranian Prime Minister, Qavam es Saltaneh, a promise to introduce a bill providing for the formation of a Soviet-Iranian Oil Company to exploit the Northern oil reserves. In return, the U.S.S.R. agreed to negotiate over Azerbaijan: the Iranians thereupon withdrew their complaint to the Security Council, and Soviet forces left Azerbaijan by May 9, 19467.

Soviet reactions to Iranian accession to the Baghdad pact

In 1955, when Iran was considering joining a regional defensive pact - later to materialise as the Baghdad Pact - the Soviet Ambassador threatened that such a move would oblige the USSR to act in accordance with Article 6 of the 1921 treaty. This was the «big stick» aspect of Russian attempts to forestall Iranian membership of such a pact: the «carrot» being the conclusion in 1955 of a Soviet-Iranian Financial and Fronticr Agreement whereby tho Russians agreed to a mutually beneficial re-alignment of the frontier and to pay debts arising from their wartime occupation of Northern Iran8.

The Russions pursued their war of nerves against Iranian accession to the Pact by breaking off trade negotiations in October 1955 and by a series of minor slights, such as the cancellation of cultural visits and minimal attendance at the Iranian National Day celebrations in Moscow. The Iranian Government in a memorandum of November 26 forthrightly rejected Russian criticisms. Soviet displeasure was expressed not only officially but also in the Press and to private individuals. Since then Soviet and Soviet-controlled radio stations have incessantly bombarded their listeners with criticism of the Baghdad Pact, or CENTO as it later became9.

Breakdown of Irano-soviet negotiations

In January 1959, negotiations began in Tehran for an Irano-Soviet non-aggression pact. These were terminated in February on the orders of the Shah, who had decided to sign a bilateral agreement with the United States. The Russian negotiating team re-

6 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Kuniholm, Op. Cit., pp. 140-203, 304, 383-398.

7 FC051/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in the World Affairs, 4th edition, Connell University Press, Ithaca 1990, pp. 167-229.

8 FC051/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Lenczowski, Op. Cit., pp. 167-229.

9 FC051/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Lenczowski, Op. Cit., pp. 167-229.

turned to Moscow in circumstances which they considered humiliating, and the Soviet Ambassador was recalled to Moscow10.

Soviet radio campaign

Almost immediately, Moscow Radio launched a bitter campaign against the Shah's Government. This was quickly followed by the opening up of an even more intemperate campaign from a station purporting to be inside Iran, called the «National Voice of Iran». This station (which some months later was conclusively traced to the Soviet Caucasus) concentrated on scurrilous attacks on the Shah, his family and court. For sone months the combinod force of this propaganda caused considerable concern in Tehran11.

Activities of soviet embassy

Simultaneously, the Soviet Embassy in Tehran started spreading rumours designed to cause apprehension about the possibility of Soviet military action against Iran if the Shah was not speedily overthrovm. When on 14 May 1959, the Iranians arrested some locally employed staff of the Soviet Embassy who was engaged in distributing propaganda, the Russians protested in threatening terms12.

Iranian statements on bases

In a statement to the Majles on 12 February 1959, Dr. Ali As-ghar Hekmat, Minister for Foreign Affairs, had said that Iran was prepared to conclude a treaty with the Soviet Union containing an article to the effect that Iran would not permit foreign military bases to be establishcd on her territory, the phrase «military base» being subject to definition by a committee of experts. On February 21, the Shah announced that he was not prepared to authorise any foreign power to establish aggressive bases in Iran, particularly missile bases. His statement did not prevent the Russians from sending strongly worded notes in late February and March warning the Iranian Government of the consequences of their bilateral military agreement with the United States. The most threateningly worded of these notes (that of February 26) was returned by the Iranians as unacceptable, since it contained insulting references to the Shah13.

Khrushchev's speeches

Several threatening references to Iran were made in apeeches by Khrushchev. At Tula on February 17, he severely criticised the Shah's regime, and five days later, he predieted early disaster for the Shah.

Macmillan's approach to Khrushchev

Alarmed by all this pressure, the Iranians asked the British Government to take an early opportunity of speaking on their behalf to Khrushchev. The Prime Minister was anxious to avoid much discussion of the Middle East during his visit to Moscow, but since these attacks were having a bad effect on Iranian public opinion, Macmillan told Khrushchev on 25 February 1959 that he deplored Soviet propaganda campaigns against Iran and

10 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Peter Cal-vocoressi, World Politics since 1945, 6th edition, Longman, London 1991, pp. 287-388, 391-422.

11 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Calvocoressi, Op. Cit., pp. 287-388, 391-422.

12 FC051/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Calvocoressi, Op. Cit., pp. 287-388, 391-422.

13 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Calvocoressi, Op. Cit., pp. 287-388, 391-422.

against the Shah personally. Khrushchev replied «with noticeable bitterness.»14

Airspace violations

On 7 March 1959, the Iranians claimed that their airspace had been violated by Soviet military aircraft. Similar violations occurred at intervals throughout the following two years. On most occasions the Russians did not reply to Iranian protests but, on more than one occasion, they lodged counter-protests claiming that Iranian aircraft had overflown the Soviet Union15.

Iranian denunciation of article 5 and 6

In the same month, the Iranians showed some signs of anxiety about the possibility of Soviet invocation of the Treaty of 1921. An Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated publicly that Articles 5 and 6 of this Treaty (on the basis of which the Russians claim the right to send troops into Iran to counter foreign aggression) were null and void. His statement was modified by the Foreign Minister, who declarcd that while the Treaty as a whole was still valid and of indefinite duration, these articles related to an eventuality which no longer existed (viz: possible attempts by White Russians and their supporters to restore the old regime) and were therefore no longer appliceble16.

Possibility of raising soviet propaganda campaign against Iran in the united nations

When Soviet radio propaganda failed to abate, the Iranians considered the possibility of raising this question in the United Nations. The Secretary-General was consulted and undertook to raise the matter with the Soviet representative. This he did in July, but received a completely negative response.

Return of Iranian ambassador to Moscow

After the Soviet Ambassador's recall to Moscow, the Iranians had also recalled their Ambassador, Sami'i. On April 3, Mas'ud Ansari (a former Iranian Ambassador in Moscow) was reap-pointed in that capacity. His early attempts to improve relations were cold-shouldered, and he was told that it was up to the Iranians to «take some definite action». In July, Ansari proposed that an Iranian goodwill mission might visit Moscow, Khrushchev did not respond. However, in September when Ansari saw Mr. Gromyko and Khrushchev again, they tempered their threats against Iran with offers of massive economic support if the Iranian military agreements with the United States were revoked17.

Allies' support

Meanvhile Iran was anxious to elicit positive statements of support from her allies. With this in mind, a statement was made in the House of Commons in August 1959, expressing general support of our allies in the face of Soviet pressure. For the same reason, at the CENTO Ministerial meeting in Washington in October a statement was made deploring the soviet propaganda campaign against Iran. 1959 ended with relations still extremely strained between the two countries. Iranian Ministers and officials virtually boycotted the Soviet National Day reception on November 7 in Tahran; and on December 28, the Iranian Am-

14 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Calvocoressi, Op. Cit., pp. 287-388, 391-422.

15 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky & Mark D. Steinberg, Rusya Tarihi, Çev. Figen Dereli, Inkilap Kitabevi, Istanbul 2011, pp. 501-646.

16 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky & Mark D. Steinberg, Op. Cit., pp. 501-646.

17 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Nicholas V.

Riasanovsky & Mark D. Steinberg, Op. Cit., pp. 501-646.

bassador in Moscow conveyed to Khrushchev his government's decision that they could not go beyond the assurance already offered. No further negotiations took ploce regarding a protocol on missile or military bases18.

Early 1960

The propaganda war continued throughout the first half of 1960. A Pravda article of February 14 reiterated the charge that Iran was degenerating into little more than an American colony, and contanined that was virtually a call to all «patriotic» Iranians to force a change in policy, presumably by overthroving the regime. The Soviet press and radio were particularly hostile in connexion with (a) a CENTO air exercise held in Iran in May and (b) the execution on May 4 in Tabriz of four members of the Tudeh party charged with organizing a spy ring. On May 14, the USSR protested to the Iranian Government against the CENTO exercise, drawing attention to Article 5 of the treaty of 192119.

Allied intervention

In January, the Foreign Minister, Aram, asked if Iran's two great allies would not intervene with the Soviet leaders. He was told, however, that an approach by the British Ambassador in Moscow was most unlikely to gain anything, and would probably only serve to assure the British Soviets that their propaganda was having the desired effect. The British Government were prepared, if it seemed worth while, to raise the matter at the Summit Conference at Paris in May, but this of course proved abortive20.

Proposed visit of Voroshilov

In February the Soviet Chargé d' Affaires intimated to Aram, through the Indian Ambassador, that if the Iranian Government were formally to renew their invitation to President Voroshilov to visit Iran, it vould be favourably considered. At the decision of the Shah, the Iranians confined themselves to indicating that the original invitation was still open. Ther British Government expressed the view that a visit by Voroshilov would be more acceptable and less dangerous than a visit by an Iranian mission to Moscow, but it was to be borne in mind that Voroshilov would not come alone and might well be accompanied by someone more high-powered21.

«Fortuitous» meeting

In March 1960, the Iranians were considering a suggestion (which apparently originated with their Ambassador in Moscov) that a «fortuitous» meeting might be arranged in Vienna in May between the Shah and Khrushchev. The British Government strongly advised the Iranians against such an initiative, and nothing more was heard of the idea22.

Goodwill visit

In February, when the Voroshilov visit was under consideration, Mr. Aram informed the British Ambassador that the Russians had suggested that he should make a visit to Moscow as a «prelude». Late in March the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, Voro-

18 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Galia Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990, pp. 176-210.

19 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Golan, Op. Cit., pp. 176-210.

20 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Golan, Op. Cit., pp. 176-210.

21 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Golan, Op. Cit., pp. 176-210.

22 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Golan, Op. Cit., pp. 176-210.

nin, confirmed that his Government were prepared to invite Aram to Moscow. Voronin is reported to have added that while in Moscow Mr. Aram would be expected to sign an assurance on military bases. Aram said he was not prepared to discuss this, and Voronin compromised by saying that a draft on this subject might form «a basis of discussions»23.

Assurance on missile bases

The next significant development was in June, when the Russians reverted to a proposal that the Iranians should give them a written assurance: (a) that Iran would not allow her territory to be used as a «base of aggression» against the Soviet Union, and (b) that she would not grant missile bases, whether long, medium or short-range, to any foreign power. The British Government were given to understand that while the Iranians were not prepared to concede an assurance on military bases in general, they saw no objection to an assurance on missile bases24.

The Iranians were strongly advised by both the United States and the British Government that the only safe thing was to give no written assurances whatsoever, since to do so would gain nothing but a short respite in the propaganda war, if that, and would assist the Soviets in their aim of isolating Iran from her allies and disrupting CENTO. We agreed, howevcr, that the assurance on missile bases was relatively harmless, providod it led to a genuine normalization of rolations and providod that Iran reserved the right to possess her own missiles25.

«Means of aggression»

The British Government were informed in July 1960 that Shah was considering a formula to the effect that Iran would not allow herself to become «a means (or medium) of aggression» against the Soviet Union. Britain again took the line that it was not in Iran's interest to give any such assurance: although this formula was less objectionable than some, it was vague and patently open to exploitation by the Soviets. The British Government suggested that the wisest course would be for the Iranians to respond to Soviet Advances in a firm and friendly manner vith-out giving anything away. If the Iranians were set on offering an assurance of some sort, they should make the Russians promise in retum to cease their propaganda26.

Reciprocal assurances

On 8 July 1960, Ansari brought from Moscow a proposal from Gromyko that Iran and the Soviet Union should sign reciprocal assurances (a) that they would not permit the establishment of foreign missile bases on their territory, and (b) that they would not permit the missiles to become a «means (or medium)» of aggression against each other27.

Khrushchev's message to the shah

This proposal was followed up on 19 July 1960, by a message from Khrushchev to the Shah, proposing that each country should undertake that it would not (a) allow any third power to construct, use or maintain foreign military bases on its territory,

23 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Panagiotis Dimi-trakis, Failed Alliances of the Cold War, I. B. Tauris, London 2012, pp. 135-165.

24 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Dimitrakis, Op. Cit., pp. 135-165.

25 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Dimitrakis, Op. Cit., pp. 135-165.

26 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Dimitrakis, Op. Cit., pp. 135-165.

27 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Dimitrakis, Op. Cit., pp. 135-165.

or (b) allow any foreign military forces to be stationed on its territory. The message added that «Retaliatory action by modern rockets could be avoided by not permitting aerial reconnaissance from Iranian territory.»28 It also appears that the message contained a proposal that troops should be withdrawn from both sides of the Irano-Soviet border, but the British Government were not informed of this until a later stage29.

Iranian reply

The Shah's immediate reaction to the message was to consider giving an assurance on (a) missile bases and (b) reconnaissance planes. The United Kingdom and United States Ambassadors advised strongly against the proposed exchange of assurances, which, they considered, came dangerously close to a nonaggression pact. They recommended that if there waa any question of an assurance it should be offered unilaterally and without negotiations. They continued to oppose the inclusion of the two assurances in a reply to the Khrushchev message, and the Shah eventually agreed to omit the assurance on reconnaissance flights. As regards the assurance on missile bases, it appeared that Mr. Ansari had exceeded his instructions earlier in the month and had already made an offer of such an assurance to the Russians, and the Shah felt committed by this30.

The final text of the Shah's reply to Mr. Khrushchev stated that the Iranian Government were prepared to undertake in writing not to permit any foreign Government to establish missile bases on Iranian territory, but that Iran reserved the right to possess her «own missiles». The reply was dated August 2, 1960, but Khrushchev was out of Moscow at the time and it was not until August 17 that the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires was able to deliver it to him. He received it coldly and is reported to have said that he could point out which parts had been drafted by the British and which by the Americans31.

Fall of Dr. Eghbal's government

After the fall of the Eghbal Government at the end of August 1960, and the appointment of Sharif-Emami as Prime Minister, there was an improvement in the tone of Moscow Radio broadcasts to Iran. There vas a moment of hestitation over the appointment of the Foreign Minister and at first the Shah appeared to be considering Ansari. This would almost certainly have implied a radical re-orientation of Iranian policy towards the Soviet Union, and the West was much relieved when Azodi was appointed. The Soviet Ambassador returned to Tehran on September 14 after more than nine months' absence32.

Khrushchev's reply to the shah

On 22 September 1960, Khrushchev's reply to the Shah's message of August 2 was delivered. He took note of the offered assurance on missile bases, but stated that this was not enough. The Soviet Union offered economic and technical assistance in return for an assurance that Iran would not use her territory as a

28 This may well have been a reference to aerial reconnaissance similar to that being carried out by Major Powers when his U-2 aircraft was shot down over the soviet Union in May 1960.

29 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Robert O. Freedman; Moscow and the Middle East, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991, pp. 1-71.

30 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Freedman, Op. Cit., pp. 1-71.

31 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Freedman, Op. Cit., pp. 1-71.

32 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Freedman, Op.

Cit., pp. 1-71.

base against the Soviet Union. Both the Shah and the Iranian Government showed that they were fully aware of the dangers of offering any further assurances. In a press conference on September 24, the Shah stated that Iran desired friendly relations with her great neighbour of the north but was not prepared to purchase it by taking measures which were contrary to her sovereign rights33.

The Shah replied to Khrushchev's message in general terms which gave nothing away. The reply contained an expression of readiness to end a goodwill mission if this would be acceptable to the Soviets. The Iranian Ambassador was to qualify this orally when delivering the letter by indicating that the mission would not be empowered to conduct political negotiations. In reply, Khrushchev accepted the proposal for a goodwill mission and also extended an invitation to Princess Shams, the Shah's sister, to visit the Soviet Union in her capacity as President of the Red Lion and Sun Society. Britain expressed no great enthusiasm for the projected mission, pointing out again that the Soviets were primarily interested in extracting a general assurance on military bases, which they would then use to press for the withdrawal of all American advisers from Iran. Sharif Emami appreciated this but considered that, although the Soviets would continue to bargain for a higher price, they would eventually accept an innocuous goodwill mission as an amende honorable for the events of February 1959. A further exchange of letters between the Shah and Khrushchev did little, however, to reconcile Iranian and Soviet views on the mission's terms of reference34.

Postponement of the goodwill mission

The continued postponement of the mission in the early part of 1961 made it seem less and less likely that it would in fact ever go to Moscow. On 13 February, however, the Iranian Government found it necessary to make a statement as a result of press reports, and the Political Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs used the following words: «To confirm goodwill on the part of Iran and bearing in mind the expressed wishes of the Government of the USSR, it is intended that the Prime Minister should go to Moscow to pay a visit to the Soviet Prime Minister. The date of this visit will be announced later.» The Foreign Office News Department were instructed to comment as follows: «This visit will be useful if it marks the beginning of more normal relations between Iran and the Soviet Union, based on the respect for her sovereign rights on which Iran has always insigted.» On February 28, there was an announcement in the Soviet press regarding the forthcoming goodwill mission, referring to «the importance attached to it by the Iranians.»35

Lippman's interview with Khrushchev

On April 18, the Washington Post published an article by Walter Lippman describing his interview with Khrushcev. He quoted the latter as saying that «Iran has a weak Communist Party, but the misery of the masses and the corruption of the government were surely producing a revolution», and drew the conclusion that, while Khrushchev was not contemplating military intervention, he would do all he could by propaganda and other means to bring down the Shah. The Lippman's interview made a

33 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Freedman, Op. Cit., pp. 1-71.

34 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Freedman, Op. Cit., pp. 1-71.

35 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Freedman, Op. Cit., pp. 1-71.

deep impression in Iran. There was no official reaction, but the goodwill mission seemed less and less likely to take place36.

Appointment of Dr. Amini as prime minister

The appointment of Dr. Ali Amini as Prime Minister in May 1961 was soon followed by a deterioration of relations. In his public statements and in conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in June, Amini made it clear that Iran had no intention of leaving CENTO and adopting a neutral policy; and the possibility of his programme of rigorous economic reform proving effective could not be expected to appeal to the Russians. The Soviet Ambossador was recalled to Moacow «for consultations» and Moscow broadcasts became increasingly virulent. The provocative tone of the commentaries on July 20 and 21, 1961, inciting Iranians to take part in demonstrations on July 2l, commemorating Dr. Mosaddeq's return to power in 1952, were the subject of a formal protest to the Soviet Ambassador37.

The cento documents

On August 18, Tass published some alleged documents of the former Baghdad Pact Organisation, classified as secret, which purported to reveal plans for the atomic bombing of frontier areas of Iran (among other countries) in order to deny accees to these areas to an enemy. These alleged documents provided the material for a campaign against CENTO, which was represented as an imminent threat to the peoples of its member countries. When taxed about the matter by the Soviet Ambassador in early September, Dr. Amini declined to read copies of the document and declared that there was no question of the Iranian Government seeking accommodation with the Soviet Union at the expense of Iran's commitments to the West. The tone of Soviet propaganda became increasingly menacing in September, with references to Soviet rights under Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Treaty and the fate which awaited Iran if she found herself on the wrong side in a nuclear war. The Iranian Government took this barrage as merely a phase in the nerve war38.

Iranian protests against soviet propaganda

Since Moscow radio maintained its attacks, the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a note of protest to the Soviet Ambassador. This was folloved by a campaign in the Iranian press against Soviet demands that Iran should leave CENTO, against the Soviet radio attacks and the publication of the «CENTO documents»39.

Talks with Gromyko

Dr. Ardelan, the new Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, had a series of talks in November 1961 with Gromyko in the course of which he revived the offer of a unilateral assurance, aparently in response to a cautiously worded expression by Gromyko of the USSR's desire to improve relations, The Iranian Government hoped that such a concession on their part might bring about a cessation of hostile Soviet propaganda, but the likelihood of this was discounted by the Wcst. Despite Soviet pressure for a bilat-

36 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Freedman, Op. Cit., pp. 1-71.

37 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Dimitrakis, Op. Cit., pp. 135-165.

38 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Dimitrakis, Op. Cit., pp. 135-165.

39 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Dimitrakis, Op. Cit., pp. 135-165.

eral agreement, the Iranians stood firm on their offer and rejected the Soviet counter-proposal40.

United Kingdom views on rapprochements between Iran and Russia

Throughout these exchanges between the two countries, the view of the British Government, which was frequently tendered to, and accepted by, the Iranians, was that any bilateral agreement with the USSR, even if it were limited to the subject of missile bases and ignored earlier Soviet requirements about foreign bases and troops in Iran and even short-range missiles in Iranian possession, would: a) aid the USSR in its desire to cut Iran off from CENTO and particularly from American military support; (b) force the Iraniana to pay too high a price for a temporary respite from hostile propaganda and subversion attempts;

(c) encourage the USSR to press Turkey for similar assurancee;

(d) enable the Soviet Union to claim that the Iranians were not keeping their side of the bargain properly, and so to loose upon them further pressure and propaganda41.

Iranian government's offer of a unilateral statement

1962 opened with the Iranian Government's advancing a formula for a unilateral communication, which was very similar to that set out in the Shah's letter to Khrushchev of August 1960. However, discussion between Ghods-Nakhai and the Soviet Ambassador resulted in a stalemate, since the Soviet Union insisted on a bilateral agreement to cover, inter alia, foreign bases. In February and March, the Soviet Ambassador again approached the Shah with requests for a bilateral agreement that would include a reference to non-aggression. The Shah stood firm on his earlier offer42.

With the resignation of Dr. Amini and the appointment of Amir Asadollah Alam as Prime Minister in July 1962, public opinion in Iran expected some favourable development in relations with the Soviet Union, and the new Prime Minister indeed explained to Her Majesty's Ambassador that this would be one of his objectives. However, it was reported that the Shah had expressly ordered that there should be no further change in Iran's position43.

Quite unexpectedly, the Soviet Ambassador informed the Shah in September that the Soviet Government was prepared to accept a unilateral undertaking by the Iranian Government not to permit the establishment of any missile base by a foreign government on Iranian territory. An Iranian note to this effect and a Soviet acknowledgment were exchanged in Tehran on 15 September 1962 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Soviet Ambassador44.

On September 18, the British Ambassador suggested to the Shah that the more conciliatory attitude which the Russians might now display in public might be designed to facilitate the further development of Communist subversive activity in Iran, especially in the North. The Shah replied that he was conscious of this, and imagined the Russians might now also proffer economic aid45.

40 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Dimitrakis, Op. Cit., pp. 135-165.

41 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, Westview Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 271-283.

42 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Cleveland, Op. Cit., pp. 271-283.

43 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Cleveland, Op. Cit., pp. 271-283.

44 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Cleveland, Op. Cit., pp. 271-283.

45 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Cleveland, Op.

Cit., pp. 271-283.

Ratification of transit and frontier demarcation agreements

A sign of the easing of relations was the exchange of instruments of ratification respectively in Moscow, on 26 October 1962, and in Tehran on December 20, relating to the «Transit and Frontier Demarcation Agreements» concluded in April 1957 - these agreements had been approved and ratified, but no formal exchange of instruments had ever taken place46.

The Iranian declaration brought an improvement in the tone of the Soviet press and official broadcasts (but not the clandestine radio stations). The Soviet Union also offered practical assistance, in the form of joint works on the Border Rivers, fish conservation projects, construction of silos etc. In April 1963, the Soviet Ambassador conveyed to the Iranian Foreign Minister a request that Mr. Brezhnev, the President of the Praesidium, should visit Iran. The Shah agreed and it was announced on May 26 that the visit would take place in November. To judge by these indications, the USSR deems it expedient to continue for the time being the policy of improving overt relations with Iran. The facilities for a sudden reversal of this policy at any time continue, of course, to be at hand in the organs of propaganda and subversion which the USSR controls47.

Some aspects of Soviet-Iranian relations

1. Iran as a potential «base of aggression» against the Soviet Union

In their discussions with the Iranians, the Soviet Government have returned constantly to the theme that Iran could, in certain circumstances, become a «base of aggression» or «a means of aggression» against the Soviet Union. In doing so, they were no doubt concerned to secure a re-affirmation in more modem terms of the hypothetical right of intervention which they enjoyed under Articles 5 and 6 of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921. The Iranians, for their part, have considered at various times meeting this Soviet pressure by giving some kind of general assurance, and have hoped, in return, to secure recognition by the Soviet Government that Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Treaty were no longer applicable48.

Thus in March 1955 the Shah authorised the Soviet Ambassador to convey to his Government two assurances for which he had asked: (1) That Iran would not become a military base, and (2) That the Iranians would not permit the transit of non-Iranian forces through Iranian territory for the purpose of attacking the USSR49.

The Shah added that (2) applied provided that Iran was not attacked. In a Note of April 3, 1956, the Iranian Government stated that «Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact did not and would not create possibilities for the use of Iranian territory against Soviet territory.»50

During the abortive negotiations for a Soviet-Iranian NonAggression Pact in January and February 1959, the Iranian Foreign Minister talked about the possibility of a Russian offer to cancel Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Treaty in exchange for an assurance on «military bases». The Shah wished to obtain a pro-

46 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Cleveland, Op. Cit., pp. 271-283.

47 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Cleveland, Op. Cit., pp. 271-283.

48 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Cleveland, Op. Cit., pp. 271-283.

49 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Cleveland, Op. Cit., pp. 271-283.

50 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Cleveland, Op. Cit., pp. 271-283.

tocol with the Soviet Union on these lines, in addition to the Non-Aggression Pact itself. He asked whethcr, if he signed both the Pact and the Protocol, the United States Government would be prepared to go ahead with the signature of the United States-Iranian Bilateral Agreemcnt51.

Then the negotiations with the Soviet Union collapsed on February 10, discussions on the subject of this assurance were also dropped. But in reportlng to the Majlis on February 12, Hekmat said that the Iranian Government were ready to inscribe in a Treaty with the Soviet Union: (1) That there would be no military bases on Iranian territory, (2) That as long as Iran was not attacked, she would not permit the stationing of foreign forces on her soil to the detriment of another country52.

He stated that the exprossion «military bases» must be defined. In speaking to journalists on 21 February 1959, the Shah repeated this in a somewhat different form. He said that the Iranian Government were ready to repeat that they were determined not to allow any State to set up bases of aggression on their territory and in particular bases for the launching of rockets. In an interview with «US News and World Report» on 23 April 1959, the Shah mentioned the Soviet demand for an assurance on military bases as one of the reasons for the breakdown of the negotiations, adding that the Russians had been unwilling to define what the expression meant53.

After the breakdown of the Soviet-Iranian negotiations, the Soviet Ambassador returned to Moscow, and for a time there were no further exchanges. These were resumed on 2 September 1959, when the Iranian Ambassador had a meeting with Khrushchev and Gromyko. In the course of that conversation, Ansari reminded them that «the Shah had stated publicly more than once that he would not allow any foreign military bases on Iran's territory»54. On his return to Tehran, the Soviet Ambassador had an interview with the Shah, on September 22. At this interview, the Shah tried to meetthe Soviet demands by offering an assurance on missile bases. He informed Pegov that the Iranian Government would be ready to give an oral or written assurance that they would not allow foreign missile bases to be established on Iranian soil, or even to incorporate such an assurance in a Treaty. The Iranian Ambassador saw Khrushchev some days later and asked whether the latter had anything to say in regard to this offer. Pegov saw the Shah on November 8 to give him the Soviet reply. It was to the effect that the Soviet Government would welcome such an assurance but would like to have a much more far-reaching one, to the effect that: (1) Iran would not allow foreign military bases, and (2) Would not permit her territory to be used as a «springboard for aggression»55.

The Shah said that these demands were unacceptable. In his account to the British Ambassador of the interview, however, the Shah said that he would be prepared to give an oral assurance of the self-evident fact that he would not allow Iranian territory to be used as a «place d'armes». He was not prepared to give any assurance about military bases since it was impossible to find an acceptable definition. The Foreign Minister subse-

51 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Cleveland, Op. Cit., pp. 271-283.

52 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Lenczowski, Op. Cit., pp. 167-229.

53 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Lenczowski, Op. Cit., pp. 167-229.

54 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Lenczowski, Op. Cit., pp. 167-229.

55 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Lenczowski, Op.

Cit., pp. 167-229.

quently complained that in spite of further Soviet pressure, the Shah intended to stand firm and give nothing more than the assurance which he had already offered on missile bases56.

The discussions shifted to the question of a visit by Iranian Foreign Minister, Aram, to Moscow and the Soviet Chargé d' Affaires made it clear to him in March 1960, that on arrival Aram would be expected to sign a draft on military bases. However, on 15 July 1960, Aram informed the British Ambassador that the Russians had produced a somewhat different proposal, which Iran should agree: (1) Not to allow her territory to be used as «a base for aggression»; and (2) Not to allow the establishment of missile bases, whether long, medium or short range57.

Later it appeared that Gromyko hadused the term «means of aggression» and had proposed that the assurances should be reciprocal. The Shah was reported to be seriously considering whether some written «means of aggression» formula could be devised. At this point, with the delivery of Khrushchev's message to the Shah of July 18, the discussions merged into the Khrushchev-Shah correspondence, in which Khrushchev concentrated on the demand that Iran should give assurances: (1) That no third power should construct or maintain military bases on her territory, and (2) That no foreign forces should be stationed there58.

2. The Assurance on Missile Bases

The Shah originally offered an assurance on missile bases to the Soviet Ambassador on 22 September 1959, though whether there had been any previous discussions on this was not clear. The offer appears at that time to have been restricted to medium and longrange missiles, since the Shah wished to reserve the possibility of having Iranian missile bases. In a conversation with the British Ambassador on 8 January 1960, Aram said that the Soviets, in addition to asking for assurances about military bases, were also asking that the assurances which had been offered about missile bases should include short range missiles. The Shah specifically had not wanted to give any assurances about short-range missiles in order not to tie his hands for the future59.

The Iranian Ambassador in Moscow was, however, informed in July 1960 that in the last resort the Iranian Government would be prepared to give an assurance about short-range missiles while preserving the right to operate her own. He was to use this concession only if it would purchase genuine normalisation of relations.

Aram subsequently complained that Ansari had exceeded his instructions but it was clear that he did so onlyin regard to short-range missiles, since the original assurance had been offered by the Shah himself the previous year. The form in which the assurance was finally given, in the Shah's reply to Khrushchev of August 2, 1960 was as follows: The Iranian Government was prepared to undertake in writing that «Iran will not permit missile bases of a foreign government to be established on its soil. Obviously the Iranian Government could arm itself with all kind of weapons, including missiles, just as the Soviet army is entitled to equip itself with all kinds of weapons»60.

56 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Lenczowski, Op. Cit., pp. 167-229.

57 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Calvocoressi, Op. Cit., pp. 287-388, 391-422.

58 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Calvocoressi, Op. Cit., pp. 287-388, 391-422.

59 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Calvocoressi, Op. Cit., pp. 287-388, 391-422.

60 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Calvocoressi, Op. Cit., pp. 287-388, 391-422.

It was understood that this assurance was to be unilateral and that it was to be embodied in a new document if the Russians accepted it. In his reply, however, delivered to the Shah on 22 September 1960, Khrushchev merely took cognisance of the offer, but noted that the Soviet proposals (for assurances on military bases and on foreign forces) had not been favourably received and that there had been no counter-proposals61.

3. The Norwegian Formula

The Norwegians have given assurances to the Soviet Union on two separate occasions, in 1949 and in 1957. Norway undertook that it would not take part in a policy which had aggressive aims, nor would it grant foreign military forces on Norwegian territory as long as Norway was not attacked or subjected to threats of attack. The Norwegians further undertook not to permit the stationing of armed forces of foreign powers on Norwegian territory as long as Norway was not attacked or expoaed to threats of attack62.

During the Soviet-Iranian negotiations for a Non-Aggression Pact, the Shah mentioned this to the British Ambassador. The British Ambassador was asked to obtain the text of these assurances, but shortly afterwards the Soviet-Iranian negotiations broke down, and the text was therefore not given63.

Afshar reverted to the subject on 21 July 1960, after the receipt of Khrushchev's letter to the Shah, and again asked for the text. Again it was not given. If he pressed the subject The British Embassy in Tehran were instructed to say that we had considerable doubts whether it would be wise to give such far-reaching undertakings, in the circumstances at that time. They were also to draw attention to the difference between the situation of Norway and that of Iran and to the effect that such assurances would have on the position of the American advisers. The only part of the Norwegian formula which might be without too great dangers for Iran was the first sentence of the 1957 assurance: «The Norwegian Government will never contribute to a policy which has aggressive aims and will not permit Norwegian territory to be used for the purposes of such a policy»; but even this would be open to misrepresentation. In the event, the Iranians have never subsequently reverted to this subject64.

4. Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Soviet-lranian Treaty

As mentioned above, the annulment of these Articles, in exchange for an assurance on military bases, was under discussion in the Soviet-Iranian negotiations of 1959. The Russians finally agreed to include this provision in the proposed Non-Aggression Pact without insisting on Iran's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact. It was, however, understood by the Russians that Iran would not proceed with the signing of the Bi-lateral American-Iranian agreement, and would give an assurance on military bases. From their point of view, however, the Russian offer came too late, since the Shah had already decided to proceed with the signing of the Bi-lateral Agreement65.

Following the collapae of the negotiations, there were reports that Iran intended to denounce Articles 5 and 6 unilaterally. In the event,

61 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Calvocoressi, Op. Cit., pp. 287-388, 391-422.

62 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Golan, Op. Cit., pp. 176-210.

63 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Golan, Op. Cit., pp. 176-210.

64 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Golan, Op. Cit., pp. 176-210.

65 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Golan, Op. Cit.,

pp. 176-210.

the Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a statement at a press conference on March 3, in which he said that «the Iranian Government considers those articles null and void and could accord them no validity», since the circumstances which led to their inclusion had ceased to exist. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, in n statement in the Senate the following day said that there was no question of the abrogation or annulment of the Articles in question. He claimed that the Articles had lapsed, though the rest of the Treaty remained in vigour66.

There were some doubts at the time whether the Iranians had been wise to repudiate part of a Treaty, which was itself not determinable in time. Afshar told Russell that he would try to ensure that no more formal step was taken for the time being. However, a Soviet memorandum given to the Iranian Embassy in Moscow in May 1960, calling attention to the U2 incident and to the forthcoming air exercise Shahbaz, referred to the two Articles, with the implication that they might, if necessary, be invoked. The Iranians felt it necessary to rebut this suggestion and in conversation with the Ambassador on June 15, the Minister of Foreign Affairs said that the Iranian Government had replied to the Soviet protest, making it clear that in view of the changed circumstances, including the United Nations Chartcr, they did not consider Article 5 any longer applicable or «adducible». So far as the British Government were aware, this was the only occasion on which the Iranians have formally repudiated the two Articles. Nevertheless, in a letter to Khrushchev of October 1960, the Shah claimed that the Soviet aggression against Iran in 1941 had not been justifiable, either under the 1921 and 1927 treaties, or in International Law. This was made clear by the Rotstein letter, on the basis of which the Majles had ratified the treaty67.

The Russians do not consider the Rotstein letter an integral part of the Treaty, and have never published it. It was contained in the version of the Treaty with the League of Nations by the Iranians in 1922 and there is a clear reference to it in the Second Protocol to the Treaty of 1927. The nearest the Russians have come to admitting its existence is an article in Pravda of March 15, 1959, which twice refers to the Rotstein letter, though without indicating the restrictive interpretation it placed on the Treaty68.

5. Is a Soviet-lranian Non-Aggression Pact Compatible with CENTO and with the US Bi-lateral Pact?

This is a matter of some difficulty. It must be remembered that Iran already has two Non-Aggression Treaties with the Soviet Union, those of 1921 and 1927. There is a summary of the proposed terms of the pact under discussion in the early part of 1959 in Tehran telegram No. 143 of that year. In Foreign Office Guidance telegram No. 293 of 1959, it was stated that the Iranian action in entering into such an agreement would not be inconsistent with their continued active association with the Baghdad Pact. This Guidance was however designed to make the best of a bad job if Iran reached agreement with the Soviets. Provided that it did not go beyond the outline we had been given, «its importance seemed to be largely psychological.»69 The United States Ambassador was instructed to inform the Shah that his Government could not reply as to whether the pact would be consistent with the US-Iranian Bi-lateral Agreement

66 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Calvocoressi, Op. Cit., pp. 287-388, 391-422.

67 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Calvocoressi, Op. Cit., pp. 287-388, 391-422.

68 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Calvocoressi, Op. Cit., pp. 287-388, 391-422.

69 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Calvocoressi, Op. Cit., pp. 287-388, 391-422.

until they had examined its terms. There was more doubt at the time whether any accompanying assurance on military bases would be consistent with the continuation of US military support. However, the line which the British Government had always taken was that the signature of such a pact by the Iranians would be such a blow to the confidence of their allies that CENTO could hardly survive, It would be interpreted both in Iran and elsewhere as a change of course70.

6. The Goodwill Mission

On 19 June 1959, the British Ambassador reported that there had been desultory talk on an Iranian delegation to Moscovr, perhaps headed by Saed, the Ambassador at the Vatican. This idea had been suggested to the Shah by the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow when they met in Copenhagen earlier in the year. Ansari reported in February 1960 that according to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs relations could never be restored to normal until the slight offered to the Soviet delegation in February of the previous year had been atoned for. The Iranian Foreign Minister Aram was under pressure to visit Moscow71.

In March, it was reported that Aram was being asked to go as a prelude to a visit by the Soviet President, Voroshilov. The latter had been invited to pay a visit to Tehran in the autumn of 1958 and the idea had been revived by the Russians in a message conveyed through the Indian Ambassador72. At the end of March the Rusaians made it clear to Aram that if he went to Moscow, he would be expected to sign a draf Protocol on military bases.

Sharif Emami revived the idea of the mission when he became Prime Minister in September 1960. He tried it on the Soviet Ambassador, from whom he understood that the Soviet Government would be prepared to accept. Sharif Emami was clear from the outset that the mission would not be empowered to negotiate about anything except the end of the propaganda warfare between the two countries, a new commercial agreement, and a limited range of economic subjects, such as the development of the Border Rivers73.

In October, the ground having been cleared with Pegov, this proposal was put to Khrushchev in the Shah's reply to Khrushchev's letter delivered on September 22. A reply was received from Khrushchev in November which, though samewhat grudging, agreed that the mission could come to Moscow at the end of December or early in January. But in January the Soviet Ambassador was still pressing Sharif Emami to be ready to sign in Moscow a Protocol on bases74.

The announcement of the proposed mission was made by the Iranian Government on February 15, 1961 and this announcement was published by the Soviet press on February 28, together with a statement that the mission had been postponed to a later date in compliance with Iranian wishes.

7. The Alleged Security Leaks

When the Shah's reply of August 2, 1960 was handed to Khrushchev, he was reported to have said that he knew it had

70 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Calvocoressi, Op. Cit., pp. 287-388, 391-422.

71 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Calvocoressi, Op. Cit., pp. 287-388, 391-422.

72 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Golan, Op. Cit., pp. 176-210.

73 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Golan, Op. Cit., pp. 176-210.

74 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Golan, Op. Cit.,

pp. 176-210.

been altered by the British and the Americans, and that he could indicate which passages had been altered by each Government.

Research revealed that in a speech of February 23, 1959 (i.e. shortly after the breakdown of the Iran-Soviet negotiations), Khrushchev had boasted that he knew the Shah's secrets, because they were passed on from one friend of his to the next.

When the Prime Minister visited Moscow in February 1959, Khrushchev, in reply to some representations by Macmillan about Soviet propaganda attacks on the Shah, claimed that he had a full record of what had passed between the Minister of Defence, Sandys, and the Shah at their meeting in February75. He also boasted in a public speech that he was in possession of the full text of the draft bi-lateral agreement with the Americans. In his interview Iranian Ambassador on 2 September 1959, Khrushchev claimed to have a copy of the letter addressed by President Eisenhower to the Shah during the Soviet-Iranian negotiations earlier in the year76.

8. The Shifting Soviet Position

It is always useful to be able to show that the Russians are constantly shifting their ground and that the satisfaction of one demand only leads to another. In fact, however, as has been shown above, the Soviet objective during the past three years has been very consistent; namely, to establish the right of intervention in Iranian affairs by claiming that Iran is a potential «base of aggression»77.

Soviet tactics have, however, changed from time to time during the period. Thus, at the end of 1958 and the beginning of 1959, the Russians were offering the Iranian Government a Non-Aggression Pact in exchange for withdrawal from CENTO. Later they were prepared to give this concession in exchange for the abandonment of negotiations for the Bi-lateral Agreement with the United States78.

In the course of these negotiations, however, they raised the demand for an assurance on «military bases». Later in 1959, when the Shah offered the assurance on middle and long-range missiles, they demanded an assurance on short-range missiles as well. In the summer of 1960, before the receipt of Khrushchev's first letter, they were asking that Iran should give an assurance, in addition to one about missiles, that it would not become a «base of aggression». Khrushchev's letter of June 19, however, demanded assurances on military bases and on the stationing in Iran of foreign military forces. Similarly, the discussions about the goodwill mission broadened into a demand that the mission should be prepared to sign a Protocol on military bases79.

9. The Evolution of Iranian Policy

It will be seen from above that the Iranians have at various times offered, or have considered offering, assurances which go further than an assurance on missile bases; thus they have said that Iran will «not become a military base», that they would be ready to undertake that there will be no «military bases» on Iranian territory, or no «bases of aggression». They have considered assurances that Iran will not become a «place d'armes» or a «means of aggression». The furthest that they have gone to-

75 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Golan, Op. Cit., pp. 176-210.

76 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Golan, Op. Cit., pp. 176-210.

77 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963.

78 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963.

79 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963.

wards meeting Soviet demands was in the statement by Hekmat in February 195980.

It must be remembered, however, that the Iranian Government at that time had just been discussing a Protocol on military bases with the Soviet Government. The Shah told the British Ambassador and the United States Ambassador on February 7, 1959, just before the breakdown of the81 negotiations, that although it was quite probable that the Russians would break off negotiations for a Non-Aggression Pact, he would «still like to try for a Protocol which would, on the one hand nullify Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Treaty and on the other contain an assurance on the part of the Iranian Government that they would not allow any military bases on their territory, with a fairly tight definition of military bases». When Hekmat received the Soviet delegation for the last time on February 10, 1959, to inform them of the Iranian Government's decision to proceed with the Bi-lateral Agreement with the United States, he told them also that Iran would still be prepared to sign a treaty with the Soviets, and a Protocol about military bases82. Having made this offer, the Iranians were no doubt reluctant to retreat from it so soon, although the Soviet Government had broken off negotiations. They were above all concerned with extricating themselves from the serious consequences for Soviet-Iranian relations of the breakdown of the negotiations. Moreover, Hek-mat's statement contained a reservation about definition83.

Thus, even at that time, the Shah had in mind that the negotiations on this subject could be broken off if necessary on this question of definition. He was probably also aware that after the rebuff administered to the Soviet delegation; the Russians were not prepared to pursue the subject. Nevertheless, there seems to have been an evolution in the attitude of the Iranian Government between February 1959, when Hekmat's statement was made, and November of that year when the Shah informed the Soviet Ambassador that the demand for an assurance on military bases would not be acceptable84.

Probably in the interval, the Shah has reflected further on the representations which had been made to him by the British and United States Govemments earlier in the year, and on the danger that any such commitments to the Soviet Union would offer the Russians a pretext for intervention in Iranian internal affairs. He has always appeared very conscious of this possibility. Thus, in his message to Khrushchev of August 2, 1960, the Shah referred to the fact that a Soviet representative had stated that the Tehran-Meshed railway could be used for strategic purposes85. He has also, in conversation, shown himseif aware of the possible effects of such an assurance on the position of the American Military Mission.

From the time of the breakdown of the Soviet-Iranian negotiations, therefore, the Shah's tactics have evidently been to retreat from the offer of an assurance on military bases by substituting for it an offer of one on missile bases. This, in his view, could do no possible harm, and its implementation could, if necessary, be submitted to verification e.g. by the United Nations86.

80 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963.

81 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963.

82 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963.

83 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Cleveland, Op. Cit., pp. 271-283.

84 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Cleveland, Op. Cit., pp. 271-283.

85 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Cleveland, Op. Cit., pp. 271-283.

86 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Cleveland, Op.

Cit., pp. 271-283.

10. The Concept of Neutralism, of an atom free zone, and of withdrawal from the frontier areas.

A Soviet Note delivered on 29 December 1958, suggested that there should be a zone of peace and of good relations in the Middle East, free of all foreign forces, military bases, atomic weapons and rockets, and proposed multilateral talks for a guarantee of the security and neutrality of Middle Eastern countries87.

The Iranlan Government replied to this suggestion in an Aide Memoire delivered in Moscow on 2 May 1959, drawmg attention to the Soviet Government's hostile propaganda (Tehran despatch No. 73 of 1959). This aide Memoire expressed the view that the Soviet proposal for the establishment of a security area and atom-free zone in the Middle East should be dealt with in the framework of the United Nations88.

In his measage of July 19, 1960, to the Shah, of which the British Government had not got the text, Khrushchev evidently raised the idea of the withdrawal by Soviet and Iranian forces on both sides of the frontier. In his reply of August 2, the Shah said that such a withdrawal could not offer any guarantee for security or have any practical effect. Nevertheless, Iran considered it as a sign of good intentions on the part of the Soviet Union. In his message of September 22, Khrushchev comploined that the Shah had cast doubts on this proposal, which was designed to promote mutual confidence89.

Subsequently the Iranian Government asked for the views of both the United States Government and the British Government on this proposal. However, before those views had been received, the Iranian Government decided against it of their own accord.

CONCLUSION

In early 1959, with the breakdown of the negotiations for a nonaggression pact, Irano-Soviet relations entered upon a phase of propaganda warfare which intensified with the signature of the bilateral military agreement between Iran and the United States. The Soviet Union was most insistent that Iran should not permit the establishment of foreign military bases on her soil, and continued to threaten Iran despite the Shah's assurance on this point. At the Iranians' request, Macmillan, the British Prime Minister, spoke to Khrushchev about the propaganda campaign, but to no great avail90.

This offer was of course not accepted, and, as relations continued strained, the Russians changed their demand to one neither for a written agreement that Iran would not allow her soil to be used as a base of aggression nor for the establishment of foreign missile bases. The publication by the USSR of the so-called «CENTO documents» did nothing to ease the situation: the Soviet Union continued to stand out for a bilateral agreement with Iran, and the Shah, in consultation with Britain and the United States, continued to offer no more than a unilateral assurance91.

Alam, who became Prime Minester in July 1962, tried with a policy of endeavouring once more to improve relations. The Shah maintained his insistence on a unilateral statement, and the Soviet Government finally agreed to this. The Iranian undertaking was accordingly given and acknowledged on 15 September. The Instruments of ratification of the 1957 Agreements on Transit and Frontier Demarcation were exchanged in Moscow on 26 October 1962 and in Tehran on December 20, respectively. The indications were that the USSR might continue the policy of improving overt relations with Iran during 1960s92.

Статья проверена программой «Антиплагиат».

Reference list:

1. All references to sources prefixed by FO and FCO refer to documents held at the UK National Archives (TNA), formerly the Public Record Office (PRO). The following files have been consulted: FCO51/50/LR6/14; FO371/104566; FO371/104567; FO371/114805; FO371/120710; FO371/127071; FO371/133001; FO371/140784; FO371/149754; FO371/157598; FO371/164179; FO371/170372.

2. CALVOCORESSI, Peter, World Politics since 1945, 6th edition, (London: Longman, 1991).

3. CLEVELAND, William L., A History of the Modern Middle East, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994).

4. DIMITRAKIS, Panagiotis, Failed Alliances of the Cold War, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012).

5. FREEDMAN, Robert O.; Moscow and the Middle East, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

6. GOLAN, Galia, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

7. KUNIHOLM, Bruce R., The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

8. LENCZOWSKI, George, The Middle East in the World Affairs, 4th edition, (Ithaca: Connell University Press, 1990).

9. OVENDALE, Ritchie, The Middle East since 1914, (London: Longman, 1992).

10. PATRIKARAKOS, David, Nuclear Iran, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012).

11. RIASANOVSKY, Nicholas V. & Mark D. STEINBERG, Rusya Tarihi, Qev. Figen Dereli, (Istanbul: Inkilap Kitabevi, 2011)

87 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Cleveland, Op. Cit., pp. 271-283.

88 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Cleveland, Op. Cit., pp. 271-283.

89 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Freedman, Op. Cit., pp. 1-71.

90 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963. Freedman, Op. Cit., pp. 1-71.

91 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963.

92 FCO51/50/LR6/14, Irano-Soviet Relations, 20 June 1963.

Хахалкина Елена Владимировна - доктор исторических наук; профессор кафедры новой, новейшей истории и международных отношений факультета исторических и политических наук Национального исследовательского Томского государственного университета

ч_ _ _/

РЕЦЕНЗИЯ

на статью доктора исторических наук, профессора истории Йешилбурса Б. К. (Турция) «От дружбы до вражды: Советско-иранские отношения (1945-1965 гг.)»

Вторая мировая война привела к формированию принципиально новой конфигурации международной системы, основанной на биполярности и комплексном противостоянии двух ведущих сверхдержав СССР и США. Складывавшаяся биполярность вела к трансформации двусторонних и многосторонних форматов отношений в различных регионах Европы и Азии. Одним из примеров данного процесса явились изменения, происходившие в данный период во взаимоотношениях СССР и Ирана.

В рассматриваемой статье предпринимается попытка охарактеризовать динамику развития советско-иранских отношений в первые два послевоенных десятилетия. При этом автор обозначает в качестве основной проблемы исследования выявление причин, приведших к резкому ухудшению двусторонних взаимоотношений в послевоенные годы. С целью более глубокого анализа произошедших изменений, Йешилбурса Б. К. обращается к истокам советско-иранских отношений, характеризуя их развитие после заключения первого двустороннего договора в 1921 г. По мнению автора, данный документ, заложил основу для в целом положительной динамики развития контактов между СССР и Ираном, прерванной событиями Второй мировой войны и оккупацией территории иранского государства силами союзных держав.

Характеризуя причины резкого осложнения двусторонних отношений в послевоенный период, Йешилбурса Б. К. обращает внимание на попытки советского руководства затянуть, вопреки достигнутым раннее договоренностям, процесс деоккупации северных провинций Ирана, а также поддержку там местных сепаратистских движений формировавшихся, в основном, на этнической основе. В тоже время, автор обращает внимание на отдельные попытки правительств двух стран улучшить двусторонний климат в середине 1950-х гг., которые, тем не менее, завершились провалом вследствие заключения двустороннего иранско-американского военного соглашения, а также окончательного складывания военно-политического блока СБИТО.

Рекомендации и замечания оставляют положительное впечатление от проделанной автором работы. Автор демонстрирует убедительные навыки работы с историческими источниками и историографической базой. Статья соответствует необходимым критериям научно-исследовательской работы и может быть рекомендована к публикации в журнале «История и современное мировоззрение».

Доктор исторических наук, заведующий кафедрой всеобщей истории и международных отношений ФГБОУ ВО «Брянский государственный университет имени академика И. Г. Петровского» Сагимбаев А. В.

INFORMATION ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Behçet Kemal Yejilbursa, Dr. Sci. (Hist.), Professor, Bursa Uludag University, Bursa, Turkey, http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6309-5703, e-mail: behcetyesil-bursa@yahoo.com

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ ОБ АВТОРЕ

Йешилбурса Бехчет Кемаль, доктор исторических наук, профессор истории, Улудагский университет, исторический факультет, г. Бурса, Турция, http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6309-5703, e-mail: behcetyesilbur-sa@yahoo.com