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СТАТЬИ
А. Джокич, П.В. Иванов, Д.И. Плотников
ДЕКОНСТРУКЦИЯ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ ИНСТИТУТОВ И ГРАЖДАНСКОГО ОБЩЕСТВА КАК КАТАЛИЗАТОР ЭТНИЧЕСКИХ, РЕЛИГИОЗНЫХ И РАСОВЫХ КОНФЛИКТОВ НА ПРИМЕРЕ РОССИИ, ЮГОСЛАВИИ И ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ КОНГО
Аннотация
Объектом анализа статьи является деконструкция гражданского общества в послереволюционном российском государстве (1917-1920 гг.), в послевоенной Федеративной Народной Республике Югославии (1945-1948 гг.) и в Конго в пост колониальный период (1960-е гг.). Авторы анализируют последствия этих политических процессов и то, как он был спровоцирован ввиду деконструкции гражданского общества. Исследование базируется на парадигме рационального выбора, историческом ин-ституционализме и теории конфликта. Основная гипотеза основана на абсолютной важности существования гражданского общества - которое проистекает из демократических институтов, многопартийной системы, свободных выборов, учета эклектичных особенностей, общего представительства различных этнических, религиозных и ра-
А. Djokic, P. Ivanov, D. Plotnikov
DECONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY AS A CATALYST OF ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND RACIAL CONFLICTS ON THE EXAMPLE OF RUSSIA, YUGOSLAVIA, AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
Abstract
The object of analysis of the following article is the deconstruction of civil society in the post-revolutionary Russian state (1917-1920), the postwar Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (1945-1948), and the Congo after decolonization (1960's). The authors will also try to analyze the consequences of these political processes and how they were triggered by the deconstruction of civil society. The research will be based on the rational choice paradigm, historical institutional-ism and the theory of conflict. The main hypothesis will be based on the absolute importance of the existence of civil society - which stems from democratic institutions, multiparty system, free elections, general representation of various ethnic, religious and racial groups -for the stability and proper societal development of any country. These three regions were specially chosen because
совых групп - для стабильности и надлежащего общественного развития любого государства. Выбор данных регионов обусловлен возможностью иллюстрации различных политических традиций и опыта, имеющих идентичность в том, что все они, но подвергались тотальной коммунистической тоталитарной деконструкции гражданского общества.
Ключевые слова :
гражданское общество, этнические, религиозные, расовые конфликты, государственное и национальное строительство, демократические институты, Конго, Россия, Югославия.
Deconstruction of civil society institutions in the south of Russia during the Civil War of 1917-1920
In modern political science, the transition from the study of classical political institutions, such as the state and its mechanisms, to the study of social structures is becoming more and more noticeable. Indeed, in modern democratic political systems socio-political institutions represented by civil society play a significant role in the process of decision making and the implementation of decisions. The Russian political system has its own unique specifics in this matter, while the institutions of civil society in Russia were formed during the revolution of 1905 and during the Civil War of 1917-1922, they were either completely eliminated or transformed into Soviet authorities.
The process of formation of civil society is rightly associated with the events of the Russian Revolution of 1905, because before these events the majority of socio-political organizations were outlawed and those regional and nongovernmental organizations that existed were under the complete control of the state. This is largely due to the peculiarities of political culture in Russia and the autocratic political regime. Because of this, society had no mechanisms of interaction with the authorities and their interests were not represented. The event known to historians as "Bloody Sunday" became the catalyst of the revolution. The use of armed force provoked mass protests and demands of the population to create a system of institutions of popular representation, the main purpose of which was to ensure a dialogue between society and the political elites of the Russian Empire. Thus, under these conditions emperor Nicholas II issued a manifesto which proclaimed: "We entrust the government to fulfill our unshakable
they represent different political traditions and experiences, but were subjected to the same kind of communist totalitarian deconstruction of civil society.
Key words :
Civil society, ethnic, religious, racial conflicts, state and nation building, democratic institutions, stability, communist totalitarian regimes, Congo, Russia, Yugoslavia.
will: 1. Give the population the unshakable foundation of civil liberty on the basis of the real integrity of the person, freedom of conscience, speech, assembly, and unions 2. Without stopping elections to the State Duma, to facilitate the participation in the Duma to the furthest extent possible, corresponding to the multiplicity of the term remaining before the convocation of the Duma, for those classes of the population that are now completely deprived of electoral rights, thus ushering the further development of the general electoral right in accordance with the newly established legislative order..." [1].
The publication of the manifesto launched a dynamic process of formation of new state and public institutions in the Russian Empire. In accordance with state's political culture the formation of institutions proceeded along three main vectors. The first vector was a political one which assured that the State Duma was formed, alongside a range of political parties, the activities of which were now supported by the laws of the empire. Also, within the framework of this vector, the system of local community institutions had been developed, through the creation of legal framework allowing provincial agitation and provincial meetings, as well as strengthening the traditions of self-government in the Cossack regions. The second vector was dedicated to the labor issue. Within its framework trade unions and societies were actively formed, as well as workers' control bodies. The development of this vector faced many difficulties for it contradicted the interests of economic and political elites of the state. The third vector was the formation of public organizations under the trusteeship of the Russian Orthodox Church. This direction covered mostly public organizations that did not put forward political demands, but at the same time actively interacted with government authorities.
The First World War and the February Revolution of 1917 made it impossible for civil society to be finally formed into a single system. Civil society made up a set of institutions and organizations that did not have a clear structure of interaction. Moreover, it is especially important to note that until 1917 many restrictions on ethnic and religious grounds remained in Russia, thus civil society was forced to form inside constraining boundaries.
The coming to power of the new government and the overthrow of the monarchy destroyed the basis of the imperial political system, which led to the need to create new systems of interaction between government and society. That is why from the first days the following course was proclaimed in the declaration of the Russian Provisional Government:
Freedom of speech, press, unions, meetings and strikes, with the extension of political freedoms to military personnel within the limits allowed by military necessities;
Cancellation of all class, religious and national restrictions;
Immediate preparation for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, equal, secret and direct voting, which will establish the form of government and the constitution of the country;
Replacing the police force with the elected authorities of the people's militia, which are subordinate to the local self-government;
Elections of the authorities of local self-government on the basis of universal, direct, equal and secret ballot [2].
According to the text of the declaration, we see the impetus the government sought to impart to the development of public structures. The society thus had the opportunity to control the functions of law and order through the creation of the people's militia. In addition, the declaration abolished the previous restrictions, which opened up a wide range of opportunities for society. It is particularly important to note that the Provisional Government sought to reform the voting rights and create a system of universal, equal and secret ballot regarding on all levels of government.
However, under the conditions of a systemic crisis, this declaration led to an even greater destruction of public institutions. Because of this, the traditional institutions of the State Duma and local self-government were eliminated, and their place was occupied by ad hoc councils, committees and unions. The expansion of freedom of speech led to the radicalization of the political demands of various parties, all of which led to the fact that anarchy and disintegration were increasingly observed in society. General Denikin described this process in his memoirs: "If at the beginning of a revolution the so-called 'public committees', or 'councils of public organizations', were really public, the representation of the union of cities and Zemstvos, the Duma, trade unions, cooperatives, magistracies etc., the situation deteriorated significantly when these public committees broke up into class and party organizations. The local authority passed to the councils of the R. and S. deputies, and in places - to force, before the introduction of law and 'democratize' socialist Dumas, not much different from halfbolshevistic tips" [3]. Thus, in the summer of 1917, in practice, the system of civil society and local self-government was transformed into the party organs of the socialist parties. A similar trend is observed throughout the revolution and
the Civil War in Russia, when all the institutions of power were absorbed by the party organs of the Bolsheviks or their organizations. This led to the fact that this practice became common in the struggle for power with regard to all Bolshevik and Communist parties in various regions of the world, such as Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and South America.
Another important feature in the conditions of the "democratization" of the political system of Russia was the striving of the border regions of the empire to form their own states, which manifested itself throughout 1917 in outbreaks of separatism and irredentism in various regions of the country. Since the beginning of the First World War, organized groups advocating broad autonomy appeared in a number of regions. This problem was most acutely reflected in the example of Poland and Finland. The overthrow of the monarchy led to the fact that many border regions began to strive, not for autonomy within Russia, but to form their own state and such a policy led to the fact that regional public organizations were isolated from the center and were integrated into new political systems. Such fragmentation led to even greater weakening of the civil society, and in the conditions of a systemic crisis we see how the links between various actors and institutions of civil society were broken.
The policy pursued by the Provisional Government led to the fact that all three vectors of the emerging civil society significantly strengthened their position, but at the same time they all denied the government their political support. That is why the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in October 1917 became possible. The civil society organizations that survived up to this point did not want to keep the existing balance of power, as it was not effective, and they were not aware of the possible threat that stemmed from the establishment of the new government.
The coming to power of the Bolsheviks interrupted a short period of democratic freedoms, at which point the transition to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia began. At first, multiple restrictions on freedom of speech began to appear informally, and then legally, as early as 10 days after the Bolsheviks came to power the following resolution of the Central Executive Committee was issued: "The closure of bourgeois newspapers was caused not only by purely military needs during the uprising and the suppression of counterrevolutionary attempts, but was also a necessary transitional measure for establishing a new regime in the printing industry, a regime in which capitalists-owners of printing houses and newspapers could not become autocratic manu-
facturers of public opinions... Restoration of the so-called 'freedom of the press', i.e. a simple return of printing houses and newspapers to capitalists — poisoners of the consciousness of the people — would be an unacceptable surrender to the will of capital, the surrender of one of the most important positions of the workers and peasants' revolution, i.e. measure that would definitely be counterrevolutionary" [4]. After the establishment of restrictions, they began to be enforced by the use of force. The activities of the Cadet party were banned, as well as the activities of those accused of counter-revolutionary activities. All this led to the fact that the activities of civil society institutions in the territories occupied by the Bolsheviks became impossible and representatives of these institutions were forced to leave the RSFSR for the territory occupied by White organizations and armies.
The nearest center of resistance to the Bolshevik occupied central Russia was the "White" south, which had formed by the spring of 1918. The power of the Volunteer Army and Cossack Atamans was established here, which presupposed a certain authoritarian dictatorship, but at the same time provided ample opportunities for the activities of social and political organizations, the exception being extreme right-wing monarchist organizations and representatives of socialist parties and public organizations. For representatives of all other civil society organizations, the "White" south had become an opportunity to find refuge and continue activities. The migration of civil society institutions from 1917 to 1919 took place in three stages: the first stage was Moscow, the second Kiev and the third Odessa and South Russia. Such migration led to the fact that the traditional ties of civil society institutions were finally destroyed. By the beginning of 1919, there was not a single socio-political organization left in Russia that could deal with real aggregation and articulation of public interests within the entire state.
At the same time, the Bolsheviks pressed to further fragment civil society in the rear of the White armies. For this purpose they allowed certain prominent public figures to travel to the territories beyond their control. This was done in order to continue and expand the conflict within the remaining structural elements and institutions of civil society.
Speaking of the "White" south of Russia, it is important to note that Odessa became the main center of all public organizations after its occupation by French troops. It was here that the remaining representatives of the Russian elite gathered and the "London" hotel became the center of activity of the ma-
jority of public organizations. Contemporaries describe the hotel in such a way: "It was poorly lit, but the view in its narrow corridors was incredible. Figures of various celebrities of Moscow and Petrograd from the world of politics, industry, and finance flashed in the crowd" [5].
However, despite the fact that representatives of many socio-political organizations gathered in Odessa, the institutions of civil society were unsystematic and chaotic in nature. Maevsky's memoirs vividly describe this situation: "In London, once every hour, all the news and rumors that arrived from the front and from other areas of the abandoned north; every possible project of rescue and pacification of Russia was created here, indignations were expressed, curses were pronounced and ... hopes were gained" [6].
A similar situation existed in the south of Russia because of the conflict, which was actively expanding within civil society. There were many organizations in the south that were united by nothing else but the struggle against Bolshevism in Russia. "The most influential in Odessa were the positions of the SRUR, the Union for the Renaissance of Russia, the Council of Zemstvos and Cities of Southern Russia, the National Center and the South Russian National Center. These organizations were constantly at odds with each other, which caused extreme surprise to the French" [7].
It is important to note that General Denikin, as the de facto commander in chief of the "White" south, did not accept attempts at a political settlement of the conflict in society. This is due to an attempt to win over the widest possible range of political forces united only by the platform of patriotism and the struggle against the Bolsheviks. This political course was called the "middle line", about which the prominent White politician of that period, Nikanor Vasilievich Savich, wrote: "Our middle line caused concern amongst some classes, the discontent amongst others and created a void in the sense of lack of social support that was felt all around" [8].
The main attempt to form a unified system of civil society in the south of Russia was an attempt to rally all organizations around the Orthodox Church. For this purpose the command of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia and the Special Conference actively supported the activities of the Orthodox clergy and sought to create a system of public institutions around the ROC. However, these attempts, with the top brass refusing to politically regulate the processes of formation of the system of civil society during the time of war, were insufficient. This conflict in society led to the exacerbation of conflicts within the White
south. The representatives of Cossack autonomous regions and political parties became increasingly radical and demanded new decisions. The outcome of these conflicts was the beginning of the complete self-liquidation of most civil society institutions, and then the elimination of the entire "White" south.
Summarizing the results of this paper, the following conclusions can be drawn: during the Civil War in Russia the Bolsheviks applied the following basic mechanisms for the deconstruction of civil society:
1. Substitution of the concepts of society and the party in the political consciousness of the masses. Any activity against the party is an activity against the whole society.
2. Support for fragmentation and conflicts within civil society.
3. Repression or destruction of the most active political and public entities beyond the political system.
4. Conducting targeted activities to discredit the non-Bolshevik political system, through active propaganda and manipulation of public consciousness.
The Deconstruction of Civil Society in Postwar Yugoslavia as a Catalyst of the Civil War - a Rational Choice and Institutional Approach
This article aims to provide one of the possible explanations of the violent breakup of The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia through a mixed methodological approach that encompasses both rational choice theory as presented by Roger D. Petersen in his book: Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe and historical institution-alism as presented by Reinhard Bendix in his book Nation-Building & Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order [9]. Petersen's approach draws it's meaning from the way social groups react based on emotions, that can be both collective and individual, but always function on a social basis [10]. The four main emotions are designated as: Fear, Hatred, Resentment and Rage. The Croatian-Serbian conflict is explained through Fear and Resentment, while the Bosnian conflict was based mostly on Resentment. The various groups in Yugoslavia were threatened in different ways in accordance to their own historical experiences and narratives, but it is the goal of this paper to show that those narratives and the social, collective emotions they caused, could have been different if the communist regime of Josip Broz did not totally deconstruct Yugoslav civil society, as well as it's multiparty and partially democratic system. Historical in-stitutionalism is needed to explain the historical context and longevity of ethnic
conflict in Yugoslavia between Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) based on the sociological term of institutions as longstanding norms, rules and conventions, but also the politological meaning that includes electoral and political systems. Historical institutionalism will also help explain what the end product of communist totalitarian form of political authority combined with already present autocratic tendencies in the Balkan region was. A background of political life and ethnic relations in Yugoslavia will be presented in order to better understand the transitional period from the multiparty system to the one-party totalitarian state from 1945 to 1948.
Yugoslavia was formed on December 1st 1918 under the official title of Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The name Yugoslavia was adopted in 1929 after king Alexander I Karageorgevich suspended the Constitution in the midst of a political crisis that threatened the sparking of civil war. From the very beginning the nation building in Yugoslavia faced serious problems mainly because it consisted of various nations most of all based on conflicting religions -Orthodox Christianity for Serbs, Roman-Catholicism for Croats and Slovenes, and Islam for Bosnian Muslims. As it would be clearly shown in events that followed, the conflict between Croats and Serbs would prove to be most dangerous to the fragile Yugoslav state. It is not too difficult to discern why that was the case - Serbs consisted almost half of the population of Yugoslavia and the most populous minority were the Croats. Also, Yugoslavia consisted of nations that had different approaches to politics in general, as well as different experiences when it came to political, party and electoral systems they were accustomed too. Traian Stoianovich an American historian of Serbian descent and a professor of history at Rutgers University claimed that the peoples that formed Yugoslavia had various and different political experiences, such as: Byzantine, Carolingian, Venetian, Habsburgian, Ottoman, Hungarian and finally Austrian [11]. In practice, the Kingdom of Serbia prior to the First World War was a democratic constitutional monarchy [12], while The Austro-Hungarian Empire was an authoritarian state that persecuted national and religious minorities. This can be summarized by Bendix's term of long-lasting historical political authority that cannot be described by either traditional or modern, but is a stable transitional mixture of the two [13]. This is important because this paper attempts to demonstrate how the communist regime in postwar Yugoslavia violently deconstructed these various traditions in an attempt to create a unified totalitarian socio-political system,
but succeeded only in creating a new type of authoritarian leaders that came to power in the 90's.
Basically, from the first popular elections in Yugoslavia in 1920 the scene was set for future conflicts - Serbs divided into two parties, the People's Radical Party (won 17,7% of the vote) that represented Serbs from the former Kingdom of Serbia and the Yugoslav Democratic Party (won 19,9% of the vote) which mostly represented Serbs from Austria-Hungary as well as some moderate Croats, while on the other hand the Croats were represented by the Croatian Peasant Party (won 14,3% of the vote) [14]. The Croat representatives supported the idea of a federal Yugoslavia, while the Serbian parties wanted an integral Yugoslavia (the Radicals were more inclined to Serbian nationalism, and the Democrats to cooperation and compromise with the Croats but not at the expense of the idea of integral Yugoslavia). But what is even more important is the relative success of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (mostly in areas outside the territory of the former Kingdom of Serbia) which won 12,4% of the vote, but was banned the following year after the assassination of the Yugoslav minister of internal affairs Milorad Drashkovich (Milorad Draskovic) [15]. Hence, Yugoslavia was torn from within by the Serbo-Croatian conflict and the looming communist threat. The Croats were not interested in becoming a part of the grater Yugoslav nation, while the Serbian parties embraced the new nation building process offered by King Alexander I and the intellectual elite. For their part, the communists were not interested both in the Yugoslav nation movement, or the nationalistic sentiments of the Croatian side, their only concern was radically reshaping both the social and political order of the newly formed state. Importantly other leftist parties continued to exist and freely operate, at least until 1929, that includes both the Agrarian Party of Dragoljub Jovanovich (Dragoljub Jovanovic) and even the Republican Party of Jasha Prodanovich (Jasa Prodanovic), which were later members of the communist led Popular Coalition Front until their parties were both banned by the communist regime in 1948 [16]. The Agrarian Party was moderately socialist and received moderate support (around 7%) on multiple election cycles, while the Republican Party was more radical in its demands and mainly uninfluential, receiving less than 1% of the popular vote.
While the Yugoslav project faced problems and wasn't democratic by nature (in a sense that its primary goal was state and nation building and not achieving civil rights) civil society still thrived and political parties that repre-
sented various ethnic groups were present and active. Even after the crisis of 1929 and the two-year suspension of the Constitution active political life and social dialogue continued, albeit in a more volatile tone. Prior to the World War II and the invasion of Yugoslavia by Germany that followed in 1941 it cannot be claimed that Serbs or Croats were totally divided, on the contrary, in 1924 the pro-Serbian Democratic Party split into two groups, the first supported the Serbian stance of integral Yugoslavia and Yugoslav nation building, while the Independents led by Svetozar Pribichevich (Svetozar Pribicevic) supported the Croat view of a federal Yugoslavia [17]. This was made possible by the relatively free press, and unhindered party activism, as well as universal voting rights (excluding only women) [18]. All ethnic and religious minorities actively participated in various electoral cycles, those in: 1920, 1923, 1925, 1927, 1935 and 1938. The elections of 1931 were not free as voters were presented only with a single list of candidates supporting the royal dictatorship of King Alexander. The king's dictatorship lasted from 1929 to 1934, which were the years that Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini came to power in Germany and Italy, which drastically changed the German and Italian relations with Yugoslavia. Hitler's Germany, alongside with Mussolini's fascist Italy, started to openly support, train and arm Croatian extremists. That had great impact on political life in Yugoslavia, which was already threatened by fascist Hungary from the north, and revanchist undemocratic Bulgaria from the east. In the end it was a matter of state security and basic survival of the Yugoslav state that ushered the short-lived era of personal dictatorship of King Alexander I. In Petersen's terms, King Alexander's actions, while necessary to preserve the unity of the Yugoslav state only contributed to that instrumental emotion - Resentment, that the Croats already felt towards the Serb majority who they perceived as the dominant and threatening actor [19].
People's Radical Party and the Democratic Party were two dominant parties which vied for power and both mainly represented Serbs which proves that there was no unified "Serbian front" that would oppose the Croats. The truth is that in multiple governments the representatives of the most prominent Croat party - the Croatian Peasant Party, held ministerial posts and actively participated in the affairs of state. This is also true for the Slovenes whose undisputed leader was Anton Koroshets (Anton Korosec) (Slovene People's Party), and Bosniaks whose leader at this period was Mehmed Spaho (Yugoslav Muslim Organization). The Croatian extremists in the form of fascist Ustasha and ultranationalist Croatian Party of Rights, from which they stemmed, were few (for
example Croatian Party of Rights received only 10,880 votes in the elections of 1920, or 0,7%, while in elections of 1923 it received only 0,4% of the vote) [20]. The mainly Serbian fascist Yugoslav National Movement also received little support, never wining more than 1% of the vote [21]. This data shows that both the Croatian and Serbian extremists were marginalized and did not play an important role in Yugoslav society. This was made possible only by the existence of a multiparty system, free-press, right of assembly and free speech, all of which were non-existent during the communist era.
In the last years of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia the integral Yugoslav project was abandoned and the Croatian territory was formed on 19 May 1940 as an administrative region of Yugoslavia called the Banovina of Croatia, and the Yugoslav Radical Union (the reformed Radical Party) and the Croatian Peasant Party, then led by Vladko Machek (Vladko Macek), formed a coalition after the Croatian local elections of 1940 [22]. The following year Yugoslavia would be attacked by the Axis forces, occupied and divided amongst the victors. It is important to note that Hitler's regime brought the before mentioned Croatian extremists - Ustashas, to power in independent Croatia, while in occupied Serbia German military command also relayed on the Serbian extremists of the Yugoslav National Movement. All of the Serbian and Croatian highly respected and popular politicians refused to cooperate with the national-socialists and all moderate pre-war parties were forbidden and their members persecuted. For example the most prominent representative of the Croats, Vladko Machek, was interned in Jasenovac concentration camp in which several hundred thousand Serbs and Jews would be killed by the Ustasha regime supported by Hitler [23]. This is a rather striking example as to the quality of civil society in prewar Yugoslavia. During the course of the war two largest resistance movements will be formed, one would be led by General Dragoljub Mihailovich (Dragoljub Mihailovic) a Yugoslavian patriot and monarchist with moderate political views and the other was a communist movement led by Josip Broz who would become a longstanding authoritarian president of Yugoslavia after the war. Broz's Partisan movement proclaimed itself the liberator of all peoples of Yugoslavia and bringer of people's democracy [24], while it was not clear from whom would the peoples of Yugoslavia be liberated if they already were represented by their own parties and what exactly was democratic about a movement that a few years later would ban all other parties except the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Broz during the war operated under the directive of the VII Congress of the
Comintern which stated that the communist resistance movements should operate under the guise of a wide coalition of antifascist parties and resisters that would later be known under the official title Popular Front.
After the war only a few unpopular parties would join the Popular Front, such as the Agrarian Party and the Republican Party, there would be no Croatian, Slovenian or Bosniak parties involved in the front since the Communist Party of Yugoslavia deemed the Croatian Peasant Party, Yugoslav Muslim Organization and the Slovene People's Party as collaborators of the old regime [25], alongside with the most popular Serbian prewar party the Yugoslav Radical Union [26]. Thus the minority nations of Yugoslavia were basically left without any democratic representatives, while the majority of the members of the Partisan movement, especially in Croatia and Bosnia were Serbs. This meant that Serbs were disproportionately represented (in lower and middle levels of government and the security forces) both in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina for a prolonged period of time which, in Peterson's terms, only heightened the Fear of the Bosniaks and the Resentment for Serbs on the Croatian side. This latent conflict would later explode in Crotian and Bosniak nationalist movements of the 1970's [27] and finally in open war during the 90's. On the other hand, banning all pro-Serbian parties meant a growing discontent amongst the Serbs from the Socialist Republic of Serbia who started to believe that Yugoslavia was no longer in their interest, which gave fruit to more extreme ideas in form of Greater Serbia that would become almost dominant during the 90's.
The only predominant Serbian party which was not banned from the start was the liberal Democratic Party, then led by Milan Grol, but since he refused to participate in the Popular Front feeling that it was an authoritarian movement his party would soon also be banned and he himself arrested. Only the Popular Front participated in the elections of 1945 which were organized by the communist regime for the benefit of Britain and The United States. The Democratic Party boycotted the elections stating the communist curtailing of freedom of speech and assembly as the main reason for its actions. Soon after the elections the Constitution was changed which centered the power in the hands of Josip Broz, making the parliament an irrelevant rubber stamp institution [28]. In the following year Josip Broz would make a speech during the Second Congress of the Popular Front in which he would state that: "All prewar parties have discredited themselves and lost the right to speak in the name of the people. They have demonstrated their incapability to govern the country and their existence has
lost all meaning and has become redundant in the current state order" [29]. Prior to this speech, Dragoljub Jovanovich the leader of the only moderately popular prewar party that agreed to participate in the Popular Front - the Agrarian Party, was arrested and sentenced to nine years in prison for high treason [30]. The next year Broz attended the Third Congress of the Popular Front and claimed that the programme of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia should also be the program of the Front itself [31]. At the same time the totalitarian rule of the communists was firmly established and the Yugoslav secret police known as UDBA (State Security Administration) had received the green light to begin widespread purges [32].
In a brief period between 1945 and 1948 the multiparty system of Yugoslavia would be completely deconstructed, which was the real goal of the communists after achieving power as a part of the Popular Front. This in turn would mean that the peoples of Yugoslavia have been left without any kind of democratically elected representatives and freedom of speech that would unable a constructive social discourse and ultimately lead to triumph of the nationalist extremists of the 90's. In a historical institutionalist sense communist totalitarian state further developed autocratic tendencies that already had roots in the political traditions and norms of prewar Yugoslavia as well as its constituent nations and in the end produced a new kind of authoritarian nationalist politicians such as Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, Alija Izetbegovich (Alija Izetbegovic) in Bosnia and Slobodan Miloshevich (Slobodan Milosevic) in Serbia. In the end, totalitarian political authority combined with the one-party system would make the violent breakup of Yugoslavia inevitable.
Political metamorphosis and deconstruction of civil society institutions in the DRC
The key point of the African feature of governance and public image is that when analyzing the initial structural elements of the political nature from a historical point of view, there is a clear connection with the European political evolution within the framework of the selective identity of some political institutions, from the moment and prerequisites of their origin (sociocultural and ethnic) before their implementation (the formation of the country). However, at the stage of creating the first proto-states, the similarities end.
Thus, by the beginning of the 13th century, on the territory of the modern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), various states emerged that were identical
in their type to the quasi-monarchist system. Partially unitary Luba and Lund appeared, as well as the multi-ethnic Bakuba conglomerate, which was the result of mass migration.
As a matter of fact, all the listed states were the result of social necessity, synthesized on the basis of the linguistic ability of the people of the Bakongo and the Bateqe to interact with each other. The catalyst was the behavioral component of the mentioned tribes and their animist beliefs that influenced them, unique to the experience of the whole continent from the point of view of a greater ambition for more dominance. This is also reflected in the pan-European civilization experience presented in the diagram of the starting political genesis.
Table 1. Diagram of the political genesis of the European civilization
linguistic foundation
territorial community
religious »(metaphysical) regulator
Therefore, regardless of the anthropological and eugenic peculiarities of the representatives of numerous ethnic groups that formed the Congolese Kingdom, there is a possibility of development of the political models of state and society building introduced from foreign factors - alien only at the first glance. However, the planned development of the region was cut short in a completely natural way based upon the principle of "the strong absorbs the weak". To a large extent, the beginning of the destabilization of the Congolese proto-statehood was initiated by the emergence of numerous representatives of the Arab world who were mainly engaged in organizing the extraction of human resources used as slaves and their subsequent sale with transportation. In view of the poorly developed shipbuilding and maritime industry, Arab traders resorted to the help of representatives of a more skilled maritime workforce — the Portuguese, Spaniards, and the British. In fact, by constructing the slave trade, the private sector destroyed and enslaved Congolese proto-statehood. Furthermore, the Portuguese Empire took total control over the people of the Bakongo, right up to the first turning point in the history of the Congolese in 1885. From 1885 to 1908, the "Independent State of the Congo" became a personal patrimony of the Belgian King Leopold II. In fact, this country was not even a full-fledged
state, and was actually a large financial enterprise, similar to early Rhodesia. Instead of administrative leadership, there were royal emissaries, instead of branches of the economy, the total exploitation of the local population in the mining and agricultural sector. The Force Publique, a security organization, was in most cases responsible for punitive limb mutilation and death sentences aimed against the Congolese workers.
The result of the "Independent Congo" period was the complete hegemony of the colonial center in Belgium, which on one hand stopped the Arab slave trade, but on the other simply abolished the entire governmental experience of the Congolese, their political culture and social stability, in order to assert control over their society and in accordance with the mercantile interests of Belgian businessmen. The fact that war crimes and other atrocities were mostly committed by African mercenaries, with the permission of the European command, only increased, not only interethnic hostility between the tribes, but also the skepticism directed towards the presence of Europeans on the "black continent".
So, by 1908 (describe the arrival of Arab slavers, Portuguese and the arrival of Belgians), and thus until 1960, when as a result of historical upheavals the economically weakened Belgian Kingdom was forced to abandon its permanent presence in the Congo, in order to limit its financial investments in the region. Thus, the independent formation of state institutions had begun, which for more than two centuries were in a rudimentary state.
The Congolese colonial experience is bivalent in its own way. That is, there are both negative aspects of the presence of the colonial center in a particular region, and positive ones. On the one hand, compulsory intervention, first by the Belgian monarch personally, and then by the Belgian state as a whole, in one way or another, contributed to the development of otherwise backward societal processes in the Congo. In exchange for economic and demographic exploitation, the metropole voluntarily or involuntarily financed the infrastructure, education, medical care and forced cultural integration of the Congolese tribes. As a matter of fact, being the culprit behind the backwardness, the colonial center also tried to correct the same backwardness. It was beneficial for big business to keep society in a half-living state to simplify control over the market of precious metals and minerals, but the permanent presence of huge numbers of subjects forced the Belgians to create a comfortable living environment for them. Ethnic integration processes should not be ruled out either, since the Congolese had the opportunity to achieve a common nationality and, conse-
quently, improve the quality of their own lives. The fragmented, almost autonomous existence, of the majority of small tribes disappeared and was replaced by regional demographic stratification. The presence of a single linguistic communicator, even if it was forced by the metropole, paved the way for the unification of the entire region. There arose an opportunity to unify society and trade, whilst improving the household and regulatory component. Having a common household and language foundation, society began to rally, and the presence of educated representatives of the tribes gave rise to the native elite, which in turn sought independence from the metropole.
The concept of utilitarian paternalism with regard to the overseas colonies continued to exist even after 1908, the only difference was the formal changing of name of the state. In the place of the degraded political and cultural eclecticism, the colonial center began to develop a progressive pan-European party-political culture - the organization of the vertical governance. The social disorientation of the majority of Congolese that followed these changes become the starting point for the growth of the marginal sentiments of its subjects and this fact would remain the catalyst for the emergence of both regional conflicts and major national crises in the Congo region for decades to come.
The mid-20th century thus became the point of no return for the whole Congolese society. Under the pressure of numerous factors, the Belgian Kingdom was forced to make concessions not only to appease the world community and the local political elites that were forming, but also because of major economic and demographic upheavals after the two world wars, where Belgium found itself almost at the epicenter of events. By 1950, in view of the liberalization of the metropole itself, the rights and freedoms of the colony's inhabitants were expanded. Autonomous resistance of the local ruling authorities was able to be formally organized, and as a result the first political blocs and parties, like Joseph Kasavubu's ABAKO, or Patrice Lumumba's aggressive left-wing populist groups were formed.
The idea of a systematic transition of colonial Congo to independence existed even in earlier periods, since direct Belgian control could simply be replaced by a puppet government, thereby solving a huge number of domestic and foreign policy problems, but amid growing protest sentiments, the need for accelerated decolonization of Congo become obvious.
In the 1960 the Belgian Kingdom officially released its colony and the Congo become independent. It was then that the first motive of the future crisis
arose, a consequence of the mistakes of the colonial center of the past centuries — the absence of political institutions and culture. Careless attempt at simply implementing the European state paradigm alien to African eclectic political history resulted in tremendous armed conflict. The lack of identity between the representatives of the elites and the ideological fragmentation made it necessary to seek outside help, instead of negotiating between each other. Patrice Lumumba sought support from the World Socialist International, while the representatives of ABACO were unwilling to accept strong communist influence over the state of affairs in the Congo. Meanwhile, the leaders of the largest and richest Congolese province of Katanga, observed the accelerating destabilization of the country, made plans to unilaterally obtain autonomy, thus dooming the already weakened state.
Moise Tsombe was a pioneer in the revival of Congolese political culture. Being a pragmatic leader, he turned for the first time to the deontological principles of building a system in which both white and black Congolese will be able to build a symbiotic coexistence under a single government denominator, where the interests of the ethnic majority will be taken into account, but the social and economic model will be identical to the European one, with amendments to regional nuances and conventions. At the same time, the province of Katanga had all of the natural resources necessary to exist as an independent and sovereign subject, but its human resources and army were vastly inferior to those of the federal center in Kinshasa. The project of an independent Katanga, whit the help of intermediaries from Belgium, was implemented during the "Simba Rebellion" [33], but ultimately failed. Nonetheless, the supporters of Pierre Mulele, a follower of Patrice Lumumba, attempted to achieve their political goals with the help of terrorist attacks and cruel massacres of the civilian population (limb mutilation, sexual crimes, the elimination of children and the elderly in particularly cruel ways, and even cannibalism were commonplace) [34]. Populism - which was central to the doctrines of both Lumumba and Mulele - presents the substitution of concepts and falsification of information. It is noteworthy that despite the atrocities committed by supporters of the ideas of Mulele and Lumumba, the factual rhetoric of the representatives of the revolutionary forces was somewhat different. In accordance with the mix of quasi-Marxism and quasi-Maoism, which these groups adhered to, emphasis was placed on the mandatory absence of chauvinism and racial hostility, criticism of sexual violence and theft (the term "expropriation" was replaced by "helping the cause"). The destruction of proper-
ty of the peasants and burning their lands was publicly criticized. The ideas of African socialism prescribed a clear conduct of behavior during hostilities and excluded the possibility of torture and the execution of prisoners of war. In practice, all of the above elements of socialist propaganda either were not followed, or were intentionally reversed in practice. The countries of the Eastern Bloc and the People's Republic of China (PRC) were mainly responsible for financing and training key figures in the Congolese communist movement, such as Pierre Mulele and Antoine Gisenga. The primary goal of the assistance provided in spreading communism was not guided by the interests of the world proletariat, on the contrary it was quite practical; the Congo is extremely rich in valuable ore and minerals, and civil war would have greatly weakened the ability to control the outflow of these resources to the West. That meant that the process of maintaining conflicts in Congolese society was economically profitable both for China and the Soviet Bloc.
In the midst of the Congolese crisis, trying to avoid the dire fate of the provinces captured by the left-wing rebels, the people of Lubu, with its leader, Albert Calonge, attempted to achieve independence along with the province of Katanga. This is how the unrecognized state of the South Kasai came to be.
Kasavubu had to act in a hurry in order to solve the grave situation of the collapse of the Congo, which was left without clear leadership from the government. The phenomenon of the dominant position of professional mercenaries, which was present throughout the history of the Congo since its inception, once again demonstrated its actuality in the conflicts that would follow. The military junta, led by Joseph Desiree Mobutu, made it impossible for Katanga to secede from the Congo. So began the era of the new administrative unit, the formation of the state of Zaire.
Joseph Desiree Mobutu, a career military officer, decided to save the country from the communist threat, with the help of authoritarian means. Adhering to the policy of military dirigisme, he planned to take the Congo out of protracted instability of governance. Thus, we register yet another attempt to revive political institutions of the Congo in the form in which they existed before colonization. A kind of vertical power structure was created, in which, nevertheless, extractive elements would take precedence, the bureaucracy would gain strength, the totalitarian "liberator" regime would acquire the features of autocracy and the cult of personality of Mobutu would be widespread. Mobutu largely used the experience of his Haitian counterpart, Francois Duvalier, to shape the
return to historical authenticity of the Congo. That meant not only the return of the historical names of the cities, but also the popularization of traditional names and animism. There were some distinctive features of Duvalier's approach to governance adopted by Mobutu such as: the expanded powers of state security and propaganda. In view of the ethnic and anthropological characteristics of the majority of the Congolese, who in a large percentage were illiterate and not too civilized at the time [35], propaganda was based not only on the power of weapons, but also spiritualistic authority, where unreasonable metaphysical phenomena were given great importance. As a matter of fact, Mobutu managed to consolidate various ethnic groups around the cult of his own personality, which correspondingly created the model that opposed the ideas of autonomy or federalization. However, in the end, after several decades of Zaire's existence, the incompetence of the leadership began to erode the authority of Mobutu's government, which was only demonstratively skeptical of the Western world, but which in practice continued to be secretly controlled by the same interested representatives of trans-national corporations and Belgium, like the previous Kasavubu government.
The stagnation of society, budget deficit and corruption only accelerated the growth of new insurgent cells inside the country. Attempts to start democratization of society also failed, and in 1996 Mobutu was defeated in the First Congo War [36]. That is when Zaire was transformed into the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo and its leader Laurent Kabila come to power, and they are heading for a final democratic transition.
Obvious is the fact that it is precisely cataclysms in the form of civil war and egregious cases of ethnocide that become the catalyst for deconstruction of civil society and institutions that have not yet managed to completely form. Despite the unification policy of the metropole, the chauvinistic sentiments within the Congolese tribes and pronounced tribalism do not represent the possibility of creating a unique political culture, while destructive behavior cannot guarantee the viability of civil society and human rights. The influence of left-wing ideas, along with both voluntary and forced separatism, does not allow for the transformation of extractive institutions into inclusive ones to take place.
Considering the current political characteristics, it is worth noting the adoption of a constitution in a general referendum in 2005, where, for the first time in the entire modern history of the de-communization of the Congo, the
first and second [37] articles at the state level reinforce the rights and freedoms of Congolese citizens - above all the right to life and personal freedom. Chapter 2 of the second article guarantees the right to private property, and hence makes possible the transition of the economy from pseudo-social justice to market economy. There are exclusive elements of the constitution, such as article 48 that guarantees decent housing and access to drinking water and electricity. Article 61 specifically stipulates that even during a state of siege or a state of emergency, the right to life, humane treatment, prohibition of slavery, prohibition of imprisonment for debt, freedom of thought and religion are not subject to restriction or cancellation. The final chord on the right path to democratize society is the system of «checks and balances», regarding executive and legislative power, and women are allowed to participate in the electoral process. An independent judicial system and newly emerged local governments are called upon to create a political culture from scratch, after which civil society may emerge.
The complexities of creating a coherent system still remain. First of all, the long-lasting rudimentary position of the culture of governance, lack of qualified and competent personnel, tribalism, local corruption and persistent ethnic conflicts within society, all have a detrimental effect.
The actual experience of integrating reworked, modified radical socialist ideas into traditional Congolese society, in which the ideas of materialism are not combined with animistic ideas about the universe, that constitute an attempt to artificially create an external enemy in order to divert attention from the current problems in the country. Typical of Marxism representatives, ambivalence in actions, namely shadow business with "officially criticized" countries of the capitalist world, economical speculation on their own people and total corruption did not allow them to fully revitalize the wiped roots of an exceptional Congolese political system, which even without the introduction of socialist ideas, by the fault of the metropole which was in a rudimentary state till the period of Kabila's democratic tryout in late 90s.
The conclusion of the main hypothesis may be summarized as follows: if civil society is violently deconstructed like in Russia or Yugoslavia, or if it is not permitted to freely evolve like in the Congo, then those societies and their political systems are more likely to fall into a state of crisis or even civil war after the fall of the totalitarian regime.
The conclusion of the secondary hypothesis states that disabling of the social dialogue by the totalitarian regime results in deepening the already existing ethnic, religious or racial conflicts. Such was the case in all three instances that the authors analyzed in this paper.
The authors conclude that the totalitarian politics of Marxist, Leninist and Maoist doctrines as a rule lead to a lack of consensus in society, both in the case of the Congo, Russia and Yugoslavia, which, according to Durkheim, is an important connecting element in building a well-functioning political system, developing political culture and organizing civil society.
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