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0городов России фруктами и овощами. Представители азербайджанской диаспоры основали в России сотни предприятий в различных сферах экономики [6, с. 142].
Согласно вышеизложенному, экономические отношения Азербайджана и России в десятилетие после распада СССР условно можно разделить на два этапа. Первый этап, охватывающий 1992-1995 годы, характеризуется нарушением взаимных связей, ослаблением экономического сотрудничества и постоянным снижением объёмов взаимной торговли. Второй этап охватывает 1996-2000 годы, и на этом этапе политика, проводимая странами в направлении восстановления и развития отношений, особенно создание Межправительственной Государственной Комиссии по Экономическому Сотрудничеству между Азербайджанской Республикой и Российской Федерацией и его деятельность, привела к оживлению взаимных экономических связей и создала основу для их дальнейшего развития.
После избрания Президентом России в 2000 году Владимира Путина динамика углубления отношений между Азербайджаном и Россией усилилась и вступила в качественно новый этап. Во время визита Владимира Путина в Баку 9-10 января 2001 года президент Азербайджана Гейдар Алиев, отметив важность этого визита и характеризуя азербайджано-российские отношения в период после распада СССР, сказал: «После обретения независимости Азербайджаном были отдельные этапы, которые осложняли наши отношения... Но сегодняшний день показал, что то, что мешало нашей встрече, Вашему визиту, во многом было искусственно, было надумано и не отвечало реальности. А реальность состоит в том, что сегодня мы провели очень плодотворную работу. И можно смело сказать, что визит очень успешный, визит удался, он знаменует собой важную веху, открывает новый этап во взаимоотношениях между Российской Федерацией и Азербайджаном» [9].
Литература и источники
1. §ahmuradovA.§. SSRl-nin süqutu prosesi haqqinda. // Baki Universitetinin Xabarlari. Humanitar elmlar seriyasi. 2012. № 4. S. 6070.
2. Здравомыслов А.Г. Межнациональные конфликты в постсоветском пространстве. - М.: Аспект Пресс, 1999. - 286 с.
3. Azarbaycan-Rusiya Россия-Азербайджан, 1992-2002: Sanadlar toplusu, Сборник документов / Azarbaycan Respublikasinin Xarici l§lsr Nazirliyi, Rusiya Federasiyasinin Bakidaki Safirliyi. - Baki: "Cüma" QlSC, 2002. - 590 s.
4. Чернявский С.И. Новый путь Азербайджана. - М.: Азер-Медиа, Книга и бизнес, 2002. - 352 с.
5. Камышев Д. Гейдар Алиев приехал исправлять чужие ошибки // Коммерсантъ. - 1993. - 7 сентября.
6. ПивоварЕ.И. Российско-азербайджанские отношения. Конец ХХ - начало XXI века. - М.: Kremlin Multimedia, 2012. -448 c.
7. Azarbaycan-Rusiya: dostluq va smskda^liq münasibattarinin inki^afinda yeni marhala. - Baki: §srq-Qsrb, 1997. - 164 s.
8. Жильцов С.С., Зонн И.С., Ушаков А.М. Геополитика Каспийского региона. - М.: Международные отношения, 2003. - 280 с.
9. Речь Президента Азербайджанской Республики Гейдара Алиева на официальном приёме, организованном в честь Президента Российской Федерации Владимира Путина - 9 января 2002 года // https://lib.aliyev-heritage.org/ru/3640002.html
References and Sources
1. §ahmuradov A.§. SSRl-nin süqutu prosesi haqqinda. // Baki Universitetinin Xabarlari. Humanitar elmlar seriyasi. 2012. №2 4. S. 60-70.
2. Zdravomyslov A.G. Mezhnacional'nye konflikty v postsovetskom prostranstve. - M.: Aspekt Press, 1999. - 286 s.
3. Azarbaycan-Rusiya Rossiya-Azerbajdzhan, 1992-2002: Sanadlar toplusu, Sbornik dokumentov / Azarbaycan Respublikasinin Xarici í§tar Nazirliyi, Rusiya Federasiyasinin Bakidaki Safirliyi. - Baki: "Cüma" QlSC, 2002. - 590 s.
4. Chernyavskij S.I. Novyj put' Azerbajdzhana. - M.: Azer-Media, Kniga i biznes, 2002. - 352 s.
5. Kamyshev D. Gejdar Aliev priekhal ispravlyat' chuzhie oshibki // Kommersant". - 1993. - 7 sentyabrya.
6. Pivovar E.I. Rossijsko-azerbajdzhanskie otnosheniya. Konec HH - nachalo HHI veka. - M.: Kremlin Multimedia, 2012. - 448 c.
7. Azarbaycan-Rusiya: dostluq va amakdajliq münasibatlarinin inki§afinda yeni marhala. - Baki: §3rq-Qarb, 1997. - 164 s.
8. Zhil'cov S.S., Zonn I.S., Ushakov A.M. Geopolitika Kaspijskogo regiona. - M.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 2003. - 280 s.
9. Rech' Prezidenta Azerbajdzhanskoj Respubliki Gejdara Alieva na oficial'nom priyome, organizovannom v chest' Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii Vladimira Putina - 9 yanvarya 2002 goda // https://lib.aliyev-heritage.org/ru/3640002.html
ДЖАЛАЛЗАДЕ БАНОВША МЕХДИОВНА - преподаватель кафедры истории и методики ее преподавания, Сумгаитский государственный университет (celalzade.92@mail.ru)
JALALZADE, BANOVSHA M. - Teacher of the Department of History and its Teaching Methodology, Sumgait State University (celalzade. 92@mail.ru).
УДК 94(669:680):327«190/200» Б01: 10.24412/2308-264Х-2024-1-153-161
ЕГЕЗИ Б.Ч.
БОРЬБА ЗА РЕГИОНАЛЬНУЮ ГЕГЕМОНИЮ В ОТНОШЕНИЯХ НИГЕРИИ И ЮЖНОЙ АФРИКИ В ЭПОХУ ПОСЛЕ АПАРТЕИДА
Ключевые слова: Нигерия, ЮАР, нигерийско-южноафриканское соперничество, гегемонистское соперничество, политическая динамика, двусторонние отношения, эпоха постапартеида.
То, что Нигерия и Южная Африка стремятся стать гегемонами в своих субрегионах, остается фактом, который невозможно опровергнуть. В статье показано, что историю выработки и реализации внешней политики каждого из двух государств
определяли их попытки распространить гегемонию за пределы соответствующего субрегиона, стремление стать ведущим государством Африки. Эта внешнеполитическая динамика, несомненно, повлияла на характер их двусторонних отношений. В центре внимания находится гегемонистское соперничество в отношениях между Нигерией и Южной Африкой в эпоху после апартеида. На основе разноплановых данных, в статье выясняется насколько принцип борьбы за национальные интересы этих государств и гегемонию в Африке были жизненно важны для хода их отношений. Автор анализирует негативные последствия гегемонистского соперничества двух государств на Африканском континенте. Обоснован вывод о том, что сложность нигерийско-южноафриканских отношений не подорвала осознания обеими странами того, что они являются взаимозависимыми и ключевыми государствами, имеющими решающее значение для будущего развития Африки. Утверждается, что для обеих стран важно прийти к полному осознанию того, что их сотрудничество, а не конкуренция и соперничество, имеет решающее значение для развития этих стран и континента в целом. С этой целью им нужно позиционировать себя как партнёров по развитию, а не соперников.
EGESI, B.Ch.
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE HEGEMONIC RIVALRY IN NIGERIA-SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS OF THE POST
APARTHEID ERA
Key words: Nigeria, South Africa, Nigerian-South African rivalry, Hegemonic Rivalry, Political dynamics, Bilateral Relations, PostApartheid Era.
That Nigeria and South Africa seek to be hegemons in their respective sub-region region remains a fact that cannot be rebutted. Also, record of the formulation and implementation of the foreign policies of each of the two state suggests an attempts at extending its hegemony beyond its respective sub-region to emerge as Africa's foremost state. Indeed, this internal political dynamics has undoubtedly influenced the character of their bilateral relationship. The focus of this paper is on the emerging hegemonic rivalry in the Nigeria-South African Relation of the post-apartheid era. It adopted the qualitative method. Through data gathered from secondary sources and with the Hegemonic Stability Paradigm as its theoretical foundation the paper explores the extent to which the guiding principles of the national interests of these states have been vital to the course of their relationship, especially as they both seek continental hegemonic status. It analyzes also, the implications of perceived hegemonic rivalry of the two states on the African Continent. Among the findings of the paper is that the complexity of Nigeria - South African relations has not undermined the awareness by both nations that they are codependent and pivotal states crucial to the future development of Africa. It posits that there is need for both countries to come to the full realization that their cooperation, and not competition and rivalry is crucial to their development and the continent at large. To this end, they must position themselves as development partners rather than rivals.
Nigeria and South Africa have been widely branded as Africa's hegemons; particularly based on the strength of their Afrocentric foreign policy aspirations and material as well as ideational capabilities [1]. No doubt both countries are the dominant state entities in their respective sub-regions [2]. Records shows that Nigeria and South Africa have a history of cooperation with, and involvement in a range of continental projects among which is the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). They have added their voices in appreciating the new commitment to African development programmes by the developed world, and have ensure that engagement with the developed world meets Africa's objective of extricating Africa from the yoke of underdevelopment [2].
However, there has also been subtle cum pronounced diplomatic clash between both countries. This is reflected in the numerous conflict of interest between the two countries in relation to their incessant disagreements over the best approach to tackle regional issues [3] Commenting on the seemingly hegemonic tussle between these two African giants, Njoku (2021) [3] reiterates that; The total liberation of Africa from the shackles of European colonialism and racial discriminatory regimes in Southern Africa, where the twin evils lasted longer became the focal of Nigeria's Afrocentric foreign policy at independence in 1960. Thus, the Apartheid era saw Nigeria lead other independent African states in the furtherance of South African liberation struggles. The end of apartheid and the emergence of multiracial and multiparty democracy in 1994 produced a South Africa with the political will, economic dependence and international credibility to play an equally prominent continental role in Africa [3]. South Africa resumed bilateral relations and international engagements with many states and organizations from which it was excluded in the apartheid years. Cheryl Hendricks cited in Pfister [4] affirms that Post-apartheid South Africa "was able to quickly transform itself from international villain to Pan-Africanist" force. Her entrance into the African space and international arena spectacularly coincided with the period of Nigeria's declining
Theoretical Framework
Facts in themselves may have not research or social significance unless they are illuminated by a theory or theoretical framework. A theory is a set of related propositions that help to explain why event occur the way they do [5, р. 1]. While theories are useful, they may be put to variety of uses. Research on hegemony can be divided into two schools of thought: the realist school and the systemic school. Each school can be further sub-divided. One of the two dominant theories that have emerged from each school
is what Robert Keohane [6, p. 68] first called the "theory of hegemonic stability," the other being Power Transition Theory [7, p. 124].
This paper is theoretically underpinned by Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) as propounded by Charles Kindleberger [8] in his application of the term to the rise and decline of the US's influence in international affairs. HST according to Joshua S. Goldstein [9, p. 83, 107] establishes the likelihood of international stability if a single-nation state has the capacity to, and enjoys an absolute dominant status in the international system. That is, the international system is more likely to remain stable when a single state is the dominant world power, or hegemon. Kindleberger [8] contends that, His main argument is that since states are rational egoists seeking to maximize their own interests and welfare defined in material terms, there is the necessity of a single leader for the provision of the public good of international stability.
HST is partly a mutation of realism and structuralism. Consequently, realists would elect a hegemon from the 'asymmetrical distribution' of power among different states. The theory has not only gained special emphasis but also a distinctive connotation over the years. The adoption of this theory is underscored by its simplification of our understanding of the workings of power relations in international politics [8]. The theory holds that, in a multilateral environment, there is always a need for a powerful state that can wield its collection of powers to maintain orderliness in a power disequilibrium [3].
Hegemony demands power. Power here is the ability of one party to affect outcomes such that their preferences take precedence over the preferences of other parties. The question of whether a country is a hegemon is tied into whether or not it has lost power. Keohane (1984) [6] sees power as tied into resources and production. Hence, according to the HST, possessing enormous political influence, economic and technological superiority and uncommon military strength are the necessary preconditions that must be met before a state can attain hegemonic status. [6] In this connection, the unscathed nature of the United States after the World Wars, at which time Europe was reeling in financial and physical wants, underscored its emergence as the world leader, though with stiff completion from the USSR. It suffices to say that the emergence of the US as a global hegemon was predicated upon her fulfillment of these special requirements [6]. Many scholars are of the opinion that hegemony stability thrives on the weakness of potential rivals in the international system. This is aptly captured in the Giplin [10] position that the demise of the USSR cemented US dominance of the world. The hegemonic status also comes with important responsibilities.
Hegemons have also been categorized into three major forms; namely benevolent, mixed-motives (strategic) and exploitative hegemons. Whereas benevolent hegemon leverages on a reward system rather than a show of force to derive loyalty of low and middle power states and advances the general wellbeing of all instead of self-interest, the exploitative hegemon who is interested in relative gains and uses compulsion to win compliance is exactly the opposite [11]. A "hegemon needs to have effective tool at its disposal, such as the ability to dispense foreign assistance, forge alliances, and use various sticks and carrots to achieve its policy objective". By implication, it must be able to communicate clearly to the 'hegemonized' its capacity to not only reward obedience and conformity with hegemonic norms and ideas but also to punish deviance or unacceptable behavior from belligerent states [12].
Nigeria and South Africa are recognised as the most influential states in Sub-Saharan Africa. This derives both from their economic prowess on the continent and from the roles they have elected to play within their sub-regions and on the continent as a whole. Nigeria is commonly regarded as the 'giant of Africa' for its large size and massive population. South Africa in recent times has been grossly referred to and celebrated as Africa's hegemon [13] particularly since the erosion of the decades of apartheid rule. Nigeria, on the other hand, has also been widely regarded as the 'giant' of Africa or Africa's Gulliver even though this cliché seems to have dwindled at an accelerated pace since the start of the post-apartheid era in 1994 coinciding also with Nigeria's comparative economic decline (late 1980s).
A Review of Nigeria South Africa Relation
In attempting to historicise Nigeria and South Africa's relationship, Adebajo [14] lays bare a sequence of the existing deep seated historical rivalries between both countries dating back to the 1960s and efforts towards mending broken diplomatic fences between the two particularly in the post-apartheid years [11]. Adebajo [14] further reiterates the contrast and similarities in both countries' continental ambition for African leadership. The birth of Nigeria in 1960 brought in an anticipation of the coming of age of an African political and economic giant. South Africa's political profile during this period plummeted after its expulsion from the Commonwealth following the Sharpeville massacre.
The release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 from prison and his eventual emergence as president in 1994 according to Adebajo [14], set the stage for a second Act (1994-1998). This stage was typified by a dash of any possible hope of a 'special relationship' between Abuja and Pretoria highlighted by a row between Nigeria's Sani Abacha and South Africa's Nelson Mandela culminating in the latter's failed call for oil sanctions against Abacha's regime and its expulsion from the Commonwealth. Citing Adebajo [14], Ogunnubi [11] puts it succinctly that this period, witnessed a reversal of international status of both countries with Nigeria becoming the pariah and South Africa the saint; as Nigeria and South Africa that was at this time considered for expulsion from the commonwealth.
Obasanjo of Nigeria and Mbeki of South Africa made concerted efforts to resuscitate the relationship and restore cooperative engagement between both country between 1999 and 2007. This period ushered in a new wave of political and economic collaborative efforts between both states even though it was interjected by some few hiccups [11]. The fourth scene spanning from 2009-2012; the era of Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria and Jacob Zuma of South Africa saw the diplomatic rivalry taking another sour turn. Ogunnubi [11] reiterates that during this era, South Africa received accelerated ascendancy in the global diplomatic environment particularly with its membership of G20 and BRICS.
There are conflicting stands of both countries in international issues relating for instance with Cote d'Ivoire and Libya in 2011. One of the highlight of this period according to Adebajo [14] was South Africa's deportation of 125 Nigerians on March 2nd, 2012 over fake yellow fever vaccination cards followed by Nigeria reciprocal deportation of 28, 56 and 42 South Africans on March 4, 6 and 7 in retaliation.
Regional Power Status of Nigeria and South Africa: A Comparative Context
In Africa, Nigeria and South Africa's de facto status as sub-regional hegemons in ECOWAS and SADC, respectively, is premised on the size of their GDP, military capacity and the leadership role they play in their respective sub-regions. It also implies that these countries assume leadership roles at regional, continental and global levels. Both countries are sub-Saharan Africa's most influential states in terms of military, economy and politics. Both countries extend their influence in the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations on the continent [15].
Ogunnubi [11] affirms that the hierarchical status of states within the international system is conditioned by their comparative hard and soft power superiority vis-à-vis other states. Holsti adds that, in many ways these power capabilities also determine states' national role orientation as well as their level of involvement in the international community [16]; Folarin [17]. The hard power potential and assertion of Nigeria and South Africa like most other countries according to McGowan [18] includes fundamentally their military and economic components. Other hard power constituents may include size (population), territory, and resources among others. The national role conception of both countries is to a considerable extent conditioned by the effective appropriation and combination of these factors as a corollary of its foreign policy. In other words, the military and economic variables of states for instance shape "the general kinds of decisions, commitments, ruler, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions their states should perform in a variety of geographic and issue settings" [16, p. 130].
Hard Power Status
The economic capability of Nigeria and South Africa have increased in remarkable proportions particularly in the last decade. For instance, Nigeria although undeniably blessed with abundant human and natural resources has paradoxically failed to evidently maximize the vast potential of its resources and essentially translate this into practical economic growth and prosperity both for the nation and its people [11]. Nevertheless, Nigeria's position as one of the most powerful countries in Africa is made possible by reason of its relative economic strength [19] which is on record the largest in Africa, second only to South Africa. Aside from being the most populous nation on the continent, it is also the largest Black nation in the world, with a population of over 200 million people. Nigeria at the time of independence was a great producer and exporter of agricultural commodities like cocoa, groundnuts and palm oil cocoa, cotton, timber, rubber, hides and skin etc. [20, p. 5]; the discovery of its seemingly inexhaustible oil deposits, combined with a huge population presented her as an archetypal and quintessential African state worthy of emulation. Olu Falae [21, p. 219] Adebajo [22] noted again that, it was at the peak of Nigeria's economy in 1975 at the time that the ECOWAS was formed as a regional body with the then leader of Nigeria Yakubu Gowon playing a pivotal role and pledging to finance a third of the funds needed for ECOWAS.
Unfortunately, the country's economic potential is grossly under-utilized with poorly articulated economic structures, fiscal and national development policies with dysfunctional economic sectors that are not properly integrated and coordinated. As a result of long years of neglect of proper basic infrastructure that is able to support economic vibrancy, the Nigerian lopsided economy is indeed a shadow of its true potentials; a situation that has invariably translated into poor quality of life and standard of living for its people.
Since the celebrated entry of South Africa into the African democratic space, the resultant implication of this has been a change in the contours of power and leadership equations in Africa [11]. In barely two decades since the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa has been able to remarkably transform itself into unarguably the strongest economy in Africa while also being the largest investor on the continent with business presence; corporate expansion of multinational corporations and parastatal investment into many parts of Africa. According to Boulle [23, p. 135], to be certain, in 2010, South Africa's GDP was $527.5b and ranked 26th largest in the world and the largest in Africa. South Africa's economic incursion into Africa in the post-apartheid period is not only driven and supported by the coordinated public sector support but also more importantly facilitated by the private sector with a significant number of corporate forays of South African businesses into the African markets ranging from retail; food; banking; telecommunications; tourism; infrastructure; power; franchise; construction; and mining [23]. Grobbelaar [24] explains that, this has helped to "unlock the business potential of the countries that they are involved in".
Without reservation, South Africa has in the past couple of years, been able to attract enormous Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into its local economy while also responsible for the same in many African countries. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "In absolute terms, the amounts invested in African countries [by South Africa] may be small, but they account for a significant share of FDI for some African economies (e.g. Mozambique)" [25, pp. 368-390]. In essence, no other African country has invested more in Africa than South Africa. A similar report by the UNCTAD World Investment Report (WIR) of 2011 equally shows that "the large share accounted for by FDI projects within sub-Saharan Africa suggests that South African investors are playing a large role." There is therefore no contesting the superior economic currency and dominance of South Africa in Africa as its "superior economic competitiveness offers an economic clout and in fact bequeaths significant amounts of diplomatic capital to South Africa's leadership potential" [26, p. 7].
The Nigeria unarguably enjoys substantial military hegemony as a result of its overwhelming military strength with reasonably well-equipped armed forces capable of defending the country against any likely external threat or internal insurgence. Nigeria's diplomatic behavior and national role within the region and beyond has always been defined and shaped by its military capabilities. The commitment of the Republic to regional peace, stability and security is essentially tied to the responsibility of its military. Alli [27] reiterates that Nigeria's military is arguably reputed to be the largest, best-equipped and professionally trained in the sub-region while also being the most sophisticated military power in sub-Saharan Africa behind South Africa [28].
To its credit, before the period of the Persian Gulf War (1989-1990), Nigeria was the only country in West Africa and Central Africa to sponsor and sustain military operations abroad. Alli [27] puts it succinctly that Nigeria's "considerable military capabilities bestow on her, as it were naturally, the role of a regional hegemon." There is no disputing the fact that Nigeria has gained a considerable level of respectability and international prestige among the comity of nations as a result of its extensive international peacekeeping involvement. There is hardly any major peacekeeping or peace-enforcement mission carried out under the auspices of the UN, AU or ECOWAS that the Nigerian military has not been involved in. Commenting on South Africa's military might, Neethling [29, p. 95] avers that South Africa has traditionally remained the military powerhouse of the African continent with an unequalled level of military investment, budget and unparalleled capacity which supersedes any other country within the continent. However, while South Africa cannot be regarded as a global military force, it nevertheless can be considered as a regional military power particularly in the regional context of Southern Africa on the basis of its impressive military capability.
Soft Power Status
In terms of soft power projection, Nigeria and South Africa seem to be the most dominant states in Africa [30]. Their soft power that stems from their culture, political values and foreign policy radiates
across the continent and beyond Nigeria's soft power may potentially be coupled from attributes such as its cultural export (Nollywood); its political and iconic personalities; sporting accomplishment; international peace keeping role; delivery of public good, Afrocentric foreign policy; good neighborliness etc [11]. Its rich multi-ethnic identity and ethno-religious diversity which undoubtedly gives it a considerable moral platform to champion the cause of conflict resolution efforts on the basis of its own historically shared experiences. For instance, Nigeria's entertainment industry particularly in the area of film, and music productions permeates virtually every nook and cranny of the African continent and beyond. Nigeria can boast of international renowned artists who have made their mark in their respective music genre. Added to the above, is a variety of international legendary icons and popular authors of Nigerian origin with landmark literary works spanning across generations. Worthy of note among these are late Chinua Achebe whose famous book "Things Fall Apart" [11].
South Africa's soft power potentials may in fact be far enormous than its hard power assets Without mincing words, South Africa can clearly be seen as a soft power state having the soft power attributes to avoid the use of coercion and force in ensuring that the attractiveness of its own ideas and preferences is reflected in the choices of other states particularly within Africa. This it can do "by taking cognisance of its racial past; the richness of its diverse culture; the contradictions in socio-economic development; the fight against poverty and inequalities; and adherence to constitutionalism and the rule of law in setting the agenda and ensuring that the multilateral system can implement policies that are people-centred. According to Chiroro as quoted in Ogunnubi [11] South Africa can confidently exercise it geopolitical influence by exercising its "values, culture, policies and institutions and use these effectively in attracting other nations to want what South Africa desires for its people; this is the ultimate display of soft power". In this way, it is able to gain acceptance and voluntary compliance where force is not needed.
Exploring Hegemonic Rivalry in Nigeria South Africa Relations
One may not incite much hues and cries concurring that hegemonic aspirations are the defining characteristic of Nigeria-South Africa relations in Africa [31]. In corroboration of the above position, Odubanjo and Akinboye [32, p. 62] posit that national interests and the Hobbesian desire for self-preservation, rather than idealistic principles, are the main guiding forces of a state's foreign policy in the modern world-system. The relationship between Nigeria and South Africa is no different. Hegemony involves a situation in which "one specific entity asserts its dominance over others through both passive and coercive means". There is generally no juridico-institutional legitimacy for any country's hegemonic claims, although empirical data does sometime back-up an aspirant country's assertion.
Hannatu Musawa [33] traced the high point of rivalry between both countries to South Africa's criticism and backing of Nigeria's expulsion from the Commonwealth in 1995. South African stance was propelled by late Gen. Sani Abacha execution of Ken Saro Wiwa (human rights campaigner) and 8 of his Ogoni followers, infamously dubbed "Ogoni nine." Mandela previously believed that he had established personal reassurance from Abacha for clemency for the Ogoni nine. Feeling betrayed he called for oil sanctions and Nigeria's expulsion from the Commonwealth. Hence, Nigeria responded in 1996 by boycotting the Africa's Nation Cup which was held in South Africa, having previously in 1994, won the competition in Tunisia and was thus unable to defend her title [33].
During the golden age of Nigeria South Africa's relation (Obasanjo and Mbeki administration) though bilateral trade increased and Nigeria became South Africa's largest trading partner. However though, South African companies in Nigeria began assuming predatory behaviors, profiting from the vast Nigerian market - three times larger than South Africa - while refusing to open up their own markets. Culpable South African companies includes: MTN, Multichoice, Woolworths, etc. Also, at the turn of the 21st century, xenophobic attacks began being meted out to Nigerian nationals residing in South Africa. Furthermore, exasperated by the ignominy visited on Nigerians trying to obtain visas to South Africa, Nigeria imposed stricter visa requirement on South Africans. Media reports in South Africa consequently began disseminating negative stereotypical reports of Nigerians as drug-traffickers and criminals [33].
As noted earlier, with the ascension of both former vice-presidents - Jacob Zuma and Goodluck Jonathan - to the helm of affairs in their respective countries, saw the continued rivalry and burgeoning "special relationship" between both countries. The election of Zuma in 2009 saw South Africa's increased cooperation with Angola, having identified it as a foremost strategic ally. This consequently created tension with Nigeria, as it appeared to relegate its special relationship between both countries. Also
exacerbating both countries rivalry is the fact that South Africa is the only African representative in the Group of 20 (G-20) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) groupings [34].
Nigeria and South Africa were also at loggerhead via their disparate approaches in tackling the post-election conflicts in Ivory Coast. Nigeria adopted a belligerent posture towards Laurent Gbagbo, who refused to concede defeat after losing the country's election. South Africa provocatively sent a warship to the Gulf of Guinea in Nigeria's traditional domain/stronghold where she is the hegemonic power. South Africa however belatedly recognized Alassane Outtara's victory during the polls [33].
Also, the opposing stance of both nations over the embattled late Libyan Leader, Muammar Gaddafi and the recognition of the government of the Transitional National Council (TNC) during the Libyan revolution, was also an attestation of the burgeoning feud between both nations. Nigeria had backed the (TNC) rebel-controlled Libya, based on the African Union's Constitutive Principle listed in Section 14 of the Constitutive Act. The Act cannot be implemented in isolation of other principles like democracy, good governance, respect for human rights and social justice amongst others. The Nigerian government had maintained that Libya under Ghaddafi has never been ruled under any known constitution since he took over power in 1969, and thus, the Constitutive Act cannot apply to Ghaddafi who had never run a constitutional government. This stance was further backed by 34 member-states of the AU. However, South Africa claimed that the AU's Constitutive Act does not allow the Union to recognize the TNC because it is an illegal force, maintaining that the government can only be removed through constitutional process [33]. They were backed by the President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe and Uganda's, Yoweri Museveni, both of whom have been in power for 32 and 26 years respectively. With Zuma having enjoyed good relations with Ghaddafi over the years, South Africa thus delayed recognition of the NTC and even accused NATO of having abused its mandate in Libya [33].
In 2012, there was a salient diplomatic clash between both countries at the AU summit in January, over recognition of the government in Guinea-Bissau which Nigeria was supporting and South Africa opposing. That same year, Nigeria and South Africa were embroiled in another diplomatic feud after the authorities at Oliver Thambo Airport in Johannesburg deported 125 Nigerians (including legislators)alleging that their yellow fever vaccination cards were fakes. The Nigerian government responded by deporting 84 South Africans in 2 days, forcing South Africa to apologise [33].
Also, the same year, Nigeria's continental battle with South Africa suffered a great blow when South Africa triumphed over Nigeria in a keenly contested election, as Dlamini Zuma of South Africa was elected Chairperson of the AU Commission, thus becoming the first woman to lead the continent. More recently, lingering bilateral tensions were again evident when Abuja ignored Pretoria's recent invitation to join part of BRICS summit in Durban, South Africa.
Another evident tussle between both countries is the jostle for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. Nigeria and South Africa have both been non-permanent members on the Council, and Nigeria is poised to begin another 2-year term on the Council beginning in January next year, a record 5th time, a feat parallel to none in the continent, and there is increasing prospects that a single slot would be allocated to the continent on permanent basis, when the Council is reformed and expanded.
From the afore-mentioned extractions, it is evident that there is a growing superiority feud between both nations. Nigeria having played the "big brother" role over the years in the emancipation of South Africa and other southern African countries from apartheid rule, earning her the title of "frontline state", South Africa should ordinarily be redevable to Nigeria [33]. However with consistent successive bad governance, ubiquitous leadership deficiency, prevalent corruption and impunity, an overly dependent economy on a single sector inhibiting diversification, and lack of articulate economic and foreign policies, South Africa today can also lay claim to being the giant of Africa. As it was in 1993, when Nelson Mandela was elected president, 33 years after Nigeria's independence, Nigeria trails the economy of South Africa as the largest economy in Africa.
Concluding Remark
Against this background, there is the need for both countries to come to the full realization that their cooperation, and not competition and rivalry is crucial to their development and the continent at large. To this end, they must position themselves as development partners rather than rivals. Nigeria and South Africa must use the advantages confer by their capacity and endowment to galvanize Africa's development. Likewise, both countries must tackle the underlying issues at the root of dangerous
stereotypical problems undermining people-to-people ties. Nigeria and Nigerians must do more to change the dangerous appellation of "criminal and fraudulent" frequently deployed to characterize them in foreign lands, in South Africa inclusive. On the same scale, South African authorities must take measures to address the numerous causative factors of xenophobic, which have seen many Nigerian residents in South Africa live with naked fear and apprehension, having, unfortunately accounted for the death of 121 Nigerians and properties belonging to thousands destroyed. More importantly, the South African government must address the current hesitation to punishing perpetrators of violence against foreigners. This is essential if deepened political engagement, trade, and people-to-people ties must be forged beyond the present level.
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ЕГЕЗИ БЛССИНГ ЧИМАНПА - кандидат наук, кафедра востоковедения и африканистики, Российский университет дружбы народов (blessingegesi1@gmail.com).
EGESI, Blessing Chimanpa - Ph.D. Candidate, Department of African and Arabic Studies, People's Friendship University Russia (RUDN University); ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3075-9950. (blessingegesi1@gmail.com).
ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ, ИСТОЧНИКОВЕДЕНИЕ
УДК 94 (437):930 DOI: 10.24412/2308-264X-2024-1-161-167
ГИМАДЕЕВ Т.В. ГЕНЕЗИС ИСТОРИЧЕСКОЙ КОНЦЕПЦИИ Ф. ПАЛАЦКОГО
Ключевые слова: история Чехии, чешская историография, XIX век, Ф. Палацкий, методология истории, славянство и германцы.
В статье реконструируется происхождение исторической концепции выдающегося чешского историка Франтишека Палацкого. В ее основе лежал тезис о «контакте и столкновении» двух «элементов» - славянского и германского, как движущей силе чешской истории. При этом основными чертами славянства назывались миролюбие, любовь к свободе и демократизм, а германизм характеризовался как имманентно воинствующий и властолюбивый элемент. Высшей точкой борьбы двух элементов и, следовательно, всей истории Чехии признавалось гуситское движение, признававшееся Ф. Палацким временным триумфом славянства на чешской земле. На основании анализа личной переписки и дневников Ф. Палацкого, а также его ранних работ, сделан вывод о том, что основные черты своей исторической концепции историк сформировал еще в молодости. Наибольшее влияние на генезис исторической концепции Ф. Палацкого оказали его протестантское происхождение и окружение, европейская историография и философская мысль последней четверти XVIII в., в особенности - работы шотландского историка У. Робертсона, немецкого историка Г. Людена и немецкого философа И.Г. Гердера, а также научное наследие выдающегося чешского слависта Й. Добровского. Таким образом, историческая концепция Ф. Палацкого, содержащаяся в его «Истории чешской нации», выход которой завершился лишь в 1876 г., представляет собой, по большей части, продукт первой четверти XIX века. Последующие веяния, например, влияние историографии эпохи французской Реставрации, не оказали решающего влияния на историческую концепцию Ф. Палацкого.
GIMADEEV, TV.
THE ORIGIN OF THE HISTORICAL CONCEPTION OF FRANTISEK PALACKY
Key words: Czech Republic, Czech history, Czech historiography, 19th century, Frantisek Palacky
The following article is aimed at reconstructing the genesis of the historical conception of Frantisek Palacky, a prominent Czech historian. His historical conception was centered around the thesis that "contact and contradiction" between the Slavic and the German "elements" was the driving force of the Czech history. The Slavs were presented as peaceful, free-spirited and democracy-loving people while Germans were seen as militant and power-hungry. The Hussite movement was considered as the zenith of Slavo-Germanic confrontation and the whole Czech history, as the temporary triumph of the Slavdom in the Czech lands. Having analyzed the correspondence, diaries and the early works of Frantisek Palacky, we concluded that the main features of his historical concept might be traced to his youth. He was strongly influenced by his Protestant background and the late 18th century European historiography and philosophy, especially by the works of William Robertson, Heinrich Luden and Johann Gottfried Herder. Josef Dobrovsky also played a significant role in the process of the origin of Frantisek Palacky's conception. As a result, we may conclude that historical conception of Frantisek Palacky was mainly formulated in early 19th century, even though his main work, "The History of the Czech nation", was concluded only by 1876. Later influences, such as Palacky's reading of the French Restoration historians, played only a minor role.
Крупнейшим представителем исторической науки Чехии XIX в., «отцом чешской историографии» [1, s. 146] был Франтишек Палацкий (1798-1876). Его заслуги трудно переоценить: осуществив громадную работу по сбору материалов по чешской истории в архивах по всей Европе, инициируя крупные проекты по изданию исторических источников, фактически, создав вспомогательные исторические дисциплины в чешской историографии, Ф. Палацкий «проделал всю ту работу, которая в других странах выполнялась целыми поколениями» [2, с. 509]. Однако, наибольший вклад в развитие чешской исторической науки Ф. Палацкий внес, выступив автором «Истории чешской нации в Богемии и Моравии», фундаментальной работы, обобщающей историю Чехии средневекового периода, в которой он сформулировал авторскую концепцию чешской истории, в центре которой находились «контакт и столкновение» славянства и германизма на чешской почве [3, с. 81-82; 4, с. 31]. Эта работа Ф. Палацкого оказала решающее
