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"Rossiya i novye gosudarstva Evrazii. IMEMO RAN", Moscow, 2015, № 3, pp. 100-106.
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L. Gusev,
Ph.D. (Hist.), Senior Research Fellow, Analytical Center, Institute of International Studies, MGIMO (University)
BASIC DIRECTIONS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN IN THE FRAMEWORK OF EURASIAN INTEGRATION
The development of integration cooperation within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union is an essential component of the strategy of Russia in the international arena. Kazakhstan is one of the key partners of Russia in the Eurasian integration. So, the strategic aspects of approach of the government of Kazakhstan to the development of Eurasian integration should be considered for further discussion on overcoming some of the contradictions that prevent the optimum results of Eurasian integration on the post-Soviet space [7].
Kazakhstan firmly supports the deepening of integration, however, this process is accompanied by the development of other "vector" of foreign policy (particularly in China and the Asia-Pacific region, the West and Islamic countries) [9]. This policy allows
Kazakhstan to "balance" between the interests of various parties in order to strengthen its own independence and for modernization [5] under the current political system in the country combining political mono-centrism and effective attraction of foreign investment [8]. The multi-vector foreign policy of Kazakhstan may be in the future a kind of "limiter" for the expansion of cooperation within the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) [6, s. 116-124].
President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev was the first to propose the idea of creating a new integration association in 1994 - the Eurasian Economic Union [23, p. 311]. Afterwards he repeatedly returned to it and advocated this idea both in his country and at the international level. The first attempt to create the Customs Union (the CU) was made a few years after that speech. The program of measures for its formation was prepared in 1996. It is expected to sign the relevant documents. However, it did not take place. However, it did not take place, since different economic interests of the participating countries have prevented them to agree on a general list of tariff and non-tariff exemptions from the free trade regime,to unify the provisions of the bilateral free trade agreements, applicable to the present, and the relevant protocols on exemptions from this regime. The failure of the Eurasian integration then led to the emergence of new restrictions and barriers in mutual trade.
The second attempt to form the Customs Union was undertaken in 2006 and leadership of Kazakhstan has actively supported this idea again. The basic decision on the establishment of the CU of three countries was made at the Council of the Eurasian Economic Community in August 2006. Three states - members of the Eurasian Economic Community (Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus) launched an initiative on the formation of the Customs Union at the summit in Sochi. The participating countries agreed to apply a common customs
tariff and other common measures regulating trade with third countries at the same summit. the CU of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan had to start acting in 2011.
Kazakhstan started to make significant efforts to create legal and economic framework for the activities of this structure immediately. At the end of January 2009 the Senate of the Parliament of Kazakhstan ratified a number of agreements on formation of the CU with Russia and Belarus [26]. In May 2009, Secretary General of the Eurasian Economic Community, a representative of Kazakhstan, Tair Mansurov reported to the President of Kazakhstan, that the three states had already agreed on 88% of all the required documents, and the intensive negotiations were continued for agreement of the remaining ones. He suggested that the heads of the states would approve customs codes of the Eurasian Economic Community and the CU by the end of 2009 [31].
Kazakhstan continues active participation in the CU after its formation. Initially, this activity has brought good economic dividends. Two-time growth of trade turnover occurred from 2010 to 2012 between Kazakhstan, on the one hand, and Russia with Belarus - on the other. The volume of trade of Kazakhstan with its partners in the Customs Union has been amounted to $ 24.5 billion [2]. However, the negative economic trends were already evident at the time. In particular, inflation began to grow faster ("exporting inflation" from the Russian Federation), food prices rose, trade imbalances began to take shape in the relations with Russia.
Despite some everyday challenges (such as significant growth in food prices due to the launch of the CU), the attitude of the citizens of Kazakhstan has always been positive to this structure. There was a survey in the second half of 2013 and 67% of the population
perceived the presence of Kazakhstan in the Customs Union as well as its work positively [16].
As for the main objectives and expectations from Eurasian integration, (As noted by Zara Mihranyan, a political scientist and expert on Central Asia) they are the following:
Ensuring of its own leading positions among the countries of the Eurasian region by integrating with the Russian economic power, the use of the territory of the CU as an area of free transit.
Guaranteed access to Russian pipelines, regardless of the political and economic situation, due to which there is a possibility of differentiation of export deliveries of energy resources from Kazakhstan at no additional cost to the alternative routes.
The use of the unified energy system of the Russian Federation in order to cover energy deficiency of some industrial regions of the republic with its own lower-cost electricity, which forms a stable foundation for the modernization of the electrical capacitance of industries of Kazakhstan and expansion of electricity exports to Belarus by transit through Russia.
Promoting the implementation of national programs for the development and modernization of Kazakh industry by facilitating access to cheaper Russian raw materials, infrastructure, Belarusian and Russian technologies.
Support and development of export of agricultural products both in Russia and on the international markets with the use of the transit potential of the Customs Union [32].
President Nursultan Nazarbayev has repeatedly stressed the inevitability of integration into the CU and its profitability for the Kazakh economy. For example, the government should adjust fiscal policy, improve the quality of the planning and execution of the state budget in the face of deteriorating economic conditions [25].
N. Nazarbayev also noted that the volume of the domestic market was limited, and it is necessary to expand the market space for further growth of the economy [25].
In 2013-2014 the leadership of Kazakhstan became increasingly concerned about a trade imbalance in relations with other actors in the Eurasian integration. It is interesting to consider the attitude of the Government to customs duties in the Customs Union in this context. Thus, the Ministry of Economy planned to submit proposals for the unification of import duties to the participants of the CU as early as 2013 [15]. Kazakhstan was going to insist on unification of export duties on oil products. Minister of Finance said that Kazakhstan has given a total of 26 bn Tenge import duties more than it has received from Russia and Belarus on September 1, 2013.
Since 2012 the growth rate of imports has been higher in Kazakhstan than in Russia and Belarus, and in this regard the revenue growth of import duties has been more in Kazakhstan than in these countries [12], that contributed to the outflow of foreign exchange from the country.
Exports of Kazakhstan to Russia decrease, while imports from it increase. Kazakhstan exports of Russian goods worth 2.4 times more than its exports to Russia. This growing trade imbalance causes serious resentment among certain circles of the Kazakh elite. In September 2013, the Agency for Protection of Competition stated that more than 30 different access restrictions of Kazakhstan businessmen to the markets of the CU were found. The dissatisfaction is expressed by the fact that Russia is promoting its own interests and goods on the market of the CU at the expense of the economic interests of Kazakhstan [24]. Deputies say that the territory of the Customs Union has quickly become the perfect scheme for the transfer of funds in offshore [30].
By the way, the Central Bank of Russia has expressed the similar criticism, and there is some foundation.
However, the Russian-Kazakh economic relations continue to grow stronger. There are new dimensions to them, such as migration. Formerly there was no mass labor migration from Kazakhstan to Russia, but now more and more young people from the south are going to Russia to work [19]. According to the Russian Federal Migration Service, there were more than 600 thousand citizens of Kazakhstan in the Russian Federation at the end of August 2013 They were more than migrants from neighboring Kyrgyzstan. The sudden influx of Kazakhs in Russia is connected with the creation of the CU that provides free movement of labor in the territories of the participating countries. Meanwhile, increased migration has both a positive impact (strengthening economic and cultural ties), and a negative one (ethnic tension). Therefore it is necessary to consider all aspects of the development of Russian-Kazakh integration and make efforts to alleviate the problems.
Kazakhstan in general tried to stick to a common customs policy within the CU at the first stage of confrontation between Russia and the European Union (before the active phase of the crisis in Ukraine). The imposition of the embargo on Moldovan wines may be mentioned in this context [14]. In autumn 2014, Astana also promised that the goods, prohibited by Russian sanctions, would not pass through its territory to Russia (in particular, foodstuffs from the EU). Kazakhstan, however, did not support the Russian sanctions in full against the EU and Ukraine.
Kazakhstan actively cooperates with Belarus, although the two countries do not conceal the fact that this cooperation is a result of their proximity to Russia, rather than their own strategic choice in favor of each other. At the same time, the common interests at the political level
have been identified between the two countries. Currently, Belarus and Kazakhstan are carried out a similar policy toward Russian retaliatory sanctions against the EU and Ukraine.
The key points of cooperation between Belarus and Kazakhstan were scheduled during the official visit of President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko to Kazakhstan on October 3-4, 2013. The day before he was interviewed by Kazakhstan TV channel 24 KZ and noted that the Eurasian Economic Union would start working in 2015, despite the uneven the willingness of countries to it [3, p. 63-71]. Member States needed to carry out mutual promises and avoid pressure on each other, to seek new forms of integration and cooperation. According to Alexander Lukashenko, the CU fell behind in the development of other integration associations of the world, particularly the EU. He pointed out that instability in the Middle East could become a threat to the CU, especially for Kazakhstan. He noted that Barack Obama's promotion of the idea of "American exceptionalism" was dangerous and unacceptable.
It should be noted that the trade turnover of Belarus and Kazakhstan fell to $601.9 million (92.6% of the results of the previous year) in January-August 2013. This occurred against the background of the global economic crisis and falling trade level between the former Soviet republics. There were also the Belarusian-Kazakh talks on cooperation in the petrochemical sector. Currently, Kazakhstan (using the status of a member of the EEA) solves the problem of access to Russian infrastructure, enabling it to supply large volumes of oil to Belarus and "to transit" the Kazakh raw materials through the country into the European Union [17]. This is one of the strategic points in the interest of Astana to integration with Russia and Belarus.
Ways of solving the problem of bilateral relations between Russia and Kazakhstan (particularly in terms of trade imbalance) were
scheduled at a meeting of Vladimir Putin and Nursultan Nazarbayev at the 10th Forum of Interregional Cooperation of Kazakhstan and Russia, in November 2013. The two presidents discussed the development of bilateral cooperation and interaction between Kazakhstan and Russia in the framework of integration associations. Prospects for strengthening inter-regional and cross-border cooperation, expansion of partnership in the fuel and energy, aerospace, nuclear and agricultural fields were discussed [18]. The President of Kazakhstan emphasized that industrial cooperation was one of the most important areas of cooperation. Mechanical engineering, mining and metallurgical complex, uranium and chemical industry were named among the successful examples of interstate cooperation of the two countries. N. Nazarbayev said that more than 50 joint Kazakh-Russian projects are implemented and planned for implementation in his country, totaling about $ 6 billion. Expanding the range of production of competitive products with high added value is of great importance for both countries. The development of co-operation extends beyond of industrial sectors only.
Russian-Kazakh inter-regional cooperation is developing on different channels and with the support of many institutions of Kazakhstan. This is one of the priorities of foreign economic order. The representative of the president and the government in the South Kazakhstan region has agreed with the Moscow region at the beginning of December 2013 on the allocation of land plots for the construction of logistics centers for domestic producers of agricultural products. The South Kazakhstan region also plans to build a number of logistics centers in Yekaterinburg, Siberia and Belarus [3].
Another example of cross-border cooperation (the Russian side) is the construction of a road to the Kazakh border in the Chelyabinsk region, which began in 2010. The construction process has gone much
faster because of accession of Kazakhstan to the Customs Union. It was decided to make the asphalt road to the border with Kazakhstan with a total length of 27 km. The cost of the works is about 100 million rubles [4].
There is a process of creating joint Russian-Kazakh enterprises. In late 2013 the presentation of the joint Kazakh-Russian enterprise "Astyk Trans" was held in Astana. Carriage of Grain Company was established on a parity basis between "Kaztemirtrans" - a subsidiary of JSC "NC Kaza^stan Temir Zholy" and "Rusagrotrans" - the largest operator of Russia in the field of rail transportation of grain cargo. The main directions of export of Kazakhstan grain are the CIS countries, the European Union, the Middle East and Central Asia. Regular consumers are Azerbaijan and Georgia [27].
The Customs Union also contributes to other forms of cooperation. The national public procurement regime of the EAEC is carried out with the participation of Kazakhstan from January 1, 2014. Thus, the national public procurement regime applies to all three countries of the Customs Union. This norm is established by a tripartite agreement on the state (municipal) procurement. This is one of the key documents on the formation of an international treaty basis for the EAEC. The agreement is aimed at ensuring equal mutual access of economic entities of the CU to the national public procurement markets, diligent competition, efficiency and transparency of the procurement process. The volume of public procurement market of the countries - partners in the EEA was approximately $ 198 billion, and the state procurement market of Kazakhstan - $ 7.6 billion in 2012 [29].
At the same time, the economic rapprochement of the members of the CU has not received development in the ideological sphere. Thus, Russia's proposal to create a single history textbook for the
countries of the Eurasian Union in the framework of the CU has been discussed for several years.
The Ministry of Education of Kazakhstan sees a number of difficulties in creating such a textbook related to different interpretations of some important events by countries - participants of the Eurasian Union. The essence of the problem is the difference between interpretations of historical events in the Russian Empire (colonial conquest or voluntary integration with progressive consequences). The issue is especially important for Kazakhstan as a universal textbook is created for schools and universities (it will be easier for schools and more complicated for schools, but according to the order of President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the essence of interpretations should be the same). This unification is already causing a lot of methodological problems. It is believed that the number of problems will increase sharply in the case of coordination this textbook with Russia. The purpose of this textbook is to strengthen the independence of Kazakhstan and its statehood and coordination of the textbook was not included in the original plans of the Kazakh leadership [1].
Creation of the EAEC leads to the further development of Russian-Kazakh cooperation. The formation of the EAEC is a complex and contradictory process. It takes place in a difficult geopolitical situation, coupled with the growth of confrontation between Russia and the West in connection with the aggravation of the situation around Ukraine. In this context, there is an active campaign in Kazakhstan in recent years, supported by the local liberal pro-Western circles against further rapprochement with Russia. There are views on the "possible loss of sovereignty" and "potential territorial claims on the part of Russia." Recent events around Ukraine have resulted to a nervous reaction to any mention of the statehood in Kazakhstan. The statement
of the President of Russia, that Nursultan Nazarbayev created a state on the territory, "where the state has never been" [20], led to a mass public action "Send a history textbook to Vladimir Putin" [21].
August 25, 2014, N. Nazarbayev said in an interview to the Kazakh TV channel "Khabar" that Kazakhstan had the right to withdraw from the EAEC, if the rules of the treaty were not be executed. Independence - that's the most important wealth of Kazakhstan [22].
Kazakhstan's leadership is forced to implement a careful multi-vector policy due to the complex geopolitical situation. However, the official leadership of Kazakhstan does not support anti-Russian campaign in the media, especially in the context of the events in Ukraine. However, we can assume that Astana uses the mood to bargain for some kind of position within the EAEC.
In general, the President N. Nazarbayev considers EAEC to be one of his own achievements. In general, President Nursultan Nazarbayev considers EAEC one of his own achievements. Nevertheless, the risk of rising nationalist sentiments against EAEC is related to the inevitability of transfer of power, if not in the short term, then in the medium one.
* * *
Kazakhstan was obviously interested in Eurasian integration in all the years of its independent existence. The country's leaders, personally President Nursultan Nazarbayev, have positioned themselves as leaders of the integration movement in the post-Soviet space. This is combined with a multi-vector foreign policy. This multi-vector policy is supported by a significant part of the elite. Claims of Kazakh leadership to some imbalances of Eurasian integration contribute to such an emphasis. Kazakhstan also does not want to bear the economic
losses from mutual sanctions of Russia and the West in connection with the conflict in Ukraine.
A number of media with the filing of the elite have expressed some criticisms, despite the official support of Eurasian integration in the press, rather strictly controlled by the state. There is a strong disappointment of the Customs Union in Kazakhstan, as the most of the population has not received any benefits or advantages from it. Indicators of the food industry, light industry, machine building show, that there is a decline in production due to excessive import of Belarusian and Russian goods for today [15]. The criticism is particularly has tightened against Russia in the media and on the Internet in connection with the current complicated geopolitical situation in the post-Soviet space. It is unable to slow down the process of integration of the Russian-Kazakh now, but this criticism, as well as a certain attitude of the elite, should be considered, since they can play a role in a possible change in the power structures of the country due to the advanced age of the President N. Nazarbayev.
It is advisable to keep in mind the following facts in terms of the overall analysis of the situation in Kazakhstan in the context of integration processes in the region near the Russian territory:
• Formation of system of integration relations occurs against the differentiation of the interests of the States Parties, and strengthen the position of the various factions of the national elites associated with multi-vector foreign policy (this is especially true for Kazakhstan).
• Promotion of Eurasian integration is accompanied by an extension of involvement, of an external regional environment (China, Western countries) in two-way interaction with the closest Russian partners - Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia.
• Prospects for the major formats of integration in the economic sphere are defined as objective moments (in particular, interest in
deepening the traditional complementarity of the economic systems) and subjective factors (in particular, the multi-vector political interests that are dominant among the ruling circles of Russian partners).
• The integration factor is based mainly on the Russian resource potential at the moment. Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia frequently delay decisions aimed at overcoming the expensive (for Russia) interaction formats.
• The system of multilateral economic cooperation of the EAEC member states is not able to block completely the negative incentives emanating from the environment for a sustainable economic integration of the core post-Soviet space. But, on the other hand, the negative external impacts are not able to stop the onward development of Russian-Kazakh integration processes.
Russia should take into account the claims of Kazakhstan to the process of Eurasian integration (in particular, the problem of trade imbalance and access to the Russian market) and maintain a regular dialogue with it on this subject. However, Moscow could emphasize that Eurasian integration is a mutually beneficial process, not a way of getting subsidies and preferences from Russia. It is necessary to take into account the irresistible multi-vector of Kazakhstan's foreign policy in the Russian-Kazakh talks. Kazakhstan does not intend to integrate with Russia at the expense of other major "vector" of its foreign policy (focus on China, Western countries). It is necessary to develop Russia's influence on the Kazakh elite, bearing in mind that the factor of the President N. Nazarbayev - the initiator and supporter of the process of Eurasian integration - may disappear from the political scene at some time in the future. Formation of the pro-Russian elite in Kazakhstan using the instruments of "soft power" is in the interests of Moscow. Russia may use the influence of Kazakhstan in the Central Asian countries which actively cooperate with Kazakhstan in the political and
economic spheres, for the further promotion of Eurasian integration. Russian policy in Central Asia should be focused on Kazakhstan as far as possible and take into account the interests of Astana, in particular, its rivalry with Tashkent for regional influence.
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"Ezhegodnik IMI. Menyayuschiysya mir I Rossiyskie interesy", Moscow, 2015, Issue 1 (11), pp. 94-104.
