CC BY
11
Л. Донай
ПРОГНОЗИРОВАНИЕ И ПЕРИОДИЧНОСТЬ ВОЙН. ИЗБРАННЫЕ ВОПРОСЫ
Аннотация
Прогнозирование может быть определено как "прикладная история", другими словами речь идёт об использовании исторических знаний для разрешения современных проблем. Ключевым является связать ответ на вопрос «что случилось и почему» с ответом на вопрос «как это может выглядеть в будущем и какие будут последствия?». История даёт указатели будущего. Идентификация исторических тенденций позволяет уловить и понять образцы и долгосрочные сопряжения в культурном поведении. Это особенно содержательно, когда необходимо найти точности, выступающие в форме периодических эпизодов или процессов (а таковым, для части исследователей является война). Так как если они действительно совпадают с каким-то алгоритмом, было бы проще предусмотреть, когда они появятся (и надо ли им появиться). Ввиду того факта, что нет способа представить в одной статье -все аспекты и факторы влияющее на появление войн: сосредоточимся тогда только на нескольких избранных, указывающих свойственные признаки вопросах. Акцентуация на представленной проблеме может побудить остановиться и задуматься над тем, необходимы (нужны) ли людям войны? Становятся ли они мотор цивилизационного развития? Или они являются только последствием жадности и человеческих недостатков? Внимание обращено также на поиск уточнений, выступающих в форме периодических случаев и процессов (в данном контексте - это война).
Ключевые слова:
история, прогнозирование, международные отношения, сила, гегемония, индустрия безопасности, война.
L. Donaj
FORECASTOLOGY AND WARS' CYCLICITY. CHOSEN ISSUES
Abstract
Forecastology may be determined as "applied history", in different words it's about applying historic knowledge to solve today's problems. Key issue is the connection of an answer for question "what happened and why?" with an answer for another question "how it may look in the future and what will be consequences of that?". History gives us guidelines about the future. Identification of historical trends allows us to capture and understand long-term constellations in the cultural behavior. It is especially precious when we try to find regularities occurring in the form of periodic happenings or processes (and this kind of happening is war to part of scientists). Because if indeed they occur according to some kind of algorithm, it would be easier to foresee, when they will happen again (and if they have to happen). In view of a fact, that there's no way to present in this article - even perfunctorily - all aspects and factors influencing outbreaks of wars: therefore, only a few chosen were focused on, ones that portray characteristics of aforesaid. It seems that even so perfunctory presentation of the problem may prompt to reflection over whether wars are intrinsic (needed) to people? Are they a motor of civilization's development? Or are they merely a consequence of greed, imperfection of human nature? The attention was also directed to regularities encountering in the form of periodic happenings or processes (and this kind of happening, for part of scientists, is war).
Key words :
history, forecasting, international relations, power, hegemony, security industry, war.
Forecastology constitutes, among others, an attempt to find accuracy, recognition of development principles. This recognition of development principles - especially development principles of international relations - creates the basis of knowledge system about this field of social relations. Since principles constitute a necessary premise to rightly explain and understand these relations, as they ease sorting out information about international reality and concluding about its variability. The conclusions serve theoreticians and practitioners to explain mutual active and reactive influence of international relations' participants. They also help explain processes of these relations coming around between participants in the past, present and in the future [24, c. 248; 36, c. 67-79].
Forecastology may be determined as "applied history", in different words it's about applying historic knowledge to solve today's problems. Key issue is the connection of an answer for question "what happened and why?" with an answer for another question "how it may look in the future and what will be consequences of that?". History gives us guidelines about the future. Identification of historical trends allows us to capture and understand long-term constellations in the cultural behavior [23].
It is especially precious when we try to find regularities occurring in the form of periodic happenings or processes (and this kind of happening is war to part of scientists). Because if indeed they occur according to some kind of algorithm, it would be easier to foresee, when they will happen again (and if they have to happen). Obviously, there is an open question of whether our forecast about these algorithms are accurate.
An example may be Modelski's theory of hegemonic cycles, Kondratiew's big cycles of economic situation or Toynbee's big war cycles etc. After Russian economist Nikolay Kondratiew presented the theory of big, in different words long cycles of economic situation, it quickly became an inspiration for other scientists. Despite popularization of the concept "Kondratiew's cycles" in macro-economic analysis, and also in regional economic analysis, the term started to be used in theory of development and collapse of societies, as the connection between economy and conflicts was noticed [18, c. 74; 29]. As an example, Arnold Toynbee - about whom below - proposed theory of "great wars" cycles, lasting for period of about 120 years, and divided them for phases: prelude, war, respite, epilogue and common peace. On the other side William Thomson indicates, that "innovative processes and global concentration are connected
with global war. Basing on the theoretic arguments and empirical data (of XIX and XX centuries) we noticed, that systematic war is a result of economic innovation and streaming to leadership and, opposite, systematic war influences innovation, economic and naval concentration. In the sense, long waves of economic and technological changes, long cycle of political-martial hegemony and war are strictly connected strength, that is instanced in the center of global economic policy's functioning" [31, c. 94-95; 29].
He also underlines, that until today, researches of great cycles identified five global wars: Spanish-Dutch war (1580-1608); war of Great Coalition against Louis XIV (1688-1713); French Revolution and Napoleonic wars (1792 - 1815); I and II World War (1914-1945) [31, c. 94-95; 29]. As from the above, periods between wars total 80 to 100 years, and in near future there it comes another world war...
Walter Goldfrank from the University of Santa Cruz in California applied a model of Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system analysis (Wallerstein himself divided cycles for three phases: war, hegemony of one state, its collapse). In a subprovince he included the majority of East Europe states, Russia, Mexico, Columbia, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, South Africa, Turkey, as well as part of Middle East and states of East Asia [19; 29]. As to his forecast, if economically free areas will be developing, leaders position will be taken by three geographically vertical blocks under leadership of the USA, Japan and the EU. In further perspective it may lead to joint domination of the USA and Japan, assimilating both Americas and Pacific Ocean's region. Policy of the EU will be dominant over other regions, what will contribute, on one side, to duopolar competition system, from the other one - to high level of integration, which attempts are already highly visible (lawmaking's unifying, transatlantic cooperation etc.). In the world's scale W. Goldfrank forecasts collapse of present capitalist system and considers four possible models of the system: chaos, fascism, socialist democracy, socialism. First variant is probable mainly as a result of nuclear war's outbreak or biosphere's destruction. Second one bases on capitalism's transformation into new variant of social-economic totalitarianism or on creation of global empire with centered ruling caste which will divide all the rest. Taking into consideration division into states-cores, and states-subprovinces, the last one will be under influence of political repressions, including influence like eugenics and physical extermination. The variant of war is not excluded, what would withstand, in this case, on unsuccessful uprising attempts or protracted conflict. Third and fourth variant of W. Goldfrank's theory, are described as most desirable models, connected with wealth states, however present
tendencies (including global crisis, overpopulation in array of countries and baby bust in others, impoverishment of natural resources, farmland's abandonment, prices' increasing in case of food and drink) indicate, that in global scale its doubtable for them to become real [29].
There exist many other views for theory of wars' cycles and hegemony, among which the most famous authors are G. Goldstein and G. Modelski. G. Modelski called periods of great growth and collapse of empires - worlds' long political cycles, where - according to analogy with two phases of "Kondratiew's cycles" - growth phase is called teaching stage and collapse phase is called leadership stage, on the beginning of which global war starts. Each of the periods is divided for four phases. G. Modelski connected influence of Portugal, the Netherlands, and also Great Britain with global policy on historic examples. In case of the USA he presented variant with two cycles. First one had already finished, and it lasted from 1850 to 1945. Second one began in 1971, whereas distraction phase fell for 2000. Afterwards, in 2030 there should begin phase of world war, and in 2050 - another period of global USA dominance [29].
Theory of hegemonic overload is not less interesting. Denis Flooring (Institute of International Research in Seul) believes, that in macrohistorical process of hegemony's of ups and downs, there exist little periods of its weakness and regeneration. As an example, may serve the connection between oil shock and recession of 70's with war in Vietnam, what led to USA's weakness, and also as another example, success of I war in Iraq and America's economic strengthening in 90's. Considering the West's and USA's future, diagnosis of D. Flooring, either way is connected with provinces and subprovinces. On one side, today's West is seen rather as unity, than as a group of states being rivals. On the other side - the culture of the west has been challenged by the Islam world, what is more, development of new, reformed superpowers is noticeable. States that may challenge USA, according to D. Flooring, are Russia, China, India [13, 14; 29]. Japan also has serious potential, but it is doubtable, that the state would like to go this way [29].
During lecture inaugurating academic year of 2017/2018 on the University of Adam Mickiewicz in Poznan, professor Ewa Domanska said: "Once I knocked to the doors of ex director of History Institute and I asked, if I can come in or is he waiting on somebody. «I'm not waiting for anything anymore» - he responded. Mind you are waiting, anticipation, being directed to what is coming constitutes an essence not only of our everyday existence, but also of all the recognition process, studying. Waiting means living, and living means that you
can go into different relations and keep transformation's potential: recreating yourself and surrounding world. We cannot afford it to find ourselves out of condition to wait - and it is not about waiting finish (...), but about waiting new beginnings. Hope is our duty! Boredom - sin. We, researchers and academic teachers can't be bored, as our lives are ruled by curiosity of the world, which wealth is bottomless" [34]. One of these questions, that should be constantly asked to ourselves in the name of curiosity of the world, is the question whether mankind need war?...
As Sonia Bukowska indicates in the contemporary philosophical notion, the problem of war is under considerations mainly in moral aspects, and its social aspect and individualistic as well. Such a research perspective causes a reflection over war to be a phenomenon engaging whole groups and most often connected with an issue of just war, whereas in the individualistic human existence view, an issue of responsibility has a special meaning. The dilemma itself, of if, or if yes, then in what situations taking up arms may be righteous, has a very long history, and thereby it has many solutions [5, c. 149].
To repeat the question: are wars intrinsic to people? Are they motor of human development? Or are they merely a consequence of greed, imperfection of human nature? And whether - may be - the problem of this nature stems from the system of values, that we are raised in from centuries? And... can we go out of this system?...
In teaching about international relations war - usually understood as military conflict between sovereign states with some level of intensity - is thought to be inevitable characteristic of international system's anarchic structure. Hence, wars "have to" outbreak, although some of them could have been avoided. In a wide sense, in the situation of lack of state structures monopolizing measures of political violence, war may be understood as a intersocial fight. Social development's processes making human being to form lives in different communities, is - as a result - war's necessary condition. As war is a military fight causing loose of life, human beings' ability to kill is another war's necessary condition. Finally, war depends on creative possibilities of society as a whole. Strength needed to lead it is a productive strength in hands of community, in hands of its dominative class at first [16, c. 845]. In spite of theoretical and empirical efforts of indicating necessary and sufficient conditions of war's outbreak, being taken in international relations teachings, has not succeeded, it constitutes one of the basic topics of history of international relations and world's his-
tory. It's because of results that it causes, from states' point of view, and from individuals', families' and local communities' point of view as well. War is not natural phenomenon, they are always result of social decision. There was no "accidental" war in the history [4, c. 292; 16, c. 845].
In his publication considering history of international relations, A. Gat-ganek connotes research of Geoffrey Blainey, who has studied through over dozen explanations of many kind, connected with searching for answer for the question why wars outbreak? Using method of elimination, he accessed basic conclusion: wars usually begin when two nations do not agree in the issue of their relative power. It leads to surprising motion from the point of view of how big role realists attach to balance of power as mechanism of maintaining peace, namely, that balance of power renders incorrect calculation to be easier in the relative power evaluation. Therefore, key to peace is clearness in the question of distribution of power. Stephen Van Evera, searching an answer for the same question, eventually indicates one hypothesis: war is more probable, when conquest is easy. However, main problem as a matter of fact lies in a different place. It's not the conquest what is easy, as in the majority of cases it is not, but the illusion of its ease. Except for this particular thesis, Van Evera first of all indicates international anarchy as the most general basic reason of war. Then, any individual cause of war is not sufficient for a war's outbreak, but rather combo of some reasons proves to be sufficient for war's outbreaks in the majority of cases. Rationalist attitude points out international anarchy; expectation of getting more benefits than costs; rational wrongful calculation connected with lack of sufficient information and lack of content considering relative power as reasons for war's outbreak [4, c. 292; 10, c. 4; 16, c. 845; 12, c. 381].
Regardless of which reason is the source of a given war, it is worth remembering that everything depends on ... perspective. In terms of the Earth, the state, the nation, etc., the previously mentioned have sense (do they?...). However, let us look at our problems from a wider, extraterrestrial perspective. Here we should recall the famous words of Carl Sagan - an American astronomer and science popularizer, a pioneer in the field of exobiology [6]. Until 1968, where the first photo of the Earth from the Moon went around the world, we did not really realize how small we were. Then we saw Earth from Saturn and the scientist mentioned above wrote: „Look again at that dot. That's here. That's home. That's us. On it everyone you love, everyone you know, everyone you ever heard of, every human being who ever was, lived out their lives. The ag-
gregate of our joy and suffering, thousands of confident religions, ideologies, and economic doctrines, every hunter and forager, every hero and coward, every creator and destroyer of civilization, every king and peasant, every young couple in love, every mother and father, hopeful child, inventor and explorer, every teacher of morals, every corrupt politician, every "superstar," every "supreme leader," every saint and sinner in the history of our species lived thereon a mote of dust suspended in a sunbeam. The Earth is a very small stage in a vast cosmic arena. Think of the rivers of blood spilled by all those generals and emperors so that, in glory and triumph, they could become the momentary masters of a fraction of a dot. Think of the endless cruelties visited by the inhabitants of one corner of this pixel on the scarcely distinguishable inhabitants of some other corner, how frequent their misunderstandings, how eager they are to kill one another, how fervent their hatreds. Our posturing, our imagined self-importance, the delusion that we have some privileged position in the Universe, are challenged by this point of pale light. Our planet is a lonely speck in the great enveloping cosmic dark. In our obscurity, in all this vastness, there is no hint that help will come from elsewhere to save us from ourselves." [2].
According to A.J. Toynbee it is not difficult to find examples of destructive evil, showing the tragedy of militarism. In his publications, the philosopher gives many examples confirming the thesis that "militarism is suicidal". It turns out that the most catastrophic is the use of military skills developed previously among people from the borderland in order to defend against the threat from the outside, against their own community. Such a switch of sides initially yields constructive results, namely, as history of the Romans or the Incas shows, as a result of the victory of militarism, it is possible to create universalist states. However, this is an apparent victory, as "the combat efficiency and warfare is a double-edged sword, capable of dealing fatal blows to those who dare to use it," says Toynbee. A more profound study of these universalist states proves that at best they are ephemerids, however if they survive thanks to acts of violence, the price they pay for it is degeneration (transforming into a baneful "social anomaly"). In terms of existence of civilization, universalist states are understood simply as "one of the accidents in a long history of decomposition." The mere fact of perfecting military techniques turns out to be the symptom of the end of civilization. Analyzing examples from the history of various civilizations, one can formulate the view that the art of war had always developed at the cost of all other arts, i.e. that the progress of military technology is not accompanied
by growth, but stagnation, decay and collapse of civilization. The conclusion following from Toynbee's theory leaves no doubt that militarism is the most frequent cause of the collapse of civilization in the last five millennia. Because of it the states fell into devastating conflicts, as, reaching for the sword, they deluded themselves that they could use it so effectively that all necessity of force would disappear in the future. The theory of civilization convinces us that their hopes must had been illusory, it shows clearly that the sword cannot be transformed into a tool of peace. Toynbee directly states: "The tools once used to destroy life cannot be transformed - even if it is desired - into a mean of saving life." In the long run, no war can be beneficial for the continuance of civilization. On the contrary, its consequence, so far, has always been the annihilation of civilization [33, c. 110, 138-139, 151, 160; 5, c. 158-159].
Andrzej Gatganek states that technology affects international relations in many different ways. First of all, technological innovations enable people to undertake operations which previously were impossible. The development of new types of weapons changes the nature of war and geopolitics. Secondly, the diffusion of technology directly affects international relations. Thirdly, international relations are influenced by technological competition between states. Fourthly, the development of the ability to use technology and introduce technological innovations affects international relations [17, c. 15].
According to Andrzej Sepkowski, theoretically in the lower dimension - referring "only" to man, however reflecting even a global aspect - this technical civilization turns against its creator, dehumanizes him, relativizes him in mechanical comfort. The machine - noted L. Mumford long time ago - can be both a tool of liberation and oppression. It saves human work and at the same time gives the wrong direction to human energy. Machines create a broad framework of new order, and at the same time disruption and chaos; they serve noble objectives, and at the same time they distort and reject them. Modern human - as added by Mumford's commentators - is not throttled by the overflow of technology, but its limited, imperfect character and our inability to adapt it effectively to the needs of individuals and communities [30, c. 154].
In the context of development of war machines, the so-called lethal autonomous weapons is worth mentioning, according to some experts, it may lead to the third revolution in military technology. When it is developed, it can lead to armed conflicts on an unprecedented scale, carried out more rapidly than people can understand. Combat robots equipped with artificial intelligence can
be, for example, a swarm of miniature drones that will get close to a human, identify him on the basis of a face image and then kill him. According to Prof. Stuart Russel of the University of California at Berkeley "The artificial intelligence can help humanity, but allowing machines to kill people will destroy our freedom and sense of security." [7, c. 35-45; 3; 8; 9; 25; 27; 35].
It should also be pointed out that - as rightly highlighted out by A. Gat-ganek - the new technologies are not "discovered" by people but developed by them. The inventions reflect specific interests, holding adequate resources and existence of specific institutional support. In that sense, science, technology and innovation are the function of human choices, interests, ideas, institutions and resources [17, c. 15-16]. "National security is becoming everyone's business", persuades a member of an American organization Business Executives for National Security, whose aim is to help large corporations in their pursuit of making America safe [26, c. 143; 15]. The idea of the "security industry" undermines the illusion that the desire for security grows spontaneously out of human needs. At the same time, it draws attention to the ways of producing and consuming goods serving security and creating a wider (un) safety culture. This perspective suggests the understanding of (un) safety as goods and relates directly to the accumulation of capital in this process. It refers to explaining the "security industry" by using the categories of criticism of political economy: commodification and fetishization. In this sense, the "security industry" includes both the military-industrial complex, development centers, oil industry, investment banks, multinational corporations and a huge number of smaller companies involved in "internal" security, and a significant part of the activity characterized as scientific and undertaken in academy [26, c. 144; 15]. The first group of entities involved in the "security industry" is most of all interested in profit. To gain profit, these entities must sell security. However, in order to be able to sell safety, they must help with generating danger and then propose the consumption of goods that aim to eliminate fear and insecurity [15].
More than a dozen years ago Alfin and Heidi Tofflers pointed out that the revolution in the field of military, started with air battle, and shown in public for the first time during the Gulf War, is still in childhood. In a few years, despite the budget cuts and rhetorical assurances of world peace, we will see the transformation of military doctrines as an answer to new challenges and reaction to new technologies. In the world of wars in the niche, the dominance of niche warriors should be expected. In a world where communication, meteorological fore-
casts and thousands of other things depend more and more on space, the army will depend on it increasingly. In a world where factories are subject to computerization and automation, one can expect that the war will also be based on them. The moment the new technological achievements break out of the world's laboratories, the armies, for better or for worse, will look for benefits in everything from genetics to nanotechnology, fulfilling the most bizarre dreams of today's dreamers, like Leonardo da Vinci used to be, and even going beyond them. At the time when the mass slaughter of population has undesirable political consequences, the development of non-lethal weapons will progress quickly. The combination of weapons with high selectivity in choice of targets with non-lethal weapons raises hopes, it shows the possibility of limiting death hitherto handed out gropingly [32, c. 155-156].
As S. Bukowska emphasizes, the analogies from the past may shed light on the future of our civilization. The philosopher believes that it is doomed that the world will soon be united politically, but she attaches great importance to the matter of in which of two possible ways this unification will be achieved. She tries to show that it would be mistake to repeat the forceful solution used by Rome to unify the Greek-Roman world, that is to impose peace by conquering the world. Since such a solution would doom humanity to at least another world war, and its effects at the current level of technology could be truly catastrophic [5, c. 160].
What then awaits us in the future? ... Michio Kaku [11] predicts that at the end of the 21st century there will be clear pressures, social as well as political and economic, under which the interplanetary civilization will arise, based on global economy. Of course, the ruling elite jealously guarding their influence will raise many obstacles. Even for many years of the XXII century they can block the creation of such a civilization on Earth. However, with the expiry of every decade, the importance of former authorities will ebb away as a result of social and economic forces created thanks to the scientific revolutions [22, c. 459]. The biggest obstacle to the emergence of planetary and then interplanetary civilization is - as brutally, but rightly points M. Kaku - division of political power between envious nations. We live in an era of nation states, which will also embrace the entire 21st century. However, we sometimes forget, that the nation states appeared on the scene of history relatively recently. They grabbed the industrial revolution and the developing capitalism and grew up with them. But ... states do not last forever [22, c. 464]. It is a pity, however, that describing ourselves in the category - at first I am a human being, and only later - alterna-
tively, pointing gender, nationality, religion, etc. has grown up nowadays to heroism, so as not to be accused of lack of patriotism ... Is that supposed to be the tribalism preceding the emergence of that planetary civilization?
Over almost the entire history of mankind, certified in written sources, narrow political elite, often brutally, ruled the great masses of poor people. Only a small group of the chosen ones had access to education, knowledge and military strength - the elements maintaining power [22, c. 466]. Especially in the context of wars, one would like to believe that people will finally understand the words of Georg Orwell from the book "1984": "The current war - if you measure it with old tests - is a simple fraud. It could be compared to the fight of two bulls, whose horns would be placed at such an angle that no one could hurt the other. But although the current war is a fraud - it is not without significance. It absorbs the surplus of consumer goods and creates a psychic atmosphere, which is an indispensable condition for maintaining the hierarchical structure of society" [28, c. 206]. You would like to believe....
It is almost a truism to say that the ruling elites act mainly to strengthen their influence. In planetary civilization, such a criterion does not exist. Although the ruling elite will by all means oppose the unification processes, a certain unifying mechanism will be activated. For M. Kaku, this binder is to be a relatively new, but perhaps extremely powerful force, which is the international middle class. With its development, the power of the ruling elite weakens [22, c. 206]. Unfortunately, I emphasize firmly - looking at the progressive stratification [1] and also the fact that in some countries the middle class - indeed, has aspirations, but also cool thoughts about how much it may lose as a result of the confrontation with the establishment - the rise of that planetary / interplanetary civilization may delay in time for the next centuries ... Unfortunately ...
But does it mean that we need to stop ... dreaming? No. And we should memorize Albert Einstein's words: "Logic will lead you from point A to point B. Imagination will take you everywhere" [20]. This also applies to dreams about the world without wars. Any. Dot.
The Senate of Adam Mickiewicz University at the meeting on June 26, 2017 awarded a distinguished university professor Anna Wolff-Pow^ska with a medal Palmae Universitatis Studiorum Posnaniensis. During the act of handing, she said: "I feel extremely honored by this beautiful distinction. I am primarily a debtor of our university. I owe the university the possibility to continue my two research passions: history and political science, apparently distant disciplines.
One focuses on the past, the other on the present. Both, however, are subject to the same research rules and the necessity to separate science and politics. Politics take a shortcut, work on the effect, in rush, simplifies, count on emotions. Politics is a game of interests, a struggle for power, it has different goals and perspectives. Its actions are carried out in spotlights. The historical research requires expert knowledge, is guided by rational considerations, excludes immediacy, needs continuity, regularity, concentration and, above all, quietness. We live in time of increasing tension between science and politics. The role of historian has changed significantly since the times of Herodotus, who saw the history researchers as the guards of memory and chroniclers of heroic deeds. The problem of the relationship between the researcher's objectivity and party membership, between engagement and distance, science and politics, has become more comprehensive. Politics, which in its action is guided by particular interest, often uses history as a weapon aimed at the opponent. Searching for truth and understanding determine the sense of learning history. Therefore, a requisite for good neighborhood in Europe is to give the young generation respect for the truth and the belief that the most important is the responsibility for drawing the appropriate conclusions from the past for the future. Memory can be a space of reconciliation, however it can also antagonize. The choice depends on us" [21]. And especially about these conclusions from the past - regarding the dire consequences of war - must be remembered now, for the future.
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