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find a job according to the received profession. In Bashkortostan over half of students expressed such conviction, and in Dagestan the prevailing majority of students were sure of it.
The lack of a choice for Imam in a rural district to ensure the adequate material maintenance for his family is the main factor of medrece graduates when they take the decision in favor of the priest's carrier. In contemporary Russia the rating of religious education coincides with its rating in foreign countries, where military, technical, scientific and circular humanitarian subjects occupy the dominant position.
One of the general conclusions of the study is as follows: the renaissance of Islam has not been reflects in the needs in Islamic education of ethnic Muslims, who live in the European part of the country and graduate from the general school. There is a good reason to assert that at present in Russia there is no alternative to Islamic education and enlightenment, which is organized and arranged within the context of Russian historic and ethnic-cultural traditions as a important factor promoting further renaissance of Islam/
"Mir cherez yazyk, obrazovaniye, kulturu: Rossiya-Kavkaz-Mirovoye soobshchestvo", Pytigorsk, 2010, p. 172-178.
R. Mukhametshin,
orientalist
FORMATION OF CONFESSIONAL POLICY IN RUSSIA: THE EXPERIENCE OF TATARSTAN
At present, the main participants of formation in Russia of confessional policy stand out in relief quite visibly. But as potential subject of this policy they have not yet become its actors. The
organizational and structural feature alone is not sufficient for the subject of policy. It is significant to fix its aims of participation in political life, the ideological orientations and main principles of its existence. What is going on in this sphere in the region, what are the perspectives and problems in formation of confessional policy? The situation is described below.
The Spiritual Departments of Muslims (SDM)
In the beginning of the 1990s, the emergence of Spiritual Departments was determined by many factors. First, the processes of "democratization" and "sovereignization", as well as disintegration of the USSR (December 1991) promoted to a large extent the radical changes within the framework of official religious institutions in the USSR and Russia. Second, the national movements unfold mainly in former autonomous republics were regarded by the Spiritual Departments as a needed attribute of statehood and spiritual renovation. At a certain level, it testifies to the fact that originally the Spiritual Departments were aimed at achievement of the other tasks than formation of valuable confessional policy. Since national movements and emerged public-political movements tried to use the religious factor for the sake of their strategic tasks, the newly appeared Spiritual Departments had t play their role mainly in the national-political field. For instance, as Damir Iskhakov, one of the ideologists of the Tatarian national movement for the end of the 1980s-1990s, considers, the Spiritual Department of Muslims of Tatarstan, although being an independent organization was developing as a fraction of national movement (Kazak time, 1998). The religious leaders themselves do not deny it. For instance, V. Yakupov, deputy mufti of SDM RT drew attention to the fact that they themselves grew out of them. Actually, up to the middle of the 1990s not only SDM RT but also other Spiritual Departments to a larger extent were sooner political than confessional
organizations. The Spiritual Departments, which lacked control over periodic publications and education institutions and which did not possess either efficient local structures or permanent financial sources, experienced difficulties in finding their political niche and in reckoning on understanding of ordinary believers.
However, since the middle of the 1990s in many Spiritual Departments there were created the vertical structures of governing Muslim community and its institutions. But has this organizationally optimal system become a valuable subject of policy, including confessional policy? Have they possessed the necessary internal resources and significant intentions to participate actively in the process of creation of principally new relations? Up to the present time, they have not achieved it. Certainly, the Spiritual Departments try to determine the main principles of their relations with the main subject of confessional policy - with the state. The principles are as follows: the principle of loyalty and the principle of separation of religion from the state. These principles are not sufficient in order to occupy an active political position and to formulate clearly the political aims and intentions; these principles do not provide enough knowledge for formation of confessional policy but they are quite adequate and acceptable for operative governance of religious relations.
The principle of loyalty in case of necessity makes it possible for Spiritual Departments and their structures to apply to the authorities, saying that the believers are valuable citizens of society and are in need of support on the part of the state, appealing to the fact that the problem not solved at the level of religious society sooner or later will disperse throughout the whole society and will penetrate into different spheres of life.
The principle of separation of religion from the state usually is used for protection of religious organizations against interference in
their internal affairs by the authorities. However, different Spiritual Departments of Russia have different points of view on efficiency of the existing structures and on the reciprocal relations with the state. It is quite natural, since they have different resources, the unequal number of Muslim communities and education institutions kept under their control.
In Russian option this principle rather underlines dependence of Muslim organizations on the state than their determination as equal partners. For the last years, the Spiritual Departments of the regions therefore pay much greater attention than beforehand to compliance with the article of the constitution about the secular characteristic of the state. At present it has become clear that the Spiritual Departments confront directly the need to determine in a more clear way their role in the sphere of political relations. They comprehend that they lack adequate resources, primarily economic resources. As is known, the lack of fixed internal mechanisms of functioning actually reduces to nothing the aspiration for forming independent policy. At present, as a result of ousting from Russia of actually all foreign Muslim charitable foundations the Spiritual Departments have no other choice except arrangement of relations with the state. In its turn, the state comprehended the significance of consolidation of its position and influence in the sphere of religious relations and for the last years took active steps for consolidation of its support in the confessional sphere. Taking into account the demonstrated support of the Russian Orthodox Church by the Russian authorities, the Spiritual Departments of Russia should more clearly determine the main specter of their activities.
Many leaders of Spiritual Departments understand well that in order to solve any significant problems they should start to comprehend their activities. There are several aspects of this problem: In what way is it possible to overcome the split in Muslim umma of Russia, to what
extent it is feasible the existence of many Spiritual Departments, how much are they efficient as institutions of governing Muslim communities?
In the end of 2009, the main leaders of Muslims of Russia, namely T. Tadzhudin, R. Gainutdin and I. Berdyev discussed the need of creation of the United Spiritual Department. Many analysts and religious leaders themselves pay attention to complexity and difficulty on the way of solving this problem. For the mid-term of the 1990s, V. Yakupov drew attention to the fact that the period for the 1990s was characterized not only by the renaissance trends, but also by the split with its negative impact. The specific generation of the post-Soviet clergy was to blame as far as the split is concerned. There are no objective reasons for this split, since it is based exclusively on ambitions of a small group of people. V. Yakupov justifies the need of unification by the fact that the institution of Church lacks in Islam. The role of Church in Islam was always played by the state. Up to present, the evident structural absence characterizes Muslim society in Russia. And it will remain, if the stereotype of relations between the state and Islam like between the state and Orthodoxy is not changed. It is necessary to take into account the specifics of Islam, the lack in it of the institution of Church and of the clergy in Christian perception. The distance of the Russian state from Muslim problems within Russia results only in the situation, when other states establish their control over Muslim structures in Russia. Should the Russian state clearly determine its policy in Islamic community in Russia even if through an authorized by it structure, the situation, like in the XVIII century, would quickly become normalized.
The clergy
The formation of the clergy as an independent stratum in Russia was terminated for the second half of the 1990s. Although the Muslim clergy may only relatively be regarded as a social stratum due to its small size, the lack of fixed social-legal status and economic basis, nevertheless the process of its formation was marked by disputes among religious leaders on many principal issues. First, the clergy, mainly Tatars, is characterized by its heterogeneous composition, since city and village imams, medrece teachers have different status and social position. Second, the heterogeneous feature of the clergy is determined by its ideological-political position. Formation of the world outlook directions, particularly of the youth, to a large extent depends on the perceptions acquired in education institutions.
The main part of the clergy consists out of representatives of the so called people's Islam, who traditionally are connected with rural districts and in terms of their social origin and material position do not differ a lot from the main part of the rural population. The majority of rural imams being "unofficial mullahs" instantly were called to be the official local representatives of Spiritual Departments, although they lack elementary religious education and perform their obligations due to absence of better trained religious representatives. However, emergence of new imams does not mean that they are ready to step down and offer them their places. But owing to many reasons young imams do not come back to rural districts or fail to accommodate to rural life.
By the end of the 1990s, the activity of the clergy in Tatarstan intensified, although the conditions were not quite favorable for it. Before the beginning of the XX century religious consciousness was an organic and needed element of the social structure of society in Tatarstan, while the clergy had a stable situation and a determined
status, but at present this organic feature and need are not the evident phenomenon. Therefore the clergy has to look for new ways and forms for consolidation of its place in society.
In order to determine its place in political life of multi-confessional society the clergy needs to measure its interests and correlate them with the interests of the whole society "keeping its face". This problem for the clergy turned out to be rather complicated due to many reasons and demands significant intellectual efforts. In this case, the clergy may count mainly on its own forces, since it should elaborate its own position on many theological and political issues. The position of political leaders and of national intellectuals is not always acceptable for it. There is some logic and some reason that for the last years the official clergy distanced from the national movement and its leaders.
The crisis of the national movement and the absence of its thoughtful attitude to Islam acceptable for the clergy promoted elaboration by the religious leaders of their own position. The clergy could not any more rely on the national intellectuals, who with enthusiasm supported the idea of Islamic renaissance but further started to form national ideology, where Islam was regarded as the ethnic-cultural factor. It is difficult to elaborate theoretical foundations without participation of theologians. But this problem is still urgent. It should be mentioned that the religious and world outlook views of the clergy do not always coincide with the position of the intellectuals. The religious leaders agree completely with intellectuals on the need of a thorough study of spiritual destiny of the people but propose their own interpretation of some public-political phenomena and teachings. It concerns primarily the principal events, notions and teachings, such as "dzhadidizm", "kadimizm", "Muslim reformation" and others, since different approaches to spiritual renovation of society were traced.
The intellectuals have not yet elaborated new conceptual foundations for comprehension of the spiritual destiny, and therefore the books presented for contemporary readers are represented by works written by the so called "progressive" wing - the attitude to religion formed within the context of Muslim reformation and Dzhadidizm. The intellectuals see exactly in these works the ideological-theoretical basis of national renaissance. The clergy is concerned about renaissance of Islam in society and primarily is interested in return of the part of spiritual destiny, which kept and consolidated traditional Muslim society in Tatarstan and today would promote this process. It is quite natural, since in Tatarstan religious life is being restored thanks to traditionalism, in words of A. Malashenko. The intellectuals try to restore traditions of Muslim reformation and apply to the ideological destiny of its representatives. But this destiny has not yet been comprehended I the context of contemporary problems. However, by the end of the 1990s, the trend to self-dependence in theoretical works of the clergy acquired the distinctive shape. The religious leaders became convicted in their need and intensified their religious and world outlook research.
But the clergy and its structures lack stable internal financial resources and material-technical basis, and this circumstance causes to some extent formation of the clergy's adjusted position, which is reflected in expressed loyalty to the authorities not always supported by the state; therefore the clergy have to pay attention to the interests of those, who keep the external financial sources under their control. This situation, on the one side, creates problems and, on the other side, postpones their solution or pushes aside contradictions and differences with those, who take decisions on financial support or on refusal to give such support.
The contemporary Muslim clergy mainly is satisfied with ideology of political indifference of religion, which makes it politically indifferent. For the period since the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s, certain attempts were taken by religious representatives to take part in political life of Russian society. For many reasons and not only due to incorrect actions of the clergy these attempts failed. It may be said that the Muslim clergy in the region gradually acquires the features of social stratum and rather actively forms its world outlook intentions. But up to present the clergy rigidly limits itself within the framework of religious rites, keeps aloof from political activities and does not express its political will. At present, the clergy therefore lacks political identity and as a subject of political life joins other political strata, which are nearer to it by origin or by local residence etc.
Recently, new trends emerged in the national composition of the Muslim clergy. It is connected primarily with formation in the regions of Tatars' traditional residence of Muslim communities by representatives of the Middle Asia and the Caucasus, who are marked by higher level of religiousness than Tatars and who form majority in mosques and, correspondingly, try to change imam for the representative of their nationality.
The number of Tatarian imams gradually diminishes, and the Tatarian language ceases to be used in praying in traditional mosques of Tatars. This process is a form involving Islam in the all-Russian identity, a new trend of creating of the all-Russian and to a large extent of Russian-cultural, Muslim identity, since most city mosques are filled today by Muslims of various nationalities, notes S. Gradirovsky. According to him, this process is going on thanks to objective reasons, and it is not planned and is not specially developed by anybody. However, the situation is much more complicated. According to V. Yakupov, in most Russian mosques, except Tatarstan and
Bashkortostan, the prayers' language is being changed for Russian. If no measures are taken, soon Islam in Russia will cease to be the religion of Tatars and the praying in the Tatarian language. To a large extent the Tatarian youth shares Salafit and wahhaby ideas, which refuse to take into account the national component. The young Tatars are often to blame that the Tatarian language becomes a forbidden language, notes V. Yakupov. He thinks that a great input into liquidation of the mosques with praying in the Tatarian language is being put by representatives of the Tatarian intellectuals, who are concerned only about reformation of Islam, i.e. the sense of their efforts is reduced to the idea of constructing "Islam" without praying obligations. These appeals essentially slow down re-Islamization of Tatars, who forget about namaz and leave mosques; but the southern colleagues immediately capture them. One can not help agreeing with V. Yakupov meaning that these processes are dangerous for the future of the Tatarian nation, for preservation of its ethnic component. He concludes that it is problematic to unite and to protect the people without the center of its consolidation, such as the mosque. The shariat justification of keeping the Tatarian language in mosques is mentioned by him as well: the mosques are the realty donated on the way to Islam; the ancestors gave money just for the mosques with praying in the Tatarian language, and their will should be sacred for the present users of the mosques' buildings.
These changes will lead to transformation of religious identity, since the factor, called to be the language of communication will appear in its sphere, S. Gradirovsky thinks. The Tatarian language as a language of identity gradually is being pushed backwards. But will these assimilation processes be accelerated by this fact? Will Islam become in this situation a deterrent factor of radicalization process? It is worth recalling that exactly within the framework of khanafit mazkhab
"Tatarian" Islam functioned with rather big ethnic component, which helped it to construct the supple model combining pliability and survival. Modernized "pure" Islam thoroughly throwing away mazkhab traditions, disregarding ethnic component and ignoring the system of rites and ceremonies, will be able to put its contribution into formation of new identity of Tatars? The answer will be: rather not.
It is possible to appraise the condition of the contemporary clergy on the basis of the results of the expertise (40 interviews) arranged by the author, who talked with representatives of Muslim elite in the Volga-Ural Basin in 2004. A number of meanings may be cited in this respect.
1. Whom do you consider to be the most authoritative scientists in the sphere of Muslim theology? Which their works are most significant for you?
The analysis of answers to this question gives it possible to be convinced that most representatives of the contemporary Muslim clergy have not received valuable religious education. Mentioning of some casual names of scientists clearly demonstrates the lack of theological education. Some names of scientists are mentioned fairly often, particularly, Abu Khanif, al-Gazali, including contemporary theologians Yusuf Kardavi and Kharun Yakhya. As the most authoritative Tatarian scientists are regarded to be R. Fakhretdinov, Sh. Mardzhani and M. Bigiyev. Regretfully, this list of names does not permit to make appreciation of the theological views of the clergy. On the contrary, it creates an impression about spontaneous theoretical thoughts. This conclusion is proved also by the answers to other questions.
2. What mazkhab is supported at present in Russia? Is the problem of mazkhabs urgent for renaissance of Islam in Russia?
The answer to this question may be divided into three types: 1) mainly khanafit mazkhab is mainly supported in Russia, but the problem of mazkhabov is not urgent; 2) the problem of mazkhab is urgent as a historic tradition. But the situation has changed, at present mazkhabs exchange their experience. There are no scientists, who are able to carry out this work, and therefore one should be above the division into mazkhabs; 3) mazkhab is a method of solving religious-legal problems, and therefore it is very urgent.
As it is seen, the attitude to mazkhabs, particularly in determination of their place in the process of religious renaissance, demonstrates the absence of unity in its comprehension. It shows primarily that the theological-legal aspect of religious renaissance is regarded not as the most urgent one. But shall the system of rites of Tatars-Muslims be formed within the framework of certain specific theological-legal space to be determined? Is it possible to form it without due account of specifics of mazkhabs? Probably, only a small part of the clergy ponders over these problems. The majority of the priests naively suppose that it will be possible to ensure renaissance of Islam by means of propaganda of its principal ideas without any legal basis. One should not forget that mazkhabs represent the centuries-long history and traditions, which should not be ignored. Disregard of traditional for the Tatars mazkhab will not result in its disappearance, but it will rather become replaced by another mazkhab.
The different attitude to Sufism was reflected in the answers -from - refusal to recognize its role to its discussion as a tradition and recognition of its perspectives in Islamic renaissance. The given answers are united by the abstractive views, the lack of knowledge of local materials and peculiarities of Sufism in the region. Only four answers to the questionnaires contain the name of one the most prominent representatives of Sufism - Zainulla-ishan Rasulev. The
other representatives of Sufism are not mentioned at all, while Sufism played a great role in preserving Islam in the Volga Basin.
Almost the same were the responses to the question: What is your attitude to political parties and movements? The respondents regarded their role in renaissance of Islam as negligible and proposed to keep aside from political parties. Such unanimous reaction of the clergy demonstrates that the process of politicization of Islam in Tatarstan is in embryo and that its feasibility is not recognized. There is no comprehension that consolidation of all forces of society is very significant for national renaissance. There is no understanding that at present religion is presented in society mainly as an element of national self-consciousness (in 2002, about 80% of young people-respondents (up to 30 years old) considered themselves as believers, but only 4% of them performed all rites). Is it not a serious warning on the need of elaborating new methods of work with the youth with due account of its notions about Islam? Obviously, the answer is yes. But the clergy not simply ignores but also sets at defiance the probable cooperation with political and public organizations. However, only a small number of these organizations and movements remained in Tatarstan. But there exists the World Congress of Tatars, and cooperation with it has attained only the initial stage of arrangement.
The respondents to the question on their attitude to non-traditional religious trends expressed mainly also a soft and pleasing meaning. They asserted that their roe and influence was exaggerated and that they do not threaten at all traditional Islam in the region. Thus, the Muslim clergy of the region still lives with perceptions, which were formed for the second half of the 1990s. It only approaches to the new stage of religious renaissance. The tempos and characteristic of religious renaissance in Russia depends on the tempos of comprehension by the Muslim clergy of the need of radical changes.
Common believers
The common Muslim believers rarely acted as an independent political subject, since their interests were mainly expressed via the community, particularly its initial cell - makhallya. The traditional Muslim society was rarely characterized by the situation, when political activities of parishioners acquired distinctive shapes. The motives of their political participation were formed under direct influence of imam, who among believers actually always enjoyed great authority. In the end of the XX century the situation radically changed. The process of forming initial cells of Muslim communities - makhalli is going on within the framework of renaissance of Islam. But up to the present time, they still do not play a great role in believers' life in the districts of Muslims' compact settlements. Today, imam enjoys authority only in the sphere of religious rites, and his influence actually is not dispersed to the other spheres of parishioners' life arrangement. Therefore common believers theoretically might express their political position. But it does not occur, since at present for the majority of believers Islam is the system of rites and an element of national self-consciousness. And their political interests and political behavior are formed outside their religious perceptions. Today, according to sociologists, it is possible to establish the fact of closely interwoven various forms of self-consciousness: religious, confessional and ethnic. At the same time, religiousness comes forward as a peculiar form of ethnic-confessional and ethnic-national self-consciousness.
Probably, therefore the contemporary Tatarian believer identifies himself more with the nation than with the Muslim umma. This sphere also is subject to uneasy transformations, though. The Tatarian language ceases to belong to the sphere of national identity. The system of common occurrences and rites is accepted in a rather simple way, and there appears the new generation of Tatars-Muslims, who are
brought up on the basis of religious values, which are alien for their nation. Since radicalization is going on mainly only within the framework of theological perceptions, the authorities have no significant reasons to take any measures against these communities. The official Islamic institutions, precisely Spiritual Departments are not engaged in solving this problem, and they themselves are far away from Islamic values, which are traditional values for Muslims of this region. Being separated from centuries-old theological Muslim traditions of their region, most contemporary Muslim leaders are unable to critically perceive the alien traditions, since they are not aware of other values, which might be used as a basis for their activities.
Muslim means of mass information
and publishing activities
The Muslim periodic printed materials started to be published since the beginning of the 1990s. At present, over 30 newspapers and magazines and 10 Internet-sites appear in public. The more significant newspapers are "Iman" (Kazan), "Islam Nury" (Naberezhnye chelny), "Islam Minbare" (Moskva), "Sovremennaya mysl" (Moskva), "Musulmansky vestnik" (Saratov), "Risalat" (Ufa). Most publications belong to religious associations and public organizations. The religious journalism has just started to restore, and the level of Muslim publications is rather low. They lack analytical materials, and the information bloc is characterized by one-sidedness, and actually more than half of materials consist in information taken from different sites, most publications are devoted to description or interpretation of religious rites, the group of authors is rather small limiting the number of reviewed problems. The Muslim means of mass information have not yet occupied their niche in the process of forming public opinion.
Probably, primarily it is caused by the lack of self-dependence of Muslim publications in terms of political information.
It should be admitted that the publishing religious sphere in Tatarstan is more developed than in other regions. Nevertheless, the textbooks used as training-methodical used as textbooks in Muslim education institutions. For 20 years of existence of Muslim education institutions in Tatarstan actually not a single textbook was prepared and written with due account of local Khanafit traditions. The textbooks used in higher education are translated from foreign editions and do not take into account the peculiar features of Islam in the Volga Basin. The conviction is being formed that local Muslims lacked the needed textbooks and their own theological books, although, as it is known, the theologians of Tatarstan wrote excellent textbooks, which still are used in the republics of the Central Asia and the Caucasus. But the tutors of the region's religious education institutions are not aware of them and do not pay any attention to them.
The public-political organizations and movements
Coming back of Islam to public and spiritual life to a great extent is connected with activities of public-political organizations and movements, which under contemporary conditions play a great role in forming mass consciousness. The characteristic and level of their influence on this process are determined by many factors, though. As far as situation in Tatarstan is concerned, one should take into account some factors. First, the impact of national public-political organizations and movements on mass consciousness even for the period of upsurge of national movement in the 1989s-1992s was not significant, as sociologists assert. For instance, in August 1991 as followers of the All-Tatarian Public Center (ATPC) accounted for 6%, as followers of party "Ittifak" - 2.5% of the respondents to the questionnaire. Second, the
Islamic component was a pure declaration and was reduced to recognition of its role in keeping of all-human values, to a basis of national culture and moral health in program documents of influential organizations, including the above mentioned ones.
For the period from the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s, the public-political movements and parties precised and concretized their attitude to Islam. Of a rather great significance was the circumstance that for the period of its upsurge the Tatarian national movement was concerned about ideas of national statehood with a clear circular feature characterized even for the radical wing of national movement (for instance, party "Ittifak"). The problem of religious renovation within the framework of spiritual renaissance of society in Tatarstan was considered as a declaration, and the role of Islam was not precisely determined in the process of national rebirth. Only since the middle of the 1990s, following the fall down and the crisis of national movement, turned out to be in the center of attention of its leaders. But the accents were somehow changed: the determination of the role of Islam in spiritual renaissance of society in Tatarstan was replaced by the attempt to use the Islamic factor in consolidation of their shaken position.
Thus, the national movement in Tatarstan in the name of its most prominent representatives could not to the utmost use the Islamic factor for achievement of their purposes. The national movement goes on through the crisis, which caused its radicalization and holds it away further from a chance of thoughtful applying of the rich experience of the Tatarian society in the sphere of state-confessional relations.
The academic scientific circles
For the years of the Soviet power, the studies of Islam and Muslim theology in Tatarstan actually lost their centuries-long
traditions. The history of Islam in the Volga Basin was actually not studied even in some research works devoted to Islam and published in the USSR. The question is that in this time two trends in research of Islam traditionally existed in national Orientalism. First, Islam attracted the researchers as a significant component of public-political life of Muslim states, which demanded the scientific comprehension in order to carry out the thoughtful foreign policy of the Soviet state in any region of the Muslim East. Many works were written about history and spiritual culture of separate Muslim states (of the Near East, the SouthEastern Asia and the Central Asia etc.), where the Islamic factor was considered as a most significant element of public-political life. Second, the works, which developed the best traditions of European and national research of Islam, were published sometimes. However, following the established world traditions in Orientalism, the researchers limited their works with studies primarily of classic Islam and actually ignored the modern and the most modern periods. They proceeded from the meaning that the Turkic world and the more so the Volga Basin represent the periphery of Muslim civilization and therefore is not interesting very much for research of classical Islam.
Should one project these trends to the study of Islam in the Volga Basin, one would see that it did not attract attention of experts either from the point of view of forming "big" policy or in terms of research of various aspects of classical Islam. Therefore it was quite logical that, leaving aside atheistic studies, in the Soviet Union Islam was subject to study in neighboring zones with other Muslim states (the Middle Asia, the Caucasus), while the experts in Islam actually kept away from their research the Central zones of the country.
The new trends formed in research of Islam in the post-Soviet Tatarstan. On the one side, it is connected with creation of the structures engaged in studies of Islam (the department of Islamic
research in the Institute of History of AS RT, the Institute of Orientalism in Kazan University, the Russian Islamic University), on the other side, it is connected with formation of new methodological approaches to study of Islam. On of them is the urge towards overcoming a certain limitation, which consists in perception of religion as a closed phenomenon subject to a small external impact including a - political influence. The interest to Islam in Russia has increased. It is too early to say that the methodological stereotypes, ideological and psychological prejudices shaped for the years of the Soviet power in relation to Islam have been finally liquidated. Islam in Russia, being transformed into the most significant factor of its internal and foreign policy, today is subject to study mainly by historians and political scientists; and the study of Islam is concentrated on appraisal of influence of Islam on public-political life of one or another region or a state as a whole. The analysis of Islam as an ethnic-confessional and cultural phenomenon in history of Russia and of its Muslim peoples has not become a significant subject to research on the part of national Islamic studies.
Up to present, the traditional methodological research methods prevail in Tatarstan. The phenomena, such as zhadidizm, kadimizm, Tatarian Muslim reformism still remain subject to thorough research. The basis of source study of Islam is the weakest aspect of Islamic research. The existing sources in Arabic characterized by complicated theological contents are still available for a small group of people due rather to unusual content apparatus. The scientists of Tatarstan educated in the traditions of Kazan research school of publicists' history regard Islam in the context of development of progressive philosophical thinking, do not analyze the Tatarian traditional society, which to a large extent shapes public consciousness.
The research of Islam makes first timid steps in restoration of former traditions, while Muslim theology actually remains a terra incognita. The activities of the Russian Islamic University and its just received license for theological studies reassure to some extent, but it is a long-term perspective. Thus, the main actors in the state-Islamic relations in Tatarstan have been designed, and they have mainly determined their positions, world outlook and the sphere of their political activities. But these actors have not yet formed the valuable political principles, which might be used by them as the guiding principles in activities of these actors. Therefore their political behavior does not let them reduce various political actions to the separate actions within the system, which in this case is called the confessional policy.
"Politeks: politicheskaya ekspertiza ", St-P., 2010, T.6, N 2, p. 58-72.
Renat Bekkin,
expert in Islam
THE ISLAMIC FINANCING METHODS
IN AZERBAIJAN
The idea of national statehood in Azerbaijan by historic traditions is closely connected not with Islam and religious values but with secularism and anti-clericalism. Therefore it is not a surprise that one of the key partners of contemporary Azerbaijan is not Iran but Turkey, which rigidly sticks to the principles of secularism. In other words, the national nearness between Turks and Azerbaijanis turned out to be more important than common religious belonging: as is known, in Iran like in Azerbaijan the majority of the population consists of Shiites.
