CC BY
137
The changed nature of the American and NATO presence in Afghanistan and the inevitably affected domestic policy and military processes will likewise affect the components of the so far stable scheme. Theoretically, this may create new models of geopolitical meandering and new studies on an even greater scale.
We cannot exclude several vastly different models consisting of the components described above: the state of America’s economy related to the funding of the Afghan campaign; the positive or negative results of confrontation with the Taliban; the geopolitical and geo-economic rivalry between the United States and China; the rivalry between Washington and Moscow in the post-Soviet expanse; the Pakistan factor and the specifics of the U.S.-Iran confrontation. The energy and transport factors are as important as the security-related considerations; together they play the key roles in shaping the geopolitical priorities and regional developments in Central Asia.
Conclusion
It is absolutely clear that the American and NATO presence in Afghanistan can be described as an all-important factor of the geopolitical situation in Eurasia and the world; it will survive in the near future irrespective of the positive or negative developments in Afghanistan.
Any scenario played out before the end of 2011or beyond that ends the stalemate in Afghanistan will cause a landslide which will upset the worldwide balance of forces and affect all the actors with interests in Afghanistan.
FOREIGN MILITARY BASES IN POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA
Nuria KUTNAEVA
Head of the International Relations Program, International University in Central Asia (IUCA) (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan)
Introduction
The collapse of the bipolar system of international relations at the end of the twentieth century led to global changes in these re-
lations, the main one being that local conflicts have replaced large-scale wars. Soft power is increasingly moving in to replace hard power; in-
This article was prepared on the basis of a report the author gave at an international conference called "Central Asia’s Most Recent Security Challenges ” held at the International University in Central Asia (IUCA), Kyrgyzstan, 15 May, 2010.
ternational and nongovernmental organizations, transnational companies, and even terrorist groups are taking the place of individual countries on the international arena.
Nevertheless, when it comes to state security, certain mechanisms that used to be part of the bipolar system continue to function. I am referring to military bases abroad, which, in the context of globalization, continue to play just as significant role in international relations as they did during the Cold War.
This article takes a look at how important it is to have these facilities in the territory of foreign states, as well as the advantages they offer the countries where they are located, using Central Asia (CA) as an example.1
In this work, military bases imply “specially equipped areas used by a state for deploying its armed forces in relation to hypothetical or actual theaters of military operations.”2
It must be specified that the term “military installation” should only be used in those cases when we are talking about Russia’s military presence in CA; the establishment of “military bases” is associated with other states.
All empires throughout history that engaged not only in territorial expansion, but also in control over neighboring territories were known to establish their military bases in other states,3 the empire of Alexander of Macedonia, the Venetian and Genoese republics, and the colonial empires of France and England being cases in point.4
During the Cold War, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (the leaders of the state belonging to NATO and the Warsaw Pact), as the main players on the international political arena, were interested in establishing their military bases in various countries, since this helped them to execute a strategy of deterrence
1 In this article, Central Asia implies 5 post-Soviet republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
2 See: Slovar mezhdunarodnogo prava, authored by S. Batsanov, G. Efimov, V. Kuznetsov, et al., Diplomatic Academy of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2nd ed., revised and enlarged, Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniia Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p. 19.
3 See: D. Dragunskiy, “Izderzhki imperii,” Kosmop-olis, No. 3 (19), Winter 2007/2008, pp. 5-10.
4 See: Z. Lachowski, Foreign Military Bases in Eurasia, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 18, June 2007, Sweden, p. 78.
and carry out a policy of containment. Proximity to the theaters of military operations ensured the possibility of gathering intelligence and rendering a certain amount of military support.
After the end of the Cold War, deployment of Russian and American military bases significantly changed. Between 1988 and 1995, the U.S. military-political leadership closed 97 of its foreign military bases.5
In 2001, the U.S. announced it was closing a few more of its foreign bases (by 2003) and moving them from the European theater of military operations to other regions of the world.6 This was due to a shift in the Pentagon’s policy. It no longer recognized the concept of static defense, which presumed visibly identifiable threats. Instead Donald Rumsfeld suggested that it was no longer possible to predict with precision where a threat may come from or exactly what kind of a threat it might be.7
So the concept of “site, and not base” was adopted. According to official data, as of September 2006, the Pentagon had approximately 823 military bases abroad.8
As for Russia, by the beginning of the 2000s, its leaders had to close almost all the country’s bases in the Far Abroad. There were different reasons for this, mainly economic and polit-ical.9 At present, the Russian Federation (RF) has
5 See: Ibid., p. 7-8.
6 See: V. Iurchenko, “O planakh po izmeneniiu bazi-rovaniia VC SShA za rubezhom,” Institute for Middle Eastern Studies, 27 January, 2004, available at [http://www. iimes.ru/rus/stat/2004/27-01-04.htm].
7 See: U.S. Department of Defense. News Transcript: Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability En Route to Guam,
13 November, 2003, available at [http://www.defense.gov/ Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2934].
8 Whereby this number did not include the Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan (at that time still the Manas Air Base). The reason for this, explains the Special Pentagon Report for 2007, was that in order to be included in this number, the size of the facility should be more than 10 acres or more than 10 million dollars should be invested in it (the so-called Plant Replacement Value) (see: Department of Defense. Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2007, p. 22, available at [www.defense.gov/ pubs/bsr_2007_baseline.pdf]). If we keep in mind that 10 acres is 4.05 hectares, and the Transit Center is around 224 hectares in area, the reason it is not included is probably economic.
9 For example, the change in the domestic political
situation in Somalia led to the withdrawal of the Russian
military contingent from this country in 1991.
25 foreign military bases, 24 of which are deployed in post-Soviet countries and one in Syria (Tartus).10
It is important to note that China, a neighbor of the CA countries and important player in this region, does not have any military bases at all abroad and, according to press reports, has no intention of establishing any.11
10 See: M. Lukin, “Vse rossiiskie bazy,” Kommer-sant-Vlast, No. 19 (723), 21 May, 2007, available at [http:// www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?docsid=766827].
11 See: M. Chaplygina, “Pekin ne planiruet sozdanie voennykh baz na chuzhoi territorii—voennye,” RIA Novosti,
11 March, 2010, available at [http://rian.ru/defense_safety/ 20100311/213467753.html].
So the following questions will be discussed
below:
(1) in which CA republics have military installations been deployed;
(2) which countries have deployed their military installations in CA;
(3) what is the purpose of the military installations;
(4) on what financial conditions is territory made available (gratuitous use, rental, or on a compensatory basis);
(5) is old infrastructure used for creating the installations or are new facilities built.
Kazakhstan-RF
After the collapse of the U.S.S.R., Kazakhstan continued to host several military installations.
Since 1991, Russia has been paying rent for their use.
They include:
1. Test Range No. 5 of the RF Ministry of Defense—the Baikonur Space Launch Complex—is the Russian Federation’s largest foreign installation, which accounts for 70% of all of Russia’s space launches12; according to an agreement of 1994, Russia pays Kazakhstan 115 million dollars in rent for its use.13 The RF also pledged to assist Kazakhstan in implementing space projects, for example in the sphere of “satellite communication and research of the Earth’s natural resources and in creating joint structures and training specialists in space technology.”14 In 2004, rental of the complex was extended until 2050.
2. Chkalov State Flight Test Center No. 929 of the RF Ministry of Defense. A total of five test ranges are located in the West Kazakhstan, Atyrau, and Mangistau Regions (Nos. 231, 170, 171, 85, and 525)15; they are designated for testing new types of weapons and carrying out combat training of air force and navy aviation pilots. Until 1 January, 2005, the annual rent payment was $1,814 million, while after 2005, it was raised to $4,454 million.16 Kazakhstan
12 See: “Voennye bazy RF za granitsei. Spravki,” RIA Novosti, 15 February, 2010, available at [http://www.rian.ru/ spravka/20100215/209344182.html].
13 See: Soglashenie mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Respublikoi Kazakhstan "Ob osnovnykh printsipakh i usloviiakh ispolzovaniia kosmodroma 'Baikonur’,” 28 March, 1994, available at [http://www.baikonuradm.ru/index.php? mod1=npb1&npbid=46].
14 Ibidem.
15 See: Soglashenie mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Respublikoi Kazakhstan "O poriadke ispolzovaniia 929 Gos-udarstvennogo letno-ispytatelnogo tsentra (ob’ekty i boevye polia, razmeshchennye na territorii Respubliki Kazakhstan) Ministerstva oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” 20 January, 1995, available at [http://www.infopravo.by.ru/fed1995/ch04/ akt16953.shtm].
16 See: “Kazinform: V. Putin podpisal chetyre zakona o ratifikatsii soglashenii s Kazakhstanom,” website of the Republic of Kazakhstan Embassy, 23 April, 2007, available at [http://kazembassy.ru/press_service/news/?newsid=2845].
also has a priority right to purchase the new types of weapons and military hardware tested at these ranges.17
3. State Central Multiservice Test Range No. 4. Since 1 January, 2005, the annual rent for use of its installations and combat fields amounts to $0.682 million (earlier it amounted to $1,022 million).18
3.1. State Test Range No. 4 comprises of State Test Range No. 10 (the Sary-Shagan Test Range—military unit 03080). It was built close to Lake Balkhash in accordance with a C.P.S.U. Central Committee and Council of Ministers resolution of 18 August, 1956 for the purpose of testing the technical specifications of a future combat system that was to defend against U.S. sea-launched ballistic missiles; the test site is mentioned in the ABM Treaty of 1972.19 It is interesting that it was at this test site that the first warhead of an R-12 ballistic missile was destroyed by a V-1000 anti-missile during testing in 1961.20 At present, the Sary-Shagan test range is used for testing new elements of penetration aids “in conditions as close to combat as possible.”21 Before 1 January, 2005, the annual rent was $19.97 million, and after that it dropped to $18.932 million.22
3.2. Until April 2010, the Emba Test Range (5580 Testing Base) belonged to the 4th Test Range. It was designated for carrying out tests and work in areas of fallout of elements of missiles launched from the Kapustin Yar firing range (RF) in the direction of the Sary-Shagan test range. At present, the base is in the process of being closed down23; it covered a total area of 2960144.6 hectares, and the annual rent amounted to $0.718 million.24
4. The Balkhash Independent Radar Node (located in Sary-Shagan, Priozersk, Balkhash). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, according to a bilateral agreement entered in 1994, the Balkhash Node, including the Dnepr and Daryal-U radar stations, became the property of the Republic of Kazakhstan.25 The Dnepr radar station controls the airspace of Pakistan, China, India, and part of the Indian Ocean (the Gulf of Bengal); it can keep track of up to 1,300 objects.26 Since 2001, the Sary-Shagan radar center belongs to the RF Space Forces.
5. Independent transport wing, combat support force, and the advanced reconnaissance command post; since 1980, they have been deployed in the town of Kostanai.
All the RF military installations in Kazakhstan were built in Soviet times (mainly after the 1960s).
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, they became the property of Kazakhstan and at present, thanks
17 See: Soglashenie mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Respublikoi Kazakhstan "O poriadke ispolzovaniia 929 Gos-udarstvennogo letno-ispytatelnogo tsentra”.
18 See: Ibidem.
19 See: V. Meilitsev, “Antiiardernyi shchit,” SpetsnazRossii, No. 12 (111), December 2005, available at [http://www. specnaz.ru/article/?837].
20 See: T. Frolova, A. Bogatyrev, “Sto raketnykh perekhvatov,” available at [http://www.redstar.ru/2006/03/23_03/ 5_01.html].
21 See: “S poligona Kapustin Yar uspeshno zapustili ballitsicheskuiu raketu,” Lenta.Ru, 23 April, 2006, available at [http://www.lenta.ru/news/2006/04/23/rocket/].
22 See: “Kazinform...”
23 See: I. Dmitriev, M. Riakhovskaia, “Rossiiskie rakety gniiut v Kazakhstane,” Versiia, 5 April, 2010, available at [http://versia.ru/articles/2010/apr/05/poligon_emba_5].
24 See: “Kazinform.”
25 See: Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan On the Upkeep and Use of the Balkhash Missile Attack Warning Center Located in the Territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 14 December, 1994.
26 See: I. Marinin, “‘Dnepr’ na Balkhashe,” Novosti kosmonoavtiki, No. 9, 2009, available at [http://www.novosti-kosmonavtiki.ru/content/numbers/320/34.shtml].
to military-technical cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan, are continuing to ensure Russia’s defense capability on a paid basis.
Kyrgyzstan-RF
The Russian Federation has five military installations in Kyrgyzstan.
1. Russian Air Base No.999 in Kant is part of the air component of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces of the Central Asian Region. The base carries out surveillance of CA airspace and, if necessary, can launch strikes at terrorist groups. According to the agreement signed in September 2003, the base was transferred to Russia on a gratuitous basis.27 In 2009-2010, financing of the base was doubled from 640 million (in 2003-2008) to 1.7 billion rubles28; it is staffed by 500 Russian servicemen. In addition, it has five Su-25 ground attack planes, 4 L-39 trainer aircraft, and 2 Mi-8 helicopters.29 The airbase is directly subordinate to the 5th army of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces of the Volga-Ural Military District; this is the first base that was established beyond the RF after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
2. Koi-Sary Antisubmarine Weapons Test Base No. 954 of the Russian Navy. It is located in the town of Karakol of the Issyk Kul Region (near Lake Issyk Kul); torpedo weapons are tested here. According to an agreement between Russia and Kyrgyzstan of 5 July, 1993, this base is recognized as Russia’s property.30
3. Liaison Center No. 338 of the Russian Navy is located in the town of Kara-Balta (Chaldo-var). It is designed to provide liaison services between Russian Navy Headquarters and Russia’s submarines and surface ships in the Pacific and Indian oceans. The Center also carries out electronic intelligence in the interests of Russian Navy Headquarters.31 The conditions under which this installation is made available for Russia’s use are not known.
4. Automated Seismic Station No. 1 is situated in the village of Ichke-Suu (the Issyk Kul Region) and is a sub-unit of the Seismic Service of the Russian Ministry of Defense.32 It is designed for monitoring the testing and use of nuclear weapons throughout the world, as well as for observing earthquakes. It is rented on a compensatory basis, that is, in return for use of this station, Russia provides the Institute of Seismology of the Kyrgyz National Academy of Sciences and the Kyrgyz Emergency Ministry with the latest updates and information on any anticipated earthquakes in the republic and their magnitude, and renders technical assistance to Kyrgyzstan’s scientific research institutions.33
27 See: Soglashenie mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Kyrgyzskoi Respublikoi "O statuse i usloviiakh prebyvaniia Rossiiskoi aviatsionnoi bazy na territorii Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki,” 22 September, 2003, available at [http://bestpravo.ru/ fed2003/data03/tex14395.htm].
28 See: “Rossiia uvelichila finansirovanie aviabasy v Kyrgyzstane v 2009-2010 gg. v dva raza,” AKIpress, 5 December, 2008, available at [http://kg.akipress.org/news/64758].
29 See: Zh. Ibraliev, V. Nosov, “Za piat let svoego sushchestvovaniia shtat aviabazy uvelichilsia v 10 raz,” IA “24.kg,”
24 October, 2008, available at [http://www.24.kg/community/2008/10/24/96121.html].
30 See: “Voennye bazy RF za granitsei. Spravki.”
31 See: M. Lukin, op. cit.
32 The radio-seismic laboratory (independent seismic center) No. 17 in the village of Mailuu-Sai (the Jalal-Abad Region) was disbanded. Instead, an independent seismic center was established that remains under Russian management.
33 Federal Law of the Russian Federation On Ratification of the Protocol on Making Amendments to the Agreement between the Russian Federation and Kyrgyz Republic on Rental Conditions of Deployment Sites of Sub-Units of the Seismic Service of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry located in the Kyrgyz Republic of 21 October, 1994, 17 July, 2009, available at [http://ntc.duma.gov.ru/duma_na/asozd/asozd_text.php?nm=159-%D4%C7&dt=2009].
There are also plans to deploy an additional Russian military contingent in Kyrgyzstan, as well as a training center for training Russian and Kyrgyz servicemen. The sides were supposed to have signed agreements on the second Russian military base (supposedly in the Batken Region) before 1 November, 2009,34 but this did not happen.
Kyrgyzstan-U.S.
The U.S. Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan
On 19 December, 2001, the Kyrgyz side ratified an agreement between the Kyrgyz Government and the U.S., according to which Kyrgyzstan made the Manas airport available for deploying forces of the Antiterrorist Coalition (ATC).35 Initially the contingent at the Manas Air Base was comprised of servicemen from 12 ATC countries. Later, however, almost all of these countries withdrew their military formations from Kyrgyzstan. In June 2009, the Manas Air Base was restructured and is now known as the Transit Center at Manas. It is responsible for delivering passengers and cargo to Afghanistan (and back) on military transport planes. Tanker planes also refuel airplanes in the air (over the territory of Afghanistan).
Every month, 15,000 servicemen and 500 tons of cargo are delivered to Afghanistan and back via the Transit Center.36 The base is 224 hectares in area and its rent has increased over time: between 2002 and 2005, the republic’s budget received 8 million dollars in rental payments.37 Later, the rental price was raised to 17.5 million dollars38; and in 2009, it reached 60 million dollars.39
At the end of 2009-beginning of 2010, the question of building a U.S. Training Center in the south of the republic costing 5.5 million dollars was discussed, but this was sooner a training center for Kyrgyz special operation forces than a military base.40
Tajikistan-RF
1. Russian Military Base No. 201 (RMB) was opened in October 2005 on the basis of the 201st Motor Rifle Division that has been deployed in Tajikistan since 1945. The base is subordinat-
34 See: A. Malashenko, “Rossiiskaia baza mozhet stat ne tolko faktorom stabilnosti v regione,” Azzatyk, 29 October, 2009, available at [http://www.azattyk.kg/content/Kyrgyzstan__Russia_Malashenko/1864106.html].
35 A. Dzhorovekova, N. Momosheva, Khronika vneshnepoliticheskoi deiatelnosti Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki (1991-2002), Bishkek, 2003, p. 181.
36 See: “V ‘Manase’ oprovergli priostanovku tranzita voennosluzhashchikh SShA v Afganistan,” NEWSru.com,
13 April, 2010, available at [http://txt.newsru.com/world/13apr2010/manasrenew.html].
37 See: A. Kasybekov, “Milliony dlia antiterroristov,” Vecherniy Bishkek, 15 November, 2005, p. 3.
38 In addition, the international Manas airport receives approximately 21 million dollars a year for the services it offers (takeoff, landing, parking, and so on) (see: A. Kasybekov, “Priznaniia polkovnika Smita,” Vecherniy Bishkek, 12 June, 2008, p. 7).
39 See: “Tranzitnyi tsentr SShA v Kirgizii budet voennym obektom—deputat,” RIA Novosti, 25 June, 2009, available at [http://www.rian.ru/defense_safety/20090625/175378736.html].
40 See, for example: “Otvet Otdela po sviaziam s obshchestvennostiu posolstva SShA v Bishkeke,” in: “Kyrgyzstan: Posolstvo SShA rasprostranilo raziazneniia po povodu “novoi voennoi bazy v Batkene,” Fergana.ru, 9 March, 2010, available at [http://www.ferghana.ru/news.php?id=14168].
ed to the command of the Volga-Ural Military District of the Russian Federation, defends the Tajik-Afghan border (in the event of armed groups crossing from Afghanistan) and intercepts the activity of illegal armed groups. Military units are deployed at three sites: in Dushanbe (the base headquarters), Kurgan-Tube (the 191st motor rifle regiment), and Kulob (the 149th guards motor rifle regiment). The RMB has three firing grounds which are used to carry out combat training of the military contingent. This is Russia’s largest base in Central Asia, it has a staff of approximately 7,000 regular servicemen, whereby 20% of them live permanently in Tajikistan41; Russia uses it on a gratuitous basis.
2. Independent Optronic Center No. 1109 at the Nurek Space Tracking Station (Okno, object 7680). It is designed for detecting and tracking the movement of space objects at altitudes ranging from 2,000 to 40,000 kilometers. The station is capable of carrying out global surveillance of space objects over Eurasia, North and Central Africa, as well as the water areas of the Indian, Pacific, and Atlantic oceans. This complex began being built in 1979; in 1992, it was removed from operation because of the civil war in Tajikistan and did not start up again until 1997. The complex operates on the basis of a special agreement between the governments of the Russian Federation and Tajikistan of 28 January, 1994. In 2004, Nurek was transferred to the Russian Federation for 49 years in exchange for settlement of Tajikistan’s debt to Russia.42 In so doing, the symbolic rent for Nurek amounts to only 39 cents a year.43 The center belongs to the 45th division of space surveillance, which is subordinate to the 3rd independent army of the Russian Missile and Space Defense Troops.
Tajikistan-France
Since December 2001, a French military base has been deployed at the Dushanbe airport. A contingent of the French Air Force carries out technical support of the coalition forces under the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan. At different times, the number of staff at the base has fluctuated between 170 and 230 servicemen.44 There are 6 Mirage bombers and 4 military transport planes of the French Air Force at the base. The French side does not pay rent to use the base, but assists Tajikistan in improving the airport’s infrastructure. In particular, approximately 5.5 million dollars have already been spent on restoring the runways.45 Official Paris has also issued a long-term privileged loan for 20 million Euros to finance construction of a new terminal at the Dushanbe airport, in which 27 million Euros are planned to be invested.46
41 See: “Zavizon: za predelami Rossii soldaty luchshe ponimaiut, chto takoe Rodina,” RIA-Novosti, 8 November, 2006, available at [http://rian.ru/interview/20061108/55451253.html].
42 The debt amounted to $305,703 million as of 15 July, 2004. In addition to transfer of Nurek, Tajikistan pledged to give Russia 75% minus one share of the Sangtuda GES-1 (see: “Gosduma ratifitsirovala soglashenie s Tadzhikistanom o peredache Rossii ‘Nurek’ v schet dolga,” IA REGNUM, 25 June, 2008, available at [www.regnum.ru/news/1019131.html]; “Prezident podpisal zakon ob uregulirovanii zadolzhennosti Tadzhikistana pered Rossiei,” Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 15 July, 2008, available at [http://www.rg.ru/2008/07/15/tadzhikistan-anons.html]).
43 See: “Tadzhikistan gotov shantazhirovat Rossiiu: voennaia baza SSha ili energeticheskii konflikt,” IA REGNUM,
7 July, 2009, available at [www.regnum.ru/news/1183055.html].
44 See: “Tajikistan: The French Military Remains a Welcome Presence in Dushanbe,” Eurasia net, 17 March, 2009, available at [http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav031709a.shtml].
45 See: “Tadzhikistan prosit Frantsiiu uskorit stroitelstvo v aeroportu Dushanbe,” IA REGNUM, 11 January, 2010, available at [http://www.regnum.ru/news/1241475.html].
46 See: I. Firuz, “Rogunskaia voina? Tadzhikistan za nedeliu,” IA REGNUM, 15 February, 2010, available at [www.regnum.ru/news/1254107.html].
Uzbekistan-U.S.
Between 2001 and 2005, the Karshi-Khanabad U.S. Air Base (K-2) was deployed in Khana-bad (10 km from the town of Karshi in the Kashkadaria Region). It was established in accordance with an agreement between the governments of Uzbekistan and the U.S. On Transit Through the Territory of and Access to Military Infrastructure in the Republic of Uzbekistan and Its Use, which was signed on 7 October, 2001. This document did not envisage any rent payment.47 The base was used to deliver food and military supplies to the ATC contingent in Afghanistan and for air support of the operations being carried out; its contingent comprised of approximately 1,500 servicemen.48 Subsequently, Uzbekistan offered 6 versions of agreements on rental payment for the use of K-2. “According to Lieu-tenant-Colonel Meppen, ‘U.S. negotiators were mystified by Uzbekistan’s repeated attempts to extract monetary concessions, particularly after explaining ... that in other theaters, sovereign nations paid ... for American troops to stay on their soil.’ After rejecting these draft leases, CENTCOM and the Air Force decided that alternatives to K2 might be necessary.”49
The U.S. paid Uzbekistan 15.7 million dollars in rent between 2001 and 2002 and other 23 million dollars between January 2003 and May 2005.50 But the Uzbek leadership accused the U.S. of not paying for the takeoff and landing services rendered its airliners and causing environmental damage to boot.51 In 2005, the base was closed due to the U.S.’s criticism of the Uzbek leadership’s actions during the Andijan events in May 2005.
Uzbekistan-Germany
According to the intergovernmental agreement between Germany and Uzbekistan entered in 2002, a German Air Base operates in Termez,52 the contingent of which is deployed at the military aerodrome; its staff numbers 300 people.53 The base is responsible for supporting the activity of the servicemen from the German contingent in Afghanistan, including transferring cargo and troops to German bases in the Afghani towns of Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, and Faizabad.
As for monetary compensation for use of the base, there is information that at the beginning of 2009, Germany invested 12 million Euros in modernization of the base.54 According to other data, the German side pays 3 million Euros a year for its use,55 as well as another 240,000 Euros a month for the German servicemen to stay at the base and 600 Euros each time it uses the runway.56
47 See: J. Nichol, “Uzbekistan’s Closure of the Airbase at Karshi-Khanabad: Context and Implications,” Congressional Research Service Report RS22295, 29 March, 2006, p. 2, available at [http://stuff.mit.edu/afs/sipb/contrib/wikileaks-crs/ wikileaks-crs-reports/RS22295.pdf].
48 See: R. Burnashev, I. Chernykh, “Vooruzhennye sily Respubliki Uzbekistan,” Kontinent, No. 2 (89), 29 January-
11 February, 2003, available at [http://www.continent.kz/2003/02/15.html].
49 Quoted from: J. Nichol, op. cit, p. 3.
50 R. Wright, A.S. Tyson, “U.S. Evicted From Air Base In Uzbekistan,” Washington Post, 30 June, 2005, available at [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/29/AR2005072902038.html].
51 See: Press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 7 July, 2005, available at [http:// old.gov.uz/ru/content.scm?contentId=13693].
52 The aerodrome in Termez began to be used earlier, from the end of 2001, but the agreement was not signed until
2002.
53 See: “Baza v Termeze poka ostaetsia za bundesverom,” Deutsche Welle, 24 November, 2005, available at [http:// www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1791693,00.html].
54 See: “Ministr oborony Germanii pribyl v Uzbekistan,” Daily Bulletin NIA Turkiston-press, 9-14 March, 2009, available at [http://uz.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/200903/1237200713561.doc].
55 See: J. Nichol, op. cit., p. 3.
56 See: Ibidem.
Conclusions
So the following conclusions can be drawn.
■ First, it is very obvious that the foreign policy of the two countries claiming leadership in the CA differs in orientation.
The table and map presented below show that Kazakhstan leads in terms of the number of foreign military installations it has on its territory (they are all Russian), while it does not have one ATC base.
Uzbekistan, on the contrary, does not have any Russian installations, which is not surprising keeping in mind its pro-West orientation (particularly before 2005). Later, however, when official Tashkent turned toward Russia, it did not make its territory available for the needs of the CSTO, although this possibility presented itself (the Karshi-Khanabad base the U.S. had departed). The former K-2 base in Khanabad and the German base in Termez function within the framework of the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan.
Table 1
Foreign Military Installations in CA after 1991
r Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan
1. Baikonur Space Launch Complex Russian Air Base No. 999 in Kant Russian Military Base No. 201 (RMB) U.S. Karshi-Khanabad Air Base (not functioning)
2. State Flight Test Center No. 929—five test grounds Russian Naval Force Koi-Sary Antisubmarine Weapons Test Base No. 954 Nurek Independent Optronic Center No. 1109 German Air Base in Termez
3. State Sary-Shagan Central Test Range Multiservice Test Range Emba Test No. 4 Range (in the process of being closed down) Russian Navy Liaison Center No. 338 French Air Base in Dushanbe
4. Balkhash Independent Radar Center Automated Seismic Station No. 1 Independent Seismic Center No. 17 (disbanded)
5. Independent transport wing in Kostanai Transit Center (U.S.)
IjT" S o u r c e: The author's version.
V --4
Second, Kyrgyzstan has Russian and American military bases (one of each), as well as another three military installations for Russia’s military needs, but not used by its own armed forces.
The situation in Tajikistan is similar. There are two Russian installations there (a military base and Nurek), whereby the contingent at the military base is the largest of all those deployed in the CA countries.
It also has a French ATC military base. In this context, it should be noted that the establishment of a Russian military base in Kyrgyzstan (2003) and the transformation of the 201st Motor Rifle Division into a Russian military base in Tajikistan (2005) occurred after the ATC bases were opened at the end of 2001 (Manas in Kyrgyzstan and the airbase in Dushanbe). In this respect, the justified question arises of whether Russian bases would have appeared in these republics if ATC bases had not been opened there first.
Third, all the military installations in the CA countries use the infrastructure inherited from Soviet times. An exception is the U.S. Transit Center at Manas in Kyrgyzstan. From the Emba Test Range (Kazakhstan) and the independent seismic center (Kyrgyzstan) it is clear that Russia is gradually backing away from installations that require a lot of money.
Fourth, due to their territorial proximity, the large areas of the installations, and well-established military-technical cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia, all the military installations in Kazakhstan are rented.
M a p 1
Deployment of Foreign Military Installations in the CA Republics
rr \
RUSSIA
■“■“■T1 la_
Independent transport wing,
Kostanai
Test ranges: ^ ^
231, 17°, 171 KAZAKHSTAN
■. Test range 85
'■■■*■ B
Emba Test Range
Sary-Shagan Test Range
(in the process of being -' closed down) m
' ■" Balkhash ■" -k}
> •
- ?
* - - — r- ^
' Balkhash 1
Baikonur Space Independent ■- BiLaunch Complex D„i„ Transit
Radar Node Center Russian Air Base
525 * ~ Russian Navy Liaison No. 999, Kant
Center No. 338
Automated
4 Fort Shevchenko __
uzbekistan L,CeKat^-Bo'»'3^^^^^*“oaeis"lcN 1
Vi. U.S. Karshi-Khanabad ,_F KYRGYZSTAN^^^«. . iclhil^e-Suu
AZERBAIJAN
AZERBAIJAN.-^,
Air Base (K-2) ■ — Koi-Sary
(closed) Antisubmarine
Weapons Test Base TAJIKISTAN i No. 954
TURKMENISTAN -i
GermanAir ' + — ' Nurek °ptrfnic Base, + I — Center CHINA
Termez Russian Military Base
No. 201 (Dushanbe, Kulob,
Kurgan-Tube)
IRAQ IRAN AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN
J J y _
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S o u r c e: The author's version.
^ 4
In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, all the Russian military installations operate on a gratuitous or compensatory basis. It is presumed that this is related to the lower investment appeal of these countries, their geographical distance from the Russian Federation, and their small size (that is, the impossibility of creating firing grounds).
We believe that the main reason the CA countries are interested in deploying the military installations of other countries in their territory is to ensure their own security.
For example, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan permitted other states to open military bases in their territory because they do not have their own developed military air contingents; while Uzbekistan has been receiving and continues to receive certain bonuses from Western countries for making its territory available.
Nor should we forget that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan greatly depend on Russia’s immigration policy with respect to migrant workers. If they ask Russia to pay rent, it might respond by tighten up its immigration legislation, which would have a negative effect on the sociopolitical situation in these republics.
■ Fifth, at the global level, by making their territory available for military bases, the CA states feel they are a part of big politics (within the framework of the ATC and CSTO antiterrorist operations) and can count on the support of the world nations in resolving their domestic political issues.
However, having their military bases in CA can be a headache for foreign states, particularly Western, and they face a whole series of questions: “Could they not criticize the CA governments more severely if they did not have their military installations there?”, “What is more important—democratic values or stable functioning of military installations?” and so on.
In this respect, it is appropriate to recall the criticism of the Andijan events by the U.S. and EU and the subsequent closing of the K-2 base, on the one hand, the West’s connivance in strengthening the authoritative regime in Kyrgyzstan, on the other.
To sum up, it can be said that the objectives for deploying military bases are the same as they were during the Cold War: proximity to the theater of military operations, defense of allies, deployment of the military contingent, and containment, whereby the function of deterrence is not as obvious as it used to be. But now the theater of military operations has shifted from the west to the east, and a new concept has been added—“site, and not base.”
Time will show how long foreign installations and primarily military bases will survive in CA. But it is already clear that the existence of foreign military installations is having a significant influence both on the domestic policy of the CA countries, and on international relations at the regional and global level.
