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territorial management of the country, including decentralization, greater financial independence of its regions and cities, electivity of municipal bodies of power, and the introduction of real local self-government.
We believe that Kazakh cities, due to historical specific features and regional environment, can hardly be referred to any concrete region or a group of countries. They remain part of the post-Soviet urban "civilization," but the latter becomes ever more heterogeneous itself, when internal differences undermined its former entirety. The socio-cultural transformation of the Kazakhstan city has not yet been finished. This is connected with the continuing adaptation of the entire urban infrastructure to the market conditions and ethnocultural demographic changes.
"Zhurnal vostokovedeniya i afrikanistiki," Moscow, 2012, No 2, pp. 51-57.
E. Borodin,
Ph. D. (Econ.)
A CLAN CHARACTER OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC
The elites in present-day Kyrgyzstan are dominated by natives of rural districts. Nevertheless, prior to the coup of 2005 the congeneric relations were manifested primarily in the rural medium which formed the majority of the population of the Kyrgyz Republic, whereas now tribalism as a system of social relations is consolidated in towns and cities. This can largely be explained by increasing inner migration (from the South to the North), which acquired a mass character in 2005 - 2010, having exacerbated contradictions between the Northerners and the Southerners.
The congeneric ties of traditional Kyrgyz society exert a great influence on the bodies of state management. Irrespective of education and circle of contacts, any Kyrgyz, regards himself, first of all, as a representative of a definite clan. It has been noticed that most Kyrgyz settled abroad not only do not accept the culture of the country of their present residence, but, on the contrary, begin to gravitate still more to the traditional values of their people.
Any government official in Kyrgyzstan is always striving to preserve ties with his clan or family. This is manifested most of all in the higher echelons of power where practically the entire system of management is based on the principles of nepotism and invitation of "one's own" relatives and fellow-villagers, who will always render support when necessary. This is how informal alliances are set up whose members are closely bound up with one another and are mutually interested in promotion of their chief representative going up the career ladder.
The entire domestic policy of Kyrgyzstan after 1991 has been implemented under the sign and in the spirit of the struggle between the North and the South. In the course of changing the ruling groupings, the force coming to power and led by the "revenge-seekers" always tries to minimize the influence of the overthrown clans.
Relations between the northern and southern parts of Kyrgyzstan have always been a subject of the greater interest of the Soviet power elite, just as at present they continue to remain a matter of grave concern of the authorities of the Kyrgyz Republic. Regional ties in the North and in the South of Kyrgyzstan manifest themselves at a state level and are supported by the stable system of archaic congeneric ties.
Kyrgyz society, in contrast to the congeneric structure of neighboring Kazakhstan with its division into three main congeneric unions, or Uzbekistan with its clan division on the territorial principle,
has its own specific features. Along with the dominant role of the congeneric institution, the determining role in Kyrgyzstan is played by man's or group's belonging to the northern or southern parts of the country, which largely determines mutual relations between people on a countrywide scale.
Such delimitation has been inherited from the past. At the time of the Kokand Khanate the northern part of present-day Kyrgyzstan was less involved in political life. It formally recognized the power of the Khan, but actually was ruled by people from the nobility of northern tribes. Chokan Valikhanov, a Kazakh researcher and scholar, wrote that the Kyrgyz in accordance with the region of their settlement have their place in the Khanate. The Kyrgyz of the southern region were actively drawn in the life of the Khanate, taking part in military and civilian rule. The northern Kyrgyz families, clans and tribes living far from the Khanate recognized the Khan's power only formally, leading independent life.
Besides, the south of the country was under a strong Uzbek influence, including religious influence (from the time of the Kokand Khanate), its population adopted a sedentary way of life, whereas the North practically never abandoned nomadic cattle breeding. This determined the specific features of economic life and, accordingly, socio-economic contradictions.
In general, tribal connections in Central Asia are very viable. The authorities of the Russian Empire oriented to modernization of archaic Central Asian society and tried to belittle the influence of the congeneric institution by introducing the system of district and regional management, but this measure did not yield positive results. Beginning from the 1920s the Bolsheviks, while appointing their officials to high posts in the Soviet republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, tried to observe congeneric balance, in particular, a balance between
representatives of the North and the South of Kyrgyzstan. Anyway, for the whole history of the Kyrgyz people rivalry between the chiefs of tribes and clans for power and for control over the best pasture lands had invariably played a major role. This tradition, in a somewhat adapted form in the modern conditions, can be seen and felt today, too, especially in politics.
The essence of the inter-Kyrgyz conflict lies in the struggle between different Kyrgyz tribes and clans for power and control over the entire republic. There is no monopoly of some one tribe or clan on power, but the struggle has been going on mainly between the North dominated by the Chu-Issykkul clan and the South dominated by the Osh clan.
Territorially there are concepts of the conditional "South" (Batken, Jelal-abad and Osh regions) and the conditional "North" (Chu, Talas, Issykkul and Naryn regions). It should be noted that these two regions are connected by the only one motor road from Bishkek to Osh. The rest of the republican territory is dominated by mountains, sometimes heavy-going.
The sources of the struggle for power between the "South" and the "North" lie in the first half of the 19th century when representatives of the clan nobility of the South vied for power with the Sart (Uzbek) and Kypchak groupings of nobility of Kokand Khanate in the Ferghana Valley.
After the 1917 revolution the ethnogeneric nobility of the leading tribes and clans was ousted from power, and it was seized, just as in Kazakhstan, by representatives of tribes and clans of secondary importance.
Inasmuch as there was no monopoly on power of some definite tribe or clan in Soviet times, all leaders had to share it with representatives of other regions.
It should be noted that Southern Kyrgyzstan is somewhat more conservative with regard to reforms and Europeanization. The South Kyrgyz who experienced ethnocultural influence of Uzbeks, are slightly more Islamized and less Europeanized.
In the spring of 2002 the "North - South conflict" flared up and led to the loss of human lives. The pretext was transfer of part of a small stretch of disputed territory to China. It comprised five percent of the territory of Kyrgyzstan, but was considered big enough for such a small country.
A new wave of the conflict rose in March 2005 in the course of the notorious "tulip" revolution. The government of President Askar Akayev was overthrown very rapidly, and the decisive role in that coup was played by the southern groupings which were able to organize mass manifestations of protest against the ruling authorities.
The growing influence of southern Kyrgyz in the republican government was accompanied with a new ethnic process, which began about the year 2000. South Kyrgyz began to move from the Ferghana Valley up north. This process was due to several reasons. One of them was the growth of the Uzbek population in the South not only by natural causes, but also thanks to immigration from Uzbekistan. As a result, the share of the Uzbek population in that part of Kyrgyzstan increased to 14 percent of the total number of the population of the Kyrgyz Republic. The resettlement of Ferghana Uzbeks in Southern Kyrgyzstan became a mass phenomenon due to insufficient economic freedom in Uzbekistan, where peasants had no opportunity to sell their produce on free market, but were forced to sell it to the state at fixed prices. Despite a significant share of the Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan, its representatives in the bodies of state power are few and far between.
Apart from demographic pressure in the overpopulated Ferghana Valley, the outflow of Kyrgyz from the South can be explained by their fear of Islamic extremism, for Islam is so weak among the Kyrgyz that they seem to be heathens to the Uzbeks and Tajiks.
After the "tulip revolution" of 2005 the outflow of Southern Kyrgyz to the North has increased not only due to the stronger pressure of Uzbeks, but also because the positions of South Kyrgyz in the authorities of Kyrgyzstan have strengthened considerably. These factors have also played their role in the exacerbation of the interethnic situation in the republic, inasmuch as they greater pressure on the still numerous Russian-speaking population in the North, which increased migration to Russia and Kazakhstan.
Taking into account the fact that the Northern Kyrgyz and Southern Kyrgyz regard themselves as "more Russified" and "more Islamized" respectively, this process causes concern because it can violate the already fragile balance in the country and lead it to irreparable demographic and geopolitical consequences (and not in Kyrgyzstan alone).
The religious factor also plays its role in the intra-Kyrgyz conflict. As we have mentioned, the positions of Islam in Southern Kyrgyzstan are much stronger than in Northern. In the mid-1990s, some experts believed that the "Erkin Kyrgyzstan" ("Free Kyrgyzstan") party, most members of which were Southerners, might begin to express fundamentalist tendencies. In any case, there are quite a few people among Southern Kyrgyz who support the idea of creating a common Ferghana Islamic state.
However, the danger lies not in Southern Kyrgyz themselves. They are slightly more Islamized, slightly less Europeanized, not bent to integration with Russia as the Northerners, but there are no principal differences between them, either between rank-and-file citizens or the
elites. The main danger lies in demographic pressure. For example, since 1990 the population of Bishkek grew from 600,000 to almost 800,000 in 1995, with the city infrastructure capable to cater for 400,000 only.
The outflow of Southern Kyrgyz to the North may entail some other processes: for instance, migration of representatives of other, more radical Islamic people, first and foremost Ferghana Uzbeks, as well as various Islamic extremists of different nationalities. Since 2004 one could observe movement to the North of strongly Islamized Uighurs. This may have a negative impact on the religious situation in the North. In the view of certain observers, in the center of Issykkul region, Kyrgyz themselves feel rather uncomfortable due to the influx of Uighurs.
It should be borne in mind that a split in Kyrgyz society has clear-cut geographical boundaries: the conservative South is distinguished by stronger separatist tendencies with regard to the more progressive North. The two poles of their confrontation are the city of Bishkek and the city of Osh. The South is under a certain influence of the Uzbek community and its population is more Islamized. The first bloody conflicts on the ethnic ground took place there in the early 1990s.
But the situation became the most critical in 2010. Among the reasons for its exacerbation were political destabilization and the absence of unity among members of the provisional government. The rulers of Kyrgyzstan at the time were ready to split the country into the South and the North. Apart from geographic division of the two parts of the country, there were historical differences between the ruling clans of the South and the North, the greater internationalization of the latter's population, and the growing share of ethnic Uzbeks in the South (from 30 to 50 percent). Information and surveillance reports showed
that the Uzbek population of Kyrgyzstan did not regard their linguistic rights in the local bodies of power substantial and just enough and did not wish to assimilate in the Kyrgyz medium. It was also known that the infrastructure of the Islamic underground in Kyrgyzstan often coincides with the inner ethnic differences of the population.
It should also be noted that the new authorities in Kyrgyzstan, which came to power as a result of the events in 2010, and its government in absolute majority repeat the composition of the opposition which overthrew President A. Akayev in March 2005, brought to power K. Bakiyev, and was part of its regime until he was removed from power by April 2010. The results of the parliamentary elections in the autumn of 2010 showed vividly the unbalanced character of the political situation in the Kyrgyz Republic.
The opposition "Ata-Zhurt" party (South) won parliamentary elections among the five parties which became represented in the republican parliament. The SDPK party (North) took second place.
The opposition "Ar-Namys" party (North) was in third place.
The neutral "Republic" party (North) was the fourth.
The "Ata-Meken" party (South) was on fifth (last) place.
The number of seats was as follows: "Ata-Zhurt" - 28; SDPK -26; 'Ar-Namys" - 25; "Republic" - 23; "Ata-Meken" - 18.
It should be borne in mind that the "Ata-Zhurt" party, which won the 2010 elections, represented the former government of Bakiyev. In the course of the election campaign the representatives of the South were able to rally together and gain most votes also with the help of the notorious administrative resource.
Election results do not give an advantage to representatives of any one grouping, and to form a qualified majority the parliamentarians will have to reach agreement on many issues.
Thus, we see that the traditional clan and territorial system of the Kyrgyz authorities is not overcome by its coalition character. Coalition power has a clannish character as before, and this destroys the centralized state. The real disunity of Kyrgyzstan cannot be overcome without the actual regionalization of the country, and its parliament and government should ensure the proper representation of the main sections of Kyrgyz society in all bodies of power.
The existing division into the North and the South has deep geographical, historical and economic roots. Historically and geographically, Kazakhstan bears "responsibility" for the North of Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan - for the South, which fact is fraught with the danger of the ultimate actual partition of the country. However, the structure of "neighbor's responsibility" has a certain difference: for Kazakhstan its priority lies in the protection of the rights of the Kazakh owners in the country's economic infrastructure and their territorial expression in the vicinity of Issykkul; for Uzbekistan it is the protection of the rights of the ethnic Uzbeks and security of the Ferghana Valley (especially in the conditions of the local scarcity of land). These interests are not of an ideological, but of an objective economic nature. It is impossible to ignore the interests of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, on the contrary, they should become a subject of bilateral agreements with a view to turning the inevitable protection of these interests into an instrument of mutual responsibility.
There is no doubt that Russia has objective interests In Kyrgyzstan and historical obligations with regard to its population, which should be clearly realized and discussed along with each million of financial assistance and each ton of humanitarian cargo. Their unbreakable "package" ties should be clear to any provisional or permanent government of the Kyrgyz Republic in order not to repeat the suicidal path of the former Kyrgyz ruler K. Bakiyev.
When the latter was in power, "Southerners" captured all command posts in economics and politics. The dangerous nature of such situation was clear even to such former allies and supporters of Bakiyev from the South as Omurbek Tekebayev and Rosa Otunbayeva (the present leaders of another Kyrgyz revolution).
In 2010, in contrast to 2005, the movement began not in the South but in the North as a natural reaction to the infringement of the "Northerners" and part of the "Southerners" under K. Bakiyev. But the movement was headed by the "Southerners" - Rosa Otunbayeva and Omurbek Tekebayev, inasmuch as the Northern elite, after the overthrow of Askar Akayev, did not put forward any bright leaders, who were popular among and respected by the broad masses. The revolution of 2010 was "Northern" by nature. But victory in the 2010 parliamentary elections was gained by the "Ata-Zhurt" party of the South. All this goes to show that it is impossible to preserve the integrity of the Kyrgyz Republic without a dialogue within the country.
Domestic interethnic stability in Kyrgyzstan is impossible until the Uzbek population in the south of the country receives an adequate representation in all bodies of power at all levels in that part of the country and until the Uzbek language receives the rights and infrastructure of a regional language, which would fully correspond to modern standards of civilization. But this should not be a result of chaotic measures caused by a civil war and interethnic conflict. These just measures should be an outcome of a responsible dialogue between central power and legitimate representatives of the territorial Uzbek communities of Kyrgyzstan, the common result of which would be mutual responsibility not only for the full rights of the Uzbek minority, but also for the territorial integrity of the state.
"Mir i politika ", Moscow, 2012, No 3, pp. 89-96.
