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Volume 6 Issue 3 2012
Rasim ABDULLA
Ph.D. Candidate, Academician Z. Bunyadov Institute of Oriental Studies,
National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan (Baku, Azerbaijan).
EAST-WEST: AN INTERCULTURAL DIALOG. FROM MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING TO INTEGRATION
Abstract
Today, the sociocultural situation shaped by global integration, mass migration, more active international contacts, and a wider information space calls for a dialog between cultures and respect for their diversity as cornerstones of civilized rela-
tions. Indeed, it has become abundantly clear that global problems cannot be resolved without an equal and constructive dialog between the West and the Muslim East, in which Azerbaijan, as a bridge between them, plays a special role.
Introduction
Intercultural dialog is a priority of our times that is increasingly acquiring global dimensions. None of the cultural and political issues today is regarded as more urgent or attracts more attention than the dialog of civilizations. Numerous international and national organizations at different levels in different corners of the world are discussing its general parameters and political, religious, and scientific aspects; numerous conferences, symposiums, and meetings bring together clergy, officials of all ranks, writers, academics, cultural figures, and sociologists to discuss the focal points from different points of view; and numerous academic papers and publicist writings deal with the same questions: How can the rising tension between the West and the Muslim world be defused? How can agreement and mutual understanding between the East and the West be achieved?
Factors that Interfere with Mutual Understanding between the West and the Muslim East
No matter how much has been done and is being done to promote intercultural dialog, recently it has become clear that these praiseworthy efforts have not yet brought the results expected by those who started the process. Hundreds of events have produced excellent resolutions and recommendations, however, only a small fraction of them have been implemented so far. This is because the sem-
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inars and colloquiums are of an academic rather than practical nature; they bring together those willing to vehemently denounce Samuel Huntington's notorious theory of the "clash of civilizations" and to tell each other that cultures and religions should start a dialog.
Today, there is a more or less widespread conviction in the Islamic world that the dialog of civilizations is in crisis and that despite its fairly long history it has produced no positive results. They insist that the world needs a new dialog based on mutual respect, equality of all countries, and a common platform of interests.1
People in the East are convinced that the West is using the dialog to impose its own concepts, symbols, and values under the banner of democracy or "scientifically substantiated" data. Having armed themselves with Bernard Lewis' "Many Muslims deeply resent to the West", because they had fallen hopelessly behind and the West allegedly has to educate them,2 Anglo-Saxons pose as such educators, while trying to revive the old formulas of "white man's burden," "civilizatory mission," etc.
Edward W. Said, a prominent American culturologist of Palestinian origin, offered the following comment: "Lewis proceeds by distorting the truth, by making false analogies, and by innuendo, methods to which he adds that veneer of omniscient tranquil authority which he supposes is the way scholars talk."3
In his Orientalism, a book published in 1979 which made him world famous and in which he discussed the European approach to the non-European part of mankind, Edward Said was scathingly critical of academics who shared Lewis' approaches, saying that Western interest in the Orient, including that of Western scholars, is nothing more and nothing less than evidence of racism and colonialism. He is out to prove than the West's interest in the East, which created colonialism and which was further confirmed by imperialist expansion of the West to the East, gave birth to an intellectual and literary trend which regarded the peoples of the East and their culture as a certain static object to be interpreted (recreated) and dominated. This trend is known as Orientalism. Edward Said believes that racism is an inalienable part of Orientalism and the way the master nation treats subjugated peoples allegedly unable to express their interests themselves.
As a prominent academic he relies on rich factual material to demonstrate that mental construction of the East in the cultural (Orient) rather than geographic (East) sense was one of the inherent elements of intellectual and political self-construction of the West. The Orient is an absolute Other, something which substantially differs from the Western man who contemplates it. "Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient."4
Edward Said traces the beginning of Orientalism to the Enlightenment when European mankind first devised a global project to teach "primitive" Eastern peoples the values of Western civilization. "Without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively."5
There is a fairly widespread opinion in the Islamic academic community that the stumbling block is the West's insistent desire to impose its own ideas about the problem's roots, its own values, and its own assessments. Several American and European scientific centers pooled forces and put forward the thesis, under various guises, that confrontation between the West and the Muslim East
1 See: .Jj*V .i^ J j-J j^jj i . J i . p. 12 (Mahmoud Hamdy Zakzouk, Islam and Problems of Dialog, Al-Ahram Press, Cairo, 2002).
2 B. Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle East Response, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2002, p. 95; idem, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," The Atlantic Monthly, September 1990, pp. 47-60.
3 E.W. Said, Orientalism, Vintage Books Edition, 1979, p. 342.
4 Ibid., p. 3.
5 Ibidem.
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was caused by Islam's militant and extremist nature. The West, its political and intellectual elite, and the media look down on Islam as a religion of a lower level.
Not infrequently, Islam is presented in the West as a black-and-white phenomenon deprived of philosophical depth; few people in the West are aware of the Islamic civilization's rich cultural heritage despite the fact that there is any number of excellent Western Orientalists well-versed in Islam and related subjects. Outside the West, on the other hand, it is commonly believed that, on the whole, the West knows pitifully little about Islam. The West remains practically ignorant of the fact that in recent years the Muslim world has acquired a new strong elite comparable (or even superior) to Western intellectuals. These people know how to address the problems of the Muslim states without outside interference.
These well-educated and enlightened people did not limit themselves to the spiritual wealth of the Islamic civilization; they have mastered the cultural heritage of the West and find it hard to accept, without indignation, that certain forces in the West are out to equate terrorism and Islam. They insist that this is the wrong way, leading nowhere, and they are absolutely right. Political terrorism has nothing to do with any religion, let alone with any of the monotheist religions. The commandments of the three Abrahamic religions are essentially the same: kindness, high morals, peace, and charity.
Assured of its superiority, or for some other reason, the West has chosen to ignore the fact that the new generation of political leaders in the Muslim East has proven by deeds and not by words that they can ensure fast economic development and promptly resolve acute confessional and political crises. The processes underway in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and other Middle Eastern countries have shown one and all that Islam relies on the intellectual unity and mounting solidarity of the new social groups. Professor Govkhar Bakhshalieva, an Orientalist from Azerbaijan, has commented on the recent developments in the Middle East by saying that they have at least one thing in common: they were started and driven by young intellectuals. "A new generation has emerged on the political scene of the Muslim world. Fairly well-educated, these people do not need political leaders and political parties to become an organized political force. This is a new social-political phenomenon."6
According to M.A. Muqtedar Khan, an American academic and Vice President of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists, the new Islamic intellectual elite can generate ideas to strengthen its potential and liberate itself from spiritual imprisonment in which secular intellectuals and the traditional ulemas still linger. Convinced that Muslim problems can be resolved inside the Muslim world, the new leaders began thinking on a larger scale; they have finally disentangled themselves from the inferiority complex in which the Muslims were trapped in the colonialist era. This means that even before they were able to build up their potential, the Muslims became a much stronger community thanks to their educated elite and their determination to move forward. This explains the discursive balance of forces achieved despite the limited imbalance of material resources. Muqtedar Khan believes that the West should become aware of the new side of the Islamic civilization; it should accept the Islamic sociopolitical movement as a legitimate force and learn to regard it as an expression of the desire of millions of Muslims to live according to their rules rather than as a crop-up of extremist feelings of a minority.7
In recent years, it has become abundantly clear that global problems will defy resolution as long as there is no equal and constructive dialog between the West and the Muslim East. The sides must achieve mutual understanding and learn not to impose their ideologies on their partner. In other words, the East is prepared to talk to the West if and when the latter abandons its neocolonialist ap-
6 K. Khamzaoglu, "Vliianie proiskhodiashchikh v arabskom mire volneniy na Azerbaidzhan nevozmozhno—Direktor Instituta Vostokovedenia NANA," Information Agency 1 news.az, available at [http://www.1news.az/analytics/ 20110406092102814.html], 6 April, 2011.
7 See: M.A. Muqtedar Khan, "U.S. Foreign Policy and Political Islam: Interests, Ideas, and Ideology," Security Dialog, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 1998 (see also: Z.H. Bukhari, S.S. Nyang, M. Ahmad, "Muslims' Place in the American Public Square: Hope, Fears, and Aspirations," AltaMira Press, Walnut Creek, CA, 2004, pp. 84-108).
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proaches. In an effort to preserve its millennia-old culture and civilizational identity, the East stands opposed to all unificatory trends. Indeed, an equal dialog, mutually advantageous cooperation, and synthesis of values accumulated by the sides, as well as partnership of civilizations in the more distant future, are the prerequisites needed today to resolve the main contradictions.
The Role of Azerbaijan in Intercultural Dialog and Regional Integration
Azerbaijan, which has been actively developing its relations with the Muslim states since 1991 while also cooperating with the West, can play an important role in a constructive discussion between the West and the Muslim East. The country is a unique place where different cultures and civilizations meet at the crossroads between the North and the South and the East and the West.
Azerbaijan, which belongs to several Islamic and European organizations, cherishes the values of both civilizations and can become a bridge for spanning them. It not merely understands both sides in the developing conflict, but can also help them better understand each other.
The country, which has been known since hoary antiquity as the Gates to the Orient, also looks like the Gates to the West when seen from the opposite side. This explains why Azerbaijan has mastered the cultures of both civilizations and blended them into a single whole. This allows it to understand the West and the East and help them to unite.
The statistics and geography of the recent international events show that Azerbaijan, known all over the world as a country in which different cultures live side by side, has initiated the largest number of events relating to the dialog between cultures and civilizations. No wonder it is seen as a "civilizational bridge" of sorts in this process, the importance of which for mankind cannot be overestimated.
In antiquity, Azerbaijan played this role as a stretch of the Great Silk Road, which tied together the East and the West; today it is resolved to support the projects designed to play the same role: TRACECA, the Nabucco gas pipeline, and the Trans-Eurasian Information Super Highway Project. This means that the country's strategic position between the East and the West and several international routes which cross its territory motivates it to contribute to regional and international cooperation, integration, and dialog on a scale that complies with its geographic location.
Today, Azerbaijan is involved in and is coping successfully with international projects—the BTC oil pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. In the final analysis, this can be described as a solid foundation for intercultural dialog and a symbol of international and regional dialog.
Azerbaijan's role in regional integration cannot be properly appreciated outside the Caucasian context and without a clear picture of the stumbling blocks on the road to cooperation and full-scale economic development. Without this, it is impossible to appreciate the fairly complex problems encountered in the region, an important meeting place between the West and East, which, therefore, calls for a special approach.
Regrettably, in late-Soviet and post-Soviet history, the Caucasus and conflict have become inseparable concepts. In the late 1980s, the Caucasus became embroiled in very acute ethnopolitical conflicts and wars. Out of the eight armed ethnopolitical and civilian conflicts that flared up in the post-Soviet expanse, six occurred in the Caucasus.8 They are the Armenian-Azeri conflict over
8 See: S.M. Markedonov, "Separatizm na Bolshom Kavkaze v postsovetskiy period: predposylki, itogi, per-spektivy," Aktualnye problemy Evropy, No. 3, 2009, p. 39.
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Nagorno-Karabakh; the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts; the civil war in Georgia; and two conflicts in Russia (the Ossetian-Ingush and Russian-Chechen). This has made the Caucasus a breeding ground of separatist units.
The academic literature offers several paradigms applicable to the conflicts in the Caucasus, Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations having the greatest impact on the academic and political analysis of the Caucasian problems. Its author argued that civilizational identity rather than ideology or the economy is responsible for potential conflicts. By civilization he meant cultural unity and broad cultural identity, while he treated religion as a civilizational determinant. The bloodiest wars will unfold along the dividing lines of civilizations, the Caucasus, in his opinion, being one such line and a zone of contact doomed to become an area of civilizational clashes. As soon as the Soviet Union fell apart, the Caucasus became an arena of uncompromising conflicts. Samuel Huntington explained them by clashes of religious identities (Orthodoxy vs. Islam), which acquired special importance in the post-Soviet period. This accounted, according to Huntington, for the conflicts in Ka-rabakh and Chechnia.9
Other authorities in Caucasian developments disagree with the above. They are convinced that Huntington overestimates the role of the religious factor. Svante Cornell, for example, has dismissed this explanation as nothing more than a stereotype and an oversimplified analysis of these conflicts. Cornell, in turn, blames the conflicts on a combination of nationalism and national interests rather than on religious-civilizational contradictions.10
In actual fact, disintegration of the Soviet Union changed the geopolitical paradigm in the Caucasus and plunged it back into the days it was searching for its identity. Before the Russian Empire established itself in the region, religious identity was the main determining feature, whereas in our times, ethnic affiliation has become the main identity factor. Decline of the Communist ideology left a moral and ideological vacuum which was filled in due time with nationalism; this was when ethnon-ationalism began to rise in the Caucasus. Ethnopolitical and nationalist biases led to conflicts between states and inside states across the Greater Caucasus (three independent republics of the Central Caucasus and nine North Caucasian entities of the Russian Federation). In all cases, separatism was the main driving force; realization of separatist projects made it, if not entirely impossible, at least problematic to carry out political integration of different ethnic communities within the same state.
We all know that Armenia's territorial claims on Azerbaijan violated stability in the Central Caucasus and sent up national tension. The aggressive ethnic separatist movement Armenia established in Nagorno-Karabakh, which spread far and wide to envelop the Caucasus, set the dangerous trend in motion. Today, ethnic extremism and separatism as its product is one of the gravest ills of the Caucasus.
Not many countries can boast of a monoethnic population (comprising over 99 percent of people of the same ethnic group): they are mainly island countries which developed in natural isolation. Strange as it may seem, Armenia, with a population comprising 97.9 percent of Armenians, is the only monoethnic state in the multinational and polyconfessional Caucasus, where even neighboring villages might use different languages. It is not an island, but a landlocked country with multinational Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkey, and Georgia as its closest neighbors. In the past, Armenia was not monoethnic; when the Armenian S.S.R. set up in the present borders of the Republic of Armenia with Goyca and Zangezur within it, the number of Azeris in Armenia, according to different sources, was either equal to the number of Armenians or even larger. "Armenization" was deliberately pursued through numerous deportations and ethnic cleansing during Soviet times and even earlier, in the 19th century, when Russia established itself in the Caucasus. In 1828, Alexander Griboedov, Russian envoy to Tehran
9 See: S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Touchstone Books, New York, 1998, p. 138.
10 See: S.E. Cornell, "Religion as a Factor in Caucasian Conflicts," Civil Wars, Vol. 1, No. 3, November 1998, pp. 46-68.
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and responsible for resettlement of the Armenians, repeatedly informed the czar that the Armenians had been indulging in ill-advised anti-Muslim propaganda, even though the Muslims had been unceremoniously pushed out.11 From that time on, Azeris became victims of consistent ethnic cleansing which extended into Soviet times.
In 1948-1953, under Stalin's decree, Azeris were deported from Armenia in huge numbers. While the Crimean Tatars, Chechens, and others were moved away from their homeland under the formal pretext of "cooperation with German occupants," the Azeris were evicted just because they were Azeris.
In 1988-1989, the region was engulfed by another wave of deportations and ethnic cleansing: Russians (Molokans), Kurds, and other nationalities also lost their homes. According to incomplete data, no fewer than 200 Azeris were killed in Armenia; several dozens died brutal deaths; and about 240 thousand had to leave their homes.
Today, the Armenian side is using self-determination of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh (meaning its detachment from Azerbaijan) to justify its territorial claims on Nagorno-Karabakh (which is part of Azerbaijan). However, it must be pointed out that the right of nations to self-determination does not mean the "right to separation" or separatism. The right to self-determination gained currency when the worldwide colonial system fell apart. On 14 December, 1960, the U.N. adopted a Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which envisages that only colonial peoples have the right to self-determination, even going as far as the establishment of an independent state. The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh can hardly regard themselves as a colonial nation within the Azerbaijan Republic. The right of nations to self-determination should not be confused with the rights of minorities.
The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 speaks about the right to self-determination in terms of territorial integrity. If this is related to the problem of national minorities, we need to place the rights included in the Helsinki Final Act in the wider context of human rights. At the level of national minorities, we must discuss their cultural, language, religious rights, etc.
As members of the Council of Europe, Azerbaijan and Armenia are equally duty bound to abide by its conventions, the framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities being one of them. Art 21 of the Convention says: "Nothing in the present framework Convention shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity or perform any act contrary to the fundamental principles of international law and in particular of the sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States." This means that the Armenian minority of Azerbaijan may engage in self-determination within the bounds of this and similar other international legal instruments without infringing on Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.
Regrettably, the international organizations and large states that have shouldered the burden of settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are not determined enough to put pressure on Armenia to push it toward a constructive position in peace talks and stop misinterpreting the self-determination issue. This still unresolved conflict negatively affects all other conflicts across the Caucasus, since most of them are of a national and ethnic nature.
To prevent or promptly resolve these conflicts, the Western countries and international organizations involved in the process need to learn much more about the region, its ethnic composition, its past, and its geopolitical present. There is no other way to success.
The Caucasus is a unique melee of different ethnicities who speak different languages, profess different religions, and have different cultures. No wonder it is often called Babylon, or a museum of peoples. Today, it is home to around 50 nationalities, each of them with its own highly specific culture and language (some of them spoken by only a few hundred people), while large ethnic groups comprise several million members. The Caucasus inherited this ethnic diversity from antiquity; in the 6th-
11 See: A.S. Griboedov, "Zapiska o pereselenii armian iz Persii v nashi oblasti," in: Sochineniya, in two volumes, Vol. 2, Pravda Publishers, Moscow, 1971, pp. 339-341.
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5th centuries B.C., Aeschylus and Herodotus described it as a geographical region with a population that spoke different languages but had similar cultures and social order.
At the dawn of our era, Strabo (64/63 B.C.-23/24 A.D.) wrote: "There assemble at Dioscurias 70 or, according to some writers who are careless in their statements, 300 nations. All speak different languages, from living dispersed in various places and without intercourse."12 Thirty years later, Roman writer and scientist Pliny the Elder (c. 23-79 A.D.) wrote in his Natural History: "There were settled therein 300 Nations which used distinct Languages. And afterwards our Romans were forced to provide 130 Interpreters for the traffic with People."13
In the Middle Ages, Oriental scholars, likewise, were struck by this diversity. Abu al-Hasan Ali ibn al-Husayn al-Mas'udi (d. 956), a famous Arab geographer and traveler, called the Caucasus "the mountain of languages" because of the multitude of peoples and multitude of languages. In his Book of Notification and Review, he wrote: "There is a vast number of kingdoms and tribes in the mountains of Kabk (Caucasus). There are 72 tribes living there, each with its own king and own language, which differs from other languages."14 Somewhat later, in 977, Abdul Kasim ibn-Haukal, another Arab geographer, wrote: "The Kabk (Caucasus) range is enormous; they say there are 360 languages. I had denied this until I saw with my own eyes numerous cities each with its own language in addition to Azeri and Persian."15
Little has changed since that time: the Caucasus is still known for its ethnic diversity.
In these conditions, those countries and organizations indulgent toward Armenia's insistent demands that the self-determination principles should be absolutely applied would do well to think carefully about what will happen to the Caucasus if all nations and ethnicities were to follow in the Armenians' footsteps. Naturally this approach would become a precedent for settling other ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus, from which neither the local countries nor the West would benefit.
Some authors claim that since the Caucasus is a traditional area of Russia's interests, Moscow only needs to preserve the status quo in the Central Caucasus to consolidate its position and that it needs "manageable instability" in the region.
Those who say so are probably unaware that "manageable instability" is as dangerous as playing with fire. Instability and conflicts are like forest fires which spread much faster than they can be controlled.
Recent developments show that Russia is not insured against the escalation of ethnic conflicts. Early in the 1990s, there were several ethnonational movements (not counting the Chechen uprising) which appealed to the idea of "self-determination up to and including secession." The Caucasian peoples wanted to separate not only from Russia, but also from the republics in which they have formed distinct ethnic groups. In 1991, five republics were declared in Karachaevo-Cherkessia alone: the republics of Karachay, Cherkessia, Abaza, Batalpashinskaya Cossack, and Zelenchuk-Urup Cossack, to say nothing of the other North Caucasian entities of Russia.
Experts, meanwhile, warn that the situation in the Northern Caucasus today is distressing. In recent years the number of conflicts, terrorist acts, and murders in the Northern Caucasus has risen. Political scientist Mubariz Akhmedoglu, for example, deems it necessary to ask: "Moscow wants peace in the Caucasus while the freedom-loving Caucasian peoples are stirred up by the example of Armenian separatism. What can convince the million-strong people of Ingushetia that they cannot be a free state if 100 thousand people in Nagorno-Karabakh get away with declaring themselves a state?"16 He is convinced that as long as Moscow continues flirting with the Armenian separatists, they will de facto remain a factor of ethnic and national clashes in the Caucasus.
12 Strabo's Geography, Book XI, available at [http://rbedrosian.com/Classic/strabo11.htm].
13 Pliny's Natural History, in thirty-seven books, Books 1-3, Printed for the Club by G. Barclay, 1848, pp. 104-105.
14 I.A.Karaulov, "Svedenia arabskikh geografov IX-X vekov o Kavkaze, Armenii i Azerbaidzhane," in: Sbornik materialov dlia opisaniia mestnostey i plemen Kavkaza, Issue 38, Tiflis, 1908, p. 40.
15 Ibid., p. 97.
16 M. Akhmedoglu, "Karabakhskiy separatizm podzhigaet Kavkaz," Zerkalo, 7 January, 2011.
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Indeed, Russia is much more than the Northern Caucasus, which means that a wave of separatism would cause havoc in such a great and multinational country; this looks even more real against the background of the radical geopolitical transformations in the Middle East, which are spreading far and wide to neighboring regions.
The West should be interested in Karabakh settlement for the sake of regional security, peace, and stability. As a meeting place of energy, transport, and trade routes, the Caucasus is a vitally important region; continued conflicts may interfere with the large West-supported projects. The Central Caucasus is one of the world's strategically important geopolitical regions; today, it offers access to Central Asia that bypasses Russia and Iran. This means that the West will find it hard to deal with a host of tiny states in a relatively small unstable region while the rest of the world is globalizing and integrating. The unsettled regional conflicts not only damage economic and political interests, but also threaten the Western countries, since they could escalate at any moment into a large-scale war in direct proximity to Europe.
The local countries should be interested more than any others in conflict settlement. Armed conflicts have already claimed numerous lives, caused material losses and economic disintegration, and turned hundreds of thousands into refugees and temporary migrants. The unresolved conflicts are adding to economic disorganization of the Caucasian countries; the conflicts interfere with the countries' unhampered development of global and regional contacts and do not allow them to fully tap their potential.
The question is: What can serve as a common stimulus for the settlement of these conflicts? No matter how complicated, the question has an answer. By overcoming their internal conflicts, these countries can profit from closer economic ties and deeper integration partly because the TRACECA transport corridor and similar projects may prove critically important for the entire region.
As the main transit link and a country rich in oil and gas, Azerbaijan is in the center of these complicated geopolitical processes in the Caucasus; this enables it to consolidate its leading role in ensuring energy security for Europe and helps it to diversify energy sources. On the other hand, Azerbaijan is a rapidly developing country: the lion's share of the region's GDP is produced in Azerbaijan. It accounts for 80% of the economy of the Central Caucasus. As an economic leader of the Caucasus, Azerbaijan stands a good chance of becoming the region's driving force and first foundation stone of regional integration.
Conclusion
The East and the West are two branches of human culture, two civilizations, and two life styles. They are different in certain cultural respects and have different material values; they follow different cultural, civilizational, social-economic, political, and spiritual roads. On the other hand, they form a common world culture in which different values and mentalities coexist without conflicts.
This explains why intercultural dialog plays an important role in the worldwide sociocultural process; today, it has acquired additional importance for mankind. It should be said that intercultural dialog has been and remains vital in the development of mankind; for centuries, or even millennia, cultures have been mutually enriching each other to form a unique mosaic of human civilization.
On the whole, the willingness to enter a dialog and reach mutual understanding has acquired special importance. In the past, the cultures of the East and the West had nothing in common; today, there are obvious points of contact and mutual understanding. Interaction between cultures and their dialog are far from consistent and far from unambiguous. Cultures not only interact, but also mutually complement and enrich each other. The idea of intercultural dialog is based on the idea of human values. This process leads to more profound cultural self-development and mutual enrichment stemming from the cultural experience of individual cultures and of world culture as a whole.
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Intercultural dialog presupposes comprehension and respect of the axiological system of other cultures; stereotypes should be pushed aside, while the original features of various cultures should lead to mutual enrichment and integration of cultures in the world cultural context. It is important to discern human values in the cultures involved in intercultural dialog; this dialog is absolutely indispensable for mankind's continued existence.
Azerbaijan as a bridge between the East and the West plays an important role in this dialog. The republic has many centuries of experience in this sphere, which it is willing to share with others. It synthesizes the Eastern and Western cultural traditions; the dual nature of the Azeri culture makes it an intermediary between the East and the West.
