CC BY
72
DOI: 10.48647/IFES.2022.37.85.022
Muhammad Faisal, Komal Khan
CHINA AND SOUTH ASIA: CHALLENGES, TRENDS AND TRAJECTORY
Abstract. China's engagement with South Asia region has grown manifold in recent years. This is a consequence of growing importance of South Asia in China's foreign policy as Beijing has emerged as a key factor in South Asian geopolitics and geo-economics. China is influencing intraregional dynamics by expanding its political, economic, and security ties with smaller South Asian nations. Enhanced engagement of China has led to push back from regional heavy-weight India, which has traditionally considered South Asia as its 'natural sphere of influence'.
Meanwhile, Pakistan and smaller South Asian states have courted China's growing presence in a bid to balance India's outsized role. This has led to intensified competition in South Asia with implications for South Asian security and economic development as their geo-strategic interests of China and India overlap. Smaller South Asia states are deftly navigating competing pressures of India and China to enhance their political and economic gains.
This article analyses emerging trends in China's engagement with South Asia due to three-way maneuvering and the attended changing dynamics of the region for peace and stability in South Asia.
Keywords: China, South Asia, Pakistan, India, BRI, CPEC.
Authors: Muhammad FAISAL (Mr), Research Fellow, the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad. E-mail: faisal@issi.org.pk;
Komal KHAN (Ms), Research Officer, Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad. E-mail: kcomal93@gmail.com
Conflict of interests. The authors declare that there is no conflict of interests.
М. Файзал, К. Хан
Китай и Южная Азия:
вызовы, тенденции и траектория развития
Аннотация. За последние годы взаимодействие Китая с регионом Южной Азии многократно возросло. Это является следствием растущего значения Южной Азии для китайской внешней политики: Китай стал ключевым фактором в геополитике и геоэкономике Южной Азии. Китай оказывает влияние на внутрирегиональную динамику путем расширения своих политических, экономических связей, а также связей в сфере безопасности с небольшими государствами Южной Азии. Рост региональной активности Китая привел к оттеснению с ее позиций регионального «тяжеловеса» — Индии, которая традиционно рассматривает Южную Азию как свою «естественную сферу влияния».
Между тем, Пакистан и менее крупные южноазиатские государства, стремясь уравновесить чрезмерную роль Индии, приветствуют расширение присутствия Китая в регионе. Это влечет за собой усиление конкуренции в Южной Азии и возникновение новых вызовов для безопасности и экономического развития региона, поскольку геостратегические интересы Китая и Индии в Южной Азии пересекаются. Малые государства Южной Азии, в надежде на получение дополнительных политических и экономических дивидендов, успешно маневрируют в условиях конкурирующего давления Индии и Китая.
В данной статье анализируются новые тенденции в отношениях Китая с Южной Азией по трем основным векторам, а также сопутствующие динамические изменения по проблемам поддержания мира и стабильности в Южной Азии.
Ключевые слова: Китай, Южная Азия, Пакистан, Индия, ИПП, КПЭК.
Авторы: Мухаммад ФАЙЗАЛ (Mr), научный сотрудник Института стратегических исследований, Исламабад. E-mail: faisal@issi.org.pk
Комал ХАН (Ms), научный сотрудник Института стратегического видения, Исламабад. E-mail: kcomal93@gmail.com
Конфликт интересов. Авторы заявляют об отсутствии конфликта интересов.
Introduction
Patterns of conflict, competition and cooperation are changing across South Asia. New contours are influencing regional dynamics. Earlier, most South Asian states looked towards India for political, economic, and securi-
ty cooperation. It was due to the geographic centrality of India in South Asia, as it shares land and maritime borders with five South Asian countries. In turn, New Delhi viewed the South Asian region as its backyard and 'sphere of influence' and acted in some ways as a regional hegemon. This, however, is changing now.
Across South Asia rising China is driving a new balance of power. China is a neighbor of South Asian countries. It shares land border with India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan. Earlier, China pursued a low-key approach in South Asia. It maintained political and diplomatic ties with all South Asian states, except for Bhutan. Beijing's focus was on stabilizing its frontier region through boundary agreements and limited economic linkages. In this, political cooperation and strategic coordination with Pakistan, however, was an exception. Gradually, due to its remarkable economic growth and development, and extensive regional trade, China is now an indispensable part of the South Asian order. It is in South Asia, that China is also showcasing its prowess and implementing a grand economic connectivity initiative. This is transforming regional dynamics.
First, China's basic interest in South Asia is to balance India in regional security and economic framework. The Indian foreign policy under Modi regime is oriented towards regional hegemonic ambitions and leadership role in Indian Ocean Region (IOR) viz-a-viz China. To this end, India has deepened its strategic cooperation with the United States (US) to counter rise of China and its influence in South Asia and IOR.
Second, China engagement in South Asia is also driven by the China-US strategic competition for dominating the global order. The China led economic connectivity is reorienting the organization of world politics, securing support of regional countries. United States has declared China as the strategic rival and a challenge to American economic and political power and security at the world level, in general, and in the Indo-Pacific in particular. Therefore, in adoption of a strategic reassurance policy under the 'United States Indo-Pacific Strategy', the 'free and open Indo-Pacific policy' implemented via alliance-cum-partnerships and the 'freedom of navigation' doctrine, the United States is seeking regional alliances to counter China's influence in the Indian Ocean Region
China has responding to the imminent strategic adjustment of the United States for the security of economic and geo-political interests of China while being in a state of constant competition and avoiding confrontation at the same time. China is doing this by entering into regional partnerships such as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and
China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), the port leasing, investments, and defense and technological trade, naval deployments, and military stationing for a sustained and effective deterrence against United States in the Indo-Pacific. A survey of China's political, economic, and military engagements as well as the BRI in South Asia has been discussed in relevant sections below.
First, this paper seeks to analyze the geo-strategic relations between China and South Asia region and finds out the challenges to China's interests in South Asia and China's liability for South Asian states' security challenged in relation to the US-China strategic competition for order and security across Indo-Pacific. Second, the research paper discusses the trends of China's political and economic engagement in South Asia. Third, the paper determines the trajectory of China's strategic gains in South Asia specifically with respect to China's emerging strategic culture and its impact on peace and security in IOR.
China's South Asia Strategy
For China, the importance of South Asia has steadily increased in the conduct of its foreign policy. China's foreign policy ideas of 'periphery diplomacy', 'major-country diplomacy', 'South-South diplomacy' intersect with South Asia, both directly and indirectly. Similarly, South Asia naturally aligns with China's external strategies pursued since 2000, such as 'Go West', which focused on the developed Western region of China, bordering South Asia. Next, 'March West' was an effort to balance Washington's pivot to Asia, and here South Asia emerged as a natural region to extend China's reach. Through these engagements, China has sought to manage competition with India and protect its periphery while balancing competition with the US, its peer competitor.
In South Asia, China remains cognizant of India's expanding power and engagement with the US-led international security arrangements. China has not engaged in an active military confrontation with any of its neighbours for nearly three decades. Remarkably, China has managed to settle nearly 17 boundary disputes with its neighbours, except for the one with India and Bhutan. With India in recent years, however, China has experienced recurring standoff in different sectors of their boundary. In 2017, the Do-klam standoff was a serious crisis, but military confrontation was averted. The June 2020, Eastern Ladakh crisis, however, led to military engagement as both armies contested intrusions and infrastructure building in border re-
gions. This has drastically altered the dynamics of the India-China relationship for the near-to-medium term and intensified regional competition. For Beijing, the priority is to maintain the status quo in the border region while pushing for a favorable resolution of the boundary question.
Meanwhile, Beijing is engaging New Delhi and expanding its political and economic equities through enhance cooperation with smaller South Asian states, as the region has a relatively young population and immense prospects for economic growth. Akin to general Chinese foreign policy, in South Asia trade and investment relations are leading China's engagement in South Asia. Between 2005 and 2018, China's exports to South Asia increased from 8 billion USD to 52 billion USD, a phenomenal increase of over 500 percent [Sinha, R., and Sareen N.]. India-China bilateral trade remains above 80 billion USD annually. In South Asia, China has a free-trade agreement with Pakistan, its closest strategic partner. Beijing is currently negotiating a free-trade agreement with Sri Lanka.
Gradually, new linkages have been established between China and South Asian states through trade, investment, and infrastructure cooperation. China is playing a leading role in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In some ways, for China, South Asia by and large, appeared an ideal first destination for several reasons: large population, developing countries, growing economies, weak intra-regional connectivity, and infrastructure waiting for upgradation. When China expressed interest in building ports, roads, and railways, South Asian nations were receptive. In 2013, when Chinese Premier Li Keqiang undertook his first international visit, he chose South Asia to promote two economic corridors i.e. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor (BCIM). Since 2013, China has steadily increased its political and economic engagement in South Asia through projects under Belt and Road Framework. Four distinct sub-initiatives of BRI in South Asia include China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Bangladesh-China-India Myanmar Economic Corridor, Trans-Himalayan Corridor, and bilateral cooperation with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives under 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR-21).
China's Interests and Capabilities in the IOR
China's interests are also growing in the Indian Ocean, which directly affects coastal states, including South Asian nations. The Indian Ocean hosts critical Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) ferrying crucial im-
ports and exports, including vital energy supplies. Presently, China is the largest importer of crude oil in the world.1 Meanwhile, around 90 percent of China's international commerce, by volume, is transported by sea.2Global trade and transit routes pass through IOR and the South China Sea, while 80 percent oil and gas ships traverse through Malacca Strait. Similarly, being a global manufacturing hub, Chinese economy is dependent on raw materials and minerals imports from African and Indian Ocean littoral states via sea. China is also focusing on developing its 'blue economy'3, which was estimated to be more than 1.2 trillion USD in 2020 and is growing at an average rate of 7 percent annually.
For China, thus, unhindered access to IOR is a strategic requirement as critical SLOCs around Eurasian rim-land must be secured. Presently, access to IOR is dependent on China's stable relations with the United States, whose navy dominates IOR, and the U.S. allies like India have sizeable presence. China's Defense strategy whitepaper issued in 2015, directed People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) to ensure security at open seas. It essentially means now PLAN is a blue water maritime force with the capabilities to undertake prolonged missions in high seas.4 The Paper also emphasized ensuring protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) across the Indian Ocean". Additionally, Military Strategy white paper emphasized that China should develop a 'modern maritime military force' to 'safeguard national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protect the security of strategic SLOCs and overseas interests'. This shift in PLAN's mission emerged at a time when Beijing has expanded its economic cooperation through BRI and requires PLAN to safeguard its interests, assets and citizens in foreign lands and seaports. Beijing is focusing on exerting influence, mitigating its vulnerabilities, and securing its maritime trade in the IOR.
1 Barron, J. (2018). China surpassed the United States as the world's largest crude oil importer in 2017. URL: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34812#:~:text= China%20surpassed%20the%20United%20States%20in%20annual%20gross%20crude%20oil, d%20for%20the%20United%20States (accessed 18.4. 2022).
2 "How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?", 2017 / Center for Strategic and International Studies. URL: https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-se a/#:~:text=ChinaPower%20found%20that%20an%20estimated (accessed 18.04 2022).
3 «Синяя (или голубая) экономика» — понятие, связанное с системным и устойчивым развитием отраслей экономики, базирующихся на использовании ресурсов мирового океана и морей (Прим. ред.).
4 "China Military Strategy". The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. May, 2015. URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/ 05/27/content_281475115610833.htm (accessed 20.04.2022).
To advance its interests, Beijing has enhanced its economic and naval cooperation with IOR littoral states by investing in a number of new ports in the IOR. This Chinese policy is being implemented through 'Maritime Silk Road' (MSR), a sea-based component of the broader BRI.1 At its core, BRI envisions connectivity across regions, enhanced industrial cooperation among partner countries.2 MSR, meanwhile, focuses on establishing a network of ports through building new ports, expanding existing ones and developing industrial zones in these port cities. A major artery of MSR goes from China's eastern-seaboard to European ports via South China Sea, the IOR, Mediterranean Sea, which then links to the Atlantic. Beijing is pursuing long-term lease rights to ports in friendly countries along strategic waterways. These agreements are being inked between Chinese state-owned companies and local governments of IOR. Long-term presence in IOR countries is intended to bolster local economies and connect them with Chinese ports. In case of Gwadar (Pakistan) and Kyaukpyu (Myanmar), goal is to stimulate development of China's inland under-developed provinces through economic corridors by linking them with Indian Ocean.
This economic cooperation has been followed by building overseas military facilities, joint exercises and expansion of defence and maritime cooperation. China stated its forays in IOR in 2008 near Horn of Africa [Shinn, D.]. In 2009, first anti-piracy missions were undertaken in Gulf of Aden. It became a regular feature with expanding scope. From 2014 onwards, Chinese submarines have also ventured into Indian Ocean, making port calls in Colombo and Karachi. Chinese patrols have gradually increased as New Delhi claimed that it spotted 14 Chinese ships in August, 2018.3 After two years of negotiations with Djibouti government, China opened its first foreign military base in August, 2017.4 PLAN troops were stationed and ships
1 "Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative"/ The State Council Information Office, June 20, 2017. URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/ publications/2017/06/20/content_281475691873460.htm (accessed 18.04.2022).
2 "Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road"/ National Development and Reform Commission, March 28, 2015. URL: http://2017.beltandroadforum.org/english/n100/2017/0410/c22-45.html (accessed 18.04.2022).
3 Shaurya Karanbir Gurung (2018). "14 Chinese navy ships spotted in Indian Ocean, Indian Navy monitoring locations", The Economic Times, July, 12. URL: https://economi ctimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/14-chinese-navy-ships-spotted-in-indian-ocean-indian -navy-monitoring-locations/articleshow/61882634.cms (accessed 20.04.2022).
4 Wang Xuejing (2017). "China's first overseas military base opens in Djibouti", CGTN, August 1. URL: https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d6b7a4e3241544e/share_p.html (accessed 20.04.2022).
were deployed to officially termed 'logistical facilities'. It now has deployment of a Marine company and related equipment. Its location in Horn of Africa in IOR enables Beijing to project power, deploy deterrent forces and undertake military operations in faraway seas.
Challenges to China's South Asia Strategy
China has been facing challenges at three levels: (a) pushback from India; (b) India-Pakistan conflict; and (c) role of the US.
Pushback from India: Traditionally, India has viewed South Asia as its natural sphere of influence. This has led India to exercise considerable regional dominance in South Asia. As mentioned above, owing to geographic advantage, New Delhi has expanded its influence and presence across smaller South Asian states, barring arch-rival Pakistan. India has pursued it through political engagement, defence cooperation, and economic and trade ties while deepening cultural linkages. When China upgraded its engagement with smaller South Asian states, India viewed it as a challenge. India remained skeptical of Chinese plans to increase political and economic engagement with smaller South Asian states particularly, the rollout of BRI and its flagship project, CPEC. New Delhi did not endorse Beijing's flagship BRI and also abstained from supporting China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship project of BRI. Chinese leadership sought to reassure New Delhi that CPEC was an economic development project and in the words of Premier Li Keqiang to "wean populace from fundamentalism".1 India, however, did not view unfolding developments the same way.
To balance China, India pursued two strategies: cooperate with China where possible and also propose alternate connectivity initiatives. In 2014, India joined the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a founding member. It also joined New Development Bank. In 2017, India gained full membership into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, a regional security forum where China plays a leading role. Meanwhile, to take advantage of its growing economic prowess and geographical location, New Delhi proposed five new initiatives Neighbourhood First policy (2014), the Act East policy (2014), Project Mausam (2014), Security and Growth for
1 Shishir Gupta (2015). "Govt Makes It Clear: India Has Not Forgotten Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir", Hindustan Times, May, 24. URL: https://www.hindustantimes.com/ india/govt-makes-it-clear-india-has-not-forgotten-pakistan-occupied-kagovt-/story-uYgfYu ruxj4eYBfpGV0H7L.html (accessed 20.4.2022).
All in the Region (SAGAR) (2015), and partnered with Japan in the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (2017).
India-Pakistan Conflict: In South Asia, the intractable India-Pakistan conflict has the potential to undermine regional peace and stability. A case in point in February 2019 crisis, which brought India and Pakistan on the brink of an open war. China has been cognizant of the impact of India-Pakistan crisis escalating to a general war. It has, thus, lent support to the US led crisis management and conflict avoidance diplomacy. Increasingly China has been reluctantly adopting crisis manger role in South Asian to support de-escalation. India's conventional strategic culture is transitioning from the Sundarji Doctrine to the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) that is a pro-active aggressive strategy limiting Pakistan to engage in kind of a limited conflict characterized by nuclear overhang. India stress over reviewing its No First Use policy is an indication of intensifying strategic dilemma in South Asia. Meanwhile, Pakistan has adopted the posture of Full-Spectrum Deterrence to avoid war, and ensure deterrence is established.
Indian is advancing its military programmes, specifically within maritime, intelligence, and aerospace domains, though propounded in the context of Pakistan, however, the recent trends of extending the weapons outreach indicate their threat factor for China. These tactical and strategic weapons of concern for China include Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle and Aerobic Vehicle for Trans-atmospheric Hypersonic Aerospace Transportation (AVATAR), the BrahMos cruise missile, Agni-III and Ag-ni-V ballistic missiles, Arihant-class submarine and the Su-30MKI combat aircraft.
Role of the US: In 2005, the United States and India entered into the strategic partnership as part of the regional bandwagoning policy1 to achieve favourable balance of power by both the partners specifically through bilateral security and intelligence exchange cooperation extended under the doctrine of a "free and open Indo-Pacific." United States and India have signed various security and intelligence cooperation and interoperability agreements bilaterally and through multilateral forums such as Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). The most significant 2+2 ministerial agree-
1 Примыкание (англ. bandwagoning) в исходном смысле — это сотрудничество с державой, представляющей основную опасность. Оно происходит, если примыкающее государство не обладает значимым потенциалом, а также в случае отсутствия у него потенциальных союзников (Walt, Stephen M. (1985). Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power, International Security, Vol. 9: 4:18.). В контексте данной статьи примыкание имеет более констатирующий смысл: авторы прямо не выделяют в связках примыкания лидеров и подчиненных (Прим. ред.).
ments include General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSO-MIA) — 2002; Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LE-MOA) — 2016; Helicopter Operations from Ships Other Than Aircraft Carriers (HOSTAC) — 2017 for maritime security; Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) — 2018; Industrial Security Agreement (ISA) — 2019 for the defense industries' bilateral information exchange; and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) — 2020 for geospatial information exchange.
The defense and technology deals include C-17, C-130J, P-81, M777, SIG716, AH-64E, CH-47F9(I), MH-60R, and strategic trade authorizati-on-1 for India. US-India bilateral military exercises include VAJRA PRA-HAS, TIGER TRIUMPH, YUDH ABHYAS, and COPE INDIA. Both states have also been in cooperation for joint training of military forces. Significantly, India has also gained naval liaison at United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT).
This reorientation of the foreign policy of India has expanded India's regional hegemonic goals viz-a-viz China primarily, and India's maritime security concerns against China's influence.
Trends of China's South Asia Engagement
China's geo-economic framework in South Asia: investments, connectivity, and financial cooperation
China's geo-economic framework in South Asia exists by the name of BRI that is primarily an infrastructure project financed by China, with the objective of bolstering China-led connectivity through South, Southeast, and Central Asia, Middle East, Europe and Africa. Out of the six economic Corridors that include China-Pakistan, China-Mongolia-Russia, New Eurasia, China-Central Asia-West Asia, and in the South Asia there is China Indo-China Peninsula, Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar route. Notably, South Asia is the key beneficiary of the BRI.1
Sri Lanka has been the route of maritime trade for China since 14th century [Anand, J.]. In February 1957, China extended to Sri-Lanka the status of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) [Samaranayake, N., p. 144]. In 2007, Sri Lanka and China signed eight bilateral agreements and Memorandum of Understanding under the framework of BRI in which the most sig-
1 Deloitte Insights. Embracing the BRI ecosystem in 2018. URL: https://www2.deloitte. com/xe/en/insights/economy/asia-pacific-bkp/china-belt-and-road-initiative.html (accessed: 10.05.2022).
nificant agreements were on economic as well as technical cooperation, investment promotion, interlinking of Guangzhou and the port city of Ham-bantota, academic and cultural exchanges, and much more. Hence, in Sri Lanka, China's BRI has been incorporated into national policy officially in 2007 by the then president Rajapaksha. China remained accounted for highest FDI to Sri-Lanka from 2011—2015, amounting to 989.6 million dollars which makes a 15 % of the total FDI in Sri Lanka [Samaranayake, N., p. 149]. In 2016, China committed to Bangladesh about 40 billion dollars investment which included 24.45 billion dollars for infrastructure projects, 13.6 billion dollar in joint ventures; and additionally, 20 billion dollar in loan agreements In 2016, MOUs for Chinese investment of 9.45 billion dollar were signed by China and Sri-Lanka [Khatun, F.].
In January 2020, China and Myanmar signed 33 MOUs and agreements under the framework of BRI for China-Myanmar Economic Corridor with investment of 21 billion dollar in areas including infrastructure, railways, industries, power projects, investments, trade, and human resource.1 CMEC resembles CPEC in kind and development.2
Nepal also signed the BRI MOU with China in May, 2017, however, its implementation and further development in still a process to be agreed upon by both states in the years to come.
In April 2017, Pakistan and China signed 51 MOUs amounting to Chinese investment of 48 billion dollar under BRI framework to launch the key corridor of CPEC. The investment pours in the areas of Gwadar port development, rail and road projects, industries, energy sector, human resource, and cultural exchange. CPEC hosts the mega project of BRI in South Asia.3 China-Pakistan Engagement: From support to proactive cooperation in South Asia
Pakistan — China strategic ties date back to 1960 with China—Indian conflict from 1962 to 1980s to the present in US-China competition for determining world order. Both sides have been into an engagement arrangement to balance the power of India in South Asia. China has at most times provided active support for Pakistan against India. China's policy viz-a-viz
1 Lwin, N. (2020). Myanmar, China Sign Dozens of Deals on BRI Projects, Cooperation During Xi's Visit. URL: https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-china-sign-doz ens-deals-bri-projects-cooperation-xis-visit.html (accessed 05.05.2022).
2 Myers, L. (2020). The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and China's Determination to See It Through. URL: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/china-myanmar-econ omic-corridor-and-chinas-determination-see-it-through (accessed 07.05.2022).
3 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Authority. URL: http://cpec.gov.pk/ (accessed 05.05.2022).
Pakistan is pursued primarily by China's interest in counterbalancing India's regional ambitions by diverting India's strategic attention away from China. The China—Pakistan cooperation presents India with a two-front confrontation during conflict, however, with either of the country.
To sustain Pakistan's active deterrence in South Asia, China remains Pakistan's key defense supplier. The recent significant developments in Pakistan-China defense cooperation include JF-17 aircraft deals, its production facilities, the F-22P frigates and helicopters, the K-8 jet trainers, the T-85 tanks, the F-7 aircraft, and other tactical arms. At present, Pakistan is pursuing modernization of its navy and air force with active cooperation from China, including acquisition of advanced systems such as Type 039 submarines and J-10C jets.
China's competitive alignment with third states in South Asia: A counterbalance strategy to the United States and India in the Indo-Pacific is less focused on alignment with the U.S. or India and more on alignments for geo-strategic and geo-economic gains. Developing smaller states in South Asia have remained more interested in economic development in their foreign policies and present trends of geo-economics in South Asia provide them with China as an attractive economic hub in Asia-Pacific.
In July 2019, China and Bangladesh agreed on integrating Bangladesh's economy with the BRI funding for geo-economic cooperation where Beijing does aim for port access of Payra similar to that of Gwadar and Ham-bantota. The 2019 agreement also pledges for defense cooperation in areas that include defense industry, arms trade, military training, and exchange of navy ships. In 2016 and then in 2017, China navy made port visits to Chitta-gong indicating maritime significance of geostrategic position of Bangladesh for China.
In 2019, China and Nepal entered into 20 agreements under BRI framework to build the Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network via ports, communications, railways, roads, and aviation with China seeking Kathmandu's acknowledgement for China's stance on Tibet dispute being China's internal matter.
Trajectory
South Asia for China: A stakeholder in emerging multilateral world order
The United States-China geo-strategic competition for the world order in the Indo-Pacific has become inescapable for South Asia. The China-led economic connectivity is reorienting the organization of world politics, se-
curing support of global and regional states including South Asia. United States has declared China as the strategic rival and a challenge to American economic and political interests, and security at the world level, in general and in the Indo-Pacific in particular.
Therefore, the United States has adopted a strategic reassurance policy under the 'United States Indo-Pacific Strategy', the 'free and open In-do-Pacific policy' implemented via alliance-cum-partnerships and the 'freedom of navigation' doctrine to counter China's influence in the region and beyond. U.S. is seeking partnership with India to counterbalance China in Indian Ocean region. The Indian membership in QUAD and the militarization of India in South Asia to create a power balance against China are part of the United States integrated deterrence strategy against China in South Asia. India's official recognition of the United States' Free and Open Indo Pacific in 2005 under partnership agreement with the United States points out Liberal World's geostrategic stakes in South Asia. The United States interest in South Asia is to balance China's expansion in Indo-Pacific and India has the potential to act as a balancing agent for power in the region.
Enhancing China's Strategic Space in South Asia
China has had success in enhancing its strategic space in South Asia by upgrading relations with smaller states, that earlier had close relations with India due to geographic and cultural linkages. Beijing's expanding relations focused more on economic and infrastructure development projects instead of a deeper political and security footprint. China's remarkable economic growth has played a crucial role, making it a major commercial partner of South Asian states, including India. This has allowed China to conduct 'neighborhood diplomacy' with much more confidence.
India under Pressure
China's steady rise opened up substantial balancing space for India's neighbours. It is also due to the relative absence of a hardcore balance of power competition, so far, between India and China in South Asia. Beijing and New Delhi are pursuing soft-balancing strategies and diplomatic engagement. This has led India to address the needs and concerns of smaller states as they pursue enhanced cooperation with China. India remains under wary of potential upgradation of China-SA states political and security cooperation, particularly, Chinese naval presence in strategic ports. If smaller states consent to Chinese naval presence, particularly, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, it will escalate regional competition in South Asia. If it happens,
this will also complicate stability for smaller states, and potentially undermine the ability of SSA countries to attract economic support and investments from both India and China.
Conclusion
China's interests in South Asia include balancing India and the United States on the one hand and to sustain China's maritime presence in the Indian Ocean Region on the other. China has political, economic, and military engagement with South Asia. The key challenge for China in South Asia remains the Indo-US partnership, which is America's way forward in US-China Competition. Second, China's integration of South Asia in China-led economic network finds resistance in the forms of nuclear-armed brinksmanship in between Pakistan, India, as well as China, hence offering a setback to China's economic order in the region. China does have liability for strategic dilemma in South Asia based on its bandwagoning policy with Pakistan to balance the Indo-U.S. alignment in U.S.-China competition for determination of world order in the IOR.
While the challenges remain intact to South Asian security dynamics, there are also positive trends of economic development led by China's geo-economic framework in South Asia which is based on policy of investments, connectivity, and financial cooperation. The China-Pakistan band-wagoning in South Asia ranges from constructive neutrality to active support in South Asia hence maintaining the deterrence equilibrium in In-do-Pak conflicts in which China acts as a participant as well as a mediation regime for conflict management and de-escalation. China has entered into competitive alignment with third states in South Asia as a counterbalance strategy to the United States in the Indo-Pacific.
The trajectory of China's dominance in Indian Ocean Region is also determined in South Asia where China successfully operates as an influential stakeholder in emerging multilateral world order. Lastly, and most significantly, South Asia is the geostrategic locality for China's emerging strategic culture in Indo-Pacific as the South Asian ports of Gwadar and Hambantota have potential to serve for China's strategic naval interests in the Asia Pacific region.
Библиографический список/ References
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