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Volume 5 Issue 1-2 2011
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
63
Rovshan IBRAHIMOV
Ph.D. (Political Science), Associate Professor, Head of the International Relations Department and Director of the Center for Energy Research at Qafqaz University
(Baku, Azerbaijan).
ENERGY RESOURCE TRANSPORTATION BY COUNTRIES WITH NO ACCESS TO THE OPEN SEA
(An Azerbaijan Case Study)
Abstract
Azerbaijan is pursuing a targeted policy that envisages maintaining reliable transport corridors and diversification of hydrocarbon deliveries to the
world markets. This article looks at the strategies and tactical steps Azerbaijan is taking to reach the above-mentioned goals.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
One hundred and fifty years ago, Azerbaijan was the first country in the world to begin producing oil on an industrial basis. After restoring its independence, the republic became one of the main Eurasian players in the energy sphere. But the fact that Azerbaijan has no direct access to the open sea means that relevant transportation infrastructure, mainly pipelines, must be built.
The main task of countries that do not have access to the open sea (including Azerbaijan) is to draw up a strategy that ensures reliable and stable delivery of energy resources to the world markets without any political or economic losses. This requires diversifying transport routes as much as possible, as well as creating transport corridors that are economically profitable and commercially appealing.
So one of the main tasks of Azerbaijan's energy policy has been to diversify its transport corridors. Time has shown that this strategy has been instrumental in carving out a substantial niche for the country in the world energy market.
1. Azerbaijan's Energy Policy as an Instrument of Balanced Foreign Policy
1.1. Russia's Influence in the Region and in Azerbaijan
After regaining its independence, Azerbaijan has had to deal with a whole slew of problems inherited from the Soviet Union, among which are the conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, the economic slump accompanied by a sharp drop in GDP and hyperinflation, and political instability. However, Russia has retained a strong influence in the region and in 1992 declared the territory of the former Soviet Union its Near Abroad.
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The situation was aggravated even more by the fact that Russia chose to support Armenia in the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. During Ayaz Mutalibov's rule (1991-1992), Moscow's priorities with respect to Azerbaijan and Armenia were not yet clearly defined. However, in the fall of 1991, Mutalibov attempted to sign an oil contract with Western companies without Russia's participation, which complicated relations between the two countries.1
During the night of 25-26 February, 1992, Armenian armed forces, with the support of the 366th motorized rifle division of the former Soviet army, carried out a massacre in the town of Khojali; more than 600 peaceful citizens were killed, several hundred were wounded and maimed, and several more hundred went missing.2 On 6 March, 1992, Ayaz Mutalibov was forced to leave his post.
In June of the same year, Abulfaz Elchibei, who was known for his pan-Turkic views, became president of Azerbaijan, after which Russia began openly supporting Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.3 Elchibei was in power for only a year and was removed as the result of a revolt in Ganja organized in May 1993 by Colonel S. Huseinov4 after the Russian 104th air-borne division withdrew from the city on 24-25 May, 1993, leaving all its weapons to the participants in the uprising.5
Due to the situation that developed, Elchibei invited Heydar Aliev, who was to replace retired I. Gambar as parliamentary speaker of the Azerbaijan Republic, to Baku. At the same time, President Elchibei left Baku and went to his home village of Keleki in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.
In August 1993, Elchibei's position as president was put to a vote of confidence at a national referendum and 97.5% of the country's citizens voted for his retirement. As a result of the election held on 3 October, 1993, Heydar Aliev became the country's president.6
Despite the many difficulties, on 20 September, 1994, the Contract of the Century was signed in Baku, in which 13 oil companies from 8 countries of the world were represented. The agreement envisaged the development and production of oil at the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli fields.
But the situation in the country remained unstable. After he became prime minister, S. Huseinov again raised a revolt, this time against Heydar Aliev. In order to prevent another state coup, the president addressed the people on national television, accusing Russia of what was happening, and within a short time thousands of people formed a human shield around the president's palace; the coup was intercepted.7
1.2. The Contract of the Century
The Contract of the Century involving the offshore fields of Azeri and Chirag, and the deep-water part of Gunashli was signed on 20 September, 1994, for a term of 30 years. The following companies were the initial members of the consortium that participated in the signing ceremony: State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (Azerbaijan) with a 20% share, British Petroleum (Great Brit-ain)—17.127%, Amoco (U.S.)—17.01%, LUKoil (Russia)—10%, Pennzoil (U.S.)—9.82%, Unocal (U.S.)—9.52%, Statoil (Norway)—8.563%, McDermott International (U.S.)—2.45%, Ramco (Great Britain [Scotland])—2.08%, TPAO (Turkey)—1.75%, and Delta-Nimir (Saudi Arabia)—1.68%.8 After signing the Contract of the Century, its participants created the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC).
1 See: V. Shorokhov, "Energy Resources of Azerbaijan: Political Stability and Regional Relations," Caucasian Regional Studies, Issue 1, 1996, available at [http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/0101-04.htm], 30 March, 2011.
2 See: S.E. Cornell, Azerbaijan Since Independence, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY, 2011, pp. 62-63.
3 See: Th. De Waal, The Caucasus. An Introduction, Oxford University, Oxford, 2010, pp. 117-118.
4 Ibid., p. 121.
5 See: S.E. Cornell, op. cit., pp. 76-77.
6 See: Ibid., p. 75.
7 See: Ibid., pp. 85-86.
8 See: N. Sagheb, M. Javadi, "Azerbaijan's 'Contract of the Century' Finally Signed with Western Oil Consortium," Azerbaijan International, 1994, pp. 26-27, available at [http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/24_folder/24_articles/24_aioc.html].
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The members of the consortium and their shares changed over time. For example, the Turkish TPAO Company acquired a 5% share of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR)9; according to the agreement signed in Baku in November 1994, another 5% was transferred to the Iranian National Gas Export Company.
The main objective of President Heydar Aliev's policy was to try and balance out the main powers in the region by providing equal terms for all the interested sides. However, the U.S. government found fault with this policy, since it could not accept the idea of American and Iranian companies working together, which resulted in Iran's exclusion from the Contract of the Century. Instead, Iran was granted a share in the Shakh Deniz field.10
Drawing Western companies into the Contract of the Century has made it possible for Azerbaijan to achieve internal stability and carry out a balanced foreign policy.
By supporting the countries of the former Eastern bloc, the West did everything it could to facilitate their integration into the Euro-Atlantic expanse. The line formed by these new spheres of influence was drawn imperceptibly along the former Soviet border (with Russia's tacit consent), but no steps were taken to interfere in the development of events in the territory of the former Soviet Union.
The hot spots in this area, as well as the need to settle the conflicts in the Balkans after the collapse of Yugoslavia, prevented the West's active policy in the region.
On 12 February, 1991, during his brief official visit to Baku, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said that the U.S. had still not defined its priorities regarding the region and that the Southern Caucasus was outside its sphere of interest. At the same time, the pro-Armenian lobby in U.S. Congress stepped up its activity. The 907th amendment (prohibiting assistance to the official structures of Azerbaijan) was adopted to the Freedom Support Act that regulates various forms of government assistance to the new countries that acquired their independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union and is aimed at developing democracy and a market economy in them.11
Azerbaijan understood that it had to draw the West's attention both to the country itself and to the region as a whole in order to resolve the existing problems. The republic's rich oil fields played a decisive role in attracting the West's attention (first the attention of its oil companies, and then of its governments).
Azerbaijan's balanced foreign policy made it possible to later build transport corridors for exporting oil and gas to the world markets.
2. Building Alternative Transport Corridors as a Guarantee of Azerbaijan's Independent Foreign Policy
2.1. Creating Infrastructure for Exporting Early Oil12
One of the important problems Azerbaijan had to resolve was building alternative routes for delivering energy resources to the world markets, thus ensuring the country's national security and allowing it to pursue a more independent foreign policy.
9 See: Gunun Olaylart, 12 April, 1995, available at [http://www.haberkazani.com/kazandan-12-nisan-1995-gundemi. html], 24 March, 2011.
10 See: Th. De Waal, op. cit., pp. 172-173.
11 See: F. Rzaev, "907-ia popravka: istoria i perspektivy," Tsentralnaia Azia i Kavkaz, No. 3 (4), 1999, pp. 148153, available at [http://www.ca-c.org/journal/cac-04-1999/st_21_rzayev.shtml], 5 February, 2011.
12 The term "early oil" appeared for describing the oil produced at the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli fields that does not need extra money to be spent on building infrastructure for carrying out the necessary work. Moreover, keeping in mind
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When the Contract of the Century was signed, the problem arose of transporting Azeri oil to the European markets, since the country does not have direct access to the open sea.13
■ The first batch of oil was produced as early as the 4th quarter of 1997 from the Chirag-1 platform; a pipeline with an output capacity of no less than 5 million tons a year was needed to export it.14 An agreement was reached between the government of Azerbaijan and members of the consortium on building oil pipelines in two directions at the same time. One such pipeline was Baku-Novorossiysk, 1,347 km in length (231 km of which pass through Azerbaijan); its capacity amounts to up to 6 million tons of oil a year. Oil was to be transported from Novorossiysk by tanker to the Black Sea and on through the Straits to the Mediterranean ports.
■ The second route was the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, 917 km in length (492 km of which pass through Azerbaijan), with a throughput capacity of around 5.5-6 million tons of oil a year. Oil was to be transported by tankers from Supsa to the Mediterranean ports.15
The need to build two pipelines with a relatively small amount of early oil at the same time was explained by the desire to decrease the country's potential economic dependence on Russia with the understanding that Azerbaijan would not be able to reject the northern route entirely for political considerations.
Building the Baku-Supsa pipeline made it possible for Azerbaijan to diversify its transport policy, as well as pursue a more independent foreign policy, including in the energy sphere. Consequently, building alternative transport routes was to become the main vector in Azerbaijan's energy policy.
2.2. Main Transport Route Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and
Its Alternative
As oil production at the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli fields grew, the need arose for building another pipeline. The Baku-Novorossiysk and Baku-Supsa routes were capable of transporting no more than a total of 11 million tons of oil a year, while beginning in 2005 Azerbaijan was supposed to transport up to 20 million tons.
Russia suggested increasing the capacity of the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, but the northern route had several shortcomings. In particular, Turkey restricts the passage of tankers from Novorossiysk and Supsa through the Bosporus and Dardanelles for security reasons.
According to statistics, the potential annual volume of oil that can be transported through the Straits is around 200 million tons, and the width of the inlet is only 600 meters in some places.16 It should be noted that between 1 May, 1982 and 18 October, 1994, there were around 210 accidents of varying degrees of severity in the Bosporus Strait.17 And on either side of the Bosporus lies the city of Istanbul with a population of more than 10 million!
that the main oil from these fields would not be produced until 2005, Azerbaijan, faced with urgently resolving the serious economic problems that arose after the collapse of the Soviet Union, needed a steady source of revenue.
13 See: R. Ibrahimov, "Azerbaijan: Happiness is the Availability of Export Corridors," Turkish Weekly, 18 March, 2007, available at [http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/2536/azerbaijan-happiness-is-the-availability-of-export-corridors. html], 1 November, 2010.
14 See: I. Aliev, Kaspiiskaia neft Azerbaidzhana, Izvestia, Moscow, 2003.
15 See: R. Ibrahimov, "Azerbaijan Energy Strategy and the Importance of Diversification of Exported Transport Routes," Journal of Qafqaz University, No. 29, 2010, p. 25.
16 See: F. Turan, "Turkiye-Turk Cumhuriyetleri Ticari ve Ekonomik lli§kileri Hakkmda Degerlendirme," Dig Ticaret Dergisi, Special Issue, January 2002.
17 See: "Bitva za Rynok," Caspian Energy, No. 5, September-October 2004.
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So all the oil from Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan could not be exported through Novorossiysk. A pipeline had to be built that bypassed the Straits.18
In 2002, construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline began with access to the Mediterranean Sea bypassing the Bosporus and Dardanelles. The shares of the participants in the consortium contracted to build the pipeline were divided as follows: BP—34.76%, SOCAR—25%, Statoil— 8.71%, Unocal—8.90%, TPAO—6.87%, Eni—5%, TotalFinaElf—5%, Itochu—3.40%, and Amerada Hess—2.36%.19 Construction of the pipeline, which was more than 1,730 km in length, was completed in 2005; as early as December 2006, Azerbaijan was able to forego use of the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline. But Russia demanded that Azerbaijan either increase the volumes of oil transshipped via the Novorossiysk route, or pay the transport fee for pumping 5 million tons of oil a year.
Construction of the BTC pipeline gave the Caspian states access to alternative oil transport routes to Europe. Moreover, by means of this route, the EU countries acquired another source of oil import in addition to Russia and the Middle East. In 2008, Kazakhstan oil began being transported along the BTC pipeline and, in 2010, Turkmen oil.
But Azerbaijan does not regard the BTC as the only priority of its export policy, particularly after the explosion in the Turkish sector of the oil pipeline in August 2008, which brought oil transportation along it to a complete halt.20
An alternative to the BTC might be the Ukrainian Odessa-Brody pipeline, which also bypasses the Straits. It was initially to be used for transporting oil from the Caspian region to Europe, but for several reasons this project was not implemented, and Ukraine began to pump Russian oil along it in the reverse direction (to the Black Sea).
The Odessa-Brody pipeline is one of the possible alternative transit routes for energy deliveries from the countries of the Caspian Basin, mainly from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. It is presumed that this route will be extended to the Polish city of Gdansk, where oil refineries are located21 capable of theoretically refining up to 6-7 million tons of oil a year.22
Moreover, there were plans for Ukraine to purchase up to 5 million tons of oil for further refining at the Galichina and Naftokhimik Prikarpatiia plants.23 Azerbaijan, in turn, is also interested in delivering oil to Ukraine's oil refineries. SOCAR has opened its own gas stations in this country,24 the number of which will increase with each passing year (there are plans to open 17 such stations before the end of 2011). SOCAR is also hoping to open another 300 gas stations in Rumania.
It should also be noted that SOCAR is the main shareholder of the Petkim petrochemical complex in Izmir,25 and, until its construction is complete, Azerbaijan will be interested in refining its oil at Ukraine's plants.
On 7 January, 2011, Ukraine's Ukrtransnafta and the Belarusian Oil Company signed a contract on rendering services for transporting oil via the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline to the Belarusian refinery in Mozyr.26
18 See: R. Ibrahimov, "Azerbaijan: Happiness is the Availability of Export Corridors."
19 See: "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan—Khronika proekta," Caspian Energy, No. 3, July-August 2002.
20 See: "Neft dorozhaet posle vzryva na nefteprovode Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan," 11 August, 2008, available at [http:// tbu.com.ua/news/neft_dorojaet_posle_vzryva_na_nefteprovode_baku_tbilisi_djeihan.html], 2 April, 2011.
21 See: R. Ibrahimov, "Energy Security Summit in Kiev and Expectations," 12 July, 2008, available at [http://www. turkishweekly.net/columnist/2939/energy-security-summit-in-kiev-and-expectations.html], 5 April, 2011.
22 See: F. Asim, "Nefteprovod Odessa-Brody-Plotsk zhdet uglevodorody," 20 August, 2008, available at [http:// www.zerkalo.az/rubric.php?id=35283], 3 April, 2011.
23 See: V. Kashin, "Obratny avers. Konflikt Iu. Timoshenko s V. Iushchenko ne dal zapolnit trubu Odessa-Brody kaspiiskoi neftiu," 18 July, 2008, available at [http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1216361040], 5 April, 2011.
24 It should be noted that there are dozens of SOCAR gas stations in Georgia.
25 See: N.E., "GNKAR otkroet v Rumynii okolo 300 benzokolonok," 2 April, 2011, available at [http://www. 1news.az/economy/oil_n_gas/20110402124523008.html], 5 April, 2011.
26 See: "'Odessa-Brody' bolshe ne nuzhen Belarusi?" 26 March, 2011, available at [http://www.1news.az/econo-my/oil_n_gas/20110326112408848.html], 3 April, 2011.
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Since the end of January 2011, Azeri oil has been delivered via the Odessa-Brody pipeline, which, according to an oil swap contract, is a substitute for the Venezuelan oil delivered to Belarus (which now goes to the U.S. markets as Azeri). There are plans to pump a total of around 4 million tons of raw hydrocarbons.27 Despite the fact that it became known at the end of March 2011 that Belarus might refuse to buy Venezuelan oil due to the more advantageous offers from Russia,28 Azerbaijan is still bent on evaluating new routes and oil export technology.
Azerbaijan is interested in further transporting its oil via the Odessa-Brody pipeline, since this correlates with the policy of export route diversification. Moreover, with the help of the BTC pipeline, Turkey has essentially monopolized the transit of Azeri oil to the world markets. Despite the friendly relations between the two countries, there are several reasons for concern relating to Turkey's decision to re-export Azeri gas to the European markets, as well as the disagreements over the price and transportation fees of natural gas.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Turkey will use its exclusive transit position as a lever of pressure on Azerbaijan.
3. Production of Natural Gas in Azerbaijan and the Search for Alternative Export Routes
The abrupt increase in natural gas production in Azerbaijan is associated with the opening of the Shakh Deniz field, which is 860 sq. km in area and located 70 km from Baku in the southwestern part of the Caspian Sea at a depth of 50 to 600 meters.
On 4 June, 1996, a production sharing agreement was signed between Azerbaijan and foreign companies29; the following companies belonged to the Shakh Deniz consortium: SOCAR (10%), BP (25.5%), Statoil (25.5%, the National Oil Company of Iran (10%), LUKAgip N.V. Joint Russian-Italian Venture (10%), and TPAO (9%).
In order to transport large amounts of Azeri gas to the world markets, still one more transport corridor had to be built. In 2006, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline was completed, and on 21 March of the same year, Azeri gas began being pumped to Turkey.
Beginning in 2008, disagreements arose between Azerbaijan and Turkey with respect to transit prices, fees, and terms, as well as to the amounts of gas to be delivered. This was prompted by Turkey's striving to play the role of regional energy transport hub. But Azerbaijan did not like the fact that Turkey was reselling its gas in the European market, since the price difference was often excessive.
Due to the discord that arose, building of the second line at the Shakh Deniz field was postponed, as a result of which Azerbaijan suffered financial losses. This situation forced Azerbaijan to look for alternative export routes for its natural gas.
On 27 March, 2009, Gazprom and SOCAR signed a contract on the delivery of Azeri gas to Russia via the Baku-Novo-Filia gas pipeline (an approximately 200-km section of Azerbaijan's gas-transportation system that passes from Baku to the Russian border along the coast of the Caspian Sea). In January 2010, Azerbaijan began exporting natural gas to Russia30; at the initial stage, the delivery volume amounted to 500 million cu m.
27 See: "Neft iz Azerbaidzhana pridet v Belarus zavtra," 28 January, 2011, available at [http://www.charter97.org/ ru/news/2011/1/28/35590/], 2 April, 2011.
28 See: "'Odessa-Brody' bolshe ne nuzhen Belarusi?" 26 March, 2011.
29 See: F. Asim, "Azerbaidzhan vse aktivnee vnedriaetsia na gruzinskii rynok," 26 April, 2011, available at [http:// www.zerkalo.az/rubric.php?id=32208], 5 April, 2011.
30 See: R. Ibrahimov, "Nabucco as a Chess Game: Azerbaijan's Next Move," 12 November, 2009, available at [http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3135/nabucco-as-a-chess-game-azerbaijan], 5 April, 2011.
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In September 2010, during Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Baku, an additional agreement was signed to the Azeri natural gas buy-sell contract that envisaged an increase in its deliveries to Russia of up to 2 bcm a year, with the further possibility of increasing the export volume.
Moreover, Azerbaijan intends to export gas to Iran. In January 2011, a corresponding contract was signed, in accordance with which Iran will receive more than one billion cu m of gas in 2011. As in the case with Russia, it is expected that the amount of gas export to Iran could double in 2012.31
On 14 September, 2010, a Memorandum was signed during a meeting among the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Rumania, and in the presence of the prime minister of Hungary, aimed at establishing a joint venture to determine the possibility of exporting natural gas from Azerbaijan and Georgia along the bottom of the Black Sea to the Rumanian port of Constanta. Signing this document was an important step in the search for alternative Azeri gas export routes and will make it possible to insure the republic against losses and possible dependence in the future.
According to the new project known as the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Rumania Interconnection (AGRI), natural gas from Azerbaijan will be delivered by pipeline to the Georgian port of Kulevi (Azerbaijan has rented it), then compressed or liquefied and transported further by tanker to the Rumanian port of Constanta. According to preliminary assessments, the estimated cost of the project will amount to between 4 and 6 billion euro.
As we know, the amounts of gas that can be transported by pipeline are limited, so if the AGRI project is implemented, Azerbaijan will be able to diversify not only its transport routes, but also the resources it exports (in particular make a partial shift to delivering compressed or liquefied gas).
In addition to the Shakh Deniz field, other deposits of natural gas have been found in Azerbaijan. In December 2010, SOCAR announced the opening of a new gas field, Umid, located at a depth of 6,500 meters; the Azerbaijan oil and gas company carried out all the surveying work related to this field independently.32
According to preliminary assessments, the gas supplies at the Umid field amount to 200-300 bcm. It is also worth mentioning Babek, another very promising natural gas field, the reserves of which might be twice as high as those at Umid.33
Another promising field is the Absheron offshore structure situated 100 km from Baku at a depth of 500 meters. The participants in the consortium are SOCAR (40%) and France's Total (40%) and Gaz De France Suez (20%) companies. According to the assessments of SOCAR's geologists, the reserves of the Absheron field might be as high as 300 bcm of gas and 45 million tons of condensate.
Moreover, as Azerbaijan's Minister of Industry and Power Engineering said, development of gas, the reserves of which might be as high as 500 bcm, is being envisaged at the Azeri-Chirag-Gu-nashli fields at the same time as oil production.34
The increase in natural gas production in Azerbaijan prompted by the growing world demand for this type of energy resource is possible thanks to the infrastructure in this republic. In this respect, transport corridors are needed via which Azeri gas can freely be exported to the European markets; this means that the search for alternative routes is related not only to the republic's political, but primarily to its commercial and economic interests.
31 See: Z. Agayev, L. Nasseri, "Azerbaijan Signs Gas Supply Contract with Iran Before EU Visit," 12 January, 2011, available at [http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-12/azerbaijan-signs-gas-supply-contract-with-iran-before-eu-visit.html], 5 April, 2011.
32 See: N.E., "SOCAR zaiavila ob otkrytii krupnogo gazovogo mestorozhdeniia 'Umid' v Azerbaidzhane," 24 November, 2010, available at [http://www.1news.az/economy/oil_n_gas/20101124043856510.html], 7 April, 2011.
33 See: A. Salaeva, "Mestorozhdenie 'Babek' vdvoe bolshe 'Umid,'" 25 November, 2010, available at [http://www. 1news.az/economy/oil_n_gas/20101125105006328.html], 6 April, 2011.
34 See: F. Asif, "Nachalos burenie na 'Absherone'," Zerkalo, 19 January, 2011.
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C o n c l u s i o n
Azerbaijan's energy policy has proven its viability; the diversification of transport routes has made it possible for the republic not only to carry out a relatively independent foreign policy, but also to insure it against possible economic and political losses.
Building the corresponding infrastructure is enhancing sustainable development and the implementation of new projects capable of reinforcing relations among states, as well as extending cooperation to other spheres of activity.
Countries that do not have access to the open sea can benefit from this kind of cooperation, particularly if there are alternative access routes to the world sales markets. Otherwise, the production country could find itself in an extremely vulnerable position if the transit state, by taking advantage of its monopoly on the transportation infrastructure, has its own interests with respect to implementing energy projects.
The only solution is to create export corridors that give the energy resource production country room for maneuver if necessary, thus reducing any potential political or economic losses.
