CC BY
19Date of publication: May 5, 2021 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.4579490
Historical Sciences
ACTIVITIES OF RUSSIAN NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DURING THE RUSSO-
JAPANESE WAR OF 1904 - 1905
A
Gurinov, Sergey Leonidovich1
Candidate of Arts and Sciences, Michurina Street, 1, Voronezh, Russia.
E-mail: gurinovsl@mail.ru
Abstract
The article is devoted to the process of the activity of the Russian naval intelligence in Japan during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. The article deals with the problems that prevented Russian naval intelligence from continuing to work on the Japanese islands during the fighting. Not the least role in the circumstances was played by the Japanese counterintelligence, which was vigilantly watching for possible spies. At the same time, Russian counterintelligence in the Far Eastern region has shown its ineffectiveness. Information about the confrontation between Japanese and Russian naval intelligence is given. The reasons for the lag of the Russian naval intelligence from the Japanese colleagues are investigated. The prerequisites for successful professional results of Japanese scouts in the early twentieth century are analyzed. The author traces the relationship between the state policy of the Russian Empire and the formation of Russian naval intelligence in the Far East. The author studies the history of Russian intelligence and the Russian Imperial Navy in the early twentieth century.
In addition, the operations of Japanese military intelligence officers are considered, such as: agitation among the small peoples of Siberia against the Russian government and the organization of an uprising of Macedonian revolutionaries in the Balkans with the aim of subsequently diverting the Russian army to the problems of this region. The most successful operation of the Japanese side was the creation of detachments of Hunghuz or Chinese bandits with enemy officers at the head of the rear of the Russian troops in Manchuria.
Keywords: intelligence, counterintelligence, Russian Empire, Japan, naval agent, military operations, peoples of Siberia, Far East, Manchuria, Hunghuz, Japanese officers, spies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Russian naval intelligence during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 worked in rather difficult conditions. Often she had to build her professional activities on open sources, for example, information about the movements of the Japanese fleet in the newspaper "Far East". [5, p. 2]
50
In addition, there were reports in the Russian Far Eastern press: about the raids of the cruiser "Russia" on Japanese sea transport communications, [12, p. 1] according to the French correspondent of the newspaper "Figaro" Germaine Bennett on Navy talents of the commander of the Japanese Imperial fleet, Vice-Admiral of Heihachiro Also [1, p. 2] information about the tour in the far East, the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadron, under the overall command of Vice-Admiral Z. P. Rozhdestvensky, [19, p. 1] reprinted an article from a foreign newspaper "Berliner Tagelblatt" considering the events of the Japanese espionage in the fighting, [12, p. 1] the interview with the prisoner, major Japanese General staff of Tatsujiro about the futility of further war with Russia, [21, R. 2] information with reference to the British telegraph agency "Reuters" about the death of the Japanese battleship "Hatsushi" and the cruiser "Yoshino" on Russian minefields. [13, p. 1]
Of course, the information of the press was only fragmentary and did not have any serious significance for the organization of the systematized activities of the Russian naval intelligence during the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-1905.
At the same time, Japanese military intelligence was a fairly qualified opponent. The emissaries of Japanese intelligence even held talks with the Macedonian radical revolutionaries. The Japanese side offered them cooperation and 4 million rubles. to destabilize the political situation in the Balkans. Negotiations with the Balkan revolutionaries took place for a long time. Japanese emissaries tried to attract representatives of all radical political movements to the dialogue.
II. METHODOLOGY
To work on the scientific article, materials from the funds of the Russian State Archive of the Navy (RGA of the Navy) were used in the city of St. Petersburg. At the same time, the scientific article contains little-known periodicals published by domestic authors.
The basis for the scientific article was the principle of historicism. This approach allows us to fully reveal the unexplored aspects of the activities of the Russian naval intelligence during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.
The article uses a comprehensive approach that defines the logic of scientific research. The problem-chronological method helped in the presentation of the sequence of events. The method of historical reconstruction helped restore the activities of the Russian and Japanese naval intelligence during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905.
III. DISCUSSION
Actually, this increased attention of the Japanese side to the little-known radical Macedonian revolutionaries was part of a well-thought-out plan. The unrest among the South Slavic peoples, according to Japanese intelligence, was supposed to distract the attention of the Russian government from the confrontation with its eastern neighbor.
It should be noted that the Japanese ruling circles approved of the preparation of the uprising of the Macedonian revolutionaries and, despite the difficult economic situation in the country due to the war with the Russian Empire, were ready to bear impressive financial costs. Unfortunately, for the Japanese, the negotiations were not crowned with a successful agreement. [22, p. 1]
During the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, Japanese spies actively promoted the unification of Asian peoples among the Gilyaks living in the Russian Amur Region. Representatives of this nation were considered natural hunters, pilots on the Amur River and trackers and could help the Japanese units in the event of hostilities. As a result, the Gilyaks refused to join the voluntary squads formed by the Russian administration. Moreover, they tried to persuade the Golds and Tunguses to act in this way.
51
The fact is that during the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905, the Japanese government began a propaganda campaign about the unification of all Asian peoples under the rule of the Japanese emperor and the expulsion of Europeans from Asia. I must say that such slogans quite effectively affected the residents of the Far Eastern region, who rightly considered the European colonialists to be the source of their socio-economic problems.
An even more striking example was the creation by the Japanese of a gang of Hunghuz, i.e. Chinese bandits, operating in the rear of the Russian army in Manchuria under the leadership of Japanese officers. The bandits managed to steal a large sum from the treasury of the Russian army during several sorties and attacks on the rear units. [20, p. 2]
By the way, in China, Japanese propaganda for the unification of Asians against Europeans has become much more popular than among the peoples of the Russian Amur region. It is enough to recall the large-scale Chinese "boxer" uprising in 1901 against all representatives of the Western European powers.
It cannot be said that in the current situation, the Russian counterintelligence was completely inactive. For example, the same Gilyaks were resettled in the depths of the Amur Region, away from the harmful influence of Japanese spies.
In turn, about 300 Japanese citizens were sent from Khabarovsk for the duration of military operations on a steamship to prevent the deployment of a spy network. [14, p. 1]
On suspicion of possible espionage activities, the Russian counterintelligence service deported the only Japanese living in Mongolia to their homeland. [23, p. 2]
Out special regulations for the prevention of work by Japanese spies: the order of 22 October 1904 on the Ussuri railway, [8, p. 2] the order management civil part of the fortress city of Vladivostok on 19 April 1905 , [17, p. 2] the order for the city of Vladivostok, limiting the work places of entertainment in the evening. [7, p. 2]
Separately, we note the formation of the already mentioned voluntary squads in the Khabarovsk and Amur regions. They planned to recruit about 10 thousand vigilantes, who were supposed to prevent the raids of the Hunghuz and Japanese espionage. [18, p. 2]
were also real detentions of Japanese spies. So, on May 14, 1904, in Port Arthur, one Japanese citizen and 4 Britons working in the firm "Clerkson & Co." were arrested for espionage activities. [4, p. 1]
However, all these measures could only partially neutralize the wide espionage network of Japanese intelligence. At the same time, Russian counterintelligence made elementary mistakes. For example, in December 1904, Vladivostok published an album with officers of the Russian Imperial Navy who distinguished themselves in the defense of the naval fortress of Port Arthur, thereby providing the enemy with a number of valuable information.
Naturally, the work of Russian naval intelligence was even more difficult compared to counterintelligence. Until the very beginning of the fighting, the naval agent in Japan, Captain 2nd rank A. I. Rusin continued to transmit special naval literature in Japanese to the Russian Maritime Ministry. [10, l. 279]
During the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, the active activity of Russian naval intelligence on the Japanese islands was virtually discontinued. The spy network developed by the captain of the 2nd rank A. I. Rusin at the beginning of the twentieth century could not operate in Japan because of the rather strict control over the subjects of the Japanese emperor by the police and counterintelligence. In the conditions of strict supervision by the Japanese authorities, the conspiracy of a Russian illegal intelligence officer for the Russian navy department at that time presented insurmountable objective difficulties. There were only established business contacts with foreign correspondents, military and merchant seamen.
Specialists of the Russian Maritime Ministry even learned about the order of Japanese submarines-the John Holland project [2, p. 42] for the sum of 4 million dollars in the North American United States [6, p. 2] with their subsequent delivery to the Yokasuka naval base from the reports of Shanghai newspapers reprinted by the Russian Far Eastern press. [15, p. 1]
52
It should be noted that the Japanese throughout the war of 1904 - 1905 were panicked by the possible actions of Russian submarines delivered from the European part of the Russian Empire along the Trans-Siberian Railway. However, the technical imperfection of the submarines of the Russian fleet did not allow to inflict any damage to the enemy's ship composition. Actually, the submarines of the John Holland project, which arrived on the order of the Japanese government from the North American United States, had tactical and technical data that were clearly insufficient for an effective combat campaign. Accordingly, in the Russian-Japanese war of 1904 - 1905, submarines were more of a psychological influence on the enemy.
An important event organized by the Russian naval intelligence was the regular interception of British merchant ships delivering secret diplomatic mail to the Japanese by the armed steamers Smolensk and Petersburg in the Red Sea. [16, p. 1] In general, the vessels of the Russian Volunteer Fleet, which raised the military flag during the Russo-Japanese war and played the role of auxiliary cruisers, distinguished themselves by effective actions on international maritime communications. Auxiliary cruisers of the Russian Imperial Navy stopped illegal smuggling, detained vessels engaged in poaching, carried out diplomatic missions and intelligence operations.
Employees of the Russian naval intelligence took part in 1904-1905 and in drawing up the rules for the exchange of prisoners of war with the Japanese. Here, the French naval agent Lieutenant Martini, who repeatedly visited Russian sailors in prisoner-of-war camps, brought significant benefits. The French naval agent acted as an official representative for the Russian POW sailors. He was constantly interested in their living conditions, food and health status. During his trips to the POW camps, the French naval officer talked to the Japanese administration and accepted various complaints from Russian sailors. At the request of the Russian Navy department, it was Lieutenant Martini who compiled a detailed list of officers killed and wounded in battle from the crew of the 1st-rank cruiser Rurik. [11, l. 73]
By January 23, 1905. The Russian Ministry of War has developed the basic rules for the exchange of prisoners of war with the Japanese side. [11, l. 134-135] All military personnel held in captivity were divided into 4 groups, [11, l. 136] which in turn had 8 categories. [11, l. 137] In any case, the principle of an equivalent exchange of military prisoners was applied. [11, l. 202-203]
The Maritime Ministry of Russia has rethought these rules taking into account its peculiarities. First, they exchanged senior officers, then staff and chief officers, after non-commissioned officers and lower ranks. Separately, the conditions for the exchange of prisoners of war among military officials, doctors and priests were stipulated, since some of the mentioned persons belonged to non-combatants under international laws.
With the help of specialists of the Russian naval intelligence, the Maritime Ministry did not forget to compile lists of sailors of the Japanese merchant fleet captured during the fighting. Among these sailors who were in Russian captivity, in addition to the Japanese, there were citizens of the North American United States. [11, l. 219 - 220]
IV. RESULTS
During the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 - 1905, a natural clash between the Russian and Japanese intelligence services took place. I must say that in this confrontation, the Japanese looked much more professional than their Russian colleagues. Even before the outbreak of hostilities, Japanese intelligence was able to create an extensive and carefully hidden network in the Russian Primorye and Amur region, not to mention China and Manchuria. Japanese intelligence emissaries incited the Gilyaks in the Amur region to disobey the Russian government and negotiated with Macedonian revolutionaries about an uprising in the Balkans. The scale of the actions of Japanese intelligence has become an indisputable guarantee of the collection of valuable information.
53
At the same time, the Japanese actively used the idea of uniting all Asian peoples under the rule of the Japanese emperor. This formulation of the question met with the support of many Asian peoples experiencing socio-economic problems due to the regime established by the Western European colonizers. As a result, they managed to organize a gang of Hunkhuz under the leadership of their officers, who were robbing the rear of the Russian army.
In Japan itself, the police and counterintelligence developed effective measures to prevent the espionage work of representatives of foreign intelligence services and subjects of the Japanese emperor who tried to sell military secrets abroad.
In the current circumstances, it is necessary to note the work of the Russian counterintelligence, which has taken a number of fairly effective measures against Japanese spies: the exile of the Gilyaks to remote areas of the Amur region, the internment of Japanese subjects from the regions of the Russian Far East, special instructions for the prevention of espionage activities in fortresses and on the railway. This approach led to the detention of several Japanese spies who carried out their work directly in the regions of the Russian Far East.
The capabilities of Russian naval intelligence after the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war of 19041905 were seriously limited for a number of reasons. First of all, the work of the naval agent in Japan, Captain 2nd rank A. I. Rusin, who worked under the diplomatic cover of the Russian Embassy, stopped. The management of the Marine Ministry of Russia, however, as the ruling circles of the state, is not considered Japan in the early twentieth century a worthy opponent, and has not allocated sufficient funds for the organization's intelligence network on the Japan Islands.
V. CONCLUSION
As a result, Russian naval intelligence could not operate directly in Japan in 1904-1905. Even about the delivery of Japanese submarines ordered from the North American United States, Russian naval intelligence learned from articles in Chinese newspapers. Of course, the Russian Maritime Ministry's intelligence specialists still had a number of responsibilities: collecting information from foreign open sources, obtaining information from naval agents and sailors of friendly states, organizing the interception of secret diplomatic mail by armed steamers of the Volunteer Fleet, and preparing rules for the exchange of prisoners of war. However, all the mentioned types of professional activities for the work of naval intelligence were of an exclusively auxiliary nature.
VI. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Using materials of the Russian archive of the Navy (RSNA) were able to analyze the organization of the activities of Russian and Japanese naval intelligence during the fighting in 1904 - 1905 The researchers used unpublished sources, periodicals and scientific literature at the present stage of historiography.
54
REFERENCE LIST
Admiral of Togo (1904) Far East. April 28. (№. 94). P. 2. (in Russ).
Dunmore S. (2005) Lost submarines: the greatest disasters-from "Hanley"to "Kursk". M. 176 p. (in Russ).
From the article "Berliner Tagelblatt" (1904) Far East. May 6, №. 100. P. 1-2. (in Russ).
From the article "Frankfurter Zeiting" (1904) Far East. May 14, № 106. P. 1. (in Russ).
Local chronicle (1904) Far East. April 18, №. 86. P. 2. (in Russ).
Submarines and neutrality (1904) Far East. December 23. №. 286. P. 2. (in Russ).
The order in the Vladivostok fortress of May 15, 1905 (1905) Far East. May 19. №. 108. P. 2. (in Russ).
Order to the troops of the Amur military district, Khabarovsk, October 22, 1904, №. 744. (1905) Far East. January 13. №. 9. P. 1. (in Russ).
Order for the city of Vladivostok of April 19, 1905 (1905) Far East. April 22. №. 88. Pp. 22-23. (in Russ).
Russian State Archive of the Navy (RGA of the Navy). F. 763. Op. 1. D. 44. (in Russ).
Russian State Archive of the Navy (RGA of the Navy). F. 417. Op. 1. D. 3020. (in Russ).
Telegrams Far East. April 20, 1904 №. 87. P. 1. (in Russ).
Telegrams Far East. May 11, 1904 №.103. P. 1. (in Russ).
Telegrams Far East. May 21, 1904 №.110. P. 1. (in Russ).
Telegrams Far East. January 8, 1905 №.5. P. 1. (in Russ).
Telegrams Far East. July 8, 1904 №. 149. P. 1. (in Russ).
Chronicle Far East. April 27, 1905 №.91. P. 2. (in Russ).
Chronicle Far East. June 12, 1904 №.128. P. 2. (in Russ).
Chronicle of the war (1904) Far East. April 30, №. 95. P. 1. (in Russ).
Chronicle of the war (1904) Far East. November 13, №. 253. P. 2. (in Russ).
Japanese about Russia (1904) Far East. May 22, №.111. P. 2. (in Russ).
Japanese emissaries in Macedonia (1904) Far East. June 13. №.129. P. 1. (in Russ).
The Japanese in Mongolia (1905) Far East. May 25. №.113. P. 2. (in Russ).
55
ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТЬ РОССИЙСКОЙ ВОЕННО-МОРСКОЙ РАЗВЕДКИ ВО ВРЕМЯ РУССКО-ЯПОНСКОЙ ВОЙНЫ 1904 - 1905 ГГ.
л
Гуринов Сергей Леонидович1
1Кандидат искусствоведения, улица Мичурина, 1, Воронеж, Россия
E-mail: gurinovsl@mail.ru
Аннотация
Статья посвящена процессу деятельности российской военно-морской разведки в Японии во время русско-японской войны 1904 - 1905 гг. Рассматриваются проблемы, из-за которых российская военно-морская разведка не смогла продолжить работу на японских островах во время боевых действий. Не последнюю роль в сложившихся обстоятельствах сыграла японская контрразведка, бдительно следившая за возможными шпионами. При этом русская контрразведка в дальневосточном регионе показала свою малоэффективность. Даются сведения о противостояния японской и российской военно-морских разведок. Исследуются причины отставания русской военно-морской разведки от японских коллег. Анализируются предпосылки успешных профессиональных результатов японских разведчиков в начале ХХ в. Прослеживается взаимосвязь между государственной политикой Российской Империи и становлением русской военно-морской разведки на Дальнем Востоке. Изучается история отечественной разведки и Российского Императорского флота в начале ХХ века.
Помимо этого рассматриваются операции японских военных разведчиков, такие как: агитация среди малых народностей Сибири против российской власти и организация восстания македонских революционеров на Балканах с целью последующего отвлечения русской армии на проблемы данного региона. Наиболее удачной операцией японской стороны стало создание отрядов хунхузов или китайских бандитов с неприятельскими офицерами во главе в тылу русских войск в Маньчжурии.
Ключевые слова: разведка, контрразведка, Российская империя, Япония, военно-морской агент, боевые действия, народности Сибири, Дальний Восток, Маньчжурия, хунхузы, японские офицеры, шпионы.
СПИСОК ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
Admiral of Togo (1904) Far East. April 28. (№. 94). P. 2. (in Russ).
Dunmore S. (2005) Lost submarines: the greatest disasters-from "Hanley"to "Kursk". M. 176 p. (in Russ).
From the article "Berliner Tagelblatt" (1904) Far East. May 6, №. 100. P. 1-2. (in Russ).
From the article "Frankfurter Zeiting" (1904) Far East. May 14, № 106. P. 1. (in Russ).
Local chronicle (1904) Far East. April 18, №. 86. P. 2. (in Russ).
Submarines and neutrality (1904) Far East. December 23. №. 286. P. 2. (in Russ).
56
The order in the Vladivostok fortress of May 15, 1905 (1905) Far East. May 19. №. 108. P. 2. (in Russ).
Order to the troops of the Amur military district, Khabarovsk, October 22, 1904, №. 744. (1905) Far East. January 13. №. 9. P. 1. (in Russ).
Order for the city of Vladivostok of April 19, 1905 (1905) Far East. April 22. №. 88. Pp. 22-23. (in Russ).
Russian State Archive of the Navy (RGA of the Navy). F. 763. Op. 1. D. 44. (in Russ).
Russian State Archive of the Navy (RGA of the Navy). F. 417. Op. 1. D. 3020. (in Russ).
Telegrams Far East. April 20, 1904 №. 87. P. 1. (in Russ).
Telegrams Far East. May 11, 1904 №.103. P. 1. (in Russ).
Telegrams Far East. May 21, 1904 №.110. P. 1. (in Russ).
Telegrams Far East. January 8, 1905 №.5. P. 1. (in Russ).
Telegrams Far East. July 8, 1904 №. 149. P. 1. (in Russ).
Chronicle Far East. April 27, 1905 №.91. P. 2. (in Russ).
Chronicle Far East. June 12, 1904 №.128. P. 2. (in Russ).
Chronicle of the war (1904) Far East. April 30, №. 95. P. 1. (in Russ).
Chronicle of the war (1904) Far East. November 13, №. 253. P. 2. (in Russ).
Japanese about Russia (1904) Far East. May 22, №.111. P. 2. (in Russ).
Japanese emissaries in Macedonia (1904) Far East. June 13. №.129. P. 1. (in Russ).
The Japanese in Mongolia (1905) Far East. May 25. №.113. P. 2. (in Russ).
57
