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COUNTERACTION OF THE JAPANESE ARMED FORCES TO VESSELS OF THE FAR EAST SHIPPING DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
Abstract
The paper deals with counteraction of the Japanese armed forces to vessels of the Far East shipping during the Great Patriotic War. The author considers ways of defensive freights delivery in the conditions of Japanese blockade of certain passages in the Pacific Ocean. Problems of detention and attacks of the Soviet vessels by Japanese armed forces in the international straits and ports are studied.
Keywords
Japanese armed forces, Far East shipping, Great Patriotic War, straits of the Pacific Ocean, navigation of the Soviet vessels, transportation of defensive freights
AUTHOR Tatyana Krupa
PhD in Sociology, Associate Professor Far Eastern Federal University Vladivostok, Russia tatianakrupa@yandex. ru
The political situation in the Far East was adverse at the beginning of the war. Japan, which was a part of the Triple pact, had far-reaching plans to conquer the Soviet Far East. the government of Nazi Germany officially addressed to the Japanese government with the offer to begin war against the USSR in June 1941 (Safronov, 2007). The Japanese Minister of War Todzio approved the plan of war with the USSR, which had the code name "Kan Tuoku-Eng" ("Special maneuvers of Kwantung army") (Zimonin, 2005). The main plan of operation consisted in a sudden raid of military and air forces to destroy the Soviet aviation, sea and overland bases, with drawing the main blow near Primorye (Isaev, 2015). At the same time, Japan prepared for war with the USA and Great Britain. Without risking to wage two-front war, the imperial rate of Japan decided to refrain from attack on the Soviet Union temporarily. Officially, without declaring war with the USSR, the Japanese authorities assisted Germany in the war against the Soviet Union (Levitsky, Silinsky, 2015).
In premilitary years, almost all vessels of the Far East shipping worked in areas of the Pacific coast well familiar to seamen. From the beginning of the war, kind of work and navigation areas changed. Seamen of Far East shipping had to come into the ports of the Southeast Asia and into the Persian Gulf, to go to coast of the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand.
Human and material resources of the Far East shipping played a significant role for providing a victory on the Far East front and other fronts of the war. It ensured needs of the rear. By the beginning of the war, 85 vessels were a part of the Far East shipping. Replenishment of shipping took place in 1940. The vessels of other shipping companies, which appeared in the Pacific waters because of military events in Europe, were left in the Far East. According to the order of the people's commissar of navy, in 1940 the Baltic motor ships and the Black Sea vessels in number of 11 units were subordinated to the chief of the Far East shipping. Same year tankers were transferred to fixed assets of shipping. During the premilitary period the part of the Far East shipping company was new vessels constructed abroad: 5 timber carrying vessels, 5 passenger-and-freight vessels, 4 motor ships constructed at the Leningrad plants (Ostrovsky and others, 1980).
Attack of Germany on the USSR led to changes in the international situation. In June 1941, the governments of the West countries considered the USSR to be the ally in fight against Nazi Germany. The war forced to pass from rivalry to cooperation for the sake of the common goal. W. Churchill, the prime minister of Great Britain, made the statement: "Nobody was more persistent opponent of communism, than I, within the last 25 years. I will not withdraw any of the words told by me, but now all this pales into insignificance in the face of the approaching events. The danger menacing to Russia is the danger menacing to us and the United States" (Safronov, 2007).
Soon F. Roosevelt, the U.S. President, declared: "Certainly, we are going to provide to Russia all that help what we are be able to provide..." (History of World War II. T.IV, 1975). The Anglo-Soviet-American agreement on mutual military deliveries was signed in Moscow in autumn 1941. The USSR was provided an interest-free loan of $1,000,000,000. The weapon and military materials was transferred as loan or for rent (lend-lease). These contracts on mutual deliveries had a direct bearing on the navy and the Far East shipping.
From the ports of America, New Zealand, Australia, Great Britain seamen of the Far East shipping delivered hundreds of thousands tons of non-ferrous metals (tin, lead, tungsten ore), the factory equipment for the Soviet enterprises in the USSR. Delivery was carried out in the conditions of blockade of certain straits. Bypassing attempts of diversions and provocations from Japan, seamen of shipping company developed new navigation areas.
In December 1941, the Japanese government, contrary to the international law, declared the La Perouse Strait, the Tsugaru Strait and the Korea Strait the "sea defensive lines". In practice, it led to the fact that "during 1941-1944 Japanese armed forces detained 178 Soviet trade vessels, in some cases having used the weapon" (Dvornyak, 1962). All delays had provocative character.
In 1941, Japanese illegally detained the steamship "Anadyr". Using provocation, they hoped that "Anadyr" would come into Japanese territorial waters, where there would be an opportunity to detain it. This provocation was not successful; nevertheless, the illegal delay of the steamship "Anadyr" proceeded about 9 hours. In December 1941, the Japanese warships held the steamship "Kuznetskstroy" without any basis within six hours carrying out interrogations of crew.
Further events showed that Japanese passed from provocative detentions of the Soviet vessels to flooding them in the high sea, in the international straits and in the ports open for foreign navigation.
In 1941 at Hong Kong coast, the vessels of the Far East shipping, which were there under repair, were shot down. Four Soviet steamships were shot down at the coast of the Kowloon Peninsula. The steamships "Krechar", "Sergey Lazo", "Simferopol" "Svir'stroy" were put out of action. Japanese at the coast the Natuna Island bombarded the vessel «Perekop» in December 1941. The survived seamen were detained. Within several months, they were held in chambers of Japanese gendarme administration. On the way to
Philippines, Japanese attacked the Maikop tanker going from Indonesia to Vladivostok with coconut oil. Japanese sank «Maikop» (Ostrovsky and others, 1980).
In 1942, the Japanese government continued to ban navigation of the Soviet vessels in the Tsugaru Strait. The heavy ice situation in the La Perouse Strait during the winter period, difficult passability without the icebreaker and closing of the Tsugaru Strait adversely reflected on the Far East shipping. Vessels went through the Korea Strait that extended their ways.
The Japanese government made big efforts to disorganize the fleet's work. Japan addressed to the USSR government with requirements to stop transportation of goods in the USSR through Vladivostok. The Soviet government rejected these requirements. The Soviet steamships were exposed to further attacks. The Japanese plane fired the steamship «Vanzetti» in 70 miles from the Osumi Strait in April 1942. "Vanzetti" was given to the Japanese Kishimoto port under a military escort, where it was detained within several weeks (Dvornyak, 1962). In April 1942, Japanese torpedo boats detained the steamship "Sergey Kirov" following to Vladivostok and kept under arrest for five days. In April 1942, Japanese stopped the steamship "Angarstroy", following from Petropavlovsk to Vladivostok. It underwent illegal examination and was escorted to the Kishimoto port. The steamship was held within 13 days, crew was interrogated and searched. Later it was torpedoed in the Korea Strait (Rudnev, 1990).
Despite fundamental change in the war in 1943, the navigation situation was the extremely adverse. Japan in every possible way interfered with normal work of the Soviet merchant marine fleet. In January 1943, Japanese destroyers near the Korea Strait detained the steamship "Komsomolsk". In February of the same year, the steamships "Kola" and "Il'men" were torpedoed near the Japanese coast. Since February 1943, routes of the Soviet vessels had to be laid through the La Perouse Strait hammered with ices, as nonfreezing Tsugaru Strait was closed, and ways through the Korea Strait could be attacked by submarines and planes and delayed by the Japanese authorities (Dremlyug, 2013).
In 1943, swimming conditions became even more complicated. Japanese established a narrow waterway in the La Perouse Strait and began to detain the Soviet vessels systematically. The Japanese ships detained vessels "Novorossiysk", "Kamenets-Podolsk", "Ingul, "Nogin", "Dvina", "Tashkent", "Stalingrad" in the straight. Vessels with freights necessary for the country were kept in the Japanese ports for two-three months. Periodically captains and other crew members were kept in the Japanese prisons.
To secure navigation of vessels with inward cargoes, it was decided to go through the Strait of Tartary. Use of the Strait of Tartary in days of the Great Patriotic War was one of tactical decisions in implementation of the plan of defensive freights transportations.
On August 9, 1945, the government of the USSR, fulfilling the obligations, declared the war with Japan. Far Eastern seamen helped the Pacific fleet to hold combat operations. The Far East shipping delivered to Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands military equipment and paratroopers. Crews provided military operations of Seysin, Sakhalin and Kuril landing operations and operations on the North Korea liberation. Unloading took place in fighting conditions under gun and mortar fire of the opponent from the coast. Crews, except those, who was occupied with elimination of damages and maintenance of survivability of vessels, participated in unloading of military equipment together with fighters (Dvornyak, 1962).
Participating in military operations in waters of the Pacific Ocean, vessels of the Far East shipping delivered about 31,487 tons of various freights and amphibious units to the such Korean ports, as Yuki, Seysin, Genzan. The vessels "Nakhodka", "Mikhail Lomonosov", "Volkhov", "Moskal'vo", "Argun'", "Novosibirsk", "Tashkent", "Jean Jores" and others carried
out unloading of military equipment in exclusively severe conditions, on open raids. Despite huge difficulties, all operations were held in a short time (Byankin, 1981).
The Soviet people got a victory in the war By huge efforts. The Far East shipping had heavy resource losses in waters of the Pacific Ocean. About five hundred seamen and passengers (including women and children) were lost at attacks and sinking by the Japanese warships.
One of the segments of the Great Patriotic War passing in the Pacific Ocean zone was very grave test for the Far East shipping. Except enormous human losses, the material loss made 2,600 billion rubles - it is about 30% of national wealth of the country. Sea transport also had serious losses: 380 large transport vessels making nearly a half of all pre-war tonnage of the fleet were sunk; the main ports and ship-repair plants of the southern and northwest basins of the country were destroyed. These losses was a heavy burden to the state.
According to the plan "Kan Tuoku-Eng", the Japanese armed forces made obstacles for Soviet defensive freights delivery in the Pacific Ocean zone. The Japanese actions had provocative and illegal character. Crews of Far East shipping had to work in the hardest conditions, constantly resisting Japanese warships attacks.
Straits blocking, attacks on the Soviet vessels from the sea and air, arrests, delays of vessels - all these measures Japanese command realized for disorganization of the Soviet fleet. However, thanks to failure of strategic plans of nazi command on the western front, Japan postponed implementation of the plan "Kan Tuoku-Eng", and later refused its realization. The Far East shipping crews executed the strategic mission, showing resistance to Japanese armed forces and delivering freights necessary for the country, despite counteraction of the Japanese armed forces.
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