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ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ
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Journal of Institutional Studies, 2019, 11(4), 090-105 DOI: 10.17835/2076-6297.2019.11.4.090-105
ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЙ КОНФЛИКТ США И КИТАЯ ЧЕРЕЗ ПРИЗМУ КЛЮЧЕВЫХ ПАРАДИГМ ТЕОРИИ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ
КАДОЧНИКОВ ДЕНИС ВАЛЕНТИНОВИЧ,
кандидат экономических наук, доцент, Факультет свободных искусств и наук, Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет;
старший научный сотрудник, Международный Центр социально-экономических исследований -Леонтьевский
центр, Санкт-Петербург, Россия, e-mail: dkadochnikov@yahoo.com;
ПУШКИНА ДАРЬЯ БУЛАТОВНА,
Ph.D. (Правительство и политика, Мэрилендский университет, США),
доцент,
Факультет свободных искусств и наук, Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет,
e-mail: d.pushkina@spbu.ru
Цитирование: Кадочников, Д. В., Пушкина, Д. Б. (2019). Экономический конфликт США и Китая через призму ключевых парадигм теории международных отношений // Journal of Institutional Studies, 11(4), 090-105. DOI: 10.17835/2076-6297.2019.11.4.090-105
Изучение международных отношений в целом и международных экономических отношений в частности открывает широкие возможности для использования методологии неоинституциональной экономической теории (или схожих по сути подходов из других социальных наук) для анализа политических и экономических событий на мировой арене. Современные парадигмы международных отношений представляют собой различные примеры институционального анализа, применяемого к одному и тому же предмету, но основанного на различных предпосылках, различных этических / философских подходах, а также опирающегося на различные базовые факты или аксиомы. В данной статье дается обзор ключевых парадигм международных отношений (реализм / неореализм, либерализм / неолиберализм, марксизм / неомарксизм и конструктивизм) в институциональном ключе, а также рассматривается текущий экономический конфликт между США и Китайской Народной Республикой с точки зрения каждой из этих парадигм. С институциональной / неоинституциональной методологической точки зрения представляет интерес, как каждая парадигма теории международных отношений рассматривает международных акторов и институты, через которые они взаимодействуют. Знание современных парадигм международных отношений необходимо для правильной интерпретации академического дискурса по данному вопросу, а также рекомендаций, предлагаемых академическим и экспертным сообществом политикам.
© Кадочников Д. В., Пушкина Д. Б., 2019
Ключевые слова: международные отношения; институты; реализм; неореализм; либерализм; неолиберализм; конструктивизм; марксизм; США; Китай; торговая война; экономический конфликт.
US-CHINA ECONOMIC CONFLICT ASSESSMENT IN THE MAJOR PARADIGMS OF THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
DENIS V. KADOCHNIKOV,
Candidate of economic sciences, Associate professor, Faculty of Liberal Arts and Sciences, St. Petersburg State University; Senior Research Fellow,
International Centre for Social and Economic Research - Leontief Centre,
St. Petersburg, Russia, e-mail: dkadochnikov@yahoo.com;
DARIA B. PUSHKINA,
Ph.D. (Government and Politics, University of Maryland, USA),
Associate professor, Faculty of Liberal Arts and Sciences, St. Petersburg State University, e-mail: d.pushkina@spbu.ru
Citation: Kadochnikov D. V., Pushkina D. B. (2019). US-China economic conflict assessment in the major paradigms of the theory of international relations. Journal of Institutional Studies, 11(4), 090-105. DOI: 10.17835/2076-6297.2019.11.4.090-105
The study of international relations in general and of international economic relations in particular, provides opportunities for using the methodology of new institutional economics (or its close analogs in other social sciences) to analyze political and economic developments on the global arena. Modern paradigms of international relations represent different cases of institutional analysis applied to the same subject but based on different assumptions, different ethical / philosophical approaches, and relying upon different basic facts or axioms. This paper gives an overview of the key paradigms of the international relations (Realism / Neorealism, Liberalism / Neoliberalism, Marxism / Neomarxism and Constructivism) from the institutional perspective, and examines the current economic conflict between the US and People's Republic of China from the perspective of each paradigm. From the institutional / new institutional methodological perspective, it is interesting to examine how each paradigm of the theory of international relations views international actors and institutions through which they interact. The knowledge about modern paradigms of international relations is necessary for correct interpretation of the academic discourse on the matter, as well as of the policy advice offered by the academic and expert community to policymakers.
Keywords: international relations; institutions; realism; neorealism; liberalism; neoliberalism; constructivism; Marxism; US; China; trade war; economic conflict.
JEL: F02, F5
Introduction
The study of international relations in general and of international economic relations in particular, provides a broad array of opportunities for using the methodology of new institutional economics to analyze all sorts of political and economic developments on the global arena. In essence, each contemporary school or paradigm of the theory of international relations represents a vision of who are major actors on the global arena; what their ultimate motives and goals are; and what factors shape how they interact with each other in pursuing those goals. While references to 'institutions' and their role are more popular in some of the paradigms and less so (or even formally absent) in others, all modern discussions of international relations rely upon certain assumptions and/or facts about the subject, that together represent a specific view of global actors' interaction mechanisms. It should be noted that (quite predictably) the rhetoric of international relations theory is very different from the rhetoric of new institutional economics, and the very terms 'institution' and 'institutionalism' are treated rather differently. When international relations scholars speak about institutions, they usually refer to 'international institutions' — that is to international organizations, treaties, alliances etc. Although currently the terms 'institution' and 'organization' are used interchangeably less frequently than in the past, it still happens (Jonsson, Tallberg, 2001). This difference may lead to a misunderstanding between economists and international relations scholars. The latter may be aware of the new institutional economics, but only tend to see parallels with it in the neoliberal paradigm of international relations. However, from an economist's point of view, the parallels with the new institutional economics can be found in all paradigms of international relations.
It is justified to say that different modern paradigms of international relations represent different cases of institutional analysis applied to the same subject but based on different assumptions, different ethical / philosophical approaches, and also relying upon different basic facts or axioms. The information (factual and/or assumed) on the actors, their agendas and their interaction strategies is really a description of an institution1 and no paradigm of international relations can do without it. Thus, from the perspective of new institutional economics, it is interesting to examine how each paradigm of the theory of international relations views international actors and institutions through which they interact.
The purpose of this paper is dual: first, to give an overview of the key paradigms of the international relations from the institutional perspective, and, second, to illustrate each paradigm by looking at its treatment of a concrete case in international relations - the current economic conflict between the US and People's Republic of China. The key paradigms discussed further are the ones that are most prominently represented in modern literature on international relations - Realism / Neorealism, Liberalism / Neoliberalism, Marxism and Constructivism. Prior to proceeding to the discussion of each school, a brief overview of the US-China economic conflict is presented.
The case of US-China economic conflict
The case of US-China relations is especially interesting subject of analysis for several reasons. These two countries undoubtedly represent major world powers - politically, economically and militarily. The sizes of their economies and their roles in the global trade and capital flows are such, that their domestic policies as well as their policies towards each other have extensive external effects / spillovers and significantly influence the rest of the world.2 The expansion of their bilateral economic ties in the 21st century has been very impressive, and the hopes and concerns related to the future of their ties have been growing accordingly. As these two countries have now found themselves at the crossroads, observers worldwide are wondering how to explain their current conflict and what to expect from
1 See, for instance, Hodgson (2006), Williamson (2000), and Williamson (2009).
2 See, for instance, Pushkina & Zincavage (2015).
the future. The current trade war / economic conflict is a challenge for social scientists and their theories and at the same time an opportunity to test basic premises of their theoretical paradigms.
Modern history of US-China economic ties began in the early 1970s, when, following Nixon's visit to China, the two countries started opening up to each other. However, it took China about two decades of reforms to develop market infrastructure, legal and institutional framework necessary for a breakthrough in trade and investments with the US. Throughout 1970s and most of 1980s, the balance of trade between US and China was in favor of the former, but the situation began changing around 19853. Since the early 1990s, China's surplus in bilateral trade began to grow, the process further intensifying in the new century. Back in 1991, according to the World Bank data4, the share of China in US imports was less than 4%, and in US exports — mere 1,5%. By 2017, the last year prior to the 'trade war', China accounted for 21,85% of US imports and for 8,40% of US exports. China has become number one importer to the US and the third destination for US exports. Meanwhile, since the early 1990s, the share of the US in China's exports has almost doubled, rising from about 10% to 19% in 2017, the share of the US in China's imports fell from 11% to 8,4%. The bilateral economic ties have not been limited to trade, as US and China has become major investors for each other. China has also become the major holder of the US sovereign debt (occasionally competing with Japan for the 1st place), essentially lending to US the money it earned due to the large trade surplus.
The rapidly expanding economic ties of US and China have never been trouble-free. On numerous occasions, and for decades already, American authorities and corporations accused China of violations of intellectual property rights, of presumably unfair commercial practices and of barriers to fair competition with US producers. Nevertheless, mutual benefits seemed far more significant for a long while. In the early 2000s, US economist and policy advisor C. Fred Bergsten came up with a concept of G-2 (the Group of Two), envisioning closer cooperation and coordination mechanisms between US and China, which would not only lead to mutual accord but also shape the entire world, presumably for the global good (Bergsten, 2005). Bergsten's idea that G-2 was crucial for the future progress of the global economy found many supporters in the US academia and policy circles. Future deepening of the symbiotic relationship of US and China seemed highly probable, and while some experts warned against too much of optimism, public at large did not expect anything like the conflict that began in 2018.
After winning the US presidential election, Donald Trump has intensified his personal 'crusade' against what he believed to be 'unfair business practices' of China, which presumable lead to financial losses and job cuts in the US. In doing so, Trump continues long history of his own advocacy of higher trade barriers needed to reduce US trade deficit and debt and to create more jobs for Americans. This rhetoric finds supporters among certain US commercial and political circles and, obviously, among substantial share of the US voters. Starting in January 2018, US gradually began introducing higher tariffs for increasing number of Chinese products, demanding radical policy changes from the authorities of China in favor of the US. China, while agreeing to buy more US goods, retaliated. Several rounds of trade talks had very limited success. Two year into the conflict, the immediate results for the bilateral US-China relationships and for the global economy have been slower economic growth and increased uncertainty. More profound consequence is an erosion of the international economic order and dispute resolution mechanisms — the mechanisms that took so long to be developed5. The deterioration of the economic relations is likely to lead to further deterioration of the bilateral relations in other areas, and eventually to the intensified geopolitical rivalry, that will generate serious risks for the entire world.
3 See also Wang (2013).
4 World Bank (https://wits.worldbank.org/) - Assessed on November 06, 2019.
5 See also Mikheev & Lukonin (2019), Vinogradov et al (2019), Trush (2018).
In the further sections of the paper, the way different schools or paradigms of international relations (Realism/Neorealism, Liberalism/Neoliberalism, Marxism/Neomarxism and Constructivism) approach the economic conflict of USA and China is summarized.
Realism / Neorealism perspective
Realism/Neorealism is one of the most prominent theories of international relations. Realists usually refer to the 'History of Peloponnesian Wars' by Thucydides (1959), 'The Prince' by Machiavelli (1950) and 'The Leviathan' by Hobbes (1965) as historic texts that focus on their major assumptions. Carr (1946), Morgenthau (1948) and Kennan (1954) have formulated realism paradigm in its classical version after WWII.
According to the realist theory, nation-states are the main actors in international relations. States are rational and unitary actors. International system is anarchic and in the condition of anarchy, states' main goal is survival through the acquisition of power6. Power is both means and end and is mostly, although not exclusively, acquired though military strength or through joining strong military alliances. Realism distinguishes domestic and international politics, stating that states on international arena behave in the same, self-help, self-preservation fashion, regardless of their domestic institutions. There is no higher authority in international system. International institutions, such as United Nations, are merely assemblies of states, where powerful nations dictate their will. International law is not a real law, unlike domestic law. In order to survive, states seek to maximize their power and strive for balance of power to maintain stability in international system. Realism emphasizes conflict and competition as norms of international relations. Cooperation, including cooperation through institutions, is possible only if/when it serves national interests.
Neorealism uses most of classical realism assumptions, and develops them further adding systemic factors. Its origin is often associated with Kenneth Waltz (1959; 1979; 1988; 2000). At present, the vast majority of realists belong to neo-realist school of structural realism. Neorealism adds to classical realism, claiming that international structures affect states' behavior. Waltz (1979) in his 'Theory of International Politics', declares that the international system imposes structural constraints on the nation-states and thus a one has to understand distribution of power in this system. This claim became one of the basic assumptions of neorealism. According to Waltz (1990), international structure is created by interactions of states. In its own turn, it precludes states from making certain actions while directing towards other actions. Waltz claims that international system functions like a market, which is "interposed between the economic actors and the results they produce. It conditions their calculations, their behavior and their interactions" (Waltz, 1990, pp. 90-91).
In economic terms, international actors aim to maximize gains relative to other countries. This focus on relative rather than absolute gains is an important feature of realism / neorealism comparatively to liberalism / neoliberalism7. An important parallel with the new institutional economics is the focus on the inherent opportunism of states in the situation of information asymmetry8.
Neorealism would analyze the case of recent US-China trade war using its major assumptions. According to neorealists, states aim to maximize their relative power. A state wants to be a hegemon of the system because that is the best way to survive. The ultimate goal for the state is to be a hegemon, globally or at least regionally. The other goal is that no other state in the system is capable of domination. In addition, Gilpin (2003) argued that when international system has a hegemon, not only balance of power limits hegemonic expansion but also other barriers such as weakening of hegemon's strength, economic and technological limits to hegemonic domination, and domestic institutions.
6 See, for instance, Grieco (1993), Axelrod & Keohane (1985), Jervis (2006).
7 See also Kadochnikov (2016).
8 See, for instance, Volchik (2015).
One of the most influential contemporary realists/neo-realists is John J. Mearsheimer (2016; 2018; 2019a; 2019b). In his talk "Realism and the Rise of China", John J. Mearsheimer claims that China cannot rise peacefully9. China, presumably, will act the way USA has always acted10. Thus, neo-realists declare that US is determined to make sure China does not dominate Asia, not to mention the world. As China continues to increase its strength, US will do what they can to contain China. The goal of the USA is to counterbalance China, and the actions towards this goal include maintaining good relations with powerful China's neighbors, for example India. According to the worldview of structural neo-realism, the actions by the US and China's neighbors that are aimed at containing China, are presented as defensive by the USA, but would appear offensive to China and vice versa. Moreover, economic and technological limits that China presents to the current world hegemon (United States) will continue to challenge US hegemonic expansion. Therefore, even though USAChina economic relationship seemed to have been gathering only a positive momentum in the recent past, as China continues to grow economically and militarily, the world will see growing rivalry and tensions between the two countries.
Liberalism / Neoliberalism perspective
Liberalist tradition in the international relations theory can be traced to John Lock although it is actual development mostly took place in the 20th century. The US President Woodrow Wilson with his idea of the League of Nations is often associated with beginning of the liberal paradigm (Wilson, 1918). International organizations, such as United Nations, are considered (by the adherents of liberalism at least) to be an application of liberalism in the real world. Liberalism disagrees with realism on some of the fundamental assumptions, while sharing some of the ideas at the same time. Liberalism considers international system an anarchy but argues that states can create international law and international organizations and thus counter the inherent security dangers in the system. The liberal theory of international relations states that domestic political system within the state affects state's behavior on an international arena. Democracies do not fight other democracies due to checks and balances of the domestic democratic institutions as well as to their responsiveness to the general needs of the population (people, liberalism argues, want progress, peace and security and thus, not wars). Among classical proponents of this theory is Immanuel Kant (1948). Contemporary scholars include Bruce Russett and William Antholis (Russett, Antholis, 1992). Classical liberalism also believes in common interest. States make rational calculations and something like Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' will make sure that national and international interests coincide. Free markets and the goodness of the human nature will lead to interdependence and show that 'war does not pay' (Angell, 1910). Even when conflicts arise, international law and international organizations will serve as legal, executive and judiciary checks and balances for all states equally. Collective security is a key concept for liberalism, offered instead of the realist concept of the security dilemma. International institutions such as the League of Nations and the United Nations embody the liberal idea of security as a collective responsibility of states rather than self-help obligation of an individual state.
After WWII, American foreign policy used the ideas of liberalism in order to justify its interventionism abroad and often came under criticism for this. For example, during the Cold War, US were criticized for supporting anti-communist regimes with bad human rights records. At the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama has famously announced 'the end of history' (Fukuyama, 1992). While he himself declared that his theses were more
9 This is a referral to Barack Obama's interview where US President claims that USA is happy to allow China's rise if it rises peacefully.
10 "Realism and the rise of China" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D2e4OyNV8L8), posted in 2012, accessed October 28, 2019 and "Why china cannot rise peacefully" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CXov7MkgPB4), posted in 2012, accessed on October 28, 2019.
complex, the most common interpretation is that throughout human history, including the 20th century, there have been ideological battles between, for example, liberalism and monarchism, liberalism and communism, liberalism and fascism. However, with the defeat of fascism and communism, at the end of the 20th century, liberal democracy becomes the only accepted norm of political organization, political institutions, norms and morals. The growing popularity of liberalism may also be linked with the globalization (Volchik, 2011).
Neoliberalism, sometimes called 'neo-liberal institutionalism', claims that the neorealists exaggerate the importance of anarchy in international system and downplay the importance of cooperation (Axelrod, Keohane 1985; Keohane, Nye 1987; Fukuyama 1992; 2016; Nye 2010). Neoliberals define security in a broader way compared to realists, emphasizing economic development, trade, welfare, environmental issues. They focus strongly on institution-building, creation of international regimes that bring absolute and not relative gains. In the neoliberal paradigm, nation-states are important but international organizations, transnational corporations, non-governmental organizations play important role. Contrary to realists / neorealists, liberals / neoliberals consider international organizations actors in themselves, not merely instruments of nation-states. This school of international relations has been strongly influenced by the new institutional economics, in particular borrowing the concepts of transactions costs and agency problem to explain the functioning of international institutions and their effects, like in the theory of international regimes (Keohane, 1984)11.
Keohane and Nye (1977; 1987) wrote extensively on complex interdependence arguing that dynamics of international relations come from various sources and involve multifaceted interactions. These authors criticize realism in particular for underscoring the role of institutions, processes, rules and norms.
One of the major contemporary representatives of neo-liberalism, Francis Fukuyama in his recent interview12 and in some of his written works13 has commented on China's contemporary role. He argues that China has started to play a prominent role due to its economic growth. He also says that China's political system is fundamentally different from totalitarianism of the 20th century, but it does not mean that China's political system is not a challenge to the international system. Reflecting neo-liberalism attention to domestic institutions and their effects on foreign policy, Fukuyama notes that Chinese military sometimes is more aggressive than Chinese civilian leadership, for example, in South China Sea. China, according to Fukuyama, represents a high quality authoritarian system without institutional checks and balances. This kind of system can outperform democracy in the short run because good technocrats can make quick decisions about, for example, investments and push forward economic development. Currently, China may rely on constant supply of good leaders but the trend of good leaders can break down. In the long term, an accountable system with democratic institutional checks and balances would generate a more cooperative China, which would be a reliable partner for the US.
In his recent interview to a Chinese news outlet14, Joseph Nye claimed that USA and China are going through a difficult time, but the trade war is not the only issue. Nye does not think that China and USA are destined to war or even a Cold War. It is essential that USA and China manage to cooperate, because the US cannot solve environmental, financial, and other problems without China and neither can China do it by itself15. Overall, neo-liberalism would generally access that while USA and China are not currently on most friendly terms,
11 There are some close parallels to this line of research in the new institutional economics; see, for instance, Nureev & Busygin (2019).
12 "China will not dominate the world" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TxaYgko3sZc), accessed on November 11, 2019
13 See, for instance, Fukuyama (2016).
14 Interview with J. Nye on US-China relations and soft power (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CmXeXlisTU8&t=56s), filmed in January 2019, accessed on October 30, 2019.
15 See also Nye (2010).
they will continue to cooperate in the future, especially on transnational issues, as it is in their direct interests to solve together problems of a global nature.
Neo-Marxism/World Systems Theory perspective
Marxism / Neo-Marxism and other schools of similar line of critical thought focus on why so many countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa cannot develop economically. They postulate that the cause is in the patterns of global exploitation and systemic domination inherent in capitalism. The most famous contemporary scholar of inequality effects of global capitalism is Immanuel Wallerstein (1976; 1984; 2010). Wallerstein has developed a theory of world capitalist development in order to explain this phenomenon. There are several basic assumptions in this paradigm: individual states and other actors operate is the context of global system; using historic analysis, neo-marxism determines that modern global system is capitalism, a specific economic system that benefits some actors at the expense of others; there are special mechanisms of domination that preserve uneven economic development in the world; economic factors are key for explaining the evolution and working of the global capitalist system.
Marxists / neomarxists examine institutions, actors and processes within and between states although still placing the priority role on the context, the world capitalist system. The representatives of this school have been directly or indirectly influenced by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (Marx, Engels 1968) with their focus on class conflict. In the international relations, the predecessor of contemporary neomarxism is Hobson (although he was a nonMarxist), who claimed that imperialism was a major cause of war and capitalists profit from such conflicts (Hobson, 1965) and Lenin and his 'Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism' (Lenin, 1967).
Economic exploitation of the least developed countries by the developed countries is not an accident as the exploitation is a natural part of the capitalist economic system. This results in the so-called dependency, when poor countries find their economies dependent on the expansion of developed countries. Some of the dependency theorists claim that the relations between states create transnational class coalitions between elites in the developed (center) and less developed world (periphery). Transnational corporations and multilateral lending institutions (such as World Bank and IMF) are the agents of the international bourgeoisie; they are critical means by which the periphery is kept on the outskirts16.
The world system theory takes a lot from the dependency theory but expands it in several important ways. Its proponents want to understand not only the lack of economic development in poor countries but also the economic, political and social development of the world to explain the global nature of uneven development; they also aim at understanding the place of various parts of the world at various periods in history (Amin, 1977; 2010; 2013; Wallerstein, 1976; 1984; 2010). The proponents of this view argue that in order to understand global economic, political and social processes, one should examine the development of capitalism. It is important to assess capitalism as a historically expanding system. All international and domestic institutions of the modern world exist to promote capitalist world system. The world exists in the situation of an institutional 'lock-in'17.
World systems theorists recognize the existence of political anarchy in the international political system. For them, the economic ramifications of political anarchy are paramount as it facilitates the expansion of world capitalist system as no single state can control world economy.
In his latest interviews, Wallerstein18 argues that we are facing a systemic crisis of global capitalist system. As it is falling apart, chaotic fluctuations in geo-politics and economics
16 See, for instance, Caporaso (1978), Cardoso (1973).
17 See, for instance, Khalil (2013).
18 "The global systemic crisis and the struggle for a post-capitalist world. Interview with Wallerstein" (https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=riK3dlgusrI&t=1252s), accessed on November 11, 2019.
occur. Wallerstein also argues that there is also a decline of the US hegemony in the world. Thus, according to neomarxism, on the one hand the opportunities for the rise of China and the rise of the BRICS are being created by the decline of the US. Yet, it would a mistake to assume that as a former hegemon (USA) declines, another hegemon (China) will necessarily rise and capture power. Historically it takes 100 or more years for a state to become a hegemon and at present the capitalist system itself is declining, hence China's hegemony is far from certain. States (USA and China alike), however, still act within the restraints of the declining capitalist system, thus competing with each other, which the current trade war exemplifies.
Constructivism perspective
Constructivism is another critical approach in international relations but at present it is not a single theory. There are many versions of it, but what is common for them is the realization that international politics are socially constructed and the structures both shape and are shaped by actors' identities and interests19.
Constructivists argue that structure is made of social relationships and that social structures have three elements: shared knowledge, material resources, and practice (Wendt, 1995). Alexander Wendt identifies several key constructivists' assumptions: first, social structures are defined, in part, by shared understandings, expectations, or knowledge. A security dilemma, for example, is a social structure composed of intersubjective understandings in which states are so distrustful that they make worst-case assumptions about each others' intentions, and as a result define their interests in self-help terms (Wendt, 1995, p. 73); second, material capabilities only matter in the context of shared knowledge, for example, military capabilities of your perceived friend would be defensive, while those of a perceived enemy would be offensive; third, social structures exist, not in actors' heads nor in material capabilities, but in practices (Wendt, 1995, p. 74).
In one of the most influential recent theoretical works of contemporary constructivism, Adler (2019) examines what he calls a cognitive evolution: constructivist social and normative theory of change and stability in international politics (Adler uses term international social orders). This fundamental work examines practices and knowledge behind these practices and analyzes how social orders evolve and why there are transformations from one social order to another.
Another major scholar, Ted Hopf20 has contributed to constructivism in international relations in two major ways by extensively studying practices and background knowledge as well as analyzing competing identities. He has brought the state back in by outlining the importance of domestic factors for understanding international structures. He also advocates involving many various interpretation methods in his research. In his recent talk at the European University of St. Petersburg on "The Rise of China and its regional hegemonic prospects" 21 Ted Hopf refers to the previous work of himself together with Vucetic (Vucetic, Hopf, 2018), where they 'argued that the rise of China was unlikely to be accompanied by Chinese hegemony because of the distribution of identities among the world's great powers' as China's 'authoritarian capitalism' (Hopfs term) does not resonate with the majority of great powers. Hopf has conducted a study of China's neighbors and found out that most Chinese neighbors are willing to balance against China's regional rise as China's hegemonic project is incompatible with their national identities (Hopf, Bentley, 2016). Wohlforth (1999) has argued that as China rises, its regional neighbors will be balancing against its rise as a regional hegemon and it is great news for the West as all it has to do is to sell weapons and watch this rivalry.
19 See Ruggie (1998), Finnemore (1996), Finnemore & Jurkovich (2014), Finnermore & Barnett (2004); Wendt (1987; 1992; 1995).
20 See Hopf (1998; 2005; 2009; 2010; 2013), Hopf & Bentley, Eds. (2016).
21 "The rise of China and its regional hegemonic prospects" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XHHJ12ZVYac), accessed on November 11, 2019.
Constructivists pay attention to the interplay of domestic and international norms, values and perceptions, and the way it influences states' interaction (Finnermore, 1996). This acknowledgment of the role of values and perceptions in explaining behavior of an otherwise rational actor is very reminiscent of the rhetoric of the new institutional economics22.
According to Vucetic & Hopf (2018), the key to understand the relations between USA and China lies in the fact that two countries have different identities and treat each other accordingly. China identifies itself as developing country but also a rising great power and modernizing, etc. One of the tools it can use to rise is to play on other countries' rejection of USA identity as a global hegemon. China can identify itself with countries that also call themselves developing and argue against USA and its allies' economic dominance. In the UN General Assembly China votes as a block with developing countries, while USA in general votes against the developing countries. China also presents an anti-colonial identity as well as more socialist identity that can also be appealing to a number of countries. According to constructivism, elites are generally very good in stressing one identity category. Hopf presents a study to show that in the UN General Assembly in most of the cases over decades USA is voting in its own league, separately from others, whereas China votes with Belarus and North Korea, which demonstrates differences in their identities even further. China votes in UN General Assembly against Israel, whereas USA votes always for Israel. China votes for arms control, USA votes against arms control.23
According to constructivism, the differences in the US and China's self-identification are the key to understanding their relations. From the constructivist point of view, America's self-understanding as the liberal democratic leader of the world would not allow US to concede to China's rise giving Chinese 'authoritative capitalism' self-identification. The current crisis between the two countries from the constructivist point of view is a demonstration of the importance of inter-subjective nature of the relations.
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The identification of specific paradigms of international relations within the body of relevant academic literature and policy rhetoric is virtually always a generalization and thus, at least to some extent, a simplification. A policymaker's actions may be based on a variety of conscious beliefs and convictions as well as on unconscious motives, unique to the specific individual and situation. When referring to a particular paradigm of international relations in describing somebody's words and steps, one should realize that the most that can be said usually is whether these look rational or not from the perspective of a specific paradigm; inner motives and rationale of the individual involved is something that is beyond the scope of social science. Nevertheless, the knowledge about modern paradigms of international relations is useful and even necessary for correct interpretation of the academic discourse on the matter, as well as of the policy advice offered by the academic and expert community to policymakers.
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22 See, for instance, Raskov (2010).
23 Ibidem.
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Hopf, T.(2013). Common-sense constructivism and hegemony in world politics // International Organization, 67 (2), 317-354.
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Amin, S. (2013). The Implosion of Contemporary Capitalism. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Axelrod, R., Keohane, R. (1985). Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions. World Politics, 38 (1), 226-254.
Bergsten, C. (2005). The United States and the world economy: foreign economic policy for the next decade. Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Caporaso, J. (1978). Dependence, dependency and power in the global system: a structural and behavioral analysis. International Organization, 32 (1), 13-44.
Cardoso, F. (1973). Imperialism and dependency in Latin America. In: Bonilla F. and Girling R. (Eds.). Structures of Dependency. Stanford, CA: Stanford Institute of Political Studies.
Carr, E.H. (1946). The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939. London: Macmillan.
Finnemore, M. (1996). National interests in international society. New York: Cornell University Press.
Finnemore, M., Barnett, M. (2004). Rules for the world: international organizations in global politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Finnemore, M., Jurkovich, M. (2014). Getting a seat at the table: the origins of universal participation in modern multilateral conferences. Global Governance, 20 (3), 361-373.
Fukuyama, F. (2016). Reflections on Chinese governance. Journal of Chinese Governance, 1 (3), 379-391.
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Wallerstein, I. (2010). Structural crises. New Left Review, 62, 133-142. Wallerstein, I. (1984). The politics of world economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Waltz, K. (2000). Structural realism after Cold War. International Security, 25 (1), 5-41. Waltz, K. (1988). The origins of war in neo-realist theory. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. XVIII, no. 4, 615-628.
Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of international politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Waltz, K. (1959). Man, the state and war. New York: Columbia University Press. Wang, D. (2013). US-China trade, 1971-2012: Insights into the U.S.-China relationship. The Asia-Pacific Journal, 11, issue 24, no. 4, 1-15.
Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. International Organization, 46 (2), 391-425.
Wendt, A. (1987). The agent-structure problem in international relations theory. International Organization, 41(3), 335-370.
Wendt, A. (1995). Constructing international politics. International Security, 20 (1), 71-81.
Williamson, C. (2009). Informal Institutions Rule: Institutional Arrangements and Economic Performance. Public Choice, 139, 371-387.
Williamson, O. (2000). The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead. Journal of Economic Literature, 38 (3), 595-613.
Wilson, W. (1918). President Woodrow Wilson 14 points, The Avalon Project. Yale University. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp, accessed 08.11.2019.
Wohlforth, W. (1999). The stability of a unipolar world. International Security, 24 (1), 5-41.
