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20SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS VOLUME 4 I ISSUE 1 I 2023 _ISSN: 2181-1601
Scientific Journal Impact Factor (SJIF 2022=5.016) Passport: http://sjifactor.com/passport.php?id=22257
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS OF UZBEKISTAN WITH THE
COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL ASIA
Bobirjon Alisher ugli Bakhronov
Tashkent State University of Oriental Study
ABSTRACT
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian states became independent and tried to pursue their foreign policy free from Russian control. Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state to pursue a proactive and independent foreign policy. Uzbekistan has higher regional power ambitions than the other Central Asian states. So what is preventing Uzbekistan from fulfilling its dream? It has the necessary subjective and objective prerequisites for this: military potential, a large and fairly homogeneous population, natural resources, favorable geographic location, U.S. support of its secular state, and the willingness of the latter to recognize its regional hegemony. However, the country continues to face several limitations that hinder its leading role. Despite its capabilities, it is not engaging wholeheartedly in regional integration and is hampered by its geographic location, water shortages, structural economic constraints, political problems, and fundamentalism issues.
Keywords: Uzbekistan, regional power, Central Asia, regional cooperation.
Uzbekistan gained its independence at the end of 1991 with the breakup of the Soviet Union. The landlocked country is a potential Central Asian regional power by virtue of its population, the largest in the region, its substantial energy and other resources, and its location at the heart of regional trade and transport networks. The chief objective of Uzbekistan's foreign policy since the country gained its independence has been to preserve internal stability for its super-presidential, authoritarian regime. Preventing unwelcome intervention or pressure from outside actors has been instrumental to this goal, which has been recognized for some time.2 Uzbekistan, one of the leading Central Asian states, has been having a significant influence on the geopolitical processes taking place in the South since the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. It is very conditioned by the central geographic location of this country in the region, its history, and the specific political course of the Uzbek administration. This administration is trying to adhere to a special way of state development.3 Home to more than half of the population of Central Asia, Uzbekistan seeks to play a leading role in regional affairs. Foreign policy is highly dependent on presidential decision-making. A new foreign policy concept was submitted to the legislature by President Karimov and quickly approved in early August 2012. It states that the main objectives of
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Uzbekistan's foreign policy are strengthening the state's independence and sovereignty; ensuring a role in international affairs; joining the ranks of the democratic and developed countries; and creating security, stability, and cooperative ties with neighboring states.4 The Central Asian countries are trying to play a key role in the region alongside foreign powers, which is shown by Uzbekistan's foreign policy activities and its regional ambitions. It has the potential to play the role of a regional power; different factors, such as historical and cultural traits, could help it to reach this objective. If we take a look at the past, we can see that Uzbekistan had a special role to play in the eyes of the Communist Party leaders, who saw that it had particular potential for implementing the Kremlin's orders in the region. Most of Tajikistan's leaders and army commanders were appointed by Uzbek elites. Uzbekistan regarded its potential advantages for performing the role of a regional power to be its geographic location, sizable population, Uzbek communities in the region, military power, military and security cooperation with the U.S. in countering terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and the fact that Samarkand and Bukhara were cultural and religious centers and Tashkent a religious center for Muslims in the Soviet era. Regional Power Regional powers (also called regional leaders, major regional powers or regional/local great powers) are considered powerful in their own regions, irrespective of whether they represent regional relations of enmity or amity.5 In international relations, a regional power is a state that has power within a geographic region. Regional powers shape the polarity of a regional area. Typically, regional powers have capabilities that are important in the region but do not have capabilities on a global scale. There are slightly different definitions of what makes a regional power. They are responsible for keeping their backyard neat and tidy, sometimes with a measure of support from the great powers. Furthermore, regional powers seem to be expected to support and promote acceptable rules and regulations for conducting regional policy and relations.7 Regional Power Characteristics A regional power is a country that (1) Is part of a region that is geographically, economically and political-ideologically delimited; (2) Has a significant influence on geopolitical delimitation and the political-ideological construction of the region; (3) Possesses the material (military, economic, and demographic), organizational (political), and ideological resources for regional power projection; (4) Is economically, politically, and culturally interconnected with the region; (5) Has truly great influence on regional affairs (activities and results); (6) Exerts this influence (and increasingly so) by means of regional governance structures; (7) Is integrated into interregional and global forums and institutions where it articulates not only its own interests, but also acts, at least rudimentarily, as a representative of regional interests8 ; (8) Is appreciated as a regional power by the other powers in the region and beyond, particularly by other regional powers; (9) Defines the regional security agenda to a high
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degree; (10) Claims to be a regional power (thinks of itself as one).9 The Main Principles, Objectives, and Vectors of Uzbekistan's Foreign Policy 31 September, 1991, the day Uzbekistan's independence was officially declared, became the starting point of the country's full-scale integration into the world community. It is based on the following general principles and objectives: 1. The priority of the country's national interests and regulations of international law, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equal cooperation, and striving to resolve all disputes in a peaceful manner. 2. Uzbekistan does not consider any country its military or political adversary. 3. State military policy is based on the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Law on Defense, the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the obligations of Uzbekistan as a member of the U.N., OSCE, CIS, NATO's Partnership for Peace, and other international organizations. 4. In the Law on Defense of 1992 Uzbekistan's military doctrine is strictly defensive, with no territorial ambitions against any other state. 5. Uzbekistan's overall military doctrine does not permit strategic or tactical nuclear weapons, as well as chemical weapons in the inventory of the Uzbek armed forces. 6. Although its armed forces are small in comparison with international standards, Uzbekistan is rated as the strongest military power among the five newly independent Central Asian nations. 7. Particular emphasis is placed on preventive diplomacy, targeted first of all toward adjusting and preventing conflicts at the international or regional level. 8. At the same time, the experience of prevention and resolution of different types of military conflict both throughout the world and in the territory of CIS countries shows that peace efforts are more efficient when based on sufficient military power and support.10 The preventive diplomacy developed under the guidance of President Islam Karimov is a distinguishing feature of Uzbek diplomacy and aimed at timely prevention of the escalation of tension and elimination of conflicts. The Republic of Uzbekistan has made timely and repeated appeals to the world community to resolve the Afghan problem, fight terrorism, extremism, and drug aggression, and create a nuclear-weapons-free-zone in Central Asia. The enhancement and development of relations with neighboring countries is one of Uzbekistan's most important foreign policy priorities. Further intensification of regional cooperation is a vitally important condition of peace, stability, and prosperity in Central Asia. Special attention is paid to constructive cooperation within the framework of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization. By dynamically and gradually developing its relations with the countries of the West, AsiaPacific, South-East and South Asia, Uzbekistan is aspiring to make these relations more substantial. Based upon the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1996) between Uzbekistan and the European Union, the country is intensifying a political dialog and trade relations with the EU.11 After it declared its independence, Uzbekistan gained an opportunity to establish direct contacts
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with the Islamic countries of Asia and the Middle East, countries that are close to Uzbekistan spiritually, culturally, and traditionally. Uzbekistan is pursuing a multivectoral foreign policy, in which disengagement from Russia is sought through: (1) Participating in different multilateral blocs; (2) Strengthening relations with the West13; and (3) Acquiring the position of a regional leader.14 In its proposals on ensuring national and regional security, Uzbekistan concentrates on the following vectors: 1. Strengthening national security, with the emphasis on building up and fortifying the national armed forces. 2. Strengthening the regional security system, with the emphasis on building trust with neighboring countries and coordinating defense activity in Central Asia on the basis of a Central Asian alliance (with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) and on bilateral cooperation (with the other countries of the region and CIS, including Russia). 3. Strengthening collective security within the framework of the CIS with primary attention on efforts under the Collective Security Treaty. 4. Strengthening the security system on a Eurasian scale to ensure general tolerance of peacekeeping activity: strengthening relations with the OSCE and NATO. 5. Strengthening the global security system, with the emphasis on cooperation with the U.N.15 Uzbekistan and the Central Asian States Tajikistan The foreign policy of independent Uzbekistan within the borders of Central Asia has always shown a particularly high profile, the real threat to Uzbekistan's attempts to pursue a more assertive regional policy in the 1990s undoubtedly being Tajikistan.16On 4 September, 1992, together with the Russian and Central Asian leaders, Karimov issued a warning that the conflict in Tajikistan endangered the security of the whole region. Uzbek fighters from Hissar and Kurgan Tube, as well as Kulob, were armed and trained in Uzbekistan. reason that Tashkent began supporting all the groups fighting against the regime: in the following months, relations between the two neighbors dramatically deteriorated, and Rakhmonov accused Uzbekistan of supporting the Uzbek mercenaries now fighting with the opposition,18 and even of complicity in the assassination attempt against Rakhmonov of April 1997 during his visit to Khujand.Tashkent was also allegedly implicated in several attempts to carry out an armed rebellion in the north of the country, which was successfully countered by Russian troops. Tajikistan accused Uzbekistan of supporting the separatists. Tajikistan feared that ethnic Uzbeks, who represent 25% of the population of Tajikistan, could seek autonomy. Uzbekistan accused Tajikistan of harboring Uzbek and Tajik terrorists intent on overthrowing the Uzbek government.21 Tajikistan is highly dependent on Uzbekistan for its imports. In 2010, Uzbekistan held up railway cars for long periods at the border in order to impede dam construction work and quite possibly also to cause other shortages, thus putting pressure on the Tajik government.22 Uzbekistan began to restrict railway and road transport to and from Tajikistan in February 2010, perhaps to dissuade Tajikistan from building a dam that might limit
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water flow to Uzbekistan.23 Afghanistan When Central Asia gained its independence in 1991, the three southern republics bordering on Afghanistan had to draw up a foreign policy toward their turbulent neighbor that consisted mainly of preventing an escalation of its widespread conflict. At that time, Karimov, according to most scholars, decided to rely on the Uzbek faction of Afghanistan (led by warlord and former army general during the Soviet war in Afghanistan Dostum) to create a buffer zone of stability protecting its southern region from further Islamic influence.24 For this purpose, Tashkent allegedly began providing Dostum with funds and arms (some commentators even talk about Karimov's dream of a so-called Greater Uzbekistan that would absorb Dostum's provinces).25 For several years, Karimov's strategy worked well, and even after the rise of the Taliban Dostum continued to control the six northern Provinces of Afghanistan, while the Uzbek leader unsuccessfully tried to consolidate a wide antiTaliban coalition involving Russia and Central Asia after1994.26 Recent trends in Uzbekistan's foreign policy, especially toward Afghanistan, reveal a strategic uncertainty in its own right due to Uzbekistan's recent controversial moves on the international arena. In turn, this perplexity reflects the ambiguity of the political trends throughout the entire region. Kazakhstan Uzbekistan's relations with Kazakhstan have long been regarded as rivalry over regional leadership between Karimov and Kazakh president Nazarbaev.28 Since Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan became independent in 1991, their governments have signed approximately one hundred bilateral agreements. The most important include the Strategy for Economic Cooperation between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for 2007-2016 and the Program of the Economic Cooperation between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for 1998-2005. The two countries' interests seem to overlap most on issues of national security, particularly on countering threats from Muslim extremists. In March 2006, the Kazakh authorities allowed one of Karimov's fiercest domestic opponents, dissident Imam Obidkhon Qori Nazarov, to leave Kazakhstan for asylum in Europe a few days before Nazarbaev visited Uzbekistan rather than accede to Uzbekistan's extradition requests.29 At a news conference on 9 September, 2002, the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan announced that they had resolved their differences regarding the Kazakh-Uzbek border and that they had no disputed issues left. President Nazarbaev even suggested that in the future, in light of the existing political and military blocs, Kazakhs and Uzbeks may have to unite into one country. There has been no official Uzbek response to this egregious suggestion, which should probably be considered an expression of friendship and common interest. The first step in the direction of closer cooperation might be better synchronization of the two economies. Aware of the opportunities presented by Kazakhstan's booming economy, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan signed a new cooperation strategy in July 2007, intended to last ten years. Kazakh Prime Minister Karim Masimov called his southern neighbor a
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"strategic partner." Bilateral trade volumes have increased rapidly. Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan's relations with Kyrgyzstan have been problematic. One issue is a piece of borderland over which Uzbekistan gained usage rights under Soviet rule and which has not been restored to Kyrgyz sovereignty. This led Uzbekistan to implement more restrictive border-crossing measures and to plant antipersonnel landmines in border regions. Another source of tension was Kyrgyzstan's refusal to repatriate hundreds of Uzbeks who had fled across the border after the Andijan Massacre in 2005.36 In October 1999, the Uzbeks criticized the Kyrgyz for not making sufficiently dynamic attempts to destroy the Islamic militants in their territory.37 Relations between Tashkent and Bishkek are improving, but in October 2002 Islam Karimov, speaking about security in the region, suggested that some states were still only talking about terrorism and "flirt too long with terrorism."38 On 17 May, 2005, Karimov asserted that the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan had facilitated the flow of arms into Uzbekistan for terrorism and accused Kyrgyzstan of harboring the fleeing "terrorists."39 The Kyrgyz prime minister rejected claims by Karimov in 2005 that Kyrgyzstan had provided training facilities and other support for the Andijan militants. The conflict between ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 further strained relations between the two countries. Up to 100,000 ethnic Uzbeks fled the fighting in southern Kyrgyzstan to take up residence in refugee camps in Uzbekistan.40 One year later, the clash between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz was still subject to different allegations and interpretations. It was a highly dramatic lesson for the so-called newly independent states of Central Asia, especially Kyrgyzstan and neighboring Uzbekistan. During the clash, the question of Uzbekistan's interference or non-interference in order to save the Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan was crucial for the further development of the conflict and its outcome.41 Turkmenistan Relations between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have at times been far from friendly and tension-free since the countries gained their independence in 1991. Various factors have contributed to this situation, including border disputes, a major source of tension in the bilateral relations of all the Central Asian countries. Certain factors have worsened Turkmenistan's ties with Uzbekistan. Like just about all the other Central Asians, the Turkmen have been concerned about Uzbekistan's efforts to establish itself as the dominant power in Central Asia. However, this general concern became a specific fear in November 2002 as a result of the unsuccessful assassination attempt on President Niyazov, which the Turkmen government interpreted as part of a coup attempt. Relations between Turkmenistan, a state that has minimized contact with the outside world, and Uzbekistan have been tense, each country has ethnic minorities owing to the way the Soviets drew the boundaries. Both the Uzbek minority in Turkmenistan and the Turkmen minority in Uzbekistan have experienced discrimination in contexts of economic decline. The
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country also has problems relating to its geographic location—it is a landlocked state with no access to the high seas. Water shortage is another significant problem, exacerbated by the fact that it is a downstream state requiring large amounts of water for irrigating its cotton plantations and for industry, as well as for meeting the needs of its growing population. The most important environmental issue in Central Asia is the Aral Sea and its dangerous consequences for the region, especially for Uzbekistan. Fundamentalism and the activities of terrorist organizations are also growing in Central Asia and Afghanistan. The increasing number of terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan by these terrorist organizations has led to the suppression and prosecution of all Islamic groups.
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