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respect the laws, traditions and customs of the “host region”. Migration processes in the abovementioned districts of Central Chernozem region prove the following: the number of migrants is growing and, accordingly, it becomes possible for representatives of one ethnos to unite and create a strong society unit — a diaspora. And, as it was said before, after some time diasporas face the problem of monopolization of cultural (value) paradigm in the region. This being the
situation in the regions where most part of the population belongs to one ethnic group, the Russians, it may lead only to further destabilization in the field of interethnic relations. In this case creating a document which would include a set of rules, traditions and customs of native population would not only have catalyzing but also educational influence on representatives of both young and middle-aged generation of people migrating to Central Chernozem regions of Russia.
References:
1. Rakowska-Harmstone T. Minority Nationalism Today: An Overview. In: The Last Empire. Nationality and Soviet Future, Stanford, 1986.
2. Estimation of resident population size as of 1 January and on average over 2013. - URL: http://www.webcitation. org/6Oo40u47f (Accessed 25 August 2014).
3. Tishkov V A Journey to Yourself/V Tishkov//Rossiiskaya gazeta, 2012, 24 August. - P. 1-2.
4. Kesyan G. Ethnosocial groups and their role in ethnopolitical conflicts//Moscow University Bulletin. Series18: Sociology and politology, 2009. - № 1. - P. 74-83.
5. Ryazanov А. Identity management: articulation of ethnocultural boundaries in polyethnic regions of Russia//Vlast, 2012. -№ 4. - P. 20-23.
6. The National Chamber ofthe Region began operating. - URL: http://culturavrn.ru/society/2988 (Accessed 25 August 2014).
7. Alexey Gordeyev: «Society is becoming more tolerant». - URL: http://36on.ru/magazine/province/41223-aleksey-gordeev-obschestvo-stanovitsya-tolerantnee (Accessed 25 August 2014).
8. Decree by the Government of the Russian Federation № 718. - URL: http://government.ru/media/files/ 41d4862001a-d2a4e5359.pdf (Accessed 25 August 2014).
9. Decree by the Government of Belgorod oblast № 511-pp issued on 16 December 2013. «On confirmation of Belgorod oblast state program “Providing Belgorod oblast with information about the activities of regional authorities and priorities of regional policy in 2014-2020” - URL: http://base.consultant.ru/regbase/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc; base=RLAW404; n=36551 (Accessed 25 August 2014).
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11. Registration certificate of the “Consolidation of the civil unity and ethnocultural development of Tambov’s nationalities” subprogram for 2015-2020. - URL: http://publ.tmbadm.ru/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/%D0%9F%D0%B0%D1% 81%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%82.pdf (Accessed 25 August 2014).
12. Winners of the competition announced. - URL: http://www.govvrn.ru/wps/portal/AVO/wcmContentlWCM_QUE-RY=/voronezh/avo/main/authorities/other+executive+power/other+executive+power21/new13082014&presentatio ntemplate=vrnOnePeaceOfNewsPt&CONTENTCACHE=NONE (Accessed 25 August 2014).
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Mudrytska Karyna Olexandrivna, Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University, Institute of International Relations, Ph. D. student at the Department of International Relations and Foreign Policy
E-mail: [email protected]
France, Germany and European Defence (Common Security and Defence Policy)
Abstract: This article covers French-German cooperation within the CSDP as well as problems which arise between France and Germany in this field.
Keywords: France, Germany, EU, CSDP, defence, security, crisis management.
Relevance of the research topic. It is widely thought that engine of European integration, which is the foreign policy
the France and Germany pair of countries is the acknowledged priority for both countries. French-German partnership is
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essential for Paris as well as for Berlin, therefore, these countries make efforts for its maintenance at the appropriate level even despite existing tensions of different nature, particularly in the field of military and political EU integration. FRG supports, in general, the French initiatives and projects within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), nevertheless, these countries have different conceptual vision of the main purpose of this EU component that military operation in Libya has brightly demonstrated. In this context, analysis of Paris and Berlin objectives which they set for themselves in the process of military and political EU integration presents scientific relevance for understanding of perspectives of further CSDP development.
Analysis of recent publications. Military and political aspects of French-German cooperation are studied in the works of Ruhl L. [1], Gareis S. B. and Leonhard N. [2] Strategies and objectives of Paris and Berlin in the EU are analyzed in publications of Meimeth M. and Göler D. [3], Clouet L.-M. and Marchetti A. [4], Stark H., Schild J., Krotz U., Schwarzer D. One should especially note the work ofMajor C. called “France, Germany and European defense: for more pragmatism and less pathos” [5] which covers results and problems of French-German partnership in the field of CSDP as well as presents recommendations concerning development of common European leadership of these countries.
Problem identification. This paper aims to specify the essence of French-German contradiction concerning further development of CSDP. To achieve this purpose, it is necessary to complete the following tasks: 1) to identify the role of CSDP in the French and German foreign policies; 2) to reveal peculiarities of French and German CSDP vision; 3) to briefly characterize common initiatives in this field; 4) to identify factors which hamper the intensification of cooperation between these countries within the CSDP.
Results of the research carried out by the author. French-German partnership is based on the Elysee Treaty which was signed in 1963 and laid the basis for cooperation between two countries in the field of foreign policy and youth policy, in the cultural dimension and in the security sphere. Berlin and Paris have been working together in these and other directions for more than 50 years.
It is France and Germany that stood at the origins of practical military and political EU integration: the Eurocorps was created in 1993 on the basis of French-German Brigade, and French-German initiative laid the basis for multilateral arms production project — the Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation (French: Organisation Conjointe de Cooperation en matiere d’Armement — OCCAr), which included in 1996 Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain.
Berlin and Paris worked actively together despite existing tensions on Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaties which formalized de jure the provisions concerning ESDP (CSDP).
N. Sarkozy and A. Merkel continued the line of their predecessors declaring importance of bilateral cooperation between France and Germany, particularly for the
strengthening of CSDP [6]. The February 2010 meeting of the French-German Council of Ministers resulted in adoption of “French-German agenda 2020” which formulated objectives in the framework of defense cooperation at the operational, political and industrial levels [7]. In February 2012, there was prepared another French-German declaration titled “Reinforcement of European Security and Defense means” [8]. Partners also develop military cooperation in the framework of the Elysee Treaty [2].
France, Germany and Poland within the “Weimar Triangle” in December 2010 addressed to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton “Letter of Weimar” which contains proposals of these countries concerning CSDP development:
1) creation of permanent planning capacities for operations;
2) improvement of tactical planning and command capacities;
3) intensification of cooperation between armed forces of EU member-states, especially within “EU-Battlegroups”; 4) reinforcement of the European Defence Agency’s role in the field of joint armament production [4, 22].
However, according to several experts, all these “declarations of intent” and initiatives have not brought the expected results [1; 3; 4; 5] due to a lot of obstacles.
According to the author, the main problem in French-German relations, which hampers the real development of CSDP, is the different ambitions of countries at the international scene and correspondingly the different vision of main purpose of CSDP/CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy). Whereas Paris has certain global ambitions and aims to leadership in the Mediterranean and Africa, that reciprocally demands active security policy in these regions, meanwhile Berlin aspires less to the status of global actor, and its security policy is more Eurocentric [5, 13]. That is also related to the different vision of the united Europe’s role in the world. For France, EU is a great power in a multi-polar world that demands from Europe to acquire its own military capacities. For Germany, EU represents rather a civilian power in a cooperative-multilateral international system [3, 199-200].
The other obstacle towards development of CSDP within the French-German couple is attitude of Germany to the use of military force that can be explained by the history of German state development during the “cold war”. FRG aimed to strengthen anchoring in the “West block”, especially in the EU and the NATO. Berlin built its own security policy in the framework of NATO that corresponded to Paris objectives then. In the conditions of post-bipolar world, Germany supported the development of EU security component, but as an additional to NATO mechanism [3, 195]. In the CSDP, Berlin gives preference to common defence over crisis management, unlike Paris. Among EU members Germany hesitates the most as for necessity of military operations deployment within CSDP [9, 84; 10]. Its contribution to the EU military operations is modest [3, 197]. In the crisis management Germany prefers economic, diplomatic and
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other means. France expected that over the years Germany would be more decisive when it comes to the use of force during conflicts, maybe not it the manner which is typical for France, but it would not at least speak out against EU operations [5, 9]. And if certain moves sometimes occur in this context [5, 12-13], German position on the use of force in general has not changed.
In this context one should mention the military operation in Libya which France tried at first to initiate within the EU. But Germany strongly opposed such a proposal. As the result certain number of experts estimated as a “lack of activity” of EU during Libyan events as failure [11, 274] or even as “end” [9, 75-76] or “death” [9, 76] of CSDP and CFSP.
To “reanimate” the CSDP Germany and Poland that also opposed EU operation, from the summer 2011 aimed to enhance an activity in the field of political and military integration. In the framework of Weimar Triangle that is with France, these countries offered to create EU operational military headquarters, the necessity of which brightly demonstrated the operation in Libya (this proposal was already made in 2010 in the “Letter of Weimar”). Spain and Italy supported this initiative. Nevertheless, Great Britain which is important EU state in military view spoke out against this proposal. London argued that EU operational military
headquarters is the duplication of NATO functions and a
“waste of money” [12].
Another problem which hampers the intensification of military and political cooperation between Germany and France derives from different power systems in Germany and France [5, 14] as well as from different format of armed forces (if French and by the way British armies are professional, the reform of German Bundeswehr has started recently) [4, 10]. Furthermore, Berlin and Paris have problems in the industrial production [4, 15-17; 5, 7-8] (for instance, serious tensions arose between them as to the А400 М project financing [4, 15-16]).
Conclusions. Germany and France are important partners to each other in European integration project, especially in the economic and financial dimensions. However, in the political and military fields there are tensions of conceptual and organizational essence between them. The main obstacle towards further development of CSDP is the different vision of its principal purpose by Germany and France (and Great Britain by the way): for Berlin CSDP has foremost to carry out the function of a “common defence”, meanwhile for Paris such a function of this EU policy is a crisis management. As for now, resolution of this problem is not likely, that is why these countries focus on an implementation of practical projects.
References:
1. Ruhl L. Les enjeux du dialogue strategique a l’echelle franco-allemande//Note du Cerfa. - № 96. - Juillet 2012. - 20 p.
2. Gareis S. B., Leonhard N. La cooperation militaire franco-allemande: fer de lance des forces armees europeennes?//An-nuaire frangais de relations internationales. - 2010. - Volume XI. - P. 481-498.
3. Meimeth M., Göler D. Europe’s Role in World Politics. Diverging Concepts in France and Germany//Ritsumeikan Law Review. - № 28. - 2011. - P. 191-201.
4. Clouet L.-M., Marchetti A. Incertitudes sur la PSDC. Une necessaire reflexion franco-allemande//Visions franco-alle-mandes. - № 19. - Juillet 2011. - 27 p.
5. Major C. La France, lAllemagne et la defense europeenne: pour plus de pragmatisme et moins de pathos//Visions franco-allemandes. - № 20. - Janvier 2013. - 33 p.
6. Securite, notre mission commune. - Article commun par Angela Merkel, Chancelliere de l’Allemagne, et Nicolas Sarkozy, President de la Republique, publie dans «Le Monde». - Paris, 3 fevrier 2009.
7. Agenda franco-allemand 2020-12ieme Conseil des ministres franco-allemand [Ressource electronique]/Paris, 4 fevrier 2010. - Disponible sur: http://www.france-allemagne.fr/Agenda-franco-allemand-2020-12eme,5230.html
8. Renforcer les moyens de la securite et de la defense europeennes [Ressource electronique]/Paris, 6 fevrier 2012. - Disponible sur: http://www.france-allemagne.fr/Renforcer-les-moyens-de-la,6502.html.
9. Menon A. European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya//Survival. - Vol. 53, № 3. - June-July 2011. - P. 75-90.
10. Göler D., Jopp M. LAllemagne, la Libye et l’Union europeenne//Politique etrangere. - № 2. - 2011. - P. 417-428.
11. Howorth J. La France, la Libye, la PSDC et l’OTAN//Annuaire frangais de relations internationales. - 2012. - Volume XIII. -P. 271-284.
12. UK snubs Ashton over EU military headquarters [Electronic resource]//EUobserver. - Brussels, 19 July 2011. - Accessible at: https://euobserver.com/defence/32639.
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