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BELARUS - UNITED STATES: THE FREEZING POINT
Andrey Fyodorov Summary
In Belarusian-American relations, the year 2011 actually began two weeks before the calendar year officially started. The whole negativity was entailed by the post-election crackdown after the police brutally broke up protestors against electoral fraud in the December 19, 2010 presidential election. The government's actions that followed only aggravated the situation, and the two countries approached the line past which freezing of cooperation was the only option. Both still maintain diplomatic relations, which is the only positive outcome and this just proves the gravity of the situation.
Trends:
• Political contacts have been maintained at the lowest level.
• Washington tightens economic and visa sanctions.
• Bilateral economic cooperation is reduced to a minimum.
• The United States objects international financial institutions' aid to Belarus.
Condemnation and sanctions
As was to be expected, the United States disagreed with the viewpoint of official Minsk that the presidential campaign was "a huge step" toward improvement of relations between the two countries. The U.S. embassy made a statement as soon as December 20. It "resolutely condemned" the violence committed on the election day and voiced "particular concern" over the excess force the Be-larusian authorities resorted to. On the next day, the Department of State demanded to release all jailed activists immediately and stop civil society harassment. Besides, the U.S. seconded the OSCE in dismissal of the election as flawed.
In late January, Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas Melia delivered Hillary Clinton's message to Minsk. However, as Melia told journalists, Foreign Minister Sergei Martynov and his assistant appeared to be on a very tight schedule and did not find time to meet with him. It is quite possible though that both knew well what it was going to be about: the appeal "to release all arrested protestors accused of made up or real actions and drop all charges against them."
After that, statements of the Department of State and the U.S. Mission to the OSCE came one after another. Literally, not a single verdict in the 19 December case went unnoticed.
The Congress was very active as always. On March 17, the Senate unanimously passed the resolution on Belarus. It urged the U.S. Administration and the European Union to take stringent measures and coordinate joint reaction. Specifically, Brussels was suggested to forbid doing business with the Belarusian state-controlled Belneftekhim Concern and block its reachable assets, and also to terminate Eastern Partnership projects in which the Belarusian authorities were involved.
On April 1, the Congress held hearings on the situation in Belarus and proceeded with consideration of a bill on reinforcement of the Belarus Democracy Act issued in October 2004 and then amended in 2006 and 2008 this time titled "Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act."
The Act was passed on December 14. With due account for the December presidential election and all that happened after it, the authors rewrote the Conclusion section thus listing the facts which the American legislators believed most evidently displayed the Lukashenko Administration's disrespect for democratic standards and human rights. Among the earlier events, only the referenda of 1996 and 2004 and forced disappearances of politicians and a journalist were mentioned. Accordingly, the substantive provisions were about non-recognition of the election results and relevancy of resumption and expansion of the previously imposed sanctions against a number of Belarusian officials. American companies were forbidden to provide financial aid to Belarus except for deliveries of humanitarian and agricultural goods and medicines.
The Department of State was supposed to inform the Congress of Belarus' arms trade. The U.S. president was suggested strengthening support for the independent electronic media broadcasting to Belarus. Finally, the International Ice Hockey Federation is called on to strip Minsk of the right to host the 2014 World Championship.
As concerns the demands addressed to the Belarusian authorities, they include "immediate and unconditional" release of all political prisoners, prosecution of senior leadership of the government of Belarus responsible for violations of human rights, and holding free and transparent presidential and parliamentary elections consistent with Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe standards and under OSCE supervision. The sanctions could be lifted and relations could be improved only after these conditions have been met.
As a matter of fact, the law was not that big a threat to official Minsk (except for those to be hit by the visa sanctions individually), but it can cause serious troubles in combination with other factors. It first of all concerns cooperation with international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organization where the United States is quite capable of blocking resolutions Belarus is looking to. Generally speaking, the document kept with American policy towards Belarus of the past few years and confirmed Washington's determination to monitor the human rights situation in the country.
The executive branch made its contribution as well: restrictions on transactions with Polotsk Steklovolokno and Lida Lakokraska enterprises were resumed on January 31 and the list of persons banned from the U.S. was expanded considerably. Making comments on this decision, U.S. Charge d'Affaires ad interim in Belarus Michael Scanlan said "the policy of sanctions was just a simple mathematical equation: as soon as the human rights situation in Belarus has improved, which we hope for, the sanctions will be mitigated. If the situation gets worse, the sanctions will get tighter." He also informed that the list of Belarusian officials banned from America was longer than those compiled by the European Union and new names would be added with time.
Confirmation came shortly: the Department of State announced restrictions on Belorusneft Concern on March 29 and Belarusian Optical and Mechanical Association (BelOMO) and Beltechexport on May 24. Although all three were officially punished for dealings with Iran, it may be safely suggested that the reaction to Belarus' domestic policy was one of the major causes.
The U.S. president made his first statement about the situation in Belarus on May 27. He condemned the guilty verdicts for Lukashenko's contenders from the opposition and called the trials politically charged. Barack Obama promised new restrictions against some enterprises controlled by the Belarusian government in addition to those previously imposed.
The sanctions followed quite soon. Four more enterprises of Belneftekhim — Belshina, Grodno Azot, Grodno Khimvolokno and Naftan — were put on the list on August 11. A bit later, the Initiative for Social Action and Renewal, which used to sponsor NGO's
environmental efforts by allocating around USD 50,000 for over 200 projects every year, closed its local office explaining that the procedure of official registration of small grants was not transparent.
Nothing happened after that, though. The incident with delayed visa for Nadezhda Yermakova, Chair of the Board of the National Bank of Belarus, is hardly worth noting.
Looking for an "adequate response"
Minsk's reaction seemed to be rather muted up to a certain point. Unlike before, no loud public statements sounded from the top level but one made on February 28 in Alexander Lukashenko's interview to The Washington Post. Using some not very diplomatic terms, he accused the West of deceit, double standards, creation of a fifth column in Belarus, aspiration to establish global dictatorship and other sins.
Some president's answers given to the periodical were "inaccurate", to put it mildly. He said that "nobody doubted the outcome of the election", "you kicked out our ambassador from America" and "nobody stops you from sending your ambassador to Belarus." A couple of compliments addressed to Barack Obama could not mask severe irritation with the policy pursued by Washington.
The Belarusian leader however abstained from criticism during the annual address to the nation and parliament on April 21 and the big press conference held on June 17. It was the Foreign Ministry that had to carry the can. They certainly condemned all measures taken by the U.S. but without the usual metallic notes in the voice. For instance, when it came to BelOMO and Beltechexport, the MFA only stated the intention "to clear things up." Obama's declaration was called "unjustified and not based on actual facts" but no appeals for "constructive cooperation to the benefit of our nations" followed.
It would be wrong to say that patience of the Belarusian government exhausted after the August sanctions took effect. Considering the pained reaction to Washington's similar steps of the past few years, one would expect much harsher response this time like the confiscation of money and property of American businessmen in Belarus like it was with McDonald's. Moreover, closing the U.S. embassy and even rupture of diplomatic relations would not have been something out of line.
Nevertheless, after a week of meditation, the Belarusian Foreign Ministry only announced suspension of the highly enriched
nuclear fuel exchange and termination of the American program on training of high class managers at the Belarusian State University. Although the probability of other countermeasures was hinted at, none were taken.
There was a strange episode on October 7. During a press conference for Russian journalists, Lukashenko claimed the United States was going to make a proposition through an intermediary: "safe and warm existence in retirement" in exchange for resignation, but the intermediary refused to negotiate it.
On first thought, few would doubt that this nanve offer would be repelled right away, but it was well worth a try in seeking to resolve the Belarusian issue in such a simple way given that there were no better options the West saw at that time.
Against the general dark background only two bright spots stood out, thus one of them resulted from the tragedy: after the April explosion in the Minsk underground, the U.S. embassy expressed heartfelt condolences to the people and government of Belarus and provided USD 7 million worth medicines as humanitarian aid under the Giving Hope Program of the City Hope International patronized by the Department of State.
Prospects far from being encouraging
It is yet unclear how painful new American sanctions would be to Belarus' economy. Department of State Spokesman Mark Toner said Belarusian businesses would face problems in the U.S. due to the restricted access to the American market and the sanctions would be a signal for European partners.
Belarusneft said it expected troubled import of manufacturing equipment and financial servicing of some projects outside the country, not to mention certain damage to the reputation. Independent experts believe the measures taken will not have serious economic consequences in the long view. Although Belarusian exports to the United States almost doubled year-on-year, it was still quite insignificant standing at USD 331 million. Besides, the turnover is fluctuating: for example, it amounted to nearly USD 90 million in May and ten times less in September.
Belarus certainly cannot retaliate because its leverage is far too modest for that. The refusal to maintain the nuclear exchange was not quite logical. The Foreign Ministry emphasized that Belarus would still safeguard nuclear fuel security in full conformity with
international nonproliferation commitments, which means that Be-larusian uranium will not come to hands of international terrorists contrary to fears of the United States.
This approach could only be welcomed, at least for pragmatic reasons, otherwise it would not have been reduced to sanctions against Belneftekhim, and Belarus would confront not only the U.S. but also all parties concerned. But in these circumstances, Belarus has to keep paying big money to secure the uranium stocks and cannot expect an invite to the next Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul scheduled for the spring. When Lukashenko was not invited to the previous summit in 2010 he called it "brainlessness and stupid inertia..."
Finally, as a result of all that happened during this crisis, the country to a great extent surrendered its credibility as a reliable partner, and the United States found grounds for impeding construction of a nuclear power plant in Belarus using all available means. As a result of the said decision, Minsk has no benefits to count on.
Conclusion
The developments observed in 2011 do not suggest any positive trends. The Belarusian government emphatically refuses to reconsider its domestic policy, and the demands to call off the Democracy Act and lift the sanctions as a prerequisite for normalization of bilateral relations are precisely the opposite of America's expectations. The United States keeps pressurizing the opponent thus having not enough leverage to bring about the desired effect.
The year 2012 will most likely see no breakthroughs, the more so as America will be too busy with the presidential campaign and Belarus-related foreign policy matters will as always pale into insignificance for a while.
Basically, it is quite possible that the Belarusian government will intend to resume dialogue, but it can only happen if Minsk and Moscow are brought into a serious confrontation again, but nothing suggests that at this point. All things considered, any progress in Belarusian-American relations is very unlikely in the foreseeable future.
This article used information from BelTA, BelaPAN, and Interfax news agencies
