FOOD SECURITY IN CONFLICT AND PEACEBUILDING SETTINGS: BEYOND A HUMANITARIAN CONCERN

Delgado Caroline; Tschunkert Kristina

*

Caroline Delgado

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

ORCID: 0000-0003-0089-5409

**

Kristina Tschunkert

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,

University of Manchester

ORCID: 0000-0003-4464-7204

DOI: 10.20542/2307-1494-2022-2-38-61

Abstract The article provides a global overview of the food security and conflict situation and discusses the two-way relationship between violent conflict and food security. On the one hand, violent conflict directly impacts food systems, affecting people's ability to produce, trade, and access food. On the other, heightened food insecurity can contribute to the emergence and duration of conflict. The pathways leading from violent conflict to food insecurity or from food insecurity to conflict are highly complex and deeply contextual. The article draws from major current conflict settings to illustrate these complexities, including the unfolding armed conflict in Ukraine, with implications for food security felt far beyond the conflict-affected areas. The article concludes by arguing that there is an urgent need for incorporating a peace and conflict lens when conceptualising food security to promote a more holistic response across humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding spheres to the rapidly increasing levels of food insecurity. In doing so, it is fundamental to consider agency within a framing of food security. This factor is largely missing from the dominant technocratic or purely economic understanding of food security.

Keywords food security, violent conflict, food systems, agency, peacebuilding, political economy

Название Продовольственная безопасность в условиях конфликта и статьи восстановления мира: за рамками гуманитарной повестки

* Caroline Delgado (Sweden) is a Senior Researcher and Director of the Food, Peace and Security Programme, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Corresponding author.

Кэролайн Дельгадо (Швеция) - старший научный сотрудник и директор Программы изучения проблем продовольствия, мира и безопасности Стокгольмского института исследования проблем мира (СИПРИ).

** Kristina Tschunkert (Germany) is a Researcher at the Food, Peace and Security Programme, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and a Lecturer in Conflict Studies, University of Manchester.

Кристина Тшункерт (ФРГ) - научный сотрудник Программы изучения проблем продовольствия, мира и безопасности Стокгольмского института исследования проблем мира (Швеция) и преподаватель конфликтологии Манчестерского университета (Великобритания).

Аннотация В статье проведен глобальный обзор ситуации с продовольственной безопасностью и конфликтами и исследуются взаимосвязи между вооруженными конфликтами и продовольственной безопасностью. С одной стороны, вооруженные конфликты оказывают непосредственное влияние на продовольственные системы, включая производство продовольствия, доступ к нему и торговлю продуктами питания. С другой стороны, обострение продовольственной проблемы также может влиять на возникновение и длительность конфликтов. Траектории, ведущие от вооруженного конфликта к ухудшению ситуации с продовольствием или в обратном направлении, сложны, запутаны и сильно зависят от конкретных контекстных условий. Эти сложность и многообразие проиллюстрированы в статье на примерах крупных текущих конфликтов, включая развивающийся вооруженный конфликт на Украине, влияние которого на продовольственную безопасность ощущается далеко за пределами районов, затронутых военными действиями. В заключении сделан вывод о настоятельной необходимости учета перспективы мира и конфликтов в концептуальном осмыслении продовольственной безопасности для того, чтобы обеспечить более комплексный, перекрестный ответ в сферах гуманитарной деятельности, развития и восстановления мира на быстрое ухудшение ситуации с продовольственной безопасностью. При этом критическое значение приобретает определение субъектов продовольственной безопасности, которым практически не уделяется внимание в преобладающих технократических или чисто экономических подходах к ней.

Ключевые продовольственная безопасность, вооруженный конфликт, продовольствен-

слова ные системы, субъектность, восстановление мира, политэкономия

I. Food insecurity and conflict: a global overview

Global food insecurity is rapidly increasing. In 2021, an estimated 29.3 percent of the global population - 2.3 billion people - were moderately or severely food insecure, i. e. they did not have access to adequate food. Close to 40 percent of these estimated 2.3 billion people were facing severe food insecurity, indicating they had run out of food and, at worst, gone a day without eating.1 Regional disparities exist. Of the 2.3 billion people who were moderately or severely food insecure in 2021, half (1.15 billion) lived in Asia and more than one-third (795 million) in Africa.2 Driven by the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine, the number of people who are acutely food insecure - i. e. food security is threatening their lives and livelihoods regardless of the causes, context or duration3 -soared to a record 345 million people in 2022.4 This represents an increase of nearly 80 per cent since the end of 2021, when the number of acutely food insecure people stood at 193 million.5

Food security exists when "all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life".6 From this definition, four main dimensions are identified: physical availability of food, economic and physical access to food, food utilization that determines people's nutritional status, and stability of the previous three dimensions over time.7 Each of these dimensions is susceptible to a range of factors that can undermine them. These factors are consequently drivers of food insecurity. The key pressures are violent conflict and climate change, to which the economic effects of the pandemic added since 2020, all exacerbated by the effects of war in Ukraine and sanctions in 2022. The combination of these mutually reinforcing drivers creates a perfect storm, eroding everybody's ability - the abilities of governments, regional and

sub-regional organisations, provinces, municipalities, communities, and families alike -to respond.8

According to the World Food Programme (WFP),9 60 percent of those experiencing hunger globally live in contexts affected by violent conflict. Indeed, since 2010, levels of hunger in conflict-affected countries were rising while there was a downward trend in other developing countries.10 On average, 24 percent of the population in conflict-affected countries were facing hunger, compared to 16 percent for countries unaffected by conflict.11 The fact that the number of violent conflicts globally is on the rise gives reason for concern. Since 2010, the number of major violent conflicts has tripled.12 Furthermore, the previous global declining trend for the number of people killed in armed conflict was reversed in 2021,13 even before Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. As mentioned above, in 2021, people living in Asia and Africa were affected the most by food insecurity.14 In the same year, Asia and Africa were also among the regions hardest hit by violent conflict due to escalating violence in Afghanistan and wars in Nigeria, Ethiopia and Somalia, which are all examples of conflict-related food crises.15

The impact of violent conflict crosses borders and has knock-on effects in completely other areas than where their direct impact is experienced. The war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia by several countries16 have led to dramatically increased energy and food prices in a short period. Prices per ton of wheat rose from USD 271 in September 2021 to USD 389 in March 2022.17 Russia and Ukraine provide in total around 30 percent of supplies to the global wheat market, as well as about three-quarters of sunflower oil and one-third of barley supplies.18 Moreover, Russia is among the world's most important oil and gas exporters.19

The war has sent global grain and energy markets into turmoil, reflected by sharp price increases. This is particularly worrying for import-dependent economies. Several countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, as well as countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, are sourcing the majority of their wheat from Russia and Ukraine.20 Egypt, for instance, is the world's largest wheat importer and receives nearly 85 percent of its wheat from Russia and Ukraine.21 The rise in international prices has placed pressure on import dependent countries' foreign reserves and, as a result, on their currencies' exchange rates. The Egyptian pound, for instance, had lost 17 percent against the U.S. dollar in April 2022, putting further inflationary pressure on food and other commodities and services while reducing buyers' purchasing power.22 The consequences of the war in Ukraine have led to food price inflation that was not seen since the 2008 and 2011 food price crises.23 Nevertheless, food prices began to stabilize and come down following the Black Sea Grain Initiative, signed by Russia and Ukraine in July 2022.24 The agreement allowed exports of grains and related foods to resume from three Ukrainian ports, and by the end of November, over 12 million tons of foodstuffs had been exported.25 However, much uncertainty remains around the future of the agreement, which is set to expire in March 2023. Export levels remain significantly lower than in previous years, and prices are still above pre-war levels. Moreover, climate change-related weather extremes causing disruptions of food production globally exacerbate the drive in food prices resulting from disruptions in exports from Russia and Ukraine.26 This includes an extreme heatwave in parts of India, the United States, and France, historic droughts in East Africa, and flooding in China.

Furthermore, these price spikes come on top of already escalating food prices due to the Covid-19 pandemic, which caused unprecedented chokepoints and delays in global supply chains. Many central banks are being pressed to raise interest rates to curb inflation, which will increase the cost of borrowing and of servicing debt. This is particularly burdensome for low-income countries because their fiscal reserves were

already depleted as a consequence of the pandemic. This will make their food and energy imports even more expensive,27 forcing many distressed households to respond with coping mechanisms, such as eating less, selling off any productive assets, and migrating. Such actions can further exacerbate their vulnerability to food insecurity.

In the face of these multiple and intersecting challenges, food security should not be treated and conceptualised as a humanitarian matter alone.28 Too often, responding to food insecurity is mainly taken up by humanitarian agencies. While humanitarian assistance in conflict-affected countries is important and saves lives, the excessive focus on it also results in inadequate investment in building resilient food systems. The fact that food insecurity and its consequences are felt most prominently in conflict-affected countries means food security is a critical peace and security issue. Attempts at conceptualising food security as a critical peace and security issue need to exercise prudence around the zero-sum logics that accompany conceptualisations of food security as national security. A more holistic and productive framing of food security, that nevertheless pays sufficient attention to the pathways between food security and conflict, may around the more inclusive, positive-sum and human-centred ideas of "human security", which asserts that the world can "never be at peace" until all people are free from "fear" and "want".29 Considering a more holistic conceptualisation as a foundation for acts that follow means that responding to the food crises worldwide requires a response that is simultaneously humanitarian, pro-development and peace-oriented. The remainder of this article explores the two-way relationship between food security and violent conflict, including some of the main compounding drivers, illustrated by examples from current conflict settings, including the armed conflict in Ukraine. The final section argues for the importance of incorporating a peace and conflict lens when conceptualising food security in order to promote a more holistic response across humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding spheres to the rapidly increasing levels of food insecurity.

II. Food systems, violent conflicts, and compounding drivers

Research has firmly established that there is a two-way relationship between violent conflict and food security. On the one hand, violent conflict has a direct impact on food systems, affecting people's ability to produce, trade, and access food. On the other, heightened food insecurity can be a contributing factor to the emergence and duration of conflict. However, the pathways leading from violent conflict to food insecurity or from food insecurity to conflict are highly complex and deeply contextual. Understanding these pathways requires an understanding of food systems.

Food systems are dynamic complex systems in that they encompass all the elements (including environment, people, inputs, processes, infrastructures, institutions) and activities that relate to the production, processing, distribution, preparation, consumption, and waste management of food.30 Food systems also encompass the broader environmental, political, social, and economic settings, in which these activities are embedded.31 Consequently, food systems generate outcomes that affect these settings. Examples of environmental, political, social, and economic outcomes include changes or consequences relating to biodiversity, environmental sustainability, income, and employment. Overall, food systems are transforming rapidly, becoming increasingly global, interdependent, and complex.

Given the above complexities, it can be helpful to conceive food systems as four interconnected systems: (1) the natural system of earth, water and climate, which determine the primary conditions for the production of food; (2) the technical agricultural

system, including the crops grown and livestock raised; (3) the logistical and distributive system that takes products from the point of origin to market and onward to waste disposal; and (4) the social and economic system that shapes relationships between producers, distributors, consumers, policymakers, and business.32 The level of food security of a population, household or individual is a principal outcome of food systems. When food systems become stressed, food security deteriorates, and people become food insecure.33 Violent conflict has a direct negative impact on food systems and is, as stated above, among the main drivers of the increasing levels of global food insecurity registered since 2015.

In a study on violent conflict in all sub-Sharan African countries between 1989 and 2010, K.Hoglund and her colleagues found that conflict is more intense in rural locations, which have a larger share of casualties than urban areas.34 This finding can help explain some of the main pathways through which violent conflict drives food insecurity. Rural areas are critical livelihood and food production sites. For example, agriculture, forestry, and fishing engage more than half of the sub-Saharan population and, in 2021, represented 17.2 percent of regional GDP.35 Globally, in countries with violent conflict, an estimated 56 percent of the population live in rural areas, although this level raises to 80 percent in countries such as Ethiopia and Niger.36 The share of agriculture for GDP in countries with violent conflict is estimated at 23 percent of the GDP.37

When farmlands and surrounding rural areas are conflict epicentres, conflict can have a detrimental effect on food production.38 Violent conflict negatively affects almost all aspects of food production. While the following is not an exhaustive list of pathways, armed actors frequently attack and destroy the means of production, confiscate land, displace, injure or kill farmworkers and other labourers at the centre of production, and control production, including forcing farmers to cultivate illegal crops.39 The precise impact of such action on food security can be hard to ascertain due to the complexities and contextual nature of the pathways, time lags, and the impact of compounding drivers. Impact will also depend on the vulnerability of livelihoods, which in turn depends on a variety of factors, ranging from levels of household resilience to effectiveness of governance.

Nevertheless, a stark example of the impact of violent conflict on food production can be seen in Mali where satellite analyses for 2019, 2020, and 2021 show a direct correlation between reduced cultivable areas compared to 2016-2017 due to the expansion of insecurity.40 Other concrete examples that illustrate violent conflicts' impact on food production can be seen in Nigeria, where clashes between farmers and pastoralists have not only led to massacres, looting, and kidnapping, but also resulted in laws prohibiting open grazing on certain farmlands.41 The declining food production in northern Nigeria, linked to farmer-pastoralist violence as well as the Boko Haram insurgency, has reduced the supply of agricultural produce to local markets and markets in southern Nigeria and neighbouring Chad. The reduced market supplies have been linked to increasing food security levels in these same regions.42 Likewise, in Yemen, attacks against the agricultural labour force and farming infrastructure have led to significant food production declines, halving the yield of crops in some areas.43 The large-scale land seizure by the "Islamic State in Iraq" in 2015 resulted in a combination of cropland expansion, cropland decrease, and reduction in cropland intensity.44

Furthermore, initial UN's Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) estimates covering four months after the Russian intervention in Ukraine indicate that the preliminary damage to Ukraine's agriculture sector is between USD 4.3 and 6.4 billion due to impacts of the conflict, including damages to irrigation, storage, machinery and equipment, shipping infrastructure, greenhouses, field crops, livestock, and processing

units.45 Food production outside of the immediate conflict epicentres is also affected. Due to the limited availability and heightened costs of fuel, 20-30 percent of the areas in Ukraine where winter crops were sown are likely to remain unharvested.46 Moreover, by mid-2022, grain yields for the year were estimated to reach only 60 percent of the harvest of the preceding year.47 Projections for 2023 foresee a continued reduced agricultural output, given the ongoing military activity, presence of landmines, farmers' lack of liquidity, reduced access to fertilizers, less advanced plan protection, and ripple effects from increased diesel and fertilizer costs.48 This notwithstanding, the immediate impact of violent conflict on food security in Ukraine is food access rather than food availability since available stocks in Ukraine are, in 2022, still greater than the estimated annual demand.49 The loss of income, supply chain disruptions, increasing prices and related dependency on food assistance are the main ways the war limits access to food across the country.50 However, beyond Ukraine, the war has resulted in reduced food availability.

Food availability and food access is negatively affected as violent conflict also disrupts the distribution and marketing of food. Elevated transport risks and related distribution delays can lead to supply reduction.51 Significant risks associated with transporting goods to or through conflict-affected territories include armed checkpoints, war taxes, and violent attacks.52 For example, in South Sudan, armed actors systematically subject trucks transporting food aid to illegal taxation.53 Such practice both raises the price of aid delivery and stifles the domestic market for farming products.54 Similarly, in Venezuela, where escalating levels of violence in rural areas have caused agricultural production to fall between 10 and 20 percent, criminal groups are extorting agribusinesses and farmers while controlling key transport routes from production sites to markets.55 Moreover, when urban areas are conflict epicentres, urban populations become vulnerable to the deliberate obstruction of food distribution routes to cut off their food supply. As urban combat operations largely favour the defender, many military organizations resort to siege warfare to conquer urban territory.56 A strategic siege tactic is the deliberate starvation of the population.57 This has been noted, among others, in the context of the war in Ethiopia, ongoing since late 2020, specifically the Tigray region.58 The WFP estimates that 5.2 million people are facing severe hunger in the region, which has been under siege for almost two years, with only a temporary pause to allow for the limited distribution of humanitarian food aid.59 Likewise, in Syria, the Assad regime and other actors, such as non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have deliberately used starvation as a weapon. The siege laid to major cities by the regime resulted in hunger and sometimes local famine.60 A thriving illegal war economy followed including taxation of goods, including foreign aid, and movement.61 Oftentimes, aid organisations were blocked from entering certain parts of the country that were controlled by groups opposing the regime. In some cases, humanitarian aid was confiscated and redirected to government forces.62 When aid reached besieged areas, it was often diverted by NSAGs to consolidate control of the territory and gain allegiance among the population.63

Due to the increasing globalization and interdependencies of food systems, as mentioned above, the impact of violent conflict on the distribution and marketing of food can affect areas far beyond those where conflict takes place; the unfolding war in Ukraine starkly illustrates this. As detailed above, countries dependent on food imports from Russia and Ukraine have been particularly affected. Moreover, supply and distribution constraints emanating from the war in Ukraine are having a devastating impact on humanitarian food supplies. In 2021, WFP sourced nearly two-thirds of its grains from Ukraine, yet since the start of the war, food shipments from the Black Sea have been reduced, and costs have increased significantly.64 At the same time, as domestic prices and food insecurity are on the rise in many high-income countries, the

attention of many traditional donors has shifted to areas closer to home.65 Taken together, in many protracted crisis settings, severely food insecure communities are going without adequate humanitarian assistance.

Beyond protracted crisis settings, where people increasingly rely on integrated and trade-dependent systems of food production and distribution, the disruptions caused by conflict can quickly create pockets of profound need.66 Economic shock or collapse through extended warfare can create conditions in which food is available but priced out of people's means to access it.67 This affects both urban and rural households that depend on low-productivity agriculture and are therefore net purchasers of food.68 Urban populations in food net-importing countries are significantly vulnerable to price changes, as they tend to depend entirely on markets and the cash economy for their food consumption.69

Price-driven increase in food insecurity is furthermore one of the pathways through which food insecurity can trigger conflict. Some studies argue that rising food prices, specifically the prices of basic staples such as wheat, are strongly associated with social unrest.70 This is because consumers cannot easily substitute staple foods. Moreover, the capacity of urban residents to engage in collective action is much more substantial than rural dwellers.71 While food demonstrations or riots are not necessarily a problem per se, such mobilization and collective action may be ruthlessly repressed, exploited by more violent or armed groups, or escalate into armed conflict.72 Protests over increasing food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have been seen in Sri Lanka,73 Peru, Argentina,74 and Iran.75 There are thus similarities between the situation in 2022 and the leadup to the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings following the 2008/9 and 2011/12 food crisis, mentioned above, when skyrocketing food prices led to unrest in dozens of countries. Food price rises can trigger conflicts, but this depends on the context and is conditional on other context-specific drivers. The most referenced compounding factors that increase the risk of grievances around food prices leading to conflict are state capacity and response and market power dynamics.76

In the deteriorating and highly insecure operating environment generated by violent conflict, resources, government spendings, and private investments are frequently diverted or reduced, with lasting effects on food systems and food security.77 Against the rising number of violent conflicts noted earlier, global military expenditure reached a record high in 2021.78 The Nigeria government increased its military spending from 3.39 percent of government spending in 2012 to 7.32 percent in 2021, in response to various security challenges, such as attacks by Islamist extremists and separatist insurgents.79 In South Sudan, at the height of the civil war between 2013 and 2016, the government diverted a significant proportion of the national budget towards security expenditure, including military spending.80 Against the unfolding war in Ukraine and reassessment of security threats, the main official development assistance (ODA) countries, such as Germany, increased their defence spendings at the cost of its ODA budget allocation.81 While Germany is still committed to provide 0.7 percent of the Gross National Income on ODA, reduced aid expenditure, as noted above, compromises the ability of humanitarian organizations - such as WFP - to respond to the increasing global food assistance needs.

The two-way relationship between violent conflict and food security is further compounded by climate change. Climate change can contribute to exacerbating violent conflicts while also impacting the various dimensions of food security and food systems. Many of the worst affected countries in terms of conflict-driven food insecurity are also among the countries most impacted by climate change.82 The increasing number of farmer-pastoralist conflicts referred to above serve as pertinent and well-researched

examples. Both kinds of livelihoods are dependent on natural resources for food and income. The impact of climate change and violent conflicts is reducing the availability of and access to such resources, including water and land appropriate for cultivation and grazing. In response, pastoralists change their mobility patterns, taking their herds outside traditional boundaries in search of water and pasture. This coping strategy can lead to intercommunal conflicts over resources between them and farmers.83 At the same time, in regions traditionally occupied by both farmers and herders, such as the Sahel, millions of hectares of readily available farmland have turned into deserts.84 As the changing climate affects the availability of critical natural resources, food and income in rural areas, disputes and grievances can emerge as conflicts over access to land, -conflicts that are resolved by force.85

At the same time, pastoralism throughout Africa is changing, bringing new cattle ownership and management patterns that risk exacerbating further farmer-herder conflicts and broader food security. Due to an increase in the value of cattle, traditional pastoralism is gradually giving way to more sophisticated cattle ownership.86 Neo-pastoralism represents a subversion of the traditional form of pastoralism by urban elites and a new form of cattle ownership characterized by extensive cattle holdings kept by salaried herdsmen, often involving the use of sophisticated arms and with links to crime and terrorism.87 For example, in Northern Nigeria, cattle rustling transformed from a relatively small-scale culturally embedded practice to a form of economic crime orchestrated by well-organized networks, often with the backing of some high-ranking officials.88 Those carrying out the raids are often well-armed groups of unemployed young pastoralists. This kind of neo-pastoralism exacerbates traditional farmer-herder tensions since farmers often blame local pastoralists for the violence. At the same time, traditional conflict management between farmers and pastoralists is complicated.89

Farmer-pastoralist conflicts are also becoming entwined with other forms of armed conflict. In northern and central Mali, armed groups engaged in non-state or one-sided violence, such as "Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb", are exploiting long-standing tensions among pastoralists and between pastoralists, farmers, and fishermen to insert themselves in the rural areas.90 These dynamics contribute to the worst food crisis in Mali seen in a decade.91 A consequence of the shifting nature of farmer-pastoralist conflicts is that they are becoming increasingly violent. Based on the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) data, the African Center for Strategic Studies calculates that there have been over 15000 deaths linked to farmer-herder violence in West and Central Africa since 2010.92 Half of these occurred after 2018.93

Food insecurity, violent conflict, and climate change have generated a steady upwards trend in forced migration. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), nearly 90 million people worldwide was forcibly displaced at the end of 2021.94 Forced migration risk reinforcing the pathways between food security and violent conflict, particularly if displacement becomes protracted. Protracted displacement crises have been linked to economic, social, environmental and, to a lesser extent, political instability.95 This can partly be explained by how large numbers of migrants can strain available resources.96 83 percent of displaced people are hosted in low- and middle-income countries where local communities often experience a high level of poverty and economic vulnerability.97 Displaced people compete with local citizens and host communities over scarce resources, including food, housing, agricultural and grazing land, and other economic income-generating activities.

These conditions can foment resentment among local host populations, particularly in areas with a history of violence and pre-existing competition over resources.98 Humanitarian assistance to alleviate immediate needs can further exacerbate tensions if

it disproportionally targets internally displaced persons (IDPs) or is perceived to do so. Research also shows that households displaced as a result of conflict are less likely to reinvest in household assets or fully engage in agricultural activities due to fear of a future cycle of conflict and the potential for further displacement.99 Thereby, protracted displacement can also lead to the loss of traditional agricultural knowledge and practice as it is often not passed on, increasing vulnerabilities to shocks and disasters. 100

Refugee and internally displaced populations can exacerbate concerns about regional destabilization.101 Several studies point to the heightened vulnerability of IDPs to recruitment into armed groups, thereby bringing violence closer to the host communities.102 In other settings, large displacement influxes can shift host communities' ethnic or sectarian composition, fueling hostilities along such divides. Refugee flows into neighboring countries have been found to significantly affect the onset of civil war in that host country.103 It must be noted, however, that, despite various examples across different displacement contexts of refugee engagement in political violence, in reality only few refugee crises generate such violence. In most cases, refugee crises destabilize international security only in combination with other factors, such as weak governments, rebel and terrorist groups' activities, and religious or ethnic fragmentation. 104

The ongoing war in Ukraine has generated one of the world's largest human displacement crises. As of October 2022, nearly one-third of Ukrainians have been forced from their homes; over 7.6 million refugees are recorded across Europe, and over 6.2 million people are displaced within Ukraine.105 While the humanitarian needs, including food needs, of the Ukrainian civilians fleeing the war are undoubtedly enormous (the WFP estimates that one in three people are food insecure),106 the crisis in Europe has evoked concerns and criticisms of that aid is being diverted from other crises. Obtaining an accurate picture is difficult, as many aid providers have stopped publishing real-time information on official development assistance to Ukraine.107 However, available figures show that the Ukraine crisis is unusually well funded; the July Flash Appeal was nearly entirely covered, whereas funding for other appeals by the start of August was 30 percent lower than in any year between 2012 and 2021.108 Moreover, several countries, including the UK and Sweden, have redirected their ODA allocations towards covering their in-country refugee costs.109

III. Conceptualising food security: incorporating a peace and conflict lens

There can be no doubt that food security is closely related to peace and stability. Regardless of how the war in Ukraine unfolds, it is highly likely that food prices will continue to rise, as the impact on food supplies increases. Countries such as Egypt and Lebanon, due to their large youth populations, heavy dependency on Russian and Ukrainian grain exports, and recent experience of instability linked to food-related grievances, may be particularly exposed to risk.

Social systems are inherently complex and the pathways explored above should not be interpreted as explaining the onset of violent conflict. Indeed, various political and economic factors feed into the eruption of violent conflict that may or may not be related to food insecurity.110 However, the two-way relationship between food insecurity and conflict, in which food insecurity can exacerbate other political, economic, and social drivers of conflict while simultaneously being a consequence of conflict itself, needs to be acknowledged and included in conceptualisations of food security.

Today's understanding of food security includes four dimensions: (1) availability, (2) access, (3) utilization, and (4) stability. Conceptualisations of food security have evolved from the first formal definition in 1974 that focused on the availability of food and

that put the focus on food production as a solution. Based on Amartya Sen's work "Poverty and Famines",111 that highlighted that famines continued to arise even in contexts where food was available, the importance of access to food stability was added. Since then, the fourth and final component of utility, the wider context that shapes the capacity to utilize food and its nutrients, e. g. the availability of non-food resources such as healthcare, childcare, water and sanitation, complements today's definition of food security.112 The most widely accepted definition emerged in 2001 and was provided by the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation: "Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life".113

While the definition has evolved over nearly five decades to become more reflective of the complexity of food security, the framing remains passive and lacks actors. In these definitions, actors responsible for food security are not named, nor actors (other than "all people") who are affected by food insecurity.114 Furthermore, the framing remains along economic terms of food insecurity as an issue of supply, which is reflected in the overwhelmingly humanitarian response to food insecurity. Humanitarian actors, in turn, frame food insecurity primarily as an issue of scarcity and the response to food insecurity along economic terms, addressing it through injections of commodities, technology, capital, or expertise.115 These efforts emphasise technological solutions to food insecurity, hinging on the expansion of liberal market transactions and North-to-South technology transfer, but doing little to address the underlying root causes, such as existing inequalities and exposure to economic shocks and climate change that threaten food security.116 As the preceding section has shown, food insecurity is a complex issue that spans across social, political and economic spheres and that therefore needs a more holistic response.

A food systems lens that approaches food security as a product of complex food systems that interact with other ecological, health, economic, political, and socio-cultural systems117 is a promising initiative to move towards a more holistic response. This lens has also gained momentum as part of the 2021 UN World Food System Summit. However, the summit failed to unpack and discuss the interlinkages between conflict and food insecurity or to integrate a peacebuilding lens into the food systems analysis and approach to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, even though conflict remains to be the main driver of food insecurity.118

Food insecurity is a structural problem, charged with inequalities of distribution and access. A political economy approach to food systems is needed to move away from the technocratic and purely economic understanding of food insecurity that depoliticizes the issue. Such an approach could also move the discussion into a direction of breaking the silence around agency and putting actors into systems, power into food chains, and seeing institutional frameworks that the food system is embedded in as constructed and as a result of path dependencies and conflicts.119 Shepherd introduces a definition and framing of food security that incorporates agency: "securing vulnerable populations from the structural violence of hunger".120 An actor with agency must be identified that is ready to act and to be held accountable by others in terms of "how its policies behaviours or actions assist in this ultimate objective of securing those going hungry or vulnerable to hunger."121

While food insecurity is still often treated as a natural phenomenon122 primarily addressed through humanitarian, technocratic, and economic response as outlined above, the global food crises of 2007-2008 and 2011-2012 have brought to the table questions of food security as linked to national security. These crises involved international price spikes that triggered dozens of food riots in import-dependent

countries. They also stimulated both a range of international initiatives to address global hunger and considerations of food as an object of strategic national importance.123 Since then, for instance, WFP suggested in a report that "food insecurity - especially when caused by a rise in food prices - is a threat and impact multiplier for violent conflict". Participants in "FAO Forum on Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises" emphasised "the circular link between food insecurity and conflict". Likewise, at a 2012 symposium in Washington on global food security, President Barack Obama argued that investment in agricultural productivity that reduces the incidence of hunger and vulnerability "advances international peace and security - and that includes the national security of the United States".124

This conversation is welcome as it elevates the food security agenda and increases the circle of stakeholders beyond those who have traditionally addressed the issue.125 However, there is a need for caution when looking at food security in terms of traditional security or geopolitics, a system of political practice that pursues territorial or state-based notions of security on the basis of exclusionary and zero-sum logics. This system often exacerbates inequality126 and contradicts more inclusive, positive-sum and human-centred ideas of security. The UN's 1994 Human Development Report introduced the concept of "human security", which asserted that the world could "never be at peace" until all people were free from "fear" and "want".127 This re-centred security from states to the physical well-being, development, and freedom of the person.128 Framing food security through the geopolitical lens could also contradict global efforts to combat and eradicate hunger for all,129 as it could lead to indifference towards suffering in other countries where national security interests are not at stake130 and as it weakens multilateral frameworks and hinders cooperation.131 This is counterproductive to address food insecurity, particularly in countries affected by conflicts, where an approach is needed that encompasses various actors across humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding disciplines and across all levels of governance, from the global to the local.

The analysis in this article has shown the two-way relationship between conflict and food insecurity and demonstrated the resulting importance of addressing food insecurity holistically across humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding spheres and involving actors across all governance levels. This endeavour asks for a framing of food security that acknowledges this relationship between conflict and food insecurity and that incorporates agency, such as the aforementioned definition by Shepherd.132 Cautious of the risks involved in framing food security as national security and a geopolitical issue, food insecurity might be better described as a "threat multiplier". Borrowing from literature and policy frameworks linked to security implications of climate change, food insecurity could similarly be described as a "threat multiplier"133 that "interacts with and compounds existing risks and pressures in a given context and could increase the likelihood of instability or violent conflict."134

Continued research into the complex interactions between different risk factors is needed to add to understanding of food insecurity as a variable that affects certain pre-existing economic, social, and political issues that are often root causes of conflict. Based on rigorous insights, a more holistic definition of food security that includes matters of agency and the interlinkages with conflict needs to be drawn and adopted by relevant actors, ranging from practitioners to policymakers. With such a foundation in place, food insecurity must then be addressed through concerted and holistic efforts that go beyond incomplete technocratic and economic solutions to include issues of governance and equity. Such efforts need to bridge the humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding divides and incorporate actors at the global to the local level.

ENDNOTES

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2 Ibid.

3 Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Technical Manual Version 3.1. Evidence and Standards for Better Food Security and Nutrition Decisions. - Rome: Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Global Partners, 2021. URL: https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/manual/IPC_Technical_Manual_ 3_Final.pdf (accessed 01.11.2022).

4 War in Ukraine Drives Global Food Crisis: Hungry World at Critical Crossroads. - Rome: The World Food Programme (WFP), 2022. URL: https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000140700/download/?_ga =2.174687586.1543906269.1666252034-1864444658.1587377445 (accessed 01.11.2022).

5 2022 Global Report on Food Crisis: Joint Analysis for Better Decisions. Global Network Against Food Crises, Food Security Information Network. - Rome; Washington, D.C.: FAO; WFP; International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 2022. URL: https://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/136345/filename/ 136550.pdf (accessed 01.11.2022).

6 An Introduction to the Basic Concepts of Food Security. Food Security Information for Action Practical Guides. The European Commission (EC) - FAO Food Security Programme, 2008. P. 1. URL: https://www.fao.org/3/ al936e/al936e00.pdf (accessed 01.11.2022).

7 Ibid.

8 For more detail, see also Delgado C., Tschukert K., Smith D. Food Insecurity in Africa: Drivers and Solutions. SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security № 2023/1. - Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2023 (forthcoming).

9 Unprecedented Needs Threaten a Hunger Catastrophe. World Food Program Unprecedented Needs Factsheet. 12 May 2022. URL: https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000138231/download (accessed 01.11.2022).

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93 Leonhardt M. Op. cit.

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95 Puma M.J., Chon S.Y., Kakinuma K., Kummu M., Muttarak R., Seager R., Wada Y. A developing food crisis and potential refugee movements // Nature Sustainability. 2018. V. 1. № 8. P. 380-382; Ek R., Karadawi A. Implications of refugee flows on political stability in the Sudan // Ambio. 1991. V. 20. № 5. P. 196-203; Cazabat C. The Ripple Effect: Economic Impacts of Internal Displacement. June 2018. - Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2018. URL: https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/20180608-idmc-economic-impacts-intro_0.pdf (accessed 02.11.2022); Fajth V., Bilgili Ö., Loschmann C., Siegel M. How do refugees affect social life in host communities? The case of Congolese refugees in Rwanda // Comparative Migration Studies. 2019. V. 7. № 1. P. 1-21.

96 Reuveny R. Climate change-induced migration and violent conflict // Political Geography. 2007. V. 26. № 6. P. 656-673; Krampe F., Van de Goor L, Barnhoorn A., Smith E., Smith D. Water Security and Governance in the Horn of Africa. SIPRI Policy Paper no. 54. March 2020. - Sölna: SIPRI, 2020. URL: https://www.sipri.org/ sites/default/files/2020-03/sipripp54_0.pdf; Assessing the Relationship between Climate, Food Security and Conflict in Ethiopia and the Central Dry Corridor: Quantitative Analysis on the Impact of Climate Variability on Conflict in Ethiopia and in the CADC Countries. Final report. 31 October 2021. -Rome: WFP, 2021. URL: https://cgspace.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10568/116292/31%20October_CGIAR_Fin al%20Report.pdf; De Coning C.H, Krampe F., Ali A., Funnemark A., Rosvold E. L., Kim K., Seyuba K., Tarif K., Hegazi F. Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: Ethiopia. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI); SIPRI. 29 June 2022. URL: https://www.nupi.no/en/news/climate-peace-and-security-fact-sheet-ethiopia (all accessed 02.11.2022).

97 Holzer E. A case study of political failure in a refugee camp // Journal of Refugee Studies. V. 25. № 2. 2012. P. 257-281; Reuveny R. Op. cit.; Krampe F., Van de Goor L., Barnhoorn A. et al. Op. cit.; Assessing the Relationship between Climate, Food Security and Conflict in Ethiopia and the Central Dry Corridor. Op. cit.; De Coning C. H, Krampe F., Ali A. et al. Op. cit.; Figures at a Glance; Fajth V., Bilgili Ö., Loschmann C. et al. Op. cit.

98 Reuveny R. Op. cit.; Krampe F., Van de Goor L, Barnhoorn A. et al. Op. cit.; Haider H. Refugee, IDP and Host Community Radicalisation. Government, Social Development, Humanitarian, Conflict (GSDRC) Applied Knowledge Services. GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report. 31 October 2014. - Birmingham: GSDRC, 2014. URL: http://gsdrc.org/docs/open/hdq1162.pdf (accessed 02.11.2022).

99 Quak E.-J. The Drivers of Acute Food Insecurity and the Risk of Famine.

100 ■_, Ibid.

101 Lischer S. K. The global refugee crisis: regional destabilization and humanitarian protection // Daedalus. 2017. V. 146. № 4. P. 85-97.

102 Haider H. Op. cit.

103 Salehyan I., Gleditsch K. Refugees and the spread of civil war // International Organization. 2006. V. 60. № 2. P. 335-366.

104 Lischer S. K. Op. cit.

105 Ukraine Situation Flash Update no. 32. 7 October 2022. - Geneva: UNHCR, 2022. URL: https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/96052 (accessed 02.11.2022).

106 WFP Ukraine Limited Emergency Operation. External Situation Report no. 28. 21 October 2022. - Rome: WFP, 2022. URL: https://www.wfp.org/countries/ukraine (accessed 02.11.2022).

107 The Ukraine Crisis and Diverted Aid.

108

108 Ibid.

109

109 Ibid.

110 Koren O., Bagozzi B.E. Op. cit.

111 Sen A. Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. - Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981.

112 Clapp J., Moseley W.G., Burlingame B., Termine P. Viewpoint: The case for a six-dimensional food security framework // Food Policy. 2022. V. 106. Publ. online 27 Oct. URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ article/pii/S0306919221001445 (accessed 17.11.2022).

113 The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2001: Food Insecurity - When People Live with Hunger and Fear Starvation. - Rome: FAO, 2002. P. 41.

114 Shepherd B. Thinking critically about food security // Security Dialogue. 2012. V. 43. № 3. P. 195-212.

115 Sommerville M., Essex J., Le Billon P. The "global food crisis" and the geopolitics of food security // Geopolitics. 2014. V. 19. № 2. P. 239-265; Shepherd B. Op. cit.; De Schutter O. The political economy approach to food systems reform: the political economy of food // IDS Bulletin. [Institute for Development Studies, Brighton]. 2019. V. 50. № 2. P. 13-26. URL: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/ 20.500.12413 14614/IDSB50.2_10.190881968-2019.112.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed 02.11.2022).

116 Sommerville M., Essex J., Le Billon P. Op. cit.

117 Clapp J., Moseley W.G., Burlingame B. et al. Op. cit.

118 Tschunkert K., Delgado C. Food Systems in Conflict and Peacebuilding Settings: Ways Forward. - Solna: SIPRI, 2022. URL: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-01/2201_food_systems_ways_forward.pdf (accessed 02.11.2022).

119 De Schutter O. Op. cit.

120 Shepherd B. Op. cit.

121 ,,.■ .

iНе можете найти то, что вам нужно? Попробуйте сервис подбора литературы.

121 Ibid.

122

122 Ibid.

123 Zhou J., Dellmuth L. M., Adams K. M., Neset T.-S., Von Uexkull N. The Geopolitics of Food Security: Barriers to the Sustainable Development Goal of Zero Hunger. SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security. no. 2020/11. -Solna: SIPRI, 2020. URL: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/sipriinsight2011_zero _hunger_2.pdf.

124 Sommerville M., Essex J., Le Billon P. Op. cit.

125 Is global hunger a national security concern? It's complicated // Perspectives: a Humanitarian Lens on Global Issues [MercyCorps Blog]. 23.05.2018. URL: https://europe.mercycorps.org/en-gb/blog/perspective-global-hunger?_ga=2.149112438.1723103263.1664354745-1576482247.1664354745 (accessed 02.11.2022).

126 Zhou J., Dellmuth L. M., Adams K. M. et al. Op. cit.

127 Human Development Report 1994. - New York; Oxford: United Nations Development Program (UNDP); Oxford University Press, 1994. URL: https://hdr.undp.org/system/files/documents//hdr1994encomplete nostatspdf.pdf (accessed 02.11.2022).

128 Zhou J. Producing Food, Security and the Geopolitical Subject. Linkoping Studies in Arts and Sciences no. 833. - Linkoping: Linkoping University, 2022. URL: https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1653813/ FULLTEXT01.pdf (accessed 02.11.2022).

129 Zhou J., Dellmuth L. M., Adams K. M. et al. Op. cit.

130 Is global hunger a national security concern?

131 Zhou J., Dellmuth L. M., Adams K. M. et al. Op. cit.

132 Shepherd B. Op. cit.

133 Mobjork M., Gustafsson M.-T., Sonnsjo H., van Baalen S., Dellmuth L. M., Bremberg N. Climate-Related Security Risks. Towards an Integrated Approach. - Solna: SIPRI, 2016. URL: https://www.sipri.org/sites/ default/files/Climate-related-security-risks.pdf; Bremberg N. European Regional Organizations and Climate-Related Security Risks: EU, OSCE and NATO. SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, no. 2018/1. - Solna: SIPRI, 2018. URL: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-02/sipriinsight_1802_01_igos_and_climate_change. pdf (both accessed 02.11.2022).

134 Vivenka J., Ruttinger L. Understanding the compound risks of climate change and fragility in SIPRI // SIPRI Yearbook 2016: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. - Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. P. 455.

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FOOD SECURITY IN CONFLICT AND PEACEBUILDING SETTINGS: BEYOND A HUMANITARIAN CONCERN Текст научной статьи по специальности «Социальная и экономическая география»

Аннотация научной статьи по социальной и экономической географии, автор научной работы — Delgado Caroline, Tschunkert Kristina

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