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"THE GIANT OF AFRICA” AND "AFRICA’S SUCCESS STORY”: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA AND BOTSWANA
© 2020 Emmanuel Oladipo Ojo & William Abiodun Duyile
Emmanuel Oladipo OJO is an Associate Professor at the Department of History & International Studies, Ekiti State University, Ado Ekiti, Nigeria. He is a visiting scholar at the Department of General History, Institute of Humanities, Siberian Federal University, Russian Federation, 660041, Krasnoyarsk, Svobodny av., 79.
William Abiodun DUYILE is a Lecturer in the Department of History & International Studies, Ekiti State University, Ado Ekiti, Nigeria
Abstract. Nigeria and Botswana are famous for their sobriquets - while the former is often regarded as the ‘giant of Africa’; the latter is renowned as ‘Africa’s success story ’, ‘African miracle ’ and ‘Africa’s bastion of democracy ’. This paper examines the fortunes of democracy in both countries with particular reference to the delivery of socio-economic and political goods. We argue that the delivery of socio-economic goods to Nigerians is almost exactly nil and that the country’s hybrid and militician democracy is a tragedy. On the other hand, we argue that although comparatively it still delivers substantial democratic gains, Botswana’s once ‘pure ’ democracy is regressing particularly with regard to perpetual one party rule, ‘presidential strongman’ and growing inequality among others. We conclude that demographically and in ‘big brotherliness ’, Nigeria qualifies as the ‘giant of Africa’ but with reference to qualitative governance, socio-economic development, functional institutions and delivery of the gains of democracy, Nigeria is a crippled giant and an eminent member of the committee of ‘failed democracies ’. Its democratic regression in some core areas notwithstanding, relative to the ‘giant of Africa’ and other African states, Botswana still tolerably qualifies as ‘Africa’s success story ’. The study relied on documentary data subjected to internal and external criticisms as well as textual and contextual analysis.
Keywords: Nigeria, Botswana, development, economy, corruption, resources
DOI: 10.31132/2412-5717-2020-50-2-30-50
Introduction: Pre-Colonial and Colonial Antecedents
Comparative studies have a number of advantages over general, omnibus global studies. First, unlike the latter which focus on grand sweeps; the former focus on specifics and provide answers to definite questions - the ‘why’, ‘what’, ‘where’ and ‘how’ of the histories of the countries or societies being compared. Also, comparative studies generate interesting and logical juxtaposition data which shed ample light on why two countries with relatively similar initial experiences and almost predictable similar socio-economic and political fates and des-
tinies ended up at almost diametrically opposed destinations in virtually all spheres [1].1 This article, broken into three sections, compares the delivery of democratic goods in Nigeria and Botswana. Although, the latter gained independence in 1966 and its statehood should normally date there-from; however, Botswana’s democratic ideals and credentials predated British protectorate. For a meaningful treatment and understanding of Botswana’s modern democracy therefore, a brief examination of its traditional proto-democracy is essential. This introduction, which highlights the above as well as the situation in pre-colonial and colonial Nigeria, is followed by an examination of the post-colonial policies of both countries which are responsible for their different socio-economic and political variations and destinations. This is followed by the conclusion.
Nigeria is famous for at least three reasons: its extensive multi-ethnic and heterogeneous configuration (the country’s over 250 ethnic nationalities make her the most heterogeneous in Africa. ); the centrifugal tendencies of Nigerian colonial policies and constitutions; and being a lopsided and fractured federation grappling with a thorny national question.3
On the other hand, Botswana had always had what Parez called ‘tribal unity’.4 Although there are about 20 ethnic groups and about the same number of different (though interrelated) languages, the Ketswana, who constitute more that 80 percent of Botswana’s population, are in clear majority.5 Indeed, the name ‘Botswana’, which means ‘place of Tswana’ derives from the name of that ethnic group even though it bears a double meaning as it equally refers to all the citizens of Botswana.6 This bears close resemblance to Nigeria’s WAZOBIA (Wa’ is Yoruba, ‘zo’ is Hausa while ‘bia’ is Igbo all of them meaning ‘come’). As a scholar has pointed out, the concept of WAZOBIA does not only promote the three main ethnic groups; it creates the impression that “the Nigerian Federation was created to accommodate the majorities and to merely contain the minorities”.7 Indigenous conditions in Bechuanaland (modern-day Botswana) exhibited a comparatively fairer amount of cultural and ethnic homogeneity -this is not an attempt to claim that Botswana is completely ethnically, linguistically and culturally homogenous. For example, one of the major planks of criticism of Botswana by Good is what he called ‘cultural genocide’ and ‘negative peace’ particularly “the expulsion of the deeply subordinated San people from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) [which] was relentlessly pursued in 1997 and again in 2002”. Thus, inter-ethnic tensions and rivalries with their attendant cleavages and centrifugal tendencies may not be altogether absent in Botswana; compared with Nigeria, however, the former has had far greater ethnic homogeneity and tribal unity with appreciable centripetal pulls.
Pre-colonial Nigeria had a large array of indigenous socio-cultural, economic and political systems and institutions with substantial regional variations. Being a dynamic society that was given to constant change and economic and political alignment and re-alignment however, the number, strength, extent and influence of political states and entities varied depending on the period one chooses to interrogate, an endeavour that is not possible here because of constraints of space. Generally, however, centralisation and autocracy prevailed among the Hausa-Fulani in the north with the Habe kings exercising enormous power and influence. The same scenario played out following the success of the 1804-10 Uthman dan Fodio-led Jihad, which resulted in the establishment of the theocratic Sokoto Caliphate that lasted almost a century.9 Among the chief-led Igbo speaking people of eastern Nigeria, de-centralisation and quasi democracy in the form of village assemblies held sway in the clans.10 Among the Yoruba, absolute monarchical modes of government prevailed, though with variations from one group to another. Part of the title of the oba (king) was kabiyesi meaning ‘there is no querying or questioning of your authority’ since he was regarded as alase ekeji orisa, his word was law, second and accountable only to the gods. Indeed, they were generally seen as “living spirits and embodied composite identities of their people”.11 However, in practice, because of the inbuilt checks and balances, most Yoruba oba were not more than primus inter pares as the case of the Alaafin (oba of) the Old Oyo Empire clearly showed. Be that as it may, all
Nigerian peoples, through their respective indigenous institutions, effectively maintained law and order and grew their economies. Comparatively however, the Igbo speaking people had the nearest approximation to modern day democratic culture.
In contradiction, the pre-colonial political setting in Bechuanaland (Botswana) revolved round the kgotla institution which was largely democratic and participatory. Tribal chiefs were highly influential and respected in pre-colonial Botswana. The chief determined whether land should be allocated to hunting, farming or residence. Moreover, as executive head of the tribe, he formulated economic policies, ensured the maintenance of law and order, resolved conflicts within the tribe and managed ‘external relations’ with other tribes. However, the chief did not act by fiat but through the kgotla system. Although, the system served quite a number of purposes the most prominent was regular meetings of large tribal assemblies through which Tswana chiefs discussed important issues, policies and legislation with their subjects. Waddell summarised the kgotla system as “a democratic process in which the village chief would consult with local villagers who have the right to express their views and concerns.”14 Moreover, the system enabled the chiefs to appraise the popularity and acceptability or otherwise of their policies. Although the size and scope of the tribal assemblies varied depending on the type of meeting as well as its subject or object of discourse, they all had the same basic format: the chief, and members of his court sat in front of the assembly in a semicircle and the chief opened the discourse by explaining the purpose for which the meeting was called. He then relinquished the floor to members of his court. After the administrative elites had stated their own positions, the rest were called upon to make contributions or ask questions. When discussions died out, the chief then announced his decision.15 This system, described by Beaulier as “the exception rather than the rule in pre-colonial Africa”, made Botswana’s pre-colonial political system “quite tolerant of dissent”.16 Thus, “Botswana built a working democracy on an aboriginal tradition of local gatherings called kgotlas that resemble New England town meetings”.17
It must be stated, however, that, like any other human institution, the kgotla had its own limitations. Indeed, Good has dismissed the kgotlas as almost thoroughly devoid of democratic values while eulogising Athenian democracy which, according to him, stood because of its “belief in the wisdom of mass assemblies and the associated practice that all citizens were eligible for public office”. He argued further that ‘peasant-citizens’ were able to use their political power to resist exploitation and domination by the rich. While there is no doubt that Athens remains the ‘birthplace of democracy’ where every inhabitant supposedly had a direct say on issues which directly affected the state, it should be pointed out that in practice, Athenian democracy was an exclusive one because a large part of the adult population was denied full citizenship i.e. the right to participate in politics whether by attending the meetings of the Sovereign Assembly19 or by serving in public offices. Not only were women denied the right of full citizenship, but also long-term resident aliens (metics) and slaves. Indeed, the slaves were no more than the property of their owners wholly without legal rights. Thus, only the non-slaves were allowed to vote and by 430 BC, nearly half of the total population of Athens were slaves.21
British imperial rule in Nigeria dates from 1861, following the annexation of Lagos that year.22 Constraints of space cannot permit any detailed examination of British conquest and administration in Nigeria, nor is there need for such endeavour since there are dozens of excellent studies on the subject. Suffice it to state that colonialism was imposed on Nigeria by force of arms or the threat of it which compelled surrender and acceptance. Having gained a foothold through its annexation of Lagos in 1862, the British swiftly launched long-drawn expeditionary campaigns against the various Nigerian peoples and groups: King Jaja of Opobo was dethroned and exiled in 1887; Ijebu was vanquished in 1892; King Nana Olomu of Ebrohimi was conquered in 1894; Oba Ovonramwen of Benin was dethroned in 1897; Chief Ologbosere who sought to ensure the continuity and survival of the Kingdom was swept
off the stage in 1899; King Ibano-Chuka of Okrika was vanquished and exiled in 1898; the Nupe and Ilorin were devastated in 1897 while the one century old Sokoto Caliphate was conquered in 1903. Consequently, at the installation of Mohammadu Attahiru II as the ‘colonial emir’ of Sokoto on 21 March 1903, Frederick Lugard declared that all legitimate political authority in Northern Nigeria (and by extension in other parts of the country) had passed to the British24, thus marking what Herbst calls ‘the dawn of colonial rule’ in Nigeria, even though pockets of resistance to the British administration continued. After the January 1914 fusion of the hitherto separate administrative systems of the Northern and Southern Protectorates, British colonial rule in Nigeria took shape and trod firmer grounds. There were many parts and sides to British colonial administration in Nigeria; for its purposes, however, this paper places emphasis on the colonial policies and constitutions that unwholesomely promoted ethnicity and eventually led to the emergence of a politically polarised Nigeria. Progressively, British colonial administration advertently promoted the ‘divide and rule’ policy and encouraged “communal sentiments among Nigerians. It seized every available opportunity to spread the myth and propaganda that the peoples were separated from one another by great distances, by differences of history and traditions and by ethnological, racial, tribal, political, social and religious barrier”.26 This was for the primary purpose of preventing north-south understanding and collaboration that could imperil British rule.
It was probably for the above reason that the 1914 amalgamation failed or refused to unify the two halves of the country. Quite a lot of scholarly works had been done on both the rationale for (and reservations about) and the justifiability or otherwise of the 1914 exercise which requires no repetition here.27 Although, scholars do not agree on the immediate reasons for the 1914 exercise, Lugard, the arrowhead of the amalgamation, did not leave anyone in doubt regarding the factors that necessitated it. Reading between the lines, he had three main reasons. The first was financial expediency. While Southern Nigeria was financially viable, Northern Nigeria was not. Indeed, on the eve of amalgamation, while the former was deriving about £1,138 from liquor duties alone with colonial reserves of about £1,007,625, the latter was largely dependent on annual grant-in-aid from Britain which stood at about £314,500 on the eve of amalgamation. On the other hand, the Northern Protectorate was barely able to balance its budget with the most parsimonious economy and was unable to find funds to house its officers properly. Indeed, Lugard’s budget of £135.000 for 1900 was supplemented to the tune of £45,000 by Southern Nigeria while the rest came from London as grants-in-aid. This was at cross-purposes with Britain’s colonial economic policy. It will be recalled, for example, that Lord Grey, a very influential Colonial Secretary (1846-1852) had maintained that “the surest test for the soundness of measures for the improvement of an uncivilised people is that they should be self-sufficing’. Lugard expressed the view that Nigeria’s aggregate revenue was practically equal to its needs but that the ‘arbitrary line of latitude’ that divided the country into two created economic and financial imbalance and anomaly.
Pressing difficulties with regard to railway policies and coordination was another immediate reason for the 1914 amalgamation. It would be recalled that the Baro-Kano Railway Project embarked upon by Northern Nigeria in 1906 conflicted with that of Southern Nigeria. This created what Lugard described as unnecessary, unhealthy and acute competition between the two halves of the country. Citing an earlier report by Major R.E. Wagborn and himself, Lugard concluded that some sort of joint control and administration of railway policy in Nigeria was inevitable. Moreover, the 1914 amalgamation was expected to bring the backward North to “the highest plane attained by any particular part [of the country, i.e. the South]”.33
I.F. Nicolson, a one-time Civil Servant in Lagos Colony and arguably the most outstanding critic of Lugard and the amalgamation, had attempted a very detailed examination of this factor.34 The summary of his argument is that the unity of Nigeria was not one of the reasons for the 1914 exercise. The 1946 Richards Constitution broke the country into three regions (cor-
responding to the three major ethnic groups) while the 1951 constitution made the regions permanent and political.35
The overall consequence of the above was the emergence of extreme ethnicity and regionalism which climaxed with the emergence of three regionally-based political parties in 1951: the Northern People’s Congress in the North; the Action Group in the West while the erstwhile national party, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens, virtually became synonymous with the Igbo of Eastern Nigeria. Coupled with the lopsidedness in the geographical and demographical configuration of the country, one immediate and long-term consequence of the above was promotion of the region above the nation. For example, the 312 parliamentary seats in the Federal House of Representatives were allocated as follows: Northern Region 174, Eastern Region 73, Western Region 62 and Lagos (federal capital) 3. Thus, the Northern Region had more seats than the rest of the Federation combined. This meant that if it won all its seats in an election, a Northern Region-based political party could form the federal government for which a simple majority of 154 seats was required. It is therefore not surprising that in the 1959 independence election, the NPC fielded only 2 candidates in all the 138 constituencies in southern Nigeria - 1 each in Lagos and the Western Region and none in the Eastern Region.36 Among others, this prevented the emergence of a nationally acknowledged leader and practically made it impossible for politicians from the two halves of the country to work on the same political wavelengths. This was the situation when Nigeria obtained independence on 1 October 1960. Obviously, democracy, post independence development and nation building cannot but be doomed in an impossible political atmosphere as the above.
On the other hand, British colonial administration contributed to the emergence of a wealthy, stable and democratic independent Botswana. Following the dramatic change in British policy towards Bechuanaland in 1884 as a result of the German annexation of South West Africa (present-day Namibia) in that year, Bechuanaland became a region of strategic importance for the British.37 The British became alarmed by the prospect of German occupation of Bechuanaland and blockage of a major corridor to northern Africa, which, for all intents and purposes, was the “Suez Canal into [Africa’s] interior” This threat led to the rather hurried protection status Britain offered Bechuanaland in 1885. The Protectorate Agreement prohibited any form of incursion into or invasion of Bechuanaland. It must be stressed here that aside from the offer of ‘protection’ and warding off threats from other colonial powers, the British had no interest in any elaborate bureaucratic involvement in the affairs of Bechuanaland. This may have been because unlike resource-rich and attractive Nigeria, Bechuanaland lacked valuable natural resources. The absence of British active involvement in the socio-economic and political architecture of Bechuanaland has led historians to the conclusion that Britain maintained a “benign neglect” approach to Bechuanaland. Thus, in terms of measurable social and physical infrastructure, colonialism neither took nor gained much from Bechuanaland. As Parson has pointed out, this minimum involvement is evident in Britain’s spending patterns in Bechuanaland: seventy-five percent of British spending on the protectorate went to “administrative expenses” while fairly substantial funds were devoted to upgrading, training and supporting tribal militants in the event of threats from either Germany or the Boers.40 In the 1930s, Britain attempted to change the status quo and tighten its hold on the Bechuanaland Protectorate but a number of internal and external factors frustrated these attempts.
The political atmosphere highlighted above was favourable to the expansion and consolidation of traditional authority. Politically, tribal chiefs and the small indigenous elite wielded enormous power and influence and were ‘near omnipotence.’41 Economically, they amassed substantial wealth through free labour, herding and other related economic activities. Good opines that from about 1885, there were no distinctions between the Ngwato chiefs’ personal revenues and the coffers of the state. According to him, this enabled a chief like Khama to establish a cadre of salaried bureaucrats answerable to him and that by the 1920s, the personal
property of Tshekdi (son of Khama) was estimated at 50,000 cattle and several thousands of pound in cash.42 Given the generally peaceful nature and pattern of British-Bechuanaland relations, transition to independence was “both smooth and swift occurring relatively at an elite level between top British administrators and an established and rising indigenous leadership”. This ensured “a painless transfer of power” to indigenous leaders who had acquired vast experience and enormous “cow wealth”.43 With little or no dislocation or distortion of indigenous socio-economic institutions particularly the kgotla institution and a thriving ‘cattle economy’ coordinated by ‘big cattle barons’; Botswana was well on its way to a well entrenched post independence democratic culture and vibrant economy. The Botswana Democratic Party, founded in 1965, won 28 of the 31 parliamentary seats in the election of that year while independence was obtained in September of the following year.
Post Independence Era: Democracy and Development
This section briefly highlights developments in post independence Nigeria and Botswana and concentrates attention on the current practice and performance of democracy in both countries with emphasis on delivery of what Manzer calls ‘political goods’ (dividends).44 The concepts of democracy and development, though controversial, are common place and well researched; there is therefore no need over-flogging them here.45 In his ‘Gettysburg Address’ at the dedication of the Soldiers’ National Cemetery on 19 November 1863 in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, Abraham Lincoln gave what has since become the most famous definition of democracy. He asserted that “all men are created equal” and defined the best form of rule (democracy) as “government of the people, by the people, for the people”.46 This definition makes the people the subject and object of democracy or what a scholar calls “the raison d’etre of governance”. This is the sense in which this paper perceives democracy. Torado and Smith define development as “a multi dimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes and national institutions as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality and eradication of poverty”. This study conceives development as qualitative and quantitative improvement in people’s living standards in all spheres particularly in education, incomes, skills development, access to information, good infrastructural facilities, decent housing and employment opportunities in the modern sector.
For all intents and purposes, the Nigerian democratic experiment that came with the attainment of independence in October 1960 was dead on arrival. This was because, as pointed out above, ethno-regional politics, which prevented the emergence of a national leader who could animate the political scene also ensured that virtually every policy was perceived and interpreted from jaundiced regional or tribal perspectives. Consequently, shortly after independence, Nigeria moved almost irretrievably from one crisis to another: the 1962 Action Group crisis which led to the sack of the AG-controlled government and declaration of a State of Emergency in Western Nigeria in May 1962; a pronged and devastating census controversy that shook the country to its very foundations (1962-63); the 1964 federal election crisis that provoked a constitutional crisis that left the nation without a valid government for four days and the 1965 ‘operation wet e’ (widespread drenching of people, houses and other valuables with gasoline before setting them alight) in Western Nigeria that led to a complete breakdown of law and order in that Region. Pervasive violence, arson and political drift led the military to intervene in the democratic process on 15 January 1966, killing four of the major dramatis personae in the political debacle.49
However, the lopsidedness in the pattern of killings during the 15 January coup gave rise to the ‘Igbo-plot-theory’ - that the coup was executed by soldiers of Igbo extraction against northern Nigeria given the fact that the Region lost its two most prominent religious and political leaders among others. A brief commentary on the vantage position of the Igbo in the Nigerian Army from the mid 1950s may be necessary. It was natural for the Igbo to assume a
commanding position in the 1966 January coup since they constituted the bulk of middle-ranked officers commissioned between 1954 and 1960. For example, during the period cited above, 60% of the majors in the Nigerian Army were Easterners; 22% were Westerners while the Northern and Mid-Western Regions each had 6%.50 Furthermore, by 1962, two-thirds of the 157 commissioned officers were from the Eastern Region.51 Indeed, it was an attempt to correct the ethno-regional imbalances in the Army that led to the introduction of the quota system of recruitment in 1962. The quota system, which was based on the regional proportionate representation in the federal legislature between 1951 and 1958, gave the Northern Region 50% while the Eastern and Western Regions each got 25%. Thus, on the eve of the coup, the Nigerian Army was pyramidically structured with four principal layers: at the top (Colonels and above) westerners, mainly Yoruba, dominated; at the second level of Lieutenant-Colonels and Majors, Easterners dominated while the rank and file at the third and fourth levels were northern-dominated. Be that as it may, other ethnic related factors such as Ironsi’s lopsided appointments which tilted too much in favour of the Igbo and the promulgation of Decree 34 (which replaced federalism with unitarism) on 24 May 1966 among others led a Hausa/Fulani counter-coup of 29 July 1966. This was followed by a 30-month gruesome civil war in which more than one million people, mostly children and women, died. Indeed, except for a stint of four years (1 October 1979 - 31 December 1983), military regimes held sway in
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Nigeria until 29 May 1999 when the current democratic dispensation commenced.
On the other hand, Botswana was devoid of extreme centrifugal pulls and thus avoided what Scott and Robert call the tragedy of several African countries.54 The transfer of power to indigenous elites who had continuously held power and who had accumulated substantial cattle wealth which was readily extendable with state power and corporate collaboration in diamond wealth led to the emergence of a stable democratic state and a viable economy. Unlike Nigeria’s political class that was unable to hold a single acceptable national election until 2003;55 Botswana “is Africa’s oldest continuous democracy”56 having held general elections every five years since independence. Indeed, a critic like Aobakwe Mothusi averred that “for at least eleven (11) consecutive years, Batswana have cast their vote without fear and intimi-dation...having gone through elections for more than eleven intervals of five years, during which periods...there was no political outcry of election rigging”.57 Although landlocked and assailed by other odds at independence sufficient to make development illusory, stable democracy, rule of law and strong institutions, planned development and “abundant state resources based on mining, responsibly and equitably distributed” have made Botswana Africa’s success story.
Botswana was one of the poorest states in Africa when it gained independence with a GDP per capital of about $70; twelve kilometres of paved roads; twenty-two university graduates and one hundred secondary school leavers.59 However, through prudent policies and excellent management of its human capital and natural resources; Botswana rose from the scratch to join the league of the best performing economies in the world. For almost three decades from 1970, the country had the highest rate of growth per capital GDP in the world with a Purchasing Power Parity of 14,000.60 Thus, Botswana differed from Nigeria whose hallmarks, particularly since 1999, have been executive lawlessness, poor management and coordination, absence of investment in human capital, inequality, weak and ineffective institutions, intractable corruption and absence of basic infrastructures. While Transparency International has consistently ranked Nigeria as one of the most corrupt countries in the world; Botswana remains one of the least corrupt countries and the ‘cleanest’ in Africa: it was ranked 30th least corrupt in the world in 2012 and 2013; 31st in 2014 and 28th in 2015 (but each year the least corrupt in Africa). According to a 1998 Report by the United Nations Development Programme, “Botswana has not experienced the same wide spread corruption which affects most parts of Africa”.61 It is therefore not surprising that in contemporary African historiography, the country is often referred to as ‘an oasis in the desert of corruption’ and ‘an adminis-
trative probity unequalled in tropical Africa’.62 In his comparative study of some African institutions, Johnston opined that “Botswana is in many respects an African success story. Since independence in 1966, it has not only maintained democratic politics.. .but it has also avoided the devastating corruption found in many other countries on the continent. Indeed.the general view both in and outside of Botswana was that whatever the country’s other challenges might be, serious corruption was not among them”.63 Apparently, Botswana still grapples with the problem of corruption but not at the level and scale in Nigeria.
Beside Senegal, Nigeria probably has the most elaborate anti-corruption legislations, agencies and institutions in Africa; vet it has remained very prominent on the table of the most corrupt countries of the world.64 The country loses enormous funds and resources to corruption every single day. In one of its reports, Global Financial Integrity, GFI, a Washington-based research and advocacy organisation ranked Nigeria the 7th nation (out 143) with the highest level of illicit financial outflows. According to the report, Nigerian leaders laundered about $19 billion within a decade (2000 and 20 1 0).65 This is quite apart from the several billions of dollars stolen by public and civil servants. In the view of the present authors, the figure of illicit financial outflows from Nigeria quoted by Global Financial Integrity appears too conservative. Let us consider a few famous corruption cases: a former cabinet minister squandered about €12 million state funds on air charter services for non-official trips within two years;66 a former National Security Adviser mismanaged $2.1 billion arms funds. A former governor of Balyesa State, Chief Diepreye Alamieyeseigba, was in 2007 convicted for stealing billions of state funds; he pleaded guilty and offered to return N43 billion (about $270 million) to state coffers.67 Whether he ever did or the use to which the money was put are issues only state officials could address. Also, a former governor of Delta State, Chief James Ibori, was said to have embezzled $250 million state funds. In the oil sector alone, according to a 2012 report, “Nigeria lost more than $400 billion to oil thieves since she attained independence in 1960”.68 Indeed, in one fell swoop, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission found $43.4 million along with £27,800 ($34,807) and 23.2 million naira ($73,301) in one of the apartments in Ikoyi where super rich Nigerian public officers live.69 According to the Premium Times and Vanguard of 18 and 19 January 2016 respectively, “55 Nigerians stole 1.34 trillion naira in 8 years [more than $5 billion between 2006 and 2013”. Corruption cases in Nigeria are far beyond what dozens of studies could adequately chronicle. There is probably no issue of Nigeria’s major dailies whose pages are not daily filled with corruption cases. Indeed, food items and other relief materials intended for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and their camps are diverted. According to a 2017 World Bank Report, “investments should be.. .coordinated and targeted to enable services to reach the most vulnerable”. The reverse is the case in Nigeria as endemic corruption ensures that funds and resources are not utilised for the purposes for which they are allocated; thus, funds and resources are allocated to same projects cyclically and almost without end such that the impact of government policies and programmes are extremely negligible or almost exactly nil.
Strong and efficient state institution is sine qua non of democracy. As pointed out above, Botswana, like any other country, is not immune to corruption. Indeed, in the early 1990s, as Gbadamosi has pointed out, Botswana “was rocked by major corruption scandals among top government functionaries” which led to the appointment of three Presidential Commissions of Inquiry - two in 1991 and a third one in 1992. The first of the 1991 Commissions investigated the circumstances surrounding the supply of textbooks to primary schools for the 1990 school year. The findings of the Commission indicated that tender and financial regulations were thrown overboard leading to a loss of about P27 million (about $15 million) to the state. The second Commission of Inquiry in the same year probed the distribution of land in Mogodit-shane (a suburb of the capital Gaborone). The Commission discovered several abuses in the allocation of land in the area. Some cabinet ministers who were involved had to resign. The third Presidential Commission of Inquiry (1992) probed the Botswana Housing Corporation
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(BHC). The report of the Commission indicted top-ranking managers of the Corporation. These series of corruption scandals led to establishment of the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes in 1994. In a 2016 Report, the Centre for Public Impact opined that since its inception, the DCEC has actively pursued investigations when reports are received of possible corruption from whistleblowers, members of the public, NGOs and watchdog bodies. It is helped by specialist anticorruption units set up in ministries, and which conduct preliminary investigations of possible offences within their ministries...In 2004, the World Bank published a report evaluating anticorruption institutions across Africa. They held Botswana’s DCEC to be the top-performing anticorruption agency of all the participating African coun-tries.The 2012 Rule of Law report by the World Justice Project showed that Botswana ranked first among all African countries in its absence of corruption parameter. 18 years after the creation of the DCEC, there is an effective system of checks and balances, including an independent judiciary and a free press. Corruption is minimal and all branches of government operate effectively74.
Thus, unlike other African states where anti-corruption legislation are neither obeyed nor enforced; Botswana has demonstrated evidential commitment to combating corruption. The reverse of the above seems to be the case in Nigeria: apart from their perpetual inability to successfully prosecute and obtain convictions of corrupt officials both in the public and private sectors; anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria, particularly the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), are used by the executive arm of government as instruments of vendetta, intimidation, harassment and persecution of political opponents and critics of government policies and programmes. The depth of corruption notwithstanding, a corridor of relationship with the presidency provides buffer and immunity against arrest or investigation. In its Editorial Opinion of 9 February, 2018 entitled “EFCC and the Burden of Credibility” the National Accord observed that:
it is an incontrovertible truth...that the EFCC over the years has abused the application of its powers, distorted the lawful approach to criminal investigation and managed to create the impression that it could be an instrument in the hands of the government in power, or even some powerful individuals...the anti-graft body has compromised integrity and neutrality in the execution of some aspects of its otherwise noble assignment. It has always rendered itself prostrate before the incumbency of any President, by acting in a manner that is suspect...the EFCC’s actions have eroded public confidence over the years. Nigerians are complaining loudly about the Commission’s alleged cover-ups of apparent cases of corruption and the persecution of people referred to as Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) and businessmen who are seen to be in the opposition...The bitter vinegar of partisanship has tainted and made farcical most of its actions...the desire of Nigerian masses to have a corruption-free nation is marred by a bothersome perception of double standards in the execution of that war...The EFCC under Buhari has wittingly or unwittingly slipped into a faqade for political witch-hunt and persecution of Nigerians who flaunt opposing interests to the incumbent President...The EFCC is even now seen to have inserted ethnic, regional and religious sentiments in the performance of its lawful duties. So, there are trenchant wailings by Nigerians that the anti-graft agency is more interested in running after Mr. President’s political enemies than it is in fighting corruption...Indeed, the EFCC is now even seen in some quarters as very active in chasing those nursing presidential ambition, or who are reluctant to join the ruling party.
Governance in Nigeria is based largely on the president’s personality rather than on well entrenched state institutions. Thus, Nigeria has had ‘personalised rule’ rather than ‘institutionalised regimes’. Douglas North defines institutions as “rules of the game in a society or,
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more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. One reason for the fluidity of governance in Nigeria and failure of Nigerians to get quality leadership or hold public officers accountable for their ills and short-comings is the absence of strong institutions. In a paper he delivered at a conference on ‘how to make democracy work in Africa’, Nigerian Vice President admitted in plain language that their administration had failed to deliver on its promises. The reason for the failure, according to him, was “socio-economic inequality, weak justice system, absence of rule of law and lack of state capacity to maintain law and order”. He opined that “the inability of anti-graft agencies to secure convictions for many suspects brought to the courts for corruption [is] due to the many manipulative tendencies of the elite”. According to him “despite several suspects charged with corruption by anti-graft agencies in the country, convictions are yet to be secured.. .the question of the capacity of the state to deliver on its most important role of security, justice and rule of law is often threatened because we have not invested enough in institutions that make it possible”.76 A state that is unable to discharge its core duties is a failed one. Indeed, Hassan Kukah, Bishop of the
77
Catholic Diocese of Sokoto described Nigerian democracy since 1999 as a tragedy.
Another factor that has assailed democracy in Nigeria is what a former chairman of Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission and Professor of Political Science, Attahiru Jega, referred to as ‘militicians’ (military-politicians). According to him, Nigeria’s democracy is not thriving because of the autocratic nature and disposition of politicians with extensive military background and the fact that the country’s democracy is anchored on military legacies. One important consequence of this is a wholesale importation of the military’s command tradition into the democratic process resulting in the emergence of hybrid democracy with pervasive contradiction and contravention of democratic principles: contempt for the rule of law, outright disregard for the judiciary and court rulings and debilitating executive-legislature feud - the unending acrimony between the executive and legislative arms of government in Nigeria, particularly under the ‘‘militicians’, has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. In the current Senate, the upper chamber of the country’s bicameral legislature, the two outstanding critics of the federal government, Senators Shehu Sani and Dino Melaye, have been threatened with call from the National Assembly. While the former dismissed the group championing his recall as “sponsored... amorphous...rabble-rousers and political foot soldiers” of the government; the latter insisted that the move to recall him was intended to silence him “over perfidy, corruption, injustice and mal-administration”. Although, the duo are
members of the ruling party, both within and outside parliament, they insist that the federal
80
government must make Nigeria’s democracy yield dividends.
Our intention here is not to romanticise Botswana democracy. If anything, democracy in
81
that country has its own challenges and limitations. Several scholars, particularly Good,
Nyamnjoh, 2 Taylor,83 Julie,84 Jager and Sebudubudu,85 Molomo,86 Botlhomilwe,87 and Cook
88
and Sarkin have drawn attention to the rough edges of Botswana’s democracy. Although, their grounds of criticisms vary somewhat, they all find common grounds on perpetual democracy based on one party rule; omnipotent presidency; weak opposition; automatic succession; press censorship and attacks on journalists; inaccessibility of state owned media by the opposition and government critics and some forms of bias of anti-corruption agencies. Indeed, Good, arguably the most inveterate critic of the Botswana state described its democracy as an “unusual quasi-democratic...system which discourages opposition and delays change’. He pointed out that “regular parliamentary elections have never produced a change of government [while elections] are notable for their low turnout of eligible voters”.90 Moreover, Good examined the trajectories of poverty and deepened inequalities in “a relatively wealthy state” where “half of the population endeavours to get by on less than two dollars a day”.91 In sum, he dismissed Botswana as an “inequitable society” characterised by cultural genocide where “autocracy and irrationality have increased recently with decision making becoming more
92
idiosyncratic [while] free speech has come under increased attack”.
Apparently, perpetual one party rule is an important limitation of Botswana’s democracy. The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has ruled the country since independence in 1966. The regular splits and schisms in the ranks of the opposition contribute to the dominance of the BDP. The growing absence of internal democracy in the ruling party has worsened the situation.94 Moreover, the electorate have little or no choice in determining the country president since the incumbent determines and installs his successor (usually the vice president). Furthermore, while the constitution empowers the president to prolong or cut short the tenure of the legislature, the latter is not empowered to impeach the president, thereby centralising power around the president thus leading to ‘creeping authoritarianism’95 or what Bratton and Lewis call ‘presidential strongman’.96 In its 2015 Report, Freedom House opined that while Botswana had a free and vigorous press, state-owned media “provide inadequate access to the opposition and government critics [while] government sometimes censors or otherwise restricts news sources or stories that it finds undesirable”. In a similar vein, in its January 2016 Policy Paper, Afro Barometer expressed the view that “significant weakness in Botswana’s democracy include low civic participation, relatively weak opposition and civil society sectors and a lack of incumbent turnover in 11 consecutive free and fair elections”. Indeed, according to the 2015 Ibrahim Index of African Governance, while Botswana continues to score relatively high scores across much of the IIAG, resulting in impressive rank placements in many of the data and variables set, “its overall governance score in recent years has declined [because of] deterioration in a broad range of governance measure”.99
Bratton and Mattes have pointed out that public opinion is the best measure of democratic consolidation. They argue that no matter how well or badly international donors, NGOs and academic think tanks rate the extent of democracy in a given country, the most important variable should be whether “ordinary people themselves believe that democracy is being supplied”.100 In a 2016 survey, many Botswana citizens expressed the view that their country was a democracy with major problems. While 83 percent respondents said they were completely free to express their views on national issues in 2008; only 65 percent felt they were free in 2014.101 In addition to the problems highlighted above, there is a marked government’s failure to distribute the benefits of the country’s diamond wealth to the rural poor which has resulted into “a country of contrasts...of both wealth and poverty”. As Nyamnjoh has pointed, real democracy means much more than the right to vote or be voted for since these rights do not automatically deliver “the recognition, representation and entitlements that individuals and groups seek in any given context”. On the basis of the limitations highlighted above, Cook and Sarkin opined that clearly, Botswana has succeeded by many standards in pulling itself out of devastating poverty and building the foundation for a functioning democracy...this label of success has led to inadequate questioning of what occurs beneath the faqade in Botswana. Inequality, discrimination, the dominance of a single political party and an array of human rights abuses are among the many problems afflicting Botswana.Botswana cannot serve as example for Africa unless it confronts these fundamental failures and shortcom-
104
ings.
The above opinion or what Poteete calls the ‘gap between Botswana’s reputation and reality’105 is valid. However, while Botswana may not serve as perfect “example for Africa”, in relative terms and in virtually all measurable indices and point-on-point analysis, democracy in Botswana is far ahead of that of Nigeria whose hallmarks are intractable corruption, lack of basic infrastructures, pervasive inequality, widespread insecurity, unemployment and job losses, endemic poverty and stagnation though with a relatively vibrant and free press. A few examples will suffice. Ranked 34th (out of 180 countries and territories) with an aggregate score of 61 percent Botswana, as usual, was the ‘cleanest’ African country in the Transparency International’s 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index. On the other hand, characteristically, Nigeria was ranked 148th with 27 percent aggregate. A comparison of the rankings of the last half decade reveals the same trend for both countries: while Botswana’s aggregate scores
were 60, 63, 63, 64 and 65 percent respectively for 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013 and 2012; that of Nigeria were 28, 25, 27, 25 and 27 percent respectively for the same years.106
Moreover, in a recent Report, the World Internal Security and Police Index International (WISPI) rated the Nigeria Police Force as “the worst globally in terms of its ability to handle internal security challenges”. In a survey of 127 countries, “Nigeria failed in all four parameters of capacity, process, legitimacy and outcomes” while Botswana, which ranked 47th globally was the best in Africa. Moreover, in a survey by the Sleep in Airport website (sleepi-nairports.net), Lagos (Nigeria’s best) Airport was ranked the fifth worst in the world while the Port Harcourt Airport was ranked the third worst globally. The criteria used in the survey included comfort (gate seating and availability of rest zones), services, facilities and things to do, food options, immigration/security, customer service, cleanliness, navigation and ease of transit and sleepability. According to the survey, these airports “have the capacity to truly offend travellers...in some cases, passengers are made to stand or sit on the floor as they await their flights. In others, the bathrooms don’t have water, toilet paper, or any semblance of cleanliness”.108
Before the 2015/16 financial year three percent increase in their wages, members of the Botswana Parliament were the least paid public office holders in the country. With the minimal increment, members of the Botswana Parliament still earn less than $5,000 per month translating into less than $60,000 per annum.109 On the other hand, each of the 109 Nigerian Senators earns $83,000 a month translating into about $1 million per Senator per annum. Also, the 360 members of the House of Representatives each earns $69,000 per month ($833,000 per annum). This implies that a member of the Botswana Parliament would have to work for about 16 and 13 months to earn what a Nigerian Senator and a member of the House Representatives earns in a month respectively.110 The Emir of Kano, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi II, recently joined in the blistering criticism that had trailed the ostentatious wages of members of the Nigerian Parliament since 1999. Sanusi argued that if the salary of each member of the National Assembly was divided into two, “it would provide jobs for 70,400 jobless Nigerians at between N90,000 and N92,500 [about $250] monthly salary... half their present salaries is more than enough for them in a country where majority of Nigerians live on less than a dollar per day”.111. By ILO standards, as Sagay has pointed out, “no earner of remuneration from the public service is supposed earn more than 100 times the income of the lowest paid worker. In this Country [Nigeria] whilst the minimum basic wage is N18,000 a month there are fellow
public servants who award themselves about 30 million a month. That is, more than 1,600,000
112
times the minimum wage”.
On the other side of the divide, according to UNICEF, “Nigerians source water from rivers, lakes, ponds, streams and irrigation canals... in 1999, 12 per cent of the population had pipe access to their homes. But this percentage declined to two percent as at 2015.”113 Overall, about 68 percent Nigerians had access to fairly clean water in 2015 (the highest in 25 years) compared with Botswana’s 92 percent in the same year.114 While a World Bank Report estimated that 80 million Nigerians lack access to power and its attendant socio-economic benefits;115 Botswana recorded substantial improvements in power generation leading to “a 63.9% decrease in power imports” in 2017.116 A cursory glance at the rate of literacy level in Botswana also shows consistent annual improvements: 1991 (68.6%); 1995 (69.8%); 2003 (81%); 2011 (85.1%); 2014 (87.7%) and 2015 (88.2%).117 On the other hand, Nigeria’s literacy level of 59.6% in 2015 was lower than that of Botswana a decade earlier. According to UNICEF estimates, 10.5 million school age children were out of school in Nigeria in 2015 while the UNESCO estimated that the country was home to 65 million illiterate adults in the same year. In one of their works, Acemoglu and Robinson attempted a categorisation of states one of which is an “ineffective and corrupt state and a society where they [citizens] cannot use their talent, ambition, ingenuity and what education can get”.119 With virtually no modification, this categorisation describes the Nigerian state. While the occupiers of the Nige-
rian structural frame and democratic space access more than their fair share of the commonwealth from the common pool; majority of the citizens grapple with grinding poverty. It is indeed not surprising that Nigeria was ranked 152nd in a 188-country Human Development Index survey by the United Nations Development Programme in 2016 while Botswana took the 108th position. According to the Report, Nigeria belongs to the “low human development category...50.9 percent of the population [is] multidimensionally poor while an additional 18.4 percent live near multidimensional poverty”. In a paper titled “There’s anger in the land”, a former President of the Christian Association of Nigeria, Anthony Cardinal Olub-unmi-Okogie opined that
Nigerians are not happy; Nigerians are hungry and angry. They are not happy because their lives and their belongings are not safe. They work so hard while the value of the money they earn cannot make them enjoy basic things of life. Nigerians are unhappy because the economy has been so mismanaged that some cannot pay the school fees of their children. Nigerians are unhappy because they have not got jobs. Nigerians are unhappy because, instead of hope, they are offered propaganda and insults by the President’s men. Nigerians are angry because their loved ones are butchered by herdsmen while the response of government is woeful.121
Weighed in the balances, Nigeria’s democracy is a tragedy: it is a government by the few for the few - this is in violent conflict with the spirit of the democratic form of government prescribed by Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg Address of 19 November 1863.
Conclusion
This paper attempted an examination of democracy and its dividends in Nigeria and Botswana reputed for their sobriquets of ‘giant of Africa’ and ‘Africa’s success story’. We argued that Nigeria’s pre-independence politics was thoroughly assailed by ethnic and centrifugal tendencies leading to the emergence of parochial, tribal and ethnic leaders at independence unlike Botswana whose ‘tribal homogeneity’ and indigenous kgotla institution provided some form of proto democratic indigenous inclinations, centripetal pulls and national leaders. Also, as a protectorate, Botswana suffered less colonial intrusion and exploitation than Nigeria that was subjected to a ‘99-year lease’ and ruled bureaucratically as a colony. While Botswana’s first president, Sir Seretse Khama focused on political consultation and embarked on “responsible fiscal policy and contingency planning...emblematic of [a] successful and popular leadership”;122 at independence, Nigeria was bugged by an impossible political atmosphere and moved perilously and almost irretrievably from one crisis to another leading to the termination of the chaotic democratic process by a military coup in January 1966 and subsequent decades of military dictatorships.
Since 1999 when democracy was restored, the delivery of democratic goods and dividends have been consistently almost exactly nil. While the occupiers of the democratic space draw more than their fair share of the commonwealth from the common pool; the generality of Nigerians have been sentenced to ‘multidimensional poverty’, unemployment, insecurity, lack of access to basic utilities and infrastructures while corruption remains indelible and intractable. Many of the above ills have not substantially afflicted Botswana’s democracy. Although, with the world’s third highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of about 22 percent, unbroken one-party rule since 1966, weak opposition, lack of internal democracy in the ruling BDP, omnipotent president, a parliament that depends on the goodwill of the president for existence, growing inequality, some forms of press censorship and curtailment of free speech; it is apparent that Botswana’s democracy has regressed significantly. Indeed, Kenneth Good insists that while democracy “beamed forth from Botswana over the apartheid and single party dominated region”, that light is now fading because “what was accepted as democratic within the region of apartheid and dictatorship looks different when,
since 1990, more open, limited and accountable governments are established in Namibia and South Africa”.1 3
With the largest population in Africa (almost 16% of continental population) and abundant resources, Nigeria qualifies as the ‘giant of Africa’ in a sense. Apart from championing the continent’s fight against apartheid in South Africa and rendering different shades of assistance to the liberation of Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique; from its pool of massive skilled human resources, Nigeria had alleviated the problem of shortages of personnel in some African countries, particularly Botswana. For example, in 1972, Nigeria’s Akinola Aguda was appointed as Botswana’s first African Chief Justice. Another Nigerian, Professor Hillary Inyang was the pioneer Vice Chancellor of Botswana International University of Science and Technology. In 2012, Nigerians constituted 4% of Botswana’s health workers - of the country’s 13,713 registered health workers, 174 were Nigerians (96 medical doctors and 78 others).126 Like elsewhere, Nigeria has played the ‘big brother’ role in The Gambia. Of the country’s twelve banks, six are owned by Nigerians. Also, in addition to serving as Justices of the Court of Appeal, two Nigerians - Emmanuel Ayoola and Emmanuel Fagbenle - served as the Chief Justices of The Gambia from 1983 to 1992 and 2015 to 2017 respectively. Indeed, Fatoumata Tambajang, the Vice-President of The Gambia recently opined that “Gambia’s judiciary will collapse” should its Nigerian members withdraw.1 7 Thus, Nigeria may have contributed to nation building in some African countries but has failed to deploy its massive oil wealth to build a people-centered democracy, pull Nigerians out of poverty, provide security, employment and basic infrastructures. Till date, Nigeria remains the only member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries that depends almost exclusively on importation of refined petroleum products, a situation the Junior Minster in the Petroleum Ministry described as a national ‘shame’. From the above analysis, it should be fairly safe to conclude that while Nigeria could rightly take her place as the demo-graphical ‘giant of Africa’; with regard to functional democracy wherein the people are the subject and object, it remains crippled. Relative to the ‘giant of Africa’ and other African states, Botswana still tolerably qualifies as ‘Africa’s success story’. 1
1 Dani Rodrik, “Introduction: What Do We Learn from Cross Country Narratives?” in Dani Rodrik (ed.), In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2003, pp. 1-3.
2 Some scholars and commentators have over-estimated the number of ethnic groups in Nigeria. For example, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2000, p. 90 puts the number of Nigeria’s ethnic groups at 374. Also, Otite estimates that Nigeria has a total of 389 ethnic groups while a Federal Government publication puts the number of ethnic groups in Nigeria at between 250 and 400. See Onigu Otite, Ethnic Pluralism, Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria, Ibadan: SHANESON. C.I. Limited, 2000, pp. 221-231 and Federal Republic of Nigeria, Nigeria: Its Peoples and Diversities, Lagos: Government Printer, 1987, pp. 19-20. Indeed, in an article in the Vanguard of 30 March 2017 entitled “full list of all 371 tribes in Nigeria, states where they originate”, Kunle Sowunmi opined that there were 371 ethnic nationalities in Nigeria. Whatever the number of Nigeria’s ethnic groups, one incontrovertible fact is that three out of the lot - the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo and the Yoruba - are the majorities while the rest, in varying degrees, constitute the minorities.
3 The term ‘national question’ typically refers to issues relating to the composition and configuration of the Nigerian society, particularly the geographical and demographical imbalance amongst its diverse ethnic groups. In a bid to initiate and safeguard its economic and political interests, the British colonial administration fashioned a geographically and demographically imbalanced Nigerian nation and foisted a fractured federation on Nigerian peoples, particularly the minorities. On the eve of independence, the Federation of Nigeria consisted of three regions - North, East and West. Geographically, the Northern Region was three times larger than the Eastern and Western Regions put together as it accounted for 79% of the total geographic area compared with Western Nigeria’s 8.5% and Eastern Nigeria’s 8.3%. Demographically, till date, well over 50% of the country’s population is said to be in Northern Nigeria. See Emmanuel O. Ojo, “Minority Groups: Bridgeheads in Nigerian Politics, 1950s - 1964” in Uyilawa Usuanlele and Bonny Ibhawoh (eds.), Minority Rights and the National Question in Nigeria, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, pp. 61-84.
4 Jane Parez, “Is Botswana a Model for Democracies in Africa?”, New York Times, 16 May 1990.
5 Dayl Sharna Balfour and Peter Joyce, This is Botswana, London: Penguin, 2016, p. 2.
6 Jerry Sampson, History of Botswana, Abidjan: Sonit Education Academy, 2016, p. 1.
7 Emmanuel O. Ojo, “Minority Groups: Bridgeheads in Nigerian Politics, 1950s - 1964”, p. 62.
8 Kenneth Good, Diamonds, Dispossession and Democracy in Botswana, Suffolk: James Curry & Jacana Media, 2008, p. 4.
9 For details see, Murray Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, London: Longman, 1967; R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria: The Sokoto Caliphate and its Enemies, London: Longman, 1977 and Joseph P. Smaldone, Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
10 See, among others, U.D. Anyanwu and J.C.U. Aguwa (eds.), The Igbo and Tradition of Politics, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., 1993; Salome Nnoroviele, The Way People Live - Life Among the Ibo Women of Nigeria, San Diego: Lucent Books, 1998 and John N. Oriji, Political Organization in Nigeria since the Late Stone Age. A History of the Igbo People, New York: Palgrave, 2011.
11 Hurst Williamson, “Kingship in the Age of Extraction: How British Deconstruction and Isolation of African Kingship Reshaped Identity and Spurred Nigeria’s North/South Divide, 1885-1937”, Honors Thesis, Rice University, Fall 2014-Spring 2015, p. 7.
12 See, for example, William Bascom, The Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria, Illinois: Prospect Heights Inc., 1984.
13 Scott Beaulier, “Explaining Botswana’s Success: The Critical Role of Post-Colonial Policy”, Viercatus Center, George Mason University Working Paper 41, n.d., p. 4.
14 Andrew Waddell, “Kgotla (Botswana Public Assembly)”, retrieved from https://participedia.net/en/ meth-ods/kgotla-public-assembly on 10 February 2018.
15 Ibid.
16 Scott Beaulier, p. 5.
17 “A Longing for Liberty”, Newsweek, Vol. 116, No. 4, 1990, p. 28: quoted from ibid.
18 Kenneth Good, Diamonds, Dispossession and Democracy in Botswana, p. 6.
19 The whole body of free born males (citizens) formed the Assembly or Ecclesia, a town meeting which every Athenian who had reached the age of twenty was entitled to attend. The Assembly met ten times annually and in extra-ordinary sessions. See George H. Sabine & Thomas L. Thorson A Theory of Political Thought, New Delhi: Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. PVT. Ltd., 1973, pp. 20-21.
20 Robert A. Dahl, Participation and Opposition, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1971, p. 22.
21 Winin Pereira, Inhuman Rights, The Other India Press, The Apex Press & Third World Press, p. 34. George H. Sabine & Thomas L. Thorson. estimate that only a third of the inhabitants of Athens were slaves,
p. 20.
22 Lagos was annexed on 6 August 1861 under the threat of force by Commander Beddingfield of HMS Prometheus who was accompanied by the Acting British Consul, William McCoskry. The Oba {king) of Lagos, Dosunmu (spelled ‘Docemo’ in British documents) resisted the cession for 11 days. He however capitulated and signed the Lagos Treaty of Cession. Lagos was subsequently declared a British Colony on 5 March 1862. See “British Aggressions in Africa: Annexation of Lagos”, The New York Times, 20 October 1861; Antony G. Hopkins, “Property Rights and Empire Building: Britain's Annexation of Lagos, 1861”, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 40, Issue 4, 1980, pp. 777-798 and Preye Adekoya, “The Succession Dispute to the Throne of Lagos and the British Conquest and Occupation of Lagos” African Research Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2016, pp. 207-226. For full texts of the Treaties that ceded Lagos to Britain, see Robert S. Smith, The Lagos Consulate, 1851-1861, Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press,1979: Appendixes ‘A’, ‘B’ & ‘C’ respectively titled ‘Treaty between Great Britain and Lagos, 1 January, 1952’; ‘The Treaty of Epe, 28 September 1854’ and ‘The Treaty of Cession, 6 August 1861’, pp. 135-141.
23 See, among others, Obaro Ikime, The Fall of Nigeria: The British Conquest, London: Heinemann, 1977 and Toyin Falola, Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009. For Colonial Blue Books between 1863 and 1940, see “Colonial Africa in official statistics, 1821-1953: Nigeria, 18621945” retrieved from https://microform.digital/boa/collections/39/volumes/232/nigeria-1862-1945#paginate on 11 February 2018.
24 Olufemi Oluniyi, Reconciliation in Northern Nigeria. The Space for Public Apology, Lagos: Frontier Press, 2017, p.65; Stephanie Williams, Running theShow. Governors of the British Empire, London: Penguin, pp. 289 & 146; Bruce J. Lockhart, A Sailor in the Sahara: The Life and Travels in Africa of Hugh Clapperton, Commander PN, London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2008, p. 269 and Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa. Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 83.
25 In addition to Toyin Falola cited above, for a detailed examination of some of the resistance movements to British colonial administration in Nigeria, see Paul E. Lovejoy & J.S. Hogendorn, “Revolutionary Madhism and Resistance to Colonial Rule in the Sokoto Caliphate, 1905-6”, The Journal of African History, Vol. 31, No. 2,
1990, pp. 217-244 and Obaro Ikime, “Colonial Conquest and Resistance in Southern Nigeria”, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1972, pp. 251-270.
26 Quoted from Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., 1978, p. 4.
27 The three most recent are Richard A. Olaniyan (ed.) The Amalgamation and Its Enemies; Sam Momah Nigeria Beyond Divorce: Amalgamation in Perspective, Ibadan: Safari Books Limited, 2013 and Usman Mohammed, “International Political Economy of Nigerian Amalgamation Since 1914”, European Scientific Journal, Vol. 9, No. 29, 2013, pp. 429-457. A fourth - O. A. Akinyeye et. al. (eds.) Contending Issues in Nigeria’s Development Trajectory Since 1914 - is forthcoming.
28 National Archives, Ibadan (NAI): RG/L4 “Report by Sir F.D. Lugard on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria and Administration, 1912-1919”, London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1920, p. 45, paragraph 109. The Report was presented to the British Parliament in December 1919.
29 By 1901, there were 104 colonial officials in Nigeria. Robert Heussler, The British in Northern Nigeria, London: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 20.
30 This was at cross-purposes with Britain’s colonial economic policy. Indeed, as Lady Lugard later pointed out, the financial concessions from the Imperial treasury “were reluctantly made rather by respect for the judgement and wishes of Mr. Chamberlain, then Secretary for the Colonies, rather than by any strong conviction on the part of the British Government that Northern Nigeria was likely to prove a very valuable acquisition to the Crown”. Ibid.
31 R. Robinson et. al. Africa and the Victorians. The Official Mind of Imperialism, London: Rotberg, 1961, p. 101.
32 Lugard, “Report... ”, paragraph 6, p. 6.
33 For a detailed discussion of the ‘importance’ of these factors in Lugard’s own words, see his Report, pp. 7-8.
34 See his The Administration of Nigeria, 1900-1960: Men, Method and Myths, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, particularly Chapter VII ‘Lugard’s Amalgamation of Nigeria, 1912-1918’ pp. 180-215.
35 For details, see Emmanuel O. Ojo, “Nigerian Colonial Constitutions and Nigeria’s Political Polarization, Journal of Arts and Humanities, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005, pp. 14-23; “Government-Opposition Hostility: The Bane of the Nigerian First Republic”, Babcock Journal of History & International Studies, 2006/2007, pp. 44-67; “Leadership Crisis and Political Instability in Nigeria, 1964-1966: The Personalities, the Parties and the Policies”, International Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2011, pp. 105-132; “The Impact of Ethnic Rivalry and Gulf of Trust on Nigerian Politics: The Case of the Four-Party Alliance, the Progressive Peoples’ Party and the Progressive Parties’ Alliance, 1979-1983”, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, Vol. 16, No. 5, 2014, pp. 119-137 and “Alliance without Ideology - A Case Study of the United Progressive Grand Alliance”, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2017, pp. 50-67.
36 Daily Times, 11 December, 1959. In all, the AG fielded the largest number of candidates: 3 in Lagos; 62 in the Western Region; 43 in the Eastern Region and 174 in the Northern Region. The party fielded a total of 282 candidates. The NPC fielded 172 candidates: 1 in Lagos, 1 in the West, none in the Eastern Region and 170 in the North. The NCNC fielded 143 candidates: 3 in Lagos, 62 in the Western Region, 73 in the Eastern Region and 5 in the Northern Region. The Northern Elements Progressive Union fielded 160 candidates in the Northern Region and none in the other regions while the Democratic Party of Nigeria and the Cameroons (a splinter of the NCNC) fielded 24 candidates in the Eastern Region and none in the other regions. Other small parties like the United Middle Belt Congress (an ally of the AG); the Niger Delta Congress (NDC) an ally of the NPC and the National Emancipation League (NEL) also fielded candidates. For the names of candidates fielded by all the parties, see Daily Times, 26 November 1959
37 Daron Acemoglu, Simeon Johnson & James A. Robinson, “An African Success Story: Botswana” in Dani Rodrik (ed.), p. 94.
38 L.H.Gann and P. Duignan, Burden of Empire, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1967, p. 203.
39 R. Dale, Botswana’s Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995; A. Samatar, An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership and Colonial Legacy in Botswana Development. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1999 and Kenneth Good, Diamonds, Dispossession and Democracy in Botswana, p. 27.
0 J. Parson, Botswana: Liberal Democracy and the Labor Reserve in Southern Africa. Boulder, CO: West-view Press. 1984, p. 22.
41 Kenneth Good, p. 27.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid, p. 28.
44 Ronald Manzer, “The Essential Political Goods” in Paul W. Fox & Graham White (eds.) Politics in Canada Toronto: McGraw-Hill & Ryerson Ltd., 1984, p. 3.
45 For a comprehensive conceptual discourse of democracy, see A.T. Ajayi and Emmanuel O. Ojo, “Democracy in Nigeria: Practice, Problems and Prospects”, Developing Country Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2014,
pp. 107-110.
46 For the full text of Lincoln’s Address, see http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu or http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Gettysburg_Address. Retrieved on 4 September 2017.
47 Nkolika E. Obianyo “Democracy on Sale: The 2007 Nigerian Elections and the Future of the Democratic Movement in Africa” in Victor Oguejiofor (ed.) Nigeria’s Stumbling Democracy and Its Implications for Africa’s Democratic Movement, Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008, p. 38.
48 M.P. Torado and C.S. Smith, Economic Development, Boston: Pearson Publication, 2012, p. 16. For a detailed examination of the concepts of ‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’ as well as their theories, see Dale B. Harris (ed.), The Concept of Develo9ment: An Issue in the Study of Human Behavior. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957.
49 These were the Federal Prime Minister and Deputy Leader of the NPC, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa; the Premier of Northern Nigeria and National President of the NPC, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello (the Sadauna of Sokoto); Western Region Premier, Chief S.L.A. Akintola and the Federal Minister of Finance, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh.
50 Siyan Oyeweso, “Causal Factors in the Nigerian Civil War: A Critical and Comparative Analysis of Some Nigerian Accounts”, M.A. Thesis, Department of History, University of Ife, Ile Ife, 1986, p. 92.
51 Eghosa Osaghae “Federal Society and Federal Character: The Politics of Plural Accommodation in Nigeria since Independence” in Uma Eleazu (ed.) Nigeria: The First 25 Years, Lagos & Ibadan: Infodata Ltd. & Heine-mann Educational Books, 1988, p. 27.
52 B.J. Dudley, Instability and Political Order, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973, pp. 90-91.
53 Nigeria has had fifteen federal administrations (civilian and military) since independence on 1 October, 1960. While Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was the first and only Prime Minister (October 1960-January 1966); President Mohammadu Buhari is the sitting President. In-between them were Lt. Gen. Johnson Thomas Umurakwe Aguiyi-Ironsi (16 Jan 1966 - 29 July 1966); Lt. Gen. Yakubu Gowon (1 Aug 1966 - 29 July 1975); Brigadier-General Murtala Ramat Muhammed (29 July 1975 - 13 Feb 1976); Brigadier-General Olusegun Obasanjo (14 Feb 1976 - 1 Oct 1979); Alhaji Shehu Usman Aliyu Shagari (civilian: 1 Oct 1979 - 31 Dec 1983); General Muhammadu Buhari (31 Dec 1983 - 27 Aug 1985); General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (27 Aug 1985 - 4 Jan 1993); Ernest Adekunle Oladeinde Shonekan (interim government: 26 Aug 1993 - 17 Nov 1993); General Sani Abacha (17 Nov 1993 - 8 June 1998); General Abdulsalam Abubakar (9 June 1998 - 29 May 1999); Olusegun Obasanjo (civilian: 29 May 1999 - May 29 2007.); Umaru Musa Yar’Adua (civilian: 29 May 1999 - 5 May 2010); Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (6 May 2010 - 29 May 2015).
54 Scott A. Beaulier and Robert J. Subrick, “The Political Foundations of Development: The Case of Botswana” Working Paper, September 2005, p. 1.
55 Apart from the 12 December 1959 ‘independence elections’ conducted by the departing British officials, three general elections were conducted in Nigeria between 1960 and 1999: the 1964 federal elections in which two main political alliances - the Nigerian National Alliance and the United Progressive Grand Alliance - competed led to an unprecedented political stalemate and constitutional crisis that left the country without a valid government for four days; the 1979 federal elections were conducted by the General Olusegun Obasanjo-led military administration; the 1983 general elections held by the Sheu Shagari government produced irresolvable political crisis that led to the 31 December military coup while the 1999 general elections were conducted by the General Abdulsalam Abubakar military administration. Thus, the first successful civilian to civilian transition in 43 years was in 2003.
56 Kim Yi Dionne, “How democratic is Botswana after 50 years of independence?”, The Washington Post, 30 September 2016.
57 Aobakwe Mothusi Sekgwa, “Is Democracy in Botswana Real or is it Just a Fong Kong?”, Sunday Standard, 30 October 2016.
58 Jerry Sampson, History of Botswana, p. 1.
59 Daryl S. Balfour & Peter Joyce, This is Botswana, London: Penguin, 2016, p. 80. See also, Abdullateef Salau, “Botswana seeks import of Nigerian tomatoes, garlic”, Daily Trust, 3 October 2016.
60 Abdullateef Salau, ibid.
61 David Sebudubudu, “Corruption and its Control in Botswana”, Botswana Notes and Records, Vol. 35, 2013, p. 125.
62 Ibid
63 Quoted in ibid.
64 For details, see Emmanuel O. Ojo, “Combating Systemic Corruption in Africa: Altitudinal, Attitudinal, Constitutional or Confrontation”, Humanities & Social Sciences, Vol. 9, 2016, pp. 11-32.
65 The Sun, 15 May 2013. The Nigerian Tribune of 18 May 2013 captioned the report thus “Nigerian leaders stole, laundered $18.2b in 10 years’. According to the report, China occupied the first position with $2.74 trillion; Mexico was second with $476 billion; Malaysia was third with $285 billion; Saudi Arabia was fourth with $210 billion; followed by Russia with $152 billion while Philippines was sixth with $138 billion.
66 See Vanguard or any Nigerian daily of 21 March 2014 for details.
67 The Nation, 29 April 2013
68 Ikechukwu Nnochiri, “Nigeria loses $400bn to oil thieves”, Vanguard, 28 August 2012.
69 Seun Opejobi, “Court orders forfeiture of Ikoyi apartment where $43m was found” Daily Post, 9 November 2017
70 See, among others, Suzan Edeh, “IDPs relief materials diverted for commercial purposes in Bauchi”, Vanguard, 17 February 2018; Ikechukwu Nnochiri, “Diversion of IDP Funds: UNDP, NHRC report indicts Presidency, ex-SGF”, Vanguard, 22 November 2017; Henry Umoru & Joseph Erunke, “Senate probes diversion of N5bn IDPs funds”, Vanguard, 5 October 2016;; News agency of Nigeria, “Those diverting funds meant for IDPs must be punished - Shehu Sani”, The Guardian, 27 November 2016; “Senate calls for Babachir Lawal prosecution for IDP fund diversion”, Punch, 14 December 2016; Abdulkareem Haruna, “How officials steal food meant for people displaced by Boko Haram, IDPs narrate”, Premium Times, 5 October 2016 and Fisayo Soyombo, “How Corruption is Killing Children in IDP Camps”, Daily Trust, 30 December 2016.
71 Tope Alabi, “90% of Nigerians don’t have access to clean water - World Bank”, Information Nigeria, 29 August 2017.
72 Gbolahan Gbadamosi, “Ethics, Corruption and Economic Prosperity in Africa: Botswana Experiences”, p. 3, retrieved from http://users.clas.ufl.edu/aspring/courses/All%20courses/UF%20courses/corruption.doc on 15 February 2018. For more definite corruption cases and prosecutions in Botswana, see Gabriel Kuris, “Managing Corruption Risks: Botswana Builds an Anti-Graft Agency, 1994 - 2012”, Princeton University, 2013, pp. 1-21.
73 For the Act of Parliament that established the DCEC, see http://www.bankofbotswana.bw/assets/uploaded/ Corruption%20and%20Economic%20Crime%20Act.pdf
74 Centre for Public Impact, “Fighting Corruption in Botswana”, retrieved from https://www.centre-forpublicimpact.org/case-study/fighting-corruption-botswana/ on 10 February 2018.
75 Cited in Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, “The Role of Institutions in Growth and Development”, Review of Economics and Institutions, Vol. 2, 2010, p. 3.
76 Quoted from Luminous Jannamike, “Why we can’t deliver on our promises - Osinbajo”, Vanguard, 16 February 2018.
77 Ibid.
78 “Nigeria’s democracy not delivering dividends - Jega”, Vanguard, 9 February 2018. Former President, Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) was the Head of Nigeria’s Military Government between 13 February 1976 and 1 October 1979 while the incumbent, Mohammadu Buhari, served as Military Head of State between 31 December 1983 and 27 August 1985. Several other retired Generals are now active politicians and power brokers in the country.
79 See, among others, Ihemeje Chidiebere C. Godswealth, Zaid B. Ahmad & Jawan JayumAnak, “Factors Influencing the Executive and Legislative Conflict in Nigeria Political Development”, IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 21, Issue 8, 2016, pp. 20-25; Jacob O. Fatile & Kehinde D. Adejuwon, “Legislative-Executive Conflicts and Democratic Governance in Nigeria's Fourth Republic”, International Journal of Innovative Research in Social Sciences and Strategic Management Techniques, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2016, pp. 91-111; Innocent O. Eme, “Addressing Executive-Legislature Conflict in Nigeria”, Journal of Security Studies and Global Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2016, pp. 29-37; I. Okechukwu & Andrew Ogbochie, “Executive-Legislature Feud in Nigeria: An Examination of Service Chiefs Confirmation, 1999-2014”, Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review, Vol. 3, No. 12, 2014, pp. 1-20 and Jude A. Momodu & Gambo I. Matudi, “The Implications of Executive-Legislative Conflicts on Good Governance in Nigeria”, Public Policy and Administration Research, Vol. 3, No. 8, 2013, pp. 30-42
80 See Mohammed Sabiu, “Constituents threaten to recall Senator Sani over alleged opposition to Buhari”, Nigerian Tribune, 12 February 2018; Yemi Itodo, “I will fight ‘criminals in power’ with my last blood - Melaye tells FG”, Daily Post, 13 February 2018 and Damilola Oyedele & Alex Enumah, “Melaye’s Recall: Court refuses to stop INEC”, This Day, 7 July 2017. Chapter V, Part C, Section 69 p. 55 of the 1999 Constitution makes provision for the recall of members of the National Assembly.
81 Kenneth Good, “Resource dependency and its consequences: The costs of Botswana’s shining gems”, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2005, pp. 27-50; “Enduring elite democracy in Botswana”, Democratization, Vol. 6, Issue 1, 1999, pp. 50-66; “Authoritarian liberalism: A defining characteristic of Botswana”, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 14, Issue 1, 1996, pp. 29-51; “Corruption and Mismanagement in Botswana: A Best-Case Example?”, JCAS, Vol. 32, Issue 3, 1994, pp. 499-521; with Ian Taylor, “Botswana: A Minimalist Democracy”, Democratization, Vol. 15, Issue 4, 2008, pp. 750-765
82 Francis B. Nyamnjoh, “Chieftaincy and the Negotiation of Might and Right in Botswana Democracy”, JCAS, Vol. 21, Issue 2, 2003, pp. 233-250 and “Local Attitudes towards Citizenship and Foreigners in Botswana: An Appraisal of Recent Press Stories”, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2002, pp. 755-775
83 Ian Taylor, “The limits of the ‘African Miracle’: Academic freedom in Botswana and the deportation of Kenneth Good”, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2006, pp.101-122 and “As Good as Its Gets? Botswana’s ‘Democratic Development’, JCAS, Vol. 21, Issue 2, 2003, pp. 215-231
84 Julie J. Taylor, “Celebrating the San Victory Too Soon? Reflections on the outcome of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve case”, Anthropology Today, Vol. 23, No. 5, 2007, pp.1-5.
85 Nicola de Jager & David Sebudubudu, “Towards understanding Botswana and South Africa’s ambivalence to liberal democracy”, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 35, No.14, 2017, pp. 15-33
86 Mpho G. Molomo, “Democracy and Botswana’s Electoral System”, Journal of African Elections, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, pp. 21-40
87 Mokganedi Z. Botlhomilwe, David Sebudubudu & Bugalo Maripe, “Limited freedom and intolerance in Botswana”, JCAS, Vol. 29, Issue 3, 2011, pp. 331-348
88 Amelia Cook and Jeremy Sarkin, “Is Botswana the Miracle of Africa? Democracy, the Rule of Law and Human Rights Versus Economic Development”, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 19, Spring 2010, pp. 458-488
89 Kenneth Good, Diamonds, Dispossession and Democracy in Botswana, p. 25
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid, p. 5.
92 Ibid, p. 4.
93 Kebapetse Lotshwao and Kekgaoditse Suping, “The 2010 Split of the Botswana Democratic Party”, PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2013, pp. 344-360.
94 Kebapetse Lotshwao, “The weakness of opposition parties in Botswana: A justification for more internal-party democracy in the dominant Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)”, African Journal of Political Science and International Relations Vol. 5, No. 2, 2011, pp. 103-111; Caroline Lancaster, “The iron law of Erdogan: the decay from intra-party democracy to personalistic rule” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 9, 2014, pp. 16721690 and Brian T. Mokopakgosi & Mpho G. Molomo “Democracy in the face of a weak opposition in Botswana”, Pula: Botswana Journal of African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2000, pp. 1-22.
95 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2015 Report - Botswana”, retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/botswana on 12 February 2018.
96 Michael Bratton & Peter Lewis, “The Durability of Political Goods? Evidence from Nigeria's New Democracy”, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2007, p. 8.
97 “Freedom in the World 2015 Report - Botswana”, retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/ report/ free-dom-world/2015/botswana on 12 February 2018.
98 Rorisang Lekalake, “Botwsana’s democratic consolidation: what will it take?” Afro Barometer Policy Paper No. 30, January 2016, p. 1.
99 2015 Ibrahim Index of African Governance: Botswana”, retrieved from http://static.moibrahimfoundation. org/u/2015/10/02201308/04_Botswana.pdf on 13 February 2018.
100 Robert Mattes and Michael Bratton, “Learning about democracy in Africa: Awareness, performance and experience”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, Issue 1, 2007, p. 197.
101 Kim Yi Dionne, “How democratic is Botswana after 50 years of independence?”.
102 Geoffrey Chesler, A Quick Guide to Customs and Etiquette in Botswana, London: Kuperand, 2007, p. 8.
103 Francis B. Nyamnjoh, “Chieftaincy and the Negotiation of Might and Right in Botswana Democracy”,
p. 233.
104 Amelia Cook and Jeremy Sarkin, “Is Botswana the Miracle of Africa?. Democracy, the Rule of Law and Human Rights Versus Economic Development”, pp. 465,455,489.
105 Amy Poteete, “Does Botswana deserve its reputation as a stable democracy?” The Washington Post, 20 October 2014.
106 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2017” retrieved from https://www.trans-parency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017 on 18 February 2018
107 International Body Rates Nigeria Police Force Worst Globally”, The Punch, 12 November 2017.
108 “Port Harcourt, Lagos Airports Rated Among Worst in the World”, ThisDay, 13 November 2017
109 Keitebe Kgosikebatho, “MPs, Dikgosi get salary increase”, The Patriot, 12 April 2015; Nicholas Mok-wena, “MPs’ secret salary hike under wraps”, Botswana Guardian, 15 August 2017 and Jason Ranthatsa, “MPs demand salary raise”, Weekend Post,21 April, 2016.
110 Saxone Akhaine, “Slash legislators’, ministers’ pay by half, Sanusi tells Buhari”, The Guardian, 12 February 2018.
111 Ibid.
112 Itse Sagay, “Nigeria: The Travails of an Animal Kingdom”, Alternative Africa, 1 February 2018.
3 Nike Adebowale, 23 August 2017
‘Over 57 million Nigerians lack access to potable water - UNICEF”, Premium Times,
114 Index Mundi Water Access Survey, https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/nigeria/indicator/ SH.H2O. SAFE.ZS and The Global Economy, “Botswana: Access to drinking water, rural”, https://www.theglobal economy.com/Botswana/drinking_water_rural/
115 Cebastine Obasi, “80 million Nigerians lack access to electricity - World Bank”, Vanguard, 10 November 2015. See also Punch. 5 December 2017; Vanguard, 6 December 2017 and Obinna F. Muoh, “When 95 million Nigerians are living without electricity something needs to change”, Business Insider, 14 July 2016.
116 ESI Africa: Africa Power Journal, “Statistics: Botswana records a 63.9% decrease in power imports”, 7 July 2017.
117 World Data Atlas “Botswana Adult (15+) literacy rate”, https://knoema.com/atlas/Botswana/topics/ Edu-cation/Literacy/Adult-literacy-rate retrieved on 20 January 2017.
118 “10.5m children out of school in Nigeria - UNICEF”, Premium Times, 18 August 2015.
119 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty: Why Nations Fail, New York: Crown Publishers, 2012, p. 2.
120 United Nations Development Programme, “Human Development Report 2016”, pp. 2&6.
121 John Owen Nwachukwu, “Nigerians are angry with you, admit your government has failed - Cardinal Okogie tells Buhari”, Daily Post, 20 February 2018.
122 Amelia Cook and Jeremy Sarkin, p. 465.
123 Kenneth Good, Realising Democracy in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 1997, p. 3.
124 Tolu Ogunlesi, “South Africa-Nigeria Relations: Games of Throes”, 10 October 2014 retrieved from https://oluogunlesi.wordpress.com/2014/10/10/south-africa-nigeria-relations-a-game-of-throes-2013/ on 10 February 2018.
125 Following the foundation of the University in 2012, Professor Inyang, an Environmental Engineer, was appointed Vice Chancellor in 2013. He however resigned his appointment in February 2014 over what he termed ‘political interference’. See Sheldon G. Weeks, “Facing hard challenges - A tale of two universities”, University World News, No. 154, 27 June 2015 and Alfred Masokola, “BIUST launches ambitious strategy”, Weekend Post, 24 October 2016.
126 Nkomazana Oathokwa et. al., “Human resources for health in Botswana: The results of in-country database and reports analysis”, African Journal of Primary Health Care and Family Medicine, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2014, p. 33.
127 News Agency of Nigeria, “Gambia Will ‘Collapse’ Without Nigerian Professionals - VP”, Leadership, Premium Times and Punch, 16 March 2018.
128 Johnbobosco Agbakwuru, “Nigeria only oil producing country struggling with importation of refined products”, Vanguard, 28 June, 2017.
«АФРИКАНСКИЙ ГИГАНТ»
И «АФРИКАНСКАЯ ИСТОРИЯ УСПЕХА»: СРАВНИТЕЛЬНОЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЕ ДЕМОКРАТИИ В НИГЕРИИ И БОТСВАНЕ
© 2020 Эммануэль Оладипо Оджо, Уильям Абиодун Дуйиле
Эммануэль Оладипо ОДЖО - адъюнкт-профессор (доцент) кафедры истории и международных исследований Государственного университета Экити, Адо Экити, Нигерия, приглашенный научный сотрудник кафедры всеобщей истории гуманитарного института Сибирского федерального университета, Российская Федерация, 660041, Красноярск, пр. Свободный, 79.
Уильям Абиодун ДУЙИЛЕ - преподаватель кафедры истории и международных исследований Государственного Университета Экити, Адо Экити, Нигерия
Аннотация. В западной литературе по африканистике за Нигерией и Ботсваной закрепились два содержательно разных атрибутивных стереотипа. Первую, как правило, именуют «африканским гигантом», вторую - «африканским чудом», «африканской историей успеха» и «бастионом африканской демократии». Работа посвящена сравнительному анализу «практики демократии» в обеих странах и уделяет особое внимание социально-экономическому и политическому аспектам. Авторы утверждают, что доступ нигерийцев к социальноэкономическим благам практически отсутствует, а нигерийская модель гибридной демократии, в которой политические круги неотделимы от военных, является трагедией для страны. С другой стороны, с точки зрения авторов, некогда «чистая» демократия Ботсваны, несмотря на свои значительные достижения на этом пути, постепенно деградирует, что выражается в однопартийной политической системе, сильной президентской власти и растущем социальном неравенстве. Авторы приходят к выводу, что, хотя статус Нигерии как «африканского гиганта» и оправдан с демографической точки зрения, тем не менее проблемы социально-экономического и институционального развития, недостатки управления, а также демократических завоеваний, делают ее «больным гигантом». В то же время, с точки зрения авторов, Ботсвана, несмотря на определенную деградацию демократии, вполне может рассматриваться как «история африканского успеха», в особенности в сравнении с «африканским гигантом» и другими странами континента. Исследование опирается на документальные данные, критически осмысляемые и анализируемые авторами.
Ключевые слова: Нигерия, Ботсвана, развитие, экономика, коррупция, ресурсы
DOI: 10.31132/2412-5717-2020-50-2-30-50
