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The contents of the opposition's discourses on the North Caucasus as one of the most important region of the country correspond to the geopolitical traditions in views on the foreign policy priorities. The "internal" geopolitical discourse of western liberals on the Caucasus corresponds to western traditions, the official discourse -corresponds to state prevalence direction, the left and national-patriotic discourse - consequently corresponds to non-Communist, radical-expansionist and ground discourse.
At the same time, the consensus of all political forces exists on a certain position. Experts agree that at the present stage the key role in stabilization of the situation is played by economy: the region is in great need of investments and new jobs. Most experts also think that the North Caucasus is an integral part of Russia. Its disintegration will mean the start of disintegration of the whole Russian state. Therefore it can not admit victory of radical forces. In the geopolitical discourse of at least a part of opposition there is a trend to opposition of northern "Russians" to southern "national" regions of the North Caucasus in terms of cultural-historic peculiarities. This trend reflects the actual processes of social-economic polarization of its territory and objectively contradicts declarations on the needs in integration.
"Naselenie Yuga Rossii: transformatsiya vosproizvodstva naseleniya i obraza zhizni v novyh geopoliticheskih usloviyah", Stavropol, 2009, p. 38-52.
L. Timofeenko,
publicist
TURKMENISTAN: ROUTE DIVERSIFICATION OF ENERGY RESOURCE EXPORT
The Caspian-Central Asian region is in the spotlight of the leading world states by virtue of rich hydrocarbon raw materials
reserves and advantageous geopolitical situation. They consider the region states as the most important suppliers of energy resources, especially Turkmenistan. The main orientations of policy are energetic raw materials volume production increasing and establishing direct contacts with the buyers of the Turkmen energy resources. Ashkhabad seeks to be as the largest supplier of hydrocarbons; it would allow it not only to strengthen its positions at the world market of energy carriers but to extend its influence in Near-Caspian and Central-Asian region.
Having declared its intention of "many export variances" policy-making Turkmenistan refused definitely from isolationism policy the former leadership of the country observed and made its foreign-policy strategy more active. Positioning itself as the independent supplier of "blue fuel" Ashkhabad counts on additional investments get involved into fuel-energetic sector as the regional and non-regional states besides a competition for the right of developing oil and gas fields at the territory of the country show heightened interest to the new pipeline building where hydrocarbon feedstock must be supplied on the foreign markets. The Turkmen leadership has to take into account that the major energetic project implementation will entail the possibility of geopolitical rivalry worsening about Turkmenistan between the world centers of the force.
Turkmenistan takes the third place among the near-Caspian states according to liquid and gaseous hydrocarbon reserves and it creates conditions to organize a large transport - energetic junction at its territory. The following trends of transit-transport infrastructure developing are the most perspective for Ashkhabad:
- the northern one supposing a modernization of the existing main "Central Asia-Center" (CAC) and also the Near-Caspian gas main building;
- the eastern one including the Trans-Eurasian corridor to supply raw materials along gas main "Turkmenistan-China";
- the western one where one considers a possibility to build the Trans-Caspian gas main with a subsequent joining to the project "Nabukko";
- the southern one supposing energy feedstock supplies increasing in Iran by putting additional branch of the pipeline Dovletabat-Serakhs-Khangeran into operation but in perspective - the Trans-Afghan pipeline building.
Turkmenistan seeks to weaken the dependence on the Russian system of pipelines. For that purpose official Ashkhabad seeks within the bounds of its long-term strategy, firstly, to expand a circle of investors in the energetic sector to form a networked transit-transport system and implement state-of-the- art technologies for developing fields and a primary processing of natural resources; secondly, to develop capacities of thermal energetic complex in order to increase volumes of hydrocarbon production for satisfying of the needs of world energetic feedstock importers; thirdly, to initiate a renewed system of the relation forming in the world energetic sector allowing to implement some energetic projects in future under the aegis of UNO.
However, the Russian orientation will play the key role in fuel-energetic strategy of the republic in the medium-term perspective. It is caused by some reasons:
- firstly, the existing system of pipelines between the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan is the most convenient route of the Turkmen gas transportation for the world markets;
- secondly, "Turkmengas" and "Gasprom" are bound by the contract for the Turkmen gas purchase in volume of about 30 milliards cubic meters annually;
- thirdly, Russia seeks to hold its ground of the main transiter of the Turkmen gas in Europe and makes attempts to eliminate unbalance between economic and geopolitical component of a contract;
- fourthly, it would take some time for bringing the projects on export diversification implemented by Turkmenistan to design output in order to hold partnerships between Moscow and Ashkhabad.
Having signed the treaty with Russia and Kazakhstan in 2007 (assuming a possibility for Uzbekistan's joining to it) on the Near-Caspian gas pipeline building Turkmenistan expects to supply up to 30 milliards cbm of gas annually in the Russian direction. Within the framework of the given project one also assumes to reconstruct the pipeline "Central Asia-Center" where there was an accident on April 2009 entailing stopping of the Turkmen gas deliveries along this main. The Russian-Turkmen relations were negatively influenced by this accident. The parties couldn't come to agreement concerning terms and volumes of deliveries resumption and pricing for gas. Only in December 2009 the leaders of Russia and Turkmenistan came to accommodation on gas-transport transit resumption. One should note that the periodical contradictions between Turkmenistan and the Russian holding in spite of the political will of the parties put obstacles in the way of the Near-Caspian pipeline building. Ashkhabad's actions are dictated by its desire to carry out independent energetic policy. The fact that in October 2009 Turkmenistan declared its intention to put a ban on fuel re-export in order to sell natural gas directly testifies it. However, this variant isn't convenient for Russia as the costs on natural gas deliveries for the users in Europe will be considerably increased.
One should note that the republic leadership doesn't find external economic relations development only in the Russian direction reasonable. So, this explains a desire for route diversification of energy feedstock export. In December 2009 a transcontinental gas pipeline
"Central Asia-China" was put into operation. The length of gastransport artery build at the territory of four states (Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and China) is more than 7000 km. Turkmenistan will supply up to 40 milliards cbm of gas in China annually during 30 years according to concluded contract. Usage of pipeline capacity will be provided for the account of natural gas of the fields "Samandep" and "Altyn asyr" at the first stage. In near future the Chinese national oil and gas corporation (CNPC) will produce raw materials on the field "Bagtyyarlyk" on the right riverside of Amu Darya. It's clear that a cooperation of Ashkhabad with Peking can bring to strained competition for the Turkmen energy resources. However, one shouldn't the Russian position relaxing in the energetic sector in the short-term perspective.
Heightened China's interest for a trade-economic cooperation with Turkmenistan coincided with Ashkhabad's plans on diversification of external contacts of the republic. The financial activity stirring of the Chinese business-community must strengthen China's economic penetration in Turkmenistan and ensure its access to natural resources of the Caspian Sea. In its turn, the European states are also interested in oil and gas resources of the Near-Caspian region. One of the important policy elements of Ashkhabad on gas and oil transport system of the country is the western sector of the Turkmen hydrocarbons transportation. Many European companies including the Belgian "ENEX Process Engineering SA" and the German "RWE DEA AG" having concluded the agreement lately on the participation in hydrocarbon resource development of the Turkmen shelf of the Caspian region are also interested in the Turkmen energy resources. The gas pipeline "Nabukko" lobbied for by the western countries is a continuation of the large-scale previous European projects on pipeline building for the Central-Asian and the Caspian energy carriers delivery
on the world markets. Natural gas delivery to the terminals in Azerbaijan is also a problem. At the present no potential projects on the Turkmen gas transportation to energy centers in Baku satisfy to the necessary geopolitical and economic conditions.
The trans-Caspian pipeline. The Russian Federation interferes with this project implementation regarding this route as anti-Russian; there are some complications because of the Caspian Sea status uncertainty and mutual claims of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan relatively the Caspian shelf delimitation.
The trans-Iranian pipeline. The western countries and first of all, USA, don't support the variant to use gas-transport system of Iran for the Turkmen energy resources transit because of differences on the Iranian nuclear program and also geopolitical rivalry in the Middle East.
Liquefied gas delivery by the sea. The necessary financial costs to modernize the port terminals and also to buy expensive equipment cause non-profitability of the given project in comparison with a pipelining variant.
The uncertainty of the international-legal status of the Caspian water body and also the possible ecological risks make the gas main building along the Caspian Sea bottom which could ensure "Nabukko"s usage of capacity, however, it is considered by EU as one of the key routes the European countries could have energetic feedstock in spite of the difficulties associated with this pipeline building. Turkmenistan's leadership plans to increase energy resources delivery in the Iranian sector within the framework of strategy on diversification of energy resources export. The leadership of the country made a decision to increase deliveries of natural gas in Iran. The parties signed the agreement where the prices and the order of the Turkmen natural gas selling in Iran were regulated. In June 2009 Ashkhabad and Teheran
agreed to increase deliveries up to 14 milliards cbm gas in a year and also to build a new gas pipeline. These measures were regarded by the leadership of the republic as one of the optimal variants to stabilize the situation in the energetic sector of Turkmenistan ensuring a complete selling of produced fuel off after gas delivery stopping in the Russian sector.
Teheran's interest in cooperation with Ashkhabad in the energetic field is caused by that the additional Turkmen gas deliveries are very important for the northern-eastern oblast development of the Islamic Republic Iran. Besides, a pipelining transport infrastructure expansion corresponds to Iran's policy supposing a consolidation of the transit country status for a transportation of the Central-Asian energy carriers for the West. Turkmenistan is guided by , first of all, economic reasonability in mutual relations with the Islamic republic Iran. In case of the Iran-American and the Iran-European relation stabilization Ashkhabad will more substantially estimate the perspectives to use the territories of IRI for transit-transport routes building on the Turkmen energy feedstock in the countries of Europe. However, until the present the Geneva negotiations with the participation of USA, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China (the countries of the "group of six") didn't bring to mutually acceptable solving the problem of the Iranian nuclear program. The possibilities for a further expansion of energetic cooperation between Ashkhabad and Teheran are limited by no progress in the negotiations on the nuclear program.
The southern route of the Turkmen energy feedstock export also includes the Trans-Afghan gas pipeline. The countries participating in the project confirm their interest in its implementation. However, the situation about this transport main became complicated from the moment of having signed the agreement on pipeline building "Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India" (TAPI) by the presidents
of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkmenistan in Islamabad in 2002 and the Framework agreement on the Trans-Afghan gas pipeline building in 2008. The movement "Taliban" became more active in the frontier territories with Pakistan and the armed conflicts with the soldiers became more frequent in the northern areas of Afghanistan so security measures for a possible energetic corridor are put into the agenda. The political instability of the ruling regimes in Afghanistan and Pakistan strengthens the economic risks associated with gas pipeline building. The Asiatic bank of the development being one of the main sponsors of the project continues to search for potential investors testifying to the effect that there are problems on cover of expenditure of the TransAfghan pipeline building. So, one can't begin to work out concrete plans on a project implementation because of some problems. One should underline that it's possible to realize the project "TAPI" only in that case if a gas pipeline will be built under patronage of the international structures having the authority to solve the problems on the security measures of energy-carrying systems effectively. Turkmenistan supports just such initiative suggesting to adopt the international document on energy carrier transit. In this case some potential suppliers of hydrocarbons including the countries of Central Asia can join the Trans-Afghan project.
Turkmenistan has to face with some geopolitical and economic problems holding a line of transportation route diversification of hydrocarbons. First of all, Ashkhabad purposefully works upon to make the energetic complex of the country independent on transittransport system of the Russian Federation and to provide energy feedstock selling on alternative routes of selling off. The British company Gaffney, Cline & Associates released some numbers on studies of gas reserves of the Turkmen field "The Southern Iolotan'-Osman" being the fourth/fifth in the world and it makes Ashkhabad's
intentions actual on diversification of the feedstock delivery routes and confirms advisability of the potential projects for gas pipeline building from the Caspian region.
"Rossia I novye gosudarstva Evrazii", M, 2010, NII, p. 93-100.
Nurbek Atakanov, cand. of sciences (economy) WATER AND ENERGETIC PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL ASIA
There are two states in Central Asia - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan being in the zone of water river flowing forming and transit where almost 85% of water resources of Central Asia are concentrated but the other states - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are located in the zone of river flowing dispersing and transit. This location causes many discussions concerning this flowing use in two aspects - as watering and hydropower resource. During the soviet time when there was a single energetic system of Central Asia this problem was centralized; during a vegetation period a priority was for water as a watering resource under conditions of risky agriculture to the detriment of generation of electricity with subsequent compensation of potential losses by the other types of energy sources (coal, gas and others). Uzbekistan and Tajikistan supplied hydrocarbon fuel (coal, gas, fuel oil and etc.) in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan incurring losses because of routine outflow of water for irrigation during the vegetation period without the volume of water piling up for the winter regime of hydroelectric power plant operation.
