CC BY
8POLITOLOGIA | ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ НАУКИ
DAYTON SCENARIO IN THE CONTEXT OF CONFLICT IN UKRAINE
Ievgen Bagatskyi
Master of International Relations, Vilnius University Doctoral student, Odesa I.I. Mechnikov National University
ABSTRACT
Dayton Agreement, which ended one of the bloodiest conflicts of the XX century in Europe, was a revolutionary document as it embraced a series of brand new practices of international state-building. However, it didn't result in creation of sustainable democratic state. The same way, conclusion of the Minsk II Agreement has put Ukraine in a position relatively similar to that of post-war Bosnia. Being influenced by its western counterparts Ukraine is currently on the brink of introduction of far-reaching systemic reforms, which deal with the state decentralization. The main argument of this article is the following: while Minsk II cannot provide for compromise settlement of the conflict, a need for more comprehensive agenda will come shortly and thus the whole situation potentially threatens sustainability of would-be post-conflict Ukrainian state.
Key words: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine, Dayton, Minsk II, conflict-settlement, decentralization
Introduction
Twenty years have passed since the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia continues to suffer from deep ethnic cleavages. As early as in the beginning of the postwar reconstruction of BiH it became clear that cessation of hostilities and rebuilding of infrastructure were among the easiest tasks. At the same time, the goals, which are still being pursued by the international state-builders include creation of a stable, democratic and self-sustainable state in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Regretfully, these goals have not been achieved till present moment and Bosnia continues to be susceptible to political and economic crises while simultaneously being a source of instability for the EU and neighbouring countries.
More than a year ago interference of Russia into internal political crisis in Ukraine turned domestic clashes into full-scale internationalized military conflict. In February 2015 the Normandy format peace talks resulted in signing of Minsk II agreement. It stipulated an immediate ceasefire, pullout of heavy weapons and creation of a demilitarized zone, restoration of control over the state border by the Ukrainian government, constitutional reform in Ukraine aimed at decentralization, granting of special status to separate districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and conduct of local elections in accordance with the legislation of Ukraine. Ceasefire was achieved by late summer - autumn of 2015 but the main issues concerning the would-be status of Donbas region as a part of Ukraine are yet to be settled.
In these circumstances, the question of whether the future arrangement of the Ukrainian conflict will follow the Dayton scenario acquires critical importance. Thus the main aim of the present article is to draw parallels between the cases of Bosnia and Ukraine in terms of the conflict-resolution scenarios, which are followed by these countries. It is aimed at comparing the Dayton and Minsk II Agreements on the ground of their impact over functionality of Bosnia and Ukraine state systems.
Literature review
The war in Bosnia and ensuing post-conflict period were broadly covered in scientific literature. Conflict-resolution, post-conflict reconciliation, state- and nation-building and European integration were among the topics, which draw
attention of scholars. As it became clear that centralized state structures appeared to be inefficient and the system created in Dayton tended not to cope with the initial task of construction of self-sufficing and stable state, a wave of criticism of the Dayton-Paris system came up [2; 4; 9; 19]. These assessments have been becoming more and more critical since 2006 as the political crisis and stalemate deepened. As Roberto Belloni put it: "Even taking into account the very real constraints of negotiating a peace settlement in the course of bloody, ongoing war, which prevented the assessment of the long-term implications of the peace deal, it is hard to disagree with the judgment that the agreement's midwives created a "Frankenstein constitution" [1, 359]. By now though there has been a very limited attempt to provide detailed analysis of the conflict in Ukraine. Majority of studies concentrated on the reasons but not the outcomes of the crisis [8; 10; 11; 15] while the others are dedicated to separate aspects of the conflict[14; 18], and almost none of them is fully covering the prospects of the Minsk II Agreement [5; 22].
Dayton Agreement and its consequences for Bosnia
Dayton Agreement stipulated establishment of the decentralized state, which incorporated two entities: Republika Serpska and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited by Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats accordingly. Federation consists of ten cantons, all of which enjoy certain level of autonomy guaranteed by the existence of self-governing bodies. Annex 4 of the General Framework Agreement became Bosnia's new Constitution. It proclaimed adherence of the new state to democratic principles, established abovementioned entity system, created central state institutions and defined their powers and responsibilities [16]. Thereby one of the world's most complex and large bureaucratic systems was established. At the current moment BiH state structure comprises enormous number of presidents, prime-ministers, parliaments, governments and courts which makes this country number one in the world in terms of the quantity of high-ranking officials per capita.
In addition to the large state apparatus, international community - represented by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) - established the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The OHR's mandate included observation of the peace implementation and enforcement of civilian aspects of the peace
settlement as two main tasks [17]. The High Representative had to be appointed in accordance with the UN Security Council decision. Two years after the initial settlement, in 1997, the High Representative was entailed with broad executive powers, known as Bonn powers, which played crucial role in the ensuing period.
State system constructed in Dayton was built upon the principles of the consociational democracy. This means that it was aimed at the overcoming of wartime belligerence of the parties and at creation of conditions, which had to provide for reconciliation of former enemies within the borders of a unified state. With the view of this purpose, sophisticated mechanism of power-sharing and ethnic representation was introduced. According to the idea of its creators, Dayton system would have required three constituent peoples to share power and responsibilities with each other rather than divide it. However it became very soon evident that the ideas of the international peacemakers were more of idealistic rather than of realistic nature. The expectations that the system would regulate itself and that transition to peace would happen fast and smoothly, crumbled. It appeared that the mutual rejection was deeply rooted in the Bosnians' conscience. This was demonstrated by the prevalence of nationalistic rhetoric in domestic political discourse of postwar years.
Main outcome of the Bosnian war was effectively secured in Dayton - three conflicting parties achieved compromise. There were neither winners, nor losers after the end of hostilities as each of three ethnic groups managed to achieve their goals but only partially. Bosniaks managed to defend independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, instead of unitary they got semi-confederative state. Bosnian Serbs won their right for autonomy but they had to accept legitimacy of independent BiH and to give up their hopes for reunification with Serbia. Albeit Croats, who aspired to become a part of shared Bosniak-Croat federative formation, did achieve their goal, their position in postwar Bosnia turned to be the most vulnerable because of their small number if compared to that of Bosniaks and Croats.
Territorial dispute between Serbs and Bosniaks in BiH was not resolved in Dayton. The greatest threat to the future integrity of the country was represented by unclear distribution of territories, which could result in outbreak of violence in Muslim-dominated cities of Gorazde and Sarajevo. Furthermore, the borders separating Republika Serpska and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina remained blurred. As a result, one of the parties could any moment return to violence. In general, the major shortcoming of the Dayton Accords was that they didn't provide definitive solution to one of the gravest all-Yugoslavian problems, which was particularly topical in Bosnia, - territories inhabited by ethnic groups continued to cut across inter-state and inter-entity borders [3, 44].
The period of active state-building, which began approximately in 1999 and lasted till 2006 was characterized by the important role played by the High Representative. What happened, in fact, can be called the transition of power from the hands of domestic actors to international community. This way Bosnia became an international protectorate. Bonn powers of the OHR played crucial role in this period. Most significant changes, including the reforms of armed forces and taxation, were made under the auspices and actual rule of the two most
prominent High Representatives: Wolfgang Petritsch (19992002) and Paddy Ashdown (2002-2006). However, in 2006, following a failure of the first attempt to strengthen central state apparatus of Bosnia via amendment of Constitution, accompanied by self-imposed intervention reduction on the part of newly appointed HR Christian Schwarz-Schilling, internal situation in Bosnia deteriorated. Since then the country has made a very limited progress on the way of reformation and EU integration.
Today's Bosnia continues to linger at the bottom of the list of Western Balkan EU-aspirants. Progress towards the EU membership as well as towards implementation of socioeconomic reforms was effectively arrested by disagreement over the political future of the country. Since mid 2000's Bosnia witnessed three consecutive stillborn attempts to amend constitution (in 2006, 2008 and 2009) in order to enhance effectiveness of the state apparatus. Inability of three ethnic groups to achieve compromise brings internal situation into a deadlock. It is the Dayton state structure, which makes it impossible for the country to adopt a unified approach to statebuilding, while at the same time Dayton itself becomes more and more controversial. As the former HR Paddy Ashdown recently put it: "Those that were thrilled with Dayton because it stopped the war - the Bosniaks - now hate it because it has locked down the country and it stops the building of a united and integrated country they fought for. Those that hated Dayton, the Serbs, because it forced them to let go of a dream of a separate state, now love it, because it allows them the status quo and to continue dreaming about a separate state" [13]. What basically takes place in Bosnia is the standoff between the Bosniaks and the Serbs. It results not simply in political paralysis of the country but also entails far more serious problems such as economic hardship, social unrest and potentially even a renewal of violence.
Thus the Dayton scenario is the situation, in which development of the post-conflict country is taken hostage by peace-building procedures adopted in order to resolve the conflict. This is the reverse side of consociationalism. Ethnic hatred combined with corruption and political populism have turned political process in Bosnia into a vicious circle: disagreement over political structure inhibits profound changes simultaneously heating up enmity, which in its turn helps nationalists and populists to line up voices during inter-entity elections. At the same the instance of Bosnia suggests that a task of simultaneous management of all aspects of postcommunist transformation and post-war rebuilding is absolutely overwhelming for recent belligerents. That's why massive international presence was a necessity for Bosnia. However, inconsistency of the international policy over Bosnia left it with semi-implemented set of reforms, which could not provide a reliable basis for successful state-building and integration into the EU. That is why Dayton scenario is a complex mixture of internal transformation-related problems being perplexed by external context.
Minsk II and Prospects for Ukraine
Today notwithstanding two Minsk agreements, the conflict in Ukraine is still far from being resolved. The Minsk II agreement at the present moment has a chance of repeating its predecessor's destiny. Virtually Ukraine is following a classic
pattern of post-Soviet frozen conflict with Crimea being kept in the firm grip of Russia and Donbas representing a shadow zone of noone's responsibility. Evidently, the initial Russia's intent to win a blitzkrieg in the South-East of Ukraine has failed. However, the combination of internal and international factors forced Russia to abandon the idea of splitting so-called Novorossiya (New Russia) region off sovereign Ukraine. As a result its direct military support of separatist forces has diminished. Putin's regime shifted from "...mobilization of a Russian-speaking counterrevolution against the Euromaidan throughout Eastern and Southern Ukraine and detaching 'New Russia' or fomenting a frozen conflict" [7, 163] to simulating peace-making activities. Complex constellation of international political tendencies and events (imposition of anti-Russia sanctions, the war in Syria, rise of ISIS and recent clash with Turkey) has greatly influenced behavior of Russia in Ukraine. What is of interest here - the consequence of this shift for the future of Donbas.
Biggest success of the Minsk II was the cessation of active hostilities. Though ceasefire has been breached on numerous occasions, both parties to the conflict now refrain from using heavy weaponry. However, civil aspects of the agreement (e.g. local elections and decentralization issues) are vaguely articulated: "Clause 4. On the first day after the withdrawal, to begin a dialogue on the procedures for holding local elections in accordance with Ukrainian law and the Law of Ukraine «On a temporary order of local government in individual areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions" as well as on the future regime of these areas, according to this Act. Clause 11. Conducting constitutional reform in Ukraine, with the new constitution coming into force by the end of 2015, providing for decentralization as a key element (taking into account the characteristics of individual areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, agreed with representatives of these areas)..." [12].
This leaves a great room for interpretation of key provisions of the agreement. It is proved by the lack of progress towards implementation of the most contradicting points such as the conduct of elections (cl. 4, 12), restoration of control over the state border (cl. 9) and restoration of socio-economic relations (cl. 8). Political will on both sides is thus the crucial component for successful settlement of the conflict. While the parliament of Ukraine has actively worked on constitutional amendments stipulated in the agreement [20; 21; 23], by now there has been little evidence of will to restore the power of Ukraine over the Donbas and Luhansk areas on the part of self-proclaimed DPR and LPR as well as of Russia. Lasting stalemate plays into the hands of Russia, as by preserving DPR and LPR in their current form it manages to maintain instability and insecurity in Ukraine. Moreover, the Russian government might view the conflict in Ukraine as a bargaining chip when trying to make terms with the West over Syria. Therefore, implementation of the Minsk II agreement and strict observance of its provisions in their present wording can scarcely be expected.
This is the point at which we could compare Ukraine to Bosnia. Aside from having different background and scale of the conflicts, Bosnia and Ukraine have important common traits, such as: both countries didn't have lasting periods of independence in the XX century; both are still going through the process of postcommunist transformation; both are still on
their way to consolidated democracy; both are experiencing economic hardships to a great degree related to corruption; both have a goal of integration into the EU. This way external imposition of a peace treaty providing for amendment of internal legislation would bring Ukraine even closer to Bosnia.
In the upcoming time, the worst scenario for Ukraine would be the signing of another Minsk agreement. The biggest danger is that this provisional agreement could acquire resemblance with the Dayton Accords. A strong push for settlement of conflict and subsequent decentralization is stemming from the EU, the primary concern of which is to restore stability. For instance, it is several times emphasized in the document called "EU-Ukraine - A European Agenda for Reform", which was jointly developed by the European Commission and the government of Ukraine in 2014, that Ukraine ought to concentrate on decentralization and regional development "with special focus on Eastern and Southern regions" [6].
A probable outcome of lack of progress towards implementation of Minsk II could bring about the necessity for new agreement, which would further broaden decentralization agenda for Ukraine. At some point unwillingness of Russia and DPR-LPR to achieve compromise, could force the EU, overburdened by its internal crisis, to exert stronger pressure on Ukraine to adopt deeper measures aimed at guaranteeing special status to Donetsk and Luhansk regions. As it is suggested by the Bosnia's case, such pressure to introduce a kind of consociational framework (which might take shape of quota system, two-chamber parliament or veto rights) could lead to greater problems in both executive and legislature. Furthermore, given Russia's anxiety to preserve its presence in Ukraine, broadening of DRP-LPR autonomy would give it a strong leverage over domestic and - most importantly - over foreign policy of Ukraine. Just as Bosnia became dysfunctional after the minimization of international presence in 2006, Ukraine could lose reform-driving momentum in case of granting of veto powers to Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
Conclusion
Since 1995 Bosnia and Herzegovina has failed to achieve substantial developmental successes. After continuous efforts of the EU and other international actors to stabilize the country, Bosnia marked the 20th anniversary of the Dayton Agreement by sinking into the mire of internal disputes over the powers of the central state judiciary. Practically, the only tangible result achieved by the independent Bosnia is that it managed to stay an integral state. Meanwhile Ukraine has been for over than twenty years preserving stable relations with its main geopolitical adversary - Russia. Nonetheless, now both countries suffer from very similar developmental conflict-related problems. State structure, which was created in Dayton, determined major troubled domains for post-war Bosnia. In a similar manner, the Minsk II agreement has brought relatively peaceful times for Ukraine but it didn't provide for settlement of pivotal conflict-generating issues.
As applied to Ukraine, Dayton scenario denotes a potential threat of creation of dysfunctional decentralized state system, which may become a result of synchronized international efforts. Beyond any doubts, the argument in favor of drawing comparison between Bosnia and Ukraine can be challenged on many grounds. However, it also provides a vast space for
future reflection upon the role of international community and methods of conflict resolution and post-conflict settlement applied to the developing post-communist countries of the CEE region.
List of References
1. Belloni R. Bosnia: Dayton is Dead! Long Live Dayton!,/ Roberto Belloni // Nationalism and Ethnic Politics.
- 2009. - Vol. 15, Issue 3-4. - P. 355-375.
2. Bojkov V. Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-1995 Political System and its Functioning / Victor D. Bojkov // Southeast European Politics. - 2003. - Vol. IV, No. 1. - P. 41-67.
3. Boyd Ch. Making Bosnia work / Charles G. Boyd // Foreign Affairs. - 1998. - Volume 77, №1. - P. 42-55.
4. Cox M. State-Building and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Lessons from Bosnia / Marcus Cox // Cluster of Competence. The rehabilitation of war-torn societies. Center in Applied Stuides in International Negotiations. -2001. - 21 p.
5. Emerson M. Is there reason to hope for Minsk II? / Michael Emerson // CEPS Commentary. - 16 February 2015. [Electronic resource] // Mode of access: https://www.ceps.eu/ system/files/COMMinskII.pdf (December 13, 2015).
6. EU-Ukraine A European Agenda for Reform. Electronic resource] // Mode of access: http://ec.europa. eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/fule/docs/ukraine/a_ european_agenda_for_reform.pdf (December 14, 2015).
7. Kuzio T. Competing Nationalisms, Euromaidan, and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict / Taras Kuzio // Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism. - 2015. - Vol. 15, No. 1. - P. 157169.
8. Mamlyuk B. The Ukraine Crisis, Cold War II, and International Law / Boris N. Mamlyuk // German Law Journal.
- 2015. - Vol. 16, No. 3. - P. 479-522.
9. Marko J. Post conflict Reconstruction through State-and Nation-building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina / Joseph Marko // European Diversity and Autonomy Papers (EDAP). - 2005. - No. 4. - 21 p.
10. McFaul M., Sestanovich S., Mearsheimer J. Faulty Powers. Who Started the Ukraine Crisis? / Michael McFaul, Stephen Sestanovich, John J. Mearsheimer // Foreign Affairs. -2014. - Vol. 93, No. 6. [Electronic resource] // Mode of access: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/eastern-europe-caucasus/2014-10-17/faulty-powers (December 14, 2015).
11. Mearsheimer J. Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault. The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin. / John J. Mearsheimer // Foreign Affairs. - 2014. - Vol. 93, No. 6. [Electronic resource] // Mode of access: https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault (December 14, 2015).
12. Minsk Agreement: Full text in English [Electronic resource] // Mode of access: http://www.unian.info/ politics/1043394-minsk-agreement-full-text-in-english.html (December 14, 2015).
13. Paddy Ashdown Laments Bosnia's 'Lost Opportunities' [Electronic resource] // Mode of access: http:// www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-must-change-way-it-treats-dayton--11-06-2015 (October 09, 2015).
14. Pond E., Kudnani H. Germany's Real Role in the Ukraine Crisis / Elizabeth Pond, Hans Kudnani // Foreign Affairs. - 2015. - Vol. 94, No. 2. [Electronic resource] // Mode of access: https://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/eastern-europe-caucasus/germany-s-real-role-ukraine-crisis
15. Rutland P. An Unnecessary War: The Geopolitical Roots of the Ukraine Crisis / Peter Rutland // Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives. - March, 2015. [Electronic resource] // Mode of access: http://shron. chtyvo.org.ua/Zbirnyk_statei/Ukraine_and_Russia_People_ Politics_Propaganda_and_Perspectives_anhl.pdf#page=149 (December 13, 2015).
16. The General Framework Agreement: Annex 4 (Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina) [Electronic resource] // Mode of access: http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default. asp?content_id=372 (October 09, 2015).
17. The Mandate of the OHR [Electronic resource] // Mode of access: http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/default. asp?content_id=38612 - Title from the screen (October 09, 2015).
18. Wang W. Impact of Western Sanctions on Russia in the Ukraine Crisis / Wan Wang // Journal of Politics and Law. -2015. - Vol. 8, No. 2. - P. 1-6.
19. Weller, Marc and Wolff, Steffan, Bosnia and Herzegovina ten years after Dayton: Lessons for internationalized state building, Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 2006, 1-13.
20. Верховна Рада Украши прийняла Постанову «Про визначення окремих райошв, MicT, селищ i сш Донецько! та Лугансько1 областей, в яких запроваджуеться особливий порядок м^цевого самоврядування» [Electronic resource] // Mode of access: http://rada.gov.ua/news/Novyny/105807. html (December 14, 2015).
21. Закон Украши. Про внесення змши до статт 10 Закону Украши «Про особливий порядок м^цевого самоврядування в окремих районах Донецько! та Лугансько! областей» [Electronic resource] // Mode of access: http:// zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/256-19/paran2#n2 (December 14, 2015).
22. Лисенко Л., Шачковська Л. Дипломатична дiяль-шсть Украши в умовах тдготовки до тдписання Мшсь-ких угод / Л. Лисенко, Л. Шачковська // «Науковий дiалог «Схвд-Захвд». Матерiали IV всеукрашсько! науково-прак-тично! конференцп з мiжнародною участю. [Electronic resource] // Mode of access: http://kpnu.edu.ua/wp-content/ uploads/sites/2/2015/01/%D0%9A%D0%9F_2015_1-%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%BC.pdf (December 13, 2015).
23. Рада ухвалила змши до Конституцп у першо-му читанш [Electronic resource] // Mode of access: http:// www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/08/31/7079619/?attempt=2 (December 14, 2015).
