CC BY
35
See: ibid. p. 68. Keykurun N. Turk Ademi Merkeziyet Firkasinin faaliyeti ve Musavat Partisiyle birlesmesi // Musavat Bulteni. 1962. № 4. p. 19-21. Swietochowski T. Russian Azerbaijan. 1905-1920. The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community. - Cambridge University Press, 1995. P. 165190;
M. Rasulzade. Azerbaycan Cumhuriyyeti. Baku: Elm, 1991. pp. 66-78.
"The 2ndBigiev's readings. Muslim thought in the 21st century: unity of tradition and innovation." (Articles of the 2nd International Scientific - Educational Conference, St. Petersburg, 17-20 May 2015), Moscow, 2016, pp. 351-362.
13
I. Ryzhov,
Dr. Sc. (hist.)
M. Borodina,
PhD student, Nizhny Novgorod,
State University named after N.I. Lobachevsky
ETHNIC PROBLEMS OF MODERN IRAN
About 15 different ethnic minorities live on the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran today. The ethnic factor influences all spheres of life - political, economic and social processes. The complex ethnic diversity complicates the solution of many social and political issues and ethnic conflicts, and numerous ethnic minorities experience serious problems of integration in the political space of Iran. Thus, the ethnic problems are one of the most relevant for Iran as they are accompanied by the desire of a number of ethnic minorities for autonomy, the growth of terrorism and extremism, as well as a very high interest in this question of some regional and extra-regional actors.
Islamic Republic of Iran, one of the regional Middle East leaders, is a country of "imperial" type with a complex ethnic structure. That is why the ethnic problems are extremely important for the modern Iran. The existence of numerous ethnic minorities, separated peoples seeking
autonomy and segregation in varying degrees, exacerbate the problem only. The situation is complicated by the fact, that the citizens of Iran, related to any ethnic group or tribe, have equal rights; the freedom of parties, political organizations and religious minorities act according to the Iranian Constitution12. It often does not work in practice, and there are cases of discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities and their organizations by the Iranian authorities.
Kurds. The Kurdish population in Iran resides in the territory of Iranian Kurdistan, which covers four Iranian provinces - Kurdistan, Kermanshah, West Azerbaijan, and Elam, and is approximately 5.5 million people. Also, the Kurdish population is concentrated in the Northern Khorasan in northeastern Iran, and in the cities of Tehran and Sanandaj13. Most of the Kurds there adhere to the covenants of Sunni Islam, and only part of them professed Shia. In addition, there are religious minorities among the Iranian Kurds.
The Kurdish problem as an ethno-political one emerged in Iran in the 19th century, but its development occurred only in the early 20th century in conditions of maximum attenuation of the Iranian state, its dependence on the United Kingdom and Russia, and the profound crisis of authority14. However, the Kurdish problem could be attributed to the beginning of the 16th century, when Kurdistan was divided into Turkish and Iranian parts for Qasr-Shira peace treaty in 1639 during the wars. Then, the Entente Powers made a redistribution of the Asian possessions of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, and have divided Kurdistan into 4 parts, which significantly strengthened the struggle of the Kurds for self-determination.
The struggle for independence of the Iranian Kurds was mostly developed at the end of the Second World War, when Great Britain and the Soviet Union used the Kurdish movement for political purposes. In 1979 the Kurds actively participated in the Islamic Revolution in
Iran. Power in Iranian Kurdistan was in the hands of the Kurdish population before the armed clashes between troops of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and the "Guardians of the Islamic Revolution", sent from Tehran. After that, the situation of the Kurds in Iran has deteriorated in comparison with the Shah's times15.
Currently, the Iranian Kurds have almost no autonomous rights still. The problem is compounded by the fact that "the Islamic community is a united nation" according to the Islamic concepts, and national differences can not be in the Muslim community, so the Kurds are not considered a separate nation. This practically reduces the implementation of the political rights of the Kurdish people in Iran to zero. The Iranian authorities are trying to maintain a certain balance of forces in the region, so neither side was able to achieve the benefits. Iran opposes any changes in the political geography of the region16.
Iran is actively cooperating with Turkey for the coordination and harmonization of positions regarding the Kurdish question. The fundamental principle of the Iranian authorities to counter Kurdish separatism is a tough fight with it until the death penalty for the Kurdish terrorists. However, in parallel with this, the Iranian authorities are trying to involve the Kurds in the political life of the country. The participation of the Kurds in the political life of Iran is aimed mainly at changing the existing situation of the Kurdish population.
Most of the opposition parties of the Iranian Kurds boycotted the presidential elections in Iran on June 14, 2013 because none of the candidates included in the electoral program the question of the rights of ethnic minorities. 10. However, the Kurds were not able to achieve any significant results on this issue, mainly because of the lack of a unified position among the parties of the Kurdish opposition.
Recently there has been a tendency to unite the Kurdish parties in the national united front. However, the Kurdish movement in Iran is
still divided and is not a consolidated social and political power17. In addition to the political problems in Iranian Kurdistan, there are problems of socio-economic nature. Kurdish areas of Iran were the most economically backward areas up to the Islamic Revolution. Then life in these areas has been improved a few, but overall the place of residence of the Kurds in Iran are considered to be deep periphery. Also, there is a very acute problem of shortage of drinking water, electricity, backlog in housing construction, felt difficulties with employment, higher education and qualified medical care. The Iranian authorities have attempted to improve the socio-economic situation of the Kurdish population, developing infrastructure and economy of the Kurdish region, which basis is the agriculture. One way of raising funds was the establishment of a special economic zone in the province of Kurdistan and the preferential treatment of investment throughout Iranian Kurdistan.
Despite a number of attempts, taken by the Iranian leadership to improve the lives of the Kurdish population in Iran, it is still adversely affected by the economic and political rights: there is a ban on the Kurdish cultural and human rights organizations, women's associations and trade unions, there are practically no newspapers in the Kurdish language. Furthermore, the Iranian authorities do not allow cover the situation in Kurdistan, do not allow journalists and public figures to arrive in the Kurdish region. Separatist sentiment is quite strong in modern Iran in areas traditionally populated by the Kurds, they state that only freedom and equality can put an end to separatist movements.
Azerbaijani Turks are the largest ethnic minority in Iran, their number ranges from 9 to 28 million people, accounting for nearly one-third of the total population of Iran18. The Iranian authorities have not recognized the presence of this ethnic group in the country for a long time, considering them as ethnic Iranians speaking the Turkic language.
Iranian Azerbaijanis are concentrated in four provinces: West and East Azerbaijan, Zanjan and Ardabil, they profess Shia Islam, but there are also representatives of the Sufi and Sunni Muslims19. Nationalist moods began to spread among Iranian Azerbaijanis in the 20th century, as a result of an official policy of "Iranian nationalism" held of the shah Pahlavi dynasty. All ethnic minorities in Iran were subjected to cultural and then economic discrimination, which led to the formation of the protest of the Azerbaijani elite in Iran.
A powerful impetus to the national liberation struggle was given in 1941 in connection with the Soviet occupation of Iranian Azerbaijan. It was created by the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan in 1945. November 26, 1945, there were elections to the National Majlis of South Azerbaijan under the control of the Soviet troops, won by the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan Democratic Republic was proclaimed on December 12, and then its own army and own money appeared, and the Azerbaijani language was declared the state20.
Iranian Azerbaijanis have a high level of political activity at all times. They are well represented in the government, the parliament and the Iranian army. Over the past 60 years, four of the Prime Minister and a President of Iran and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei came from Iranian Azerbaijanis. Separatist tendencies of Iranian Azerbaijanis are supported by some regional and extra-regional actors behind the scenes -Azerbaijan, Turkey, Israel, the U.S. Secret services of the U.S., Turkey and Israel are developing projects and initiate activation of the separatist movement in Iranian Azerbaijan25. It should be noted that Iranian Azerbaijanis are the most loyal ethnic group of Iran. Despite the fact that the ethnic clashes occur from time to time, and separatist movements exist, the preconditions for a serious ethnic conflict are absent due to the strong position of this ethnic group in the economic
and political life of the country, in contrast to Iran's Kurdish population, for example.
The Arabs are the other major ethnic minority in Iran. They live in the southwestern province of Khuzestan (Al-Ahwaz). According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the number of Iranian Arabs is more than 2 million people28. Like the Persians, the Arabs are Muslim Shiite mostly. Previous to 1925, Al Ahwaz was an autonomous territory under the British protectorate, but autonomy was abolished in the same year, and came under the direct control of Tehran.
The first nationalist tendencies among the Arab population of Iran were born as early as 1958. A year later (1959), all political organizations in the province, held the National Congress of Arabistan for the liberation from the Iranian domination29. Apogee of the armed struggle of the Arab population against the central government was in the summer 1979, when the new government rejected the demands of the Arab population to preserve their self-government and traditional way of life.
Currently, the main discontent of the Arab population is reduced to the economic component. Khuzestan is the "engine" of the economy of the south-western Iran, where there are the largest petrochemical refineries and terminals, but high unemployment and a high contrast between the level of the Arabs living in Iran and the Arab countries, which also causes the emergence of nationalist movements32.
Also, the Arab population of Iran protests against the policy of Government on resettlement of ethnic Persians in Khuzestan, and increasing the number of organizations and institutions of national importance. The result of the struggle of the Arabs to the Iranian central authority can be considered a certain legalization of their national and cultural life in the territory of their compact living. Moreover, Arabic is legalized throughout the territory of Iran and is considered the language
of the state religion. In recent years, the Arabs have become increasingly involved in the civil service and the army.
The Baluchis are other ethnic minorities, the movement of which has a significant impact on the political climate in Iran. Their population is about 1.5 million people, and is concentrated in the Sistan and Baluchistan. The first protest actions of the Baluchis have begun during the Islamic Revolution in Iran and resulted in an internecine struggle between the supporters of the revolution and the supporters of the deposed regime, representing the top of tribes that cooperated with the shah's government. The political situation has been aggravated by a new round of Iran-Iraq confrontation over Iraq's concealment of the Baluchi nationalists in the early 1970s39.
The Baluchis are Sunni, and do not take the rules of Shiite Islam, which was proclaimed the state religion of Iran. This created serious contradictions between this ethnic group and the Iranian government. In addition, the Baluchis were extremely against interference in their internal affairs on the part of the revolutionary committees and members of the Revolutionary Guards, who were trying to establish centralized management.
The Baluchi nationalists in Iran use the Sunni religious rhetoric to emphasize their identity and accuse the Iranian authorities in the persecution on religious grounds.
The Baluchi National Movement develops under strong influence from abroad, particularly from Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan provides safe havens for the Baluchis, including monarchists, fleeing the Islamic revolution, and forms groups for subversive activities of them in the territory of Iran. As for Afghanistan, the Taliban and "Al Qaeda" can assist the Baluchi nationalists, for whom it is profitable -to keep the "zone of instability" along the Afghan-Pakistani border, to create training camps, to carry out the transfer of militants and to
engage smuggled weapons. The Baluchis are characterized by extreme disloyalty to Iran and never considered themselves an integral part of the Iranian people. This causes interest of the U.S. intelligence with the aim of using the Baluchi separatism against Iran. In addition to the religious component; the conflict of the Baluchis and the central Iranian government has warmed up by a number of economic problems since the Baluchi province of residence is one of the most economically backward regions of Iran.
The Turkmen. This ethnic group, living in the north-eastern Iran especially in the provinces of Khorasan and Golestan, is accounted for a population of 1.5 million people. The National Movement of the Iranian Turkmens originates from the fall of the Shah's regime and the requirements associated with the return of their land from the Shah's Fund and non-Turkmen land-settlers, moved to the Turkmen regions of Iran during the 1950s, during the rise of commodity production in the country's agriculture. The Turkmen ethnic group in Iran has a strong isolation, little affected by the process of national integration, which started in the Turkmen society only in the mid-20th century.
However, they are now almost abandoned the struggle for their rights. The Iranian Turkmens (the majority of which have not roam) are assimilated by the Persians more and more. The voluntary assimilation is most pronounced among young people. Many families began to use Farsi over the past 10-15 years. The situation in the province is heating up with the struggle of political and religious groups, based on tribal and sub-ethnic differences, and is funded by other states. Gangs, fueled from Afghanistan, create difficulties.
Moreover, the Turkmen living in Iran, like other minorities, are dissatisfied with the fact that the authorities are cutting their political, social and cultural rights. There are examples of the ban on the training of Turkmen children in their native language.
The Lurs is another ethnic group living in the south-western part of Iran, namely in the provinces of Fars and Lorestan. The number of this ethnic group in Iran is about 5 million people. The Lurs profess the Shia branch of Islam, but also among them are adherents of different sects. The Lurs is a fairly close-knit ethnic group with a strongly pronounced tribal authority. They are divided into several large tribes.
The government forcibly converted the Lurs to sedentary life from 1928, declaring the tribal lands as the state property. The Lurs were settled around special military forts along the line Tehran -Horemshehr and their tents were taken, so that they could not get away with the coming of spring to roam. However, after the abdication of Reza Shah of the throne and weakening the power of the central government, many families of the Lurs again moved to the nomadic way of life. As a result, khans of the Lurs with the support of the British, who have repeatedly tried to use the Lurs tribes to fight against the democratic movement in Iran, once again felt independent rulers.
Until now Shahristans in the southwest of Iran are the largest fiefdoms of khans with their troops, introducing their taxes, and so on. Khans of the Lurs use cultural backwardness of the nomadic population in order to preserve their feudal power.
Currently, this ethnic group almost does not manifest itself in the political life of Iran, nothing is known of the national requirements of the Lurs.
The situation in areas of traditional residing of the ethnic minorities in Iran has stabilized somewhat in recent years. There is an impression, that the central government has adopted the unauthorized changes to the local authorities, as well as recognized their own failure to provide rapid linguistic assimilation of minorities53. There are some positive developments and new trends that emerged with the coming to
power of Hassan Rohani, who put the idea of recognition of Iran's population of cultural diversity in the framework of national policies54.
However, the basic requirement of the ethnic groups of Iran - to provide autonomous rights, as well as official recognition of Sunni Islam and Islamic sects - remains unsatisfied, that creates a situation fraught with updating the existing ethnic conflicts. Of course, the current situation can not, but provoke external actors such as the U.S., Israel, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iraq and the other on the unwinding of nationalist and separatist movements in Iran.
Preserving unity is a paramount task for the Iranian government, which means that any national movement - Kurdish, Baluchi, or any other - aimed at changing Iran's territorial integrity, will continue to meet the most stringent manner.
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