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5. For greater detail see: Glaser Ch., Kelanic R. Getting Out of the Gulf: Oil and U.S. Military Strategy // Foreign Affairs. 2017. Vol. 96, issue 1, pp. 122-131.
2018.02.008. MIKHAIL SLINKIN. SPECIFIC NATURE OF THE SYRIAN ARMED OPPOSITION WARFIGHTING //
"Konfrontatsiya mezhdu Zapadom i Rossiey: S kem vy, strani Asii i Afriki?" - Moscow, IVRAN, 2016. - P. 28-34.
Keywords: Syria, the Syrian armed opposition, IAG, FSA, radical Islamists.
Mikhail Slinkin,
PhD(Hist.), Associate professor
The author of the reviewed article M. Slinkin notes that one of peculiar features of the majority of wars and armed conflicts of the end of 20 — the beginning of the 21 century is broad participation of irregular armed groups (IAG): groups of guerrilla fighters, insurgents, separatists, terrorists, ethnic and tribal levies. Events in Syria also concern them. Originally armed wing of the Syrian opposition used the principles of waging city guerrilla which main goals are: physical elimination of armed forces heads, police and their assistants; expropriation of the resources belonging to the government and individuals. At the same time the purpose focused on fight financing in Syria pales into insignificance as money for arming and maintenance of opposition groups were granted by Saudi Arabia and Qatar and also some other countries. With that it was transformed to the aspiration to put as great as possible damage to industrial facilities, economic and social infrastructure of the country. In Syria militia groups also
applied individual terror against civilian managers for destabilization of a situation, carried out attacks against garrisons of army divisions and police posts, realized detonations of the improvised explosive devices (IED) on streets of cities as a result of which ordinary citizens perished.
The opposition activity concentrated over time on acquiring one of the large centers of the country in which its political wing could be approved for its recognition by the international community in the capacity of "full-fledged representative of the Syrian people." The main efforts of the Syrian Free Army (SFA) and going own way of it radical Islamists' groups were aimed to creation of such basic reference localities. Their attempts to consolidate in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and other cities broadly defined the nature of warfare which is conducted as a rule in urban environment in Syria.
Urban saturation in the country is rather high - 56%. Particular qualities of urban area in Syria are such that houses line narrow streets wall to a wall. It allows militia members to create reference localities, coordinating them in a unified system of communications through breaches in walls and underground tunnels where it can't be made. They light them up, place underground storages, shelters, day rooms. So, in Homs in the middle of 2013 about 40% of its territory were kept by opposition. In the Old city of Homs the fighters who were forced out by government forces from one or several houses went to neighboring buildings from where buffeted to ground flank or back areas, and if it was necessary moved to other districts of the city.
"Underground war" is a special feature of warfare in Syria. Underground communications were used by opposition forces in many cities and settlements, connecting the whole quarters in joint centers of defense. However carrying out underground works demands knowledge and technological means. By declaration of opposition, these means are delivered from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, the U.S., France, Belgium which experts train militia
members skills of handling them. In Damascus and its suburbs there is a developed system of underground communications which couldn't be created after the beginning of warfare. Separate positions and firing-points are connected by tunnels to 1 kilometer long, forming defense system equipped in engineering regard. Near Bars government forces found the tunnel at a 12-meter depth 4 m wide and around 5 m height equipped with ventilation system and electric lighting. However Homs remains "champion" by underground communications in Syria, where tunnels appear as an extensive network with streets, conjunctions and lanes, leading outside the city.
Rebels seek to use military equipment seized at government forces effectively and take care of it. It concerns as FSA in the ranks of which there is a lot of former military personnel, as jihadists who got experience of handling heavy weapons during warfare in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and other countries. As for armored vehicles, considering its insufficient quantity, the shortage of weapons and fuel, they pay considerable attention to its camouflage security, promotion on in advance chosen positions and withdrawal from them, using at the same time these surveyings, including satellite images of target objects.
Militias are forced to resort to handicraft industry of arms, military equipment and armament. This is not only about IED, but also about mortars, launchers of unguided air-to-surface missiles tractor-drawn and self-propelled guns. There is an abundant practice of weaponry installation on motor transport (heavy machine gun, antiaircraft machine-gun, a small antiaircraft artillery, etc.). Besides pickups which have already become a traditional arsenal of mobile means of combat of insurgents in different "hot spots" in Syria, in the light of rather developed traffic network of the country, small trucks are used as chassis, installing on them 37-mm antiaircraft guns with local armored protection.
Particularity of warfighting of IAG's opposition is the Use of sniper specialists, the majority of who are foreign mercenaries. It is explained by the fact that training of the sniper specialists takes time
and can be successfully carried out only in the conditions of a training center having necessary base. Snipers in Syria act actively and defiantly. The territory won back of militia members for a long time remains dangerous for movement of civilians and military men. Therefore the last try to secure the routes of movement, pulling along them fabric aprons or lining up burned-out automotive equipment to remain behind them imperceptible for snipers.
Transferring by opposition of the main fight to cities and settlements pursues one aim - to break normal life of citizens, to incur displeasure and to direct it against the state which is incapable to ensure their safety. In conditions when it is impossible to reach it, oppositional groups recourse to terror, including murders of big groups of civilians with subsequent accusation of crime of government forces.
Slide towards terror not only against the authorities, but also against people is not a new phenomenon. It was noted in the 1960th in countries of Latin America, then in the 1980-1990th in Afghanistan, the Turkish Kurdistan and other "hot spots" and received the strategy's name of creation of "a situation of double terror." Its essence consists in provoking of authorities by means of acts of terrorism of inadequate punitive measures from which first of all ordinary citizens suffer, as envisioned by terrorists, these can force to revenge security forces and to rise in arms against authorities. Practice of this strategy realization leads to the fact that civilians turn in human shield for fighters. As for Syria, here the opposition often violently holds in areas of armed clashes population presented by confessional (Christians, Shiite Muslims, etc.) and ethnic (Kurds) minorities.
Presence of civilians in urban areas occupied by fighters creates considerable restrictions on use of airpower and heavy weaponry of Syrian ground forces, equating powers of opposing parties. Another "vulnerability" of regular army is that dislocation of force grouping, mobilizable resources, back area, the camp of replacement training and economic objects are known to the opponent that promotes his opportunities for the choice of place
and time for carrying out attacks and raids. These preferences of militias are added with efficiency of guerrilla methods of waging armed struggle. Their effectiveness has even more raised in connection with the following factors today. First, regular armed forces experience the increasing dependence on sustainable maintenance supply and operational stability of rear services. Secondly, the majority of modern military equipment samples and armament are very vulnerable even from insignificant damages. Thirdly, fighting capabilities of weapons system increased sharply (ATGM, LAW, MANPAD, mines, land mines), comparable by their combat capabilities with heavy IAG which are commonly used by fighters. Besides, modern compact mobile means of communication have simplified a task of the organization of an effective interaction not only between groups or their divisions, but also certain militias.
Space-like range of armed struggle contributes success of rebels' actions when the opponent - government forces - is forced to fragment forces and means, responding to militias' actions involving all new settlements in various regions of the country. The armed opposition, considering big extent of not covered with government troops and gendarmerie frontiers with bordering countries and lack of extensive network of checkpoints on roads, could create an effective pipeline of weapon, ammunition and equipment, specifically to Aleppo region from Turkey and to Homs region from Lebanon. The same factor also facilitates a replenishment of detached units by foreign contractors and Syrian citizens who were trained in foreign camps of Islamists.
Thus, IAG of the Syrian opposition use guerrilla ways of waging combat operations, including attacks on military facilities and military posts, captures and possession of settlements, entrapments, and widely resort to guerilla warfare. The armed violence is committed by them against governmental security agencies, authorities in the center and at the local levels, political opponents and big groups of population presented by religious
minorities of Shiite Muslims (first of all Alawites), Christians, etc., ethnic minority - Kurds and also against Sunni Muslims who refuse to contribute to fighters.
From the perspective of military art the civil war in Syria is a fight of active armed forces with the assistance of militia army created by the government and other security agencies against IAG. The Syrian armed forces posing an undoubted risk to the Israeli army were insufficiently effective in fight against separated, not having sole command IAG. The Syrian army, the author of the article emphasizes, prepared not for counter-terrorist operations, and was intended to wage traditional war which main opponent was Israel. Force development and its were directed at reflection of external aggression in the framework of echeloned defense providing differentiation of the concepts "front line" - "back area," absent or washed away in the Syrian interstate armed conflict. However theoretically, having superiority of forces and means over unorganized, without sole command, the eclectic opponent presented by separate detached units and just groups of bandits which are at war with the robbery purpose, security agencies of Syria were to cope with it easily. It didn't happen because besides the internal armed opposition out of Syria there are forces carrying out their financial, material, informational and foreign policy support.
M. Slinkin notes: use of regular forces in modern armed conflicts demonstrates that provisions and principles of military art based on the experience of World War II demand consolidation. Intensive, separated by place, but connected by the general concept actions of IAG often make impossible detailed planning, organization and waging combat operations by traditional methods. It is proved by character and features of waging combat operations during the civil war in Syria.
Author of the abstract - Valentina Schensnovich
