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Aleksei Malashenko,
D. Sc. (Hist.), Head of program "Religion, Society and Security", Moscow Carnegie Center WILL IT BE POSSIBLE TO CONQUER THE "ISLAMIC STATE"?
This question is asked by almost every analyst whether professional or amateur (the latter are many and varied). Discussions on the subject were especially lively at the turn of the 1970s - 1980s, after the Islamic revolution in Iran. The main thesis at the time was that the revolution of 1979 was a temporary deviation from "normal development," that it would pass as a sickness, and everything would turn back as it used to be. Beginning from the 1990s the belief in the ultimate victory over the Taliban and HAMAS has lived on. The end of "political Islam," which is often a synonym of Islamism, has been predicted time and time again. However, Islamism has gained in strength. The Islamists are thirsting for power, and gain it in certain countries. They have entrenched themselves in new (mainly African) territories. Islamists sit in parliaments of most Muslim countries, where they present the main opposition force to the ruling regimes. They organize manifestations of tens and hundreds of thousands of supporters in big cities, and millions of Muslims take their side.
What do the Islamists want? They want "more Islam" in the state, the economy, the family and society, which have lost their religious identity over the centuries. Islamists have different programs, and use different methods to attain their aims. Some of them say that people should return to Islam immediately, disregarding losses and difficulties, by hook or by crook. Others maintain that there should be no hurry, matters should proceed softly, and society should itself realize that the only way out of the general crisis is transfer on to the "Islamic development path,"
Where Is the Strength of Islamism?
Islamism as an ideological concept is a reaction of the Muslim world to its economic and political failures, collapse of its national and imitation development models, and insolvency of the ruling elites. The Islamists base themselves on concepts and standards laid down in Islam, confirming the only correct "Islamic alternative." The proof of its righteousness and success is the divine predestination, as well as the contention that Islam is the "most perfect and ultimate religion."
Islamism is a "monster" natural for the Muslim world, a complex phenomenon with deep historical and cultural roots and modern reasons.1 Not taking into account these circumstances, it will be impossible to pursue a correct policy in the Muslim world, just as the victory over religious and political extremism will be impossible either.
Islamism is not something taken from the outside. Of course, the Taliban has been formed with the help of the Pakistani Intelligence service. Israel has also helped create HAMAS hoping to use it against the Palestinian resistance movement of Yasir Arafat, and al Qaeda has come into being with support of western special services. However, the favorable ground for Islamist groupings has been prepared for decades, long before coming to power of foreign "engineers." Analogues of al Qaeda, Taliban, jihad movements, etc. would have come into being by themselves, along with other groupings and under other names, just as the emergence of an "Islamic state" has become inevitable in the chaos of the chronic crisis in the Middle East. Richard Young describes the situation there as "myriads of polarization levels within society."2 However, Islamist stars have been the brightest ones in this "cosmos."
It is useless to try to establish total control over the Islamists. True, they can be manipulated, only to a certain extent, because they are extremely unyielding, dead set to their world outlook, and proceed from their own interests. It is only in this context that we should
understand compromises between the Islamists and the United States, European countries, and Russia.
Islamism is differentiated within itself.
There are three trends in it
The first, more moderate Islamists pursue a comparatively milder policy, laying greater emphasis on the cultural and educational spheres, and Islamization of the family life. They act within the framework of the constitutions of their states. The moderate Islamists maintain a dialogue with the West, do not reject its values outright and use democratic institutions in their activity. Islamists of Turkey, Tunisia, and Tajikistan can be cited as an example. (The moderate Islamists do not call themselves such, but present themselves as Islamic reformers, which is just, in a way).
The second trend is represented by radicals who are more resolute in their theory and practice. They would like to see Islam as the foundation of a broad "Islamic perestroika." Just like the moderate Islamists, the radicals successfully use democracy in their interests, take part in elections, and even win them. They act not only within the constitutional framework, but also use street protest actions which play a no small role in traditional and post-traditional society, almost on a par with parliamentary and presidential elections.
The third, extremist, trend is oriented to uncompromising and even armed struggle. Islamist extremism is similar to terrorism, which can be seen almost every day all over the world. The extremists are striving to reach their aims here and now. They are not bound by moral or political liabilities with anybody or anything. This explains their extreme cruelty. As they assert, they are responsible only to our Lord for their actions, and His name justifies their deadliest deeds. The "global index" of terrorism, according to the data of the Australian-
American-British Institute of Economics and World for 2014 has grown by 44 percent. More than 80 percent of victims of terrorist acts were in Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria. However, a civil war has been raging in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, which is characterized, as a rule, by the extreme degree of violence against the peaceful civilian population. This is why victims in the course of the civil war can be regarded not only a result of terrorist acts, but also as war casualties.
All these three trends in Islamism are close enough. There is a great distance between the President of Turkey Recep Erdogan and the former head of al Qaeda Osama bin Laden, however the paradigm of Islamism is broad enough, and both these figures can be part of it. It is not every moderate Islamist that will inevitably turn into an extremist. It takes time for an Islamist to become an extremist. Yet, we cannot ignore the fact that part of Islamists (especially young men) often take to more radical positions. People in Russia know this well enough on the example of the North Caucasus where the third generation of militant fighters has grown up (Opti Mudarov was 19 when he committed an act of terror in Grozny on October 5, 2014). Young men pertain to glorification of jihadist-militants, who cannot be vanquished even by the military coalition created by the United States, to say nothing of national special services of many countries, including Russia.
Hence, it follows that military victory over Islamist extremists, who are best of all represented by the Islamic state, will be temporary and give a pause, not long enough, before the further confrontation both within the Muslim ummah and between Islamism and non-Muslim oecumene - the West, Russia, China, India, and certain African states. The latter contention returns us to the problem of a "clash of civilizations."3 Tension between Islam and other civilizational areas, above all, the Euro-Christian area, will long be on the agenda. In this
case Islam comes out not as "simply" religion, but in a broader sense as a socio-cultural entity united by common history and tradition, as a civilization with Islamism as its segment. If civilizations do not clash, they "chafe against each other" in a harsh manner, and this is especially dangerous where Islamism acts on behalf of Islam.
The westernized Muslim elites and part of society supporting them (mainly the middle class) are the direct opponent of Islamists. From the point of view of the Islamists, they are hypocrites, traitors of "true Islam," and stooges of the West, and earlier of the Soviet Union, and Islamist attacks are spearheaded against them. The West in this context is a secondary foe. Blows against it (September 11, 2001), attacks on U.S. military, terrorist acts in Europe are, above all, the desire to bolster up self-esteem. The prestige of Islamists is enhanced by their struggle against foreign presence on Muslim lands, and interference of western countries with internal Muslim affairs. It is a kind of Muslim-Muslim civil war.
Where Is the Weakness of Islamism?
Extreme Islamism today is vulnerable because it does not have charismatic leaders of global importance, like, say, Osama bin Laden. There are no persons comparable to Ayatollah Khomeini. Without such people a religious-political movement becomes defective. The head of the Islamic State Khalif Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi is not fit for the role of the messiah, inasmuch as he has not acquired enough political and religious authority. There are no indisputable authorities among Islamists either in the Middle East, or North Africa, or Central Asia.
Another weakness of the extremists of the Islamic State is their cruelty - they kill non-Muslims, priests who are not to their liking, western and Iraqi journalists, they restore slavery and use medieval Shariah punishment. All this discredit them in the eyes of most
Muslims who are convinced of Islam being tolerant religion, religion of peace. Thus, the extremists narrow down the base of their support themselves (in 1990-1991 in Algeria they found themselves isolated from society and were defeated due to their cruelty).
Finally, the Islamists are ignorant in the matters of state management. The downfall of radical and extremist Islamism begins with their gaining political victory, to be moiré exact, with their coming to power. The time comes when Islamists have to tackle the daily economic, social and political problems, implement reforms, maintain stability and establish their legitimacy as the ruling regime. To do this proves more difficult than criticize and protest in the name of Islam.
Muhammad Mursi who became President of Egypt in 2012, failed to cope with these tasks. The Afghan Talibs were unable to extricate the country from the impasse of the crisis. The Shi'ite Islamists in Iran could not overcome a crisis in their country. I shall venture to suppose that the defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq will begin as soon as its leaders come to power by creating their own quasi-state. True, they will hardly be allowed to do this.
However, there are exceptions. We mean Turkey, where the followers of moderate Islamism, having come to power in 2002, have been working for positive economic results, remain allies of the West, and, though cautiously, take part in the fight against the extremists. Turkey, as a national state created by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a consistent opponent of religious conservatism, has been a "secular exception" in the Muslim world. The ruling Party of justice and development "has changed the domestic policy of Turkey and also its foreign policy in accordance with Islamic vision."4
Mention should be made of Tunisia, where a ruling coalition emerged in 2011 with the participation of the moderate Islamic party "a-Nakhda," which is compared with the ruling party of Turkey.5
We should note that "an-Nakhda" suffered defeat at the 2014 elections, but it did not act outside the constitutional framework, and its secular opponents immediately announced that they were not going to oust it from the political process.
Authoritarianism can justly be called the main obstacle on the way of Islamists. Suffice it to recall the regimes of Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi, Islam Karimov, who is still in power in Uzbekistan, and Bashar Asad, still ruling Syria, although with great difficulties. The dictatorial regimes established by them, despite their cruelty and harshness, are more rational and answerable for action than the often unpredictable rule of religious fanatics.
Indicative in this respect is the situation in Syria, where Bashar Asad still retains his presidential post largely due to support of Moscow and Tehran. For Vladimir Putin he remained the last and only vestige of the former Soviet presence, memory about the bipolar world when the U.S.S.R. was equal to the United States. In the course of the civil war in his country Bashar Asad succeeded in gaining certain popularity thanks to his ability to oppose the extremists. His departure, on which the members of the international coalition insist, can result in the disintegration of Syria and, without doubt, in the strengthening of the positions of the Islamic State.
It would be appropriate to recall the situation in Afghanistan at the beginning of the 1990s. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from that country Russia has refused to come out as the successor of the U.S.S.R., having abandoned President Mohammad Najibullah, who had been in power there from 1987. Even deprived of assistance and doomed to failure his regime continued to exist for considerable time and was overthrown only in 1992. It can be assumed that given foreign aid Najibullah could have stayed in power for longer time and bolstered up the forces of national reconciliation, which could have prevented the
capture of Kabul by Taliban in 1996. In that case developments in Afghanistan, and in the entire Greater Middle East, for that matter, could have been different. Incidentally, the execution of Najibullah by Talibs reminded the assassination of the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Bashar Asad also tried to form some general national coalition, an alternative to which would be the exacerbation of the civil war and the strengthening of the extremist forces.
The authoritarians adhering to the positions of secular nationalism cannot ignore the Islamic factor. Taking into account the general growth of religious consciousness, they have to appeal to Islam in order to bolster up their popularity among faithful Muslims. This gives additional legitimacy to their rule. They "catch" Islamic slogans from the religious opposition. The problem of relations with Islamists is always pressing for an authoritarian ruler. As a rule, the authorities wage a struggle against them, and in some countries (for instance, in Central Asia, in monarchies of the Persian Gulf, in Egypt under the former president Hosni Mubarak and the present one Abd al-Fattah asSisi) their parties and movements have been banned. However, there is another experience: the kings of Morocco have been in constant secret contacts with Islamists, including radical ones, and their dialogue makes it possible to avoid excesses typical of most Arab states. In any case, the authoritarian rulers have to observe a balance of power, inasmuch as persecutions of the Islamists can give an opposite effect, giving them more popularity among the local population. The Russian North Caucasus is a case in point, where the Islamic opposition continues to act and gain popularity, despite systematic actions (even military) against it.
Conclusion
The influence of Islam on politics at national and regional levels and globally will grow, which is a prerequisite of the broadening of the geopolitical area of Islamism. This is due, among other things, to the constant instability within the Muslim world, as well as its conflict relations with the West. One of the consequences of the slow transformation of the system of international relations and one of the world poles of forces is Islamism, and above all, its radical and extremist trends, which can be considered an "asymmetrical answer" of the Muslim ummah to multipolarity.
In extreme forms Islamism will reveal itself spontaneously. However, it may be possible to predict somehow the time and place of its manifestations. They emerge, first and foremost, in countries and regions gripped by systemic crises and also where pre-crisis phenomena are observed. If one looks at a map, the greater part of the Muslim world, except Southeast Asia (although the protest potential in an Islamic form is growing in Indonesia) and western part of North Africa, is under threat.
The main source of tension is the Islamic State, whose military and political potential proved unexpectedly high. Evidently, some time later members of the international coalition will announce military victory over it, which will boil down to the destruction of the strongholds of the Islamists and their heavy weapons, as well as the establishment of formal control of the local authorities over the liberated territories. However, military victory will not lead to a political solution of the problem.
The war against the Islamic State may give rise to the emergence of more extremist groups.6 It is indicative that along with the fight against the Islamic State the UN Security Council also discussed the problem of its isolation, which means recognition of the possibility of
its existence for quite a long time (and even establishment of informal dialogues with it).
After defeat the jihadists will go underground, return to the countries of their origin from where they have come to the Middle East, and will continue their activity there. They will engage in propaganda, recruit supporters, and continue fight in the ranks of the Islamic opposition. The growing terrorist threat in European countries and in the United States will also be possible. They will spend the energy accumulated during their operations in the Middle East, and will take revenge against members of the international coalition and those who were their allies, including Russia, which supplies arms to the Iraqi government.
The Islamic State is simultaneously a subject and object of politics. Its role as a subject is indisputable. At the same time it can be regarded as an object used by foreign actors. Among the real and potential manipulators are Qatar, Turkey, and the United States. For Qatar the successes of the Islamic State means a testimony to its political significance and ability to influence the situation in the region. Turkey regards the Islamic State as an instrument for weakening the Kurdish movement and a means of pressure brought to bear on the Syrian regime. In the United States the Islamic State is viewed as an instrument to influence Bashar Asad and even to remove him. Common enmity becomes a sort of a bridge for improving relations between Washington and Tehran.
For Moscow the success of the Islamic State, in addition to the Taliban threat, can be another circumstance in favor of the Russian presence in Central Asia, and also the strengthening of the OCST. As shown by experience, the fight against the Islamic State may go on without uniting its opponents, primarily Russia. However, in that case Moscow may become tempted "to play the card of Islamism" in its
conflict with the West. First, Russia can assert that Islamism is solely a reaction of the Islamic world to the expansion of the West. Such approach was clearly seen in the policy of the Soviet Union in the early 1980s, after the Islamic revolution in Iran. At the time, speaking at the 26th congress of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev said that under the banner of Islam a struggle for liberation was unfolding.7 Official Russian ideology has appealed to the striving common to Muslims and Orthodox Christians to preserve their socio-cultural values which are allegedly threatened by the outside forces. Ultimately, the intention to create an Islamic state is quite comparable to the striving of the Russian ruling class to take their country along its own development path.
What is to be done to weaken the Islamic State
and defeat it?
To wage military operations simultaneously on the territory of Syria and Iraq, preventing regrouping and moving the Islamic State's units. In case of carrying on a land operation, to draw military units from Arab countries. To destroy the Islamic State's infrastructure.
To deal pinpoint blows in order to avoid casualties among the civilian population, even people sympathizing with the Islamic State. Otherwise the popularity of the latter will be growing. When there is no possibility to avoid casualties to express regret and pay compensation to the victims' families.
To inform the population about all cases of cruel behavior of the Islamic State militants toward the local population.
To search for and find potential charismatic leaders among high clerics and politicians, try to stem their activity, and get rid of them.
To use contradictions between Islamist organizations, for one, between IS groupings and al Qaeda, and watch the movement of militants from the IS organizations to al Qaeda.
To prevent in every way possible the activity of the former IS militants in the Muslim medium, especially their attempts to form groups around themselves and carry on propaganda work in Muslim temples.
Notes
G. Mirsky. Monstr islamizma [The Monster of Islamism] // Vedomosti. 2014. October 16.
R. Young. From Transformation to Mediation: The Arab Spring Reframed. - [S. I.]. March 20, 2014. - (Carnegie Europe Paper).
I have already tried to answer this question. See: A. Malashenko. I vsyo-taki oni stalkivayutsya [Yet They Clash with One Another] / Moscow Carnegie Center. Moscow, 2007. (Briefing, vol. 9, issue 4).
Eligur B. Turkey's Declining Democracy // Current Trends in Islamic Ideology. -Vol. 17 / Hudson Inst. - [S. I.]. August 2014. - P. 151.
Islamisty pobedili [The Islamists Have Won] // http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/ 2011/10/25_a_3812142.shtml
J.M. Dorsey. War against Islamic State: Sowing Seeds of more extremist groups //
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-dorsey/war-against-islamic-state_b_
5907794.html
Report of the CC CPSU to the 26th CPSU Congress and current tasks of the party in the sphere of domestic and foreign policy. - Moscow, 1981, p. 18.
This article has specially been written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."
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