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Aleksei Malashenko,
D. Sc. (Hist.), member of the Academic Council of the Moscow Carnegie Center and co-chairman of the program "Religion, Society and Security"
THE WHITE STEAMSHIP OF KYRGYZSTAN AMID THE ICE OF POST-SOVIET AUTHORITARISM
Each country of Central Asia is unique, in its own way. Kyrgyzstan is also unique as an independent state by its recent political history. Its first president was not like his colleagues, men originated from the Soviet nomenklatura; he was a professional scientist and real intellectual. The activity of Kyrgyz society, its hankering after political pluralism, and two revolutions, which took place in the past two decades, made Kyrgyzstan an exception among the countries of the region.
Kyrgyzstan is the only country in Central Asia which is clearly divided into southern and northern areas whose relations are far from simple. Stability and well-being of the republic depend on the state of relations between them.
The ethnic composition of Kyrgyzstan's population is rather complex and quickly changing. According to the 2009 census, of
5.5 million population, Kyrgyz account for 71 percent (in 1999 the figure was 64%), Uzbeks - 14.3% (13.8%), Russians - 7.8% (12.5%). In the southern part Uzbeks comprise 27 percent, and Russians - 5.7%.
Political pluralism, unusual for Central Asia, complex ethnic composition, economic backwardness and growing religious radicalism have turned Kyrgyzstan into a territory of instability. From this point of view, the country is the most vulnerable state of the region.
Paradoxical as it might seem, but a crisis predicted by many political analysts, which could have followed the attempt to build a
parliamentary system after the overthrow of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 2010, did not take place.
Parliamentary, and then presidential, elections in 2011 took place relatively smoothly. A coalition was formed consisting of the Social-democratic party of Kyrgyzstan, parties "Ata Meken," "Ar-Namys," and "Respublika." Social democrat Almazbek Atambayev moved from the post of Premier to that of President. There is also an opposition in the person of one of the most influential parties in the country, "Ata-Zhurt" and another party - "Butun Kyrgyzstan" headed by an ambitious person named Adakhan Madumarov, which has not gained seats in parliament.
It should be borne in mind that these parties have largely been formed on the basis of regional and even family clans. Some of them can be regarded as "southern," others as "northern." Nevertheless, clan-political pluralism is expressed through modern institutions - parties and parliament. Some parties, for example Social-democratic party, have more or less clear-cut programs, and all of them claim the status of general national parties.
It should also be admitted that there are quite a few bright, originally-minded persons in the modern Kyrgyz elite, and the political field in the republic is not barren as is the case in most Central Asian countries. The political spectrum of Kyrgyzstan is expressively motley. There is no tedious and mediocre ruling class closely-knit by common corporative interests.
The system taking shape in Kyrgyzstan is based on checks and balances, and is very fragile. However, it has existed under the regime of non-authoritarian power for almost two years already.
After the overthrow of two presidents of the republic - Akayev and Bakiyev, a joke has become popular in the republican capital Bishkek; "What is revolution? Revolution is a popular Kyrgyz sport."
An indisputable fact is that Kyrgyz, in contrast to their neighbors, have overcome inertness, they have fostered the feeling of self-respect and consciousness that "man" is the subject of politics, but not only its object.
In these conditions the authorities are forced to bear responsibility before society which, in turn, keeps an eye on their actions. But, as in known, to rule a country whose population lives under constant stress is very difficult.
To boot, the economic situation in Kyrgyzstan remains very grave. In 2011, Kyrgyzstan took 14th place among the CIS countries in per capita GDP ($2,162), being ahead only of Tajikistan ($1,907), and after Uzbekistan ($2,959).
Kyrgyzstan's national debt amounted to about $3 billion in 2011 and its deficit is $400 million. Its foreign debt reached $2,230 billion by the beginning of 2010. The black-market (shadow) sector accounts for 60 to 70 percent of the entire economy of the country. The level of unemployment is from 8.4% (officially) to 20% (unofficially). According to the UN data, about one million people suffer from malnutrition annually. Under the World Food Program, Kyrgyzstan received assistance worth $17.5 million in 2011.
Kyrgyzstan holds 126th place in the rating of the development of human potential out of 196 (Russia is in 66th place, Kazakhstan is in 68th, Uzbekistan is in 117th, Tajikistan - in 127th).
Another major problem facing Kyrgyzstan is corruption. According to the data of the republican office of the Attorney General, the total damage of corruption amounted to 24 billion som (about $500 million). Western analysts say that corruption in Kyrgyzstan is inseparable from state institutions. Fight against corruption can yield results in several years' time, all the more so since practically every political figure who has his or her own business can become corrupt.
On the other hand, the collapse of the Kyrgyz economy, which has been predicted by many people, has not taken place. On December 29, 2011, President Atambayev said at his first news conference that the country managed to increase the GDP, keep inflation in check, and there was no default. The country's GDP grew by 5.7% (in 2010 it dropped by 0.5%), and growth was registered in almost all branches of the economy. The level of inflation went down by about four percent. Budget deficit was reduced by $60 million, which amounted to $460 in 2010.
The political, social and economic problems facing Kyrgyzstan are especially acute in the conditions of a chronic ethno-political crisis in the south of the country. People well remember the bloody events in Osh in 1990, and after 2010 there was a new tragedy - the massacre perpetrated by Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Jalalabad, in which 476 people lost their life, and many more were wounded or maimed. One can talk of the social and economic causes of those clashes, or of political provocations, but the extreme cruelty was conditioned by interethnic enmity, which is very stable and which is so difficult to overcome.
Criminal investigations of the events in Osh and Jalalabad still continue. The present-day authorities still remain hostages of this bloody conflict of 2010, and its consequences will still influence the situation in the country for a long time to come.
The government has worked out a "Concept on Ethnic Accord" based on the principle of representatives of different ethnic groups living together. By the end of 2011, 11 multi-storey houses were built for those who had lost their houses or flats. Efforts are being made to eliminate material from the mass media capable to provoke interethnic discord, and four memorial complexes are under construction to honor those who lost their life in the bloody confrontation.
However, interethnic clashes do not stop. There are 147 seats of possible conflicts in the country, according to the republican Ministry for the Interior. The State Committee of National Security gives another figure - 29. In the view of the director of the "Egalite" public foundation, Tatyana Vygovskaya, up to 370,000 civilian people have been drawn in interethnic confrontation in the republic, that is, about ten percent of the entire population (in a normal situation in any country this figure does not exceed 2%).
Apart from Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, representatives of other nationalities living in the republic have also been drawn in conflicts, among them Tajiks and people of Caucasian origin. But the greatest tension still exists between two most numerous ethnic groups - Kyrgyz and Uzbek.
There are also problems connected with Russians, who continue to emigrate. This is explained not only by economic reasons, but by continuing instability and growing ethnic nationalism. During the twenty years of Kyrgyzstan's independence about 485,000 Russians have left the republic for Russia.
The Russian language is losing its popularity, although the Constitution of Kyrgyzstan recognizes it as an official language along with the Kyrgyz language. Many Kyrgyz nationals now understand Russian, but cannot speak.
Russians are not represented in any bodies of state power. There is not a single Russian in the government of Kyrgyzstan endorsed in 2011.
Ethnic nationalism is one of the main reasons for possible destabilization of the situation in Kyrgyzstan, and the present authorities understand it well enough. However, they are unable to overcome the existing interethnic tension, which continues to grow.
Just like other Central Asian states Kyrgyzstan pursues a multi-vector policy. But Kyrgyzstan is doomed to dependence on foreign actors, as well as on its neighbors, in the foreseeable future. The authorities and the political elite realize it full well. The problem of dependence remains painful for any regime.
Kyrgyzstan is connected with Russia by the strongest ties, and no leader doubts it or would wish to sever them. Moscow takes part in all basic Kyrgyz projects, including the construction of the country's biggest Kambaratin hydropower plant and Naryn hydro-energy cascade. Russia holds first place in Kyrgyzstan's import (33.4%) and third place in its export (18.2%). In 2010 Russian investments in the local economy amounted to $95.9 million. Russia also renders direct financial and material assistance to Kyrgyzstan. For instance, in January 2012 it transferred military equipment and hardware worth of $16 million to Kyrgyz border-guard units.
According to various data, up to one million Kyrgyz nationals work in Russia, who remit about $2 billion back home annually, and this exceeds the republican budget, which is about $1.8 billion.
The country's leaders sincerely wish to develop cooperation with Russia. Bishkek is ready to join the Customs Union and has a positive attitude to the unified economic area and the Eurasian Union created by Russia and Kazakhstan. Of course, there are certain unresolved economic problems between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, but, sooner or later, they will be settled and their relations will remain stable and firm.
In this context there is no need to raise hullabaloo after Kyrgyzstan's President Atambayev words of the possible closure of the Russian airforce base in Kant. It should have been regarded as a tactical ruse, an attempt to balance the promise to close the American base in Manas.
The problem of the base in Manas, which has been renamed into Center of transit shipments, is a kind of a symbol of Kyrgyzstan's many-vector policy. Bishkek regards it not as an alternative to Russian influence, but rather as a proof of the existence of the Russian and American vectors in its foreign policy.
Washington views the Manas problem rather calmly. First, Russia will not insist on the withdrawal of Americans from there, inasmuch as this base has the aim to establish and maintain law and order in Afghanistan, in which Moscow is greatly interested, too. Secondly, the preservation of the Manas base is quite advantageous to Kyrgyzstan, which earned $1.411 billion during the years of its existence. Thus, consensus between Kyrgyzstan, Russia and the United States will definitely be found.
Beijing does not object the existence of the center either, inasmuch as it regards it as an instrument for fighting Islamic radicalism. Besides, Beijing does not see it as something spearheaded against China.
Apart from Russia and the United States, China is the third vector of Kyrgyzstan's foreign policy. And just like the Russian vector, it acquires its own significance.
The Chinese direction becomes one of the key spheres of foreign economic ties of Kyrgyzstan. According to investigations carried out by the Central Asian Institute of Free Market, on Kyrgyz wholesale markets in both the North and South of the country up to 85 percent of the goods sold are of Chinese origin. Trade with China, in which tens of thousands of small and medium-sized businessmen take part, has become a political factor, because if it stops, for some reason or other, there will be great dissatisfaction of too many people involved in it. This fact alone reveals the hidden character of Beijing's political
influence on the situation in Kyrgyzstan and simultaneously, Bishkek's interest in maintaining stable relations with China.
China is no rival of Russia in Kyrgyzstan, because each of the two has its own economic niche. China respects Russian interests, and in its turn, Russia regards Chinese commodity expansion as something fitting. All the more so, since Kyrgyzstan is not an exception among dozens of other countries, including those in Central Asia, whose shops and trade centers are full of consumer goods made in China.
Beijing does not interfere with local political intrigues. Nobody among those in power doubts the need to develop relations with the powerful eastern neighbor. True, at the turn of the 1990s and the 2000th there were some people in Bishkek who displayed dissatisfaction with Chinese pressure on the republic, particularly, with the agreements signed in 1996 and 1999, according to which Kyrgyzstan ceded to China almost 500 square kilometers of its territory, but now it is a thing of the past.
Irrespective of how Kyrgyzstan's relations with foreign actors develop, its destiny ultimately depends on the political situation within the country. The desire to build a parliamentary system alien to the Central Asian region does not exclude the preservation of authoritarian sentiments and hankering after a "strong arm," which can well be explained psychologically, and search for a charismatic leader, another "father of the nation," who is allegedly able to lead society and overcome all difficulties facing the country. Incidentally, there are claimants to the place of such leader in Kyrgyzstan.
Nevertheless, a fragile and vulnerable Kyrgyzstan today, despite all and sundry contradictions and errors, is moving forward, like a formidable and brave ice-breaker, trying to blaze the trail for itself amid the thick ice of Central Asian authoritarianism.
Moscow Carnegie Center, 2012, March, issue 2, Vol. 1.
