CC BY
14DOI: 10.46991/JQFS/2023.2.4.070
Transformations of the Ideology of Nation-Building and State-Building in Armenia: Phenomenon of Integrity of
Nation and State
Ashot Yengoyan* Yerevan State University
Abstract
The article deals with the issues of creating a new national ideology in the conditions of statebuilding in modern Armenia. The discourse of political actors on the role of national ideology, which is divided, is analyzed comparatively. This article attempts to reveal the main reasons why some believe that in modern Armenian society, based on the principles of political and ideological pluralism, there should be no ideology that claims to be national. On the contrary, the adherents of the creation of a national ideology see it as an important tool for the consolidation of the Armenian society.
The author comes to the conclusion that the collapse of the USSR and the Soviet ideology led to the fact that the role of ideology was criticized. The article touches upon the topic that since 1991, the process of de-ideologization of society and public institutions began in Armenia. However, in reality, the ideological confrontation between the various actors of the Armenian transit society intensified. Since 1988, the topic of the national ideology of Armenia has been one of the key topics of interdisciplinary research.
Keywords: new national ideology, ideological confrontation, ideological renaissance, political pluralism, nationalism, Armenian transit society, political struggle.
Introduction
The complication of social life leads to a variety of different manifestations of ideology, when it appears before us in the form of peculiar, but resilient formations that
* Ashot Yengoyan is a Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor of the Chair of Political Science of the Faculty of International Relations at the Yerevan State University. Email: ashotyengoyan@ysu.am. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2767-9389.
Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University, Vol. 2 (1(4)), May Received: 16.04.2023
2023. Pp. 70-101 ' Revised: 02.05.2023
l^jKg Accepted: 04.05.2023
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial © The Author(s) 2023 4.0 International License.
reflect the new needs of social development. The constitution of national ideology as a real force in modern social and political transformations is quite logical, since in connection with the aggravation of geopolitical conflicts, a true ideological renaissance is observed, which is expressed not so much in the emergence of new ideological systems, but in the growth of the influence of old ideologies. This circumstance is connected with the rapid growth of the national self-consciousness of the peoples involved not only in the process of democratization of their societies, but also in the deepening globalization processes, as well as the ethnic paradoxes of our time (Cox 2021, 39-45; Kellas 1998, 27-32).
Nationalism prepares the necessary ground for the formation of a national ideology. It acts as a political doctrine that requires ideological justification. National ideology, just like nationalism, is aimed at creating the necessary conditions for the political self-determination of the nation. This is the main similarity between both phenomena (Cox 2021, 46-48; Kellas 1998, 189-208). The presence of a national movement of its own ideology greatly facilitates and accelerates the process of successful national and political mobilization and is often its necessary prerequisite. Ideology helps to delineate and define the politicized sphere of national identity, reinforce national demands with moral justification, give the political activity of the movement a meaning and purpose that take on a special meaning that transcends the needs of everyday existence. In general, the national ideology is designed to form the beliefs of the representatives of this national community and orient them in the social and political space (Zajda and Vissing 2022, 1-8; Rodrigues and Cabete 2022, 55-63).
At the same time, it should be noted that a certain difference remains between nationalism and national ideology, which is expressed both in the content and in the functional understanding of these phenomena. The first of them is, although meaningful, but still a political action, the second is a conceptual and theoretical substantiation of this action. The national ideology is a kind of reflection on nationalism, on national and patriotic feelings and on the desire for political action of the representatives of this nation (Kellas 1998, 129-151; Hutchinson 2003, 71-92).
Nationalism manifests itself mainly at the level of consciousness of the nation, while the national ideology at the level of self-consciousness of the nation (Zartman 2019, 379-382). At the same time, these phenomena are closely interconnected and influence each other. Thus, the national ideology is formed on the basis of nationalism and, at the same time, directs it. Nationalism and national ideology coexist as it happens in general between political practice and ideology. Despite the fact that they enjoy some independence, neither politics nor ideology can exist in isolation. Nationalism and national ideology, being multi-level phenomena, may undergo some self-correction as a result of changes in the social situation (Steber 2012, 25-31; Schoch 2007, 42-50). However, this does not mean that the process of mutual enrichment of these phenomena stops. On the contrary, they continue to interact and improve, adapting to the surrounding social and political reality, to its urgent tasks.
Relationship between national ideology and political orientation
The concept of national ideology is sometimes identified with the concept of nationalism. The national ideology, being determined by social existence, often acquires independence, which is essentially associated with the position of the actor and carrier of this ideology of the nation, with the essence of the problems and tasks facing it, and its ability to realize its social and political guidelines (Paic 2022; Riabchuk 2023; Cushing 2022). In this regard, if classical ideologies focus on the problems of social content, then the national ideology focuses primarily on resolving national problems. At certain historical stages, it has more opportunities to objectively reflect the interests of a particular community than classical ideologies. For them, society, sometimes identified with public authority, is considered a priority, while for a national ideology, the nation is a priority.
Since the end of the 19th century, after the completion of the stage of creating nation-states, the West entered a new phase of development. Having significantly strengthened economically, the West presents its ideological system as the only possible way of progress, as well as a general civilizational political ideal (Kymlicka 2003, 145-151; Bechhofer and McCrone 2009, 189-205). Moreover, using various financial, economic, ideological, political and other means of pressure, the West seeks to spread its values among the developing nations. This is facilitated by the issues of the emergence of a national ideology with the modernization processes taking place in Europe in the 18th-19th centuries.
Eurocentrism in the scientific research of Western researchers prevents them from giving an objective assessment of the history of many countries and peoples that fall out of this context and follow their own special path. Thus, according to Francois Furet, the emergence of an ideology is inextricably linked, firstly, with revolutionary consciousness or the process of modernization; secondly, with the politicization of all moral and intellectual issues; thirdly, with education as propaganda; fourthly, with the activities of the revolutionaries in European countries. According to Furet, it was the French who discovered democratic politics used as a national ideology. He argues that it is a matter of national ideology. And he connects this with the fact that the already formed nation acted as the referent of ideology in France (Furet 1998, 34; Scott 1991). Under these conditions, the desire of economically developed countries to spread their political ideals in various regions of the planet is understandable. However, it should be noted that such actions, taking place without taking into account the interests of the so-called uncivilized nations, become the reason for the reverse processes of rejection of all Western values, which is also inappropriate for national progress (Arthur 2022, 1-9; Cooley 2020).
The movement from the sacralization of national characteristics through the ideologization and politicization of the nation to the mobilization of its bearers is largely the result of the activities of national elites and is mainly manifested during periods of social stress and aggravation of intergroup rivalry. In such situations, national leaders very easily manage to convince members of their national community to perceive their destiny in national dimensions, and not in individual or social class ones. Leaders seek to convince the masses that, without national solidarity, their
special group values and interests, as well as their individual aspirations, will be seriously threatened (Malesevic 2006, 204-226; Behrma 1988, 129-131).
The intellectual elite is ideologically activated even in the case when ideological stereotypes that are unusual for a given nation are imposed from outside. However, in the context of globalization, the national elite is obliged to carefully study the imposed values, but not in order to substantiate their inconsistency, and even more so negativity, but to identify significant positive elements of this value system. Only as a result of a creative approach to values that have been proving their viability in Western countries for centuries, as well as their application, taking into account the interests and traditions of the nation, it will be possible to ensure the stability of national progress.
Applied knowledge of theories and assimilation of the experience of other countries is necessary, but only as general ideological and political guidelines, and not as realpolitik, a tool for change. Such a concept can act as such, which proceeds both from general patterns and from the known mechanism of their refraction in specific reality, which appeals not to consciousness in general, but to national consciousness (Blanksten 1967, 3-11). And this, as a research prerequisite, implies a deep theoretical understanding of both national and historical, and cultural and historical development.
The essence, structure, stages of formation and development of the national ideology, as well as the ways and forms of its functioning are directly related to the entire traditional culture. Historical experience, way of life, traditions and customs transmitted by a given culture are the main regulators of the relationship between members of society (Milacic 2022, 7-12; Burrin 2000, 135-140). The very same traditional culture of the people functions through various social institutions, which are entirely dependent on the characteristics of the social organization.
The initial basis for the formation of a national ideology is national consciousness and self-consciousness, which gradually leads to understanding, awareness of the inherent value of a given people or ethnic community. That is why the national ideology acts as the main factor of national self-consciousness and is updated during the period of aggravation of the political struggle, economic and social crisis (Tirtosudarmo 2018, 102-105). Like any ideology, a national ideology begins with knowledge of processes that are of public or group interest.
In the national ideology, along with values, the feelings and expectations of the nation, its worldview in relation to their expediency and the possibilities of preserving spirituality and its further existence are closely intertwined. The functioning of the national ideology is strongly influenced by religious values, or rather, their rooting in national self-consciousness. All this allows us to conclude that the national ideology is an important factor in national identification, the highest form of national self-consciousness and a means of integrating the representatives of the nation into a single viable integrity that exists in specific historical conditions (Linz 1993).
According to some researchers, the national ideology performs a number of fundamentally important functions for the process of ethnopolitical mobilization. First, it is a systematized set of articulated beliefs that define collective identity and membership criteria, emphasize the common interests of group members, and identify outsiders who challenge or hinder the exercise of the nation's legitimate rights. As a rule, the ideologists of national movements emphasize the common interests of all
members of the group and, consequently, the need for the unity of their thoughts and actions. At the same time, social differences existing within the nation are obscured in the face of a common threat perceived by all members of the group and ideas about the commonality of their destinies. Secondly, the national ideology explains and justifies the need for the movement, substantiates the significance of the political struggle waged by the movement, and interprets participation in it as a national value. Thirdly, the national ideology sets the vision of the final successful result of the movement, which justifies the price of participation in it. Fourth, the external function of the national ideology is to create and project a certain image of the movement and its demands to outsiders, including the government and foreign audiences.
Obviously, the definition of the essence of national ideology through its connection with a particular society does not always sound convincing. At the same time, many researchers focus on the existence of statehood as an institution that regulates the functioning of society, that is, in practice, they equate society with the state. From the point of view of the historical past of European countries, such a formulation of the question certainly has the right to exist, since it logically substantiates the processes of the emergence of national ideologies in Europe (Connor 1972). However, in this case, not only the multifaceted nature and versatility of ideology is significantly narrowed, but also the social and group essence of this phenomenon is relegated to the background.
The possibilities of such an approach are clearly insufficient when considering the history of those countries and peoples that have been deprived of political independence for hundreds of years. In such conditions, not social and historical, but historical, national and cultural characteristics come to the fore in the study of ideology (Doli 2019, 3-7; Jude 2020, 92-100). This circumstance in no way testifies to the opposition of the public to the national. Both of these phenomena always act as different sides, or even levels or beginnings, of a single historical process. Here we can only talk about the predominance of one or another of the principles within the framework of a single whole, and then under certain historical conditions (social, political crises, loss of statehood, etc.). If we proceed from the position according to which the understanding of the public is correlated with the understanding of the state, then in the absence of a state, one can only conditionally assert the existence of society (Takagi, Kanchoochat and Sonobe 2019, 3-9).
The presence of a society among nations and peoples deprived of statehood is most often mentioned in ethnographic and cultural literature. However, many researchers, using the concept of society, invest in it a completely different content. In most cases, this concept includes a sociological component, and it is used to characterize social or specific ethnic communities. However, the concept of society implies the existence of state and political structures, a system of legal norms that establish social relations within the state and ensure its functional integrity.
The situation changes radically when a certain people is included in some foreign state. Having lost statehood, this nation becomes part of a foreign society, subject to the existing order, social, political, public and economic relations, legal and legislative systems, and others. It is clear that the military and political seizure of the country does not directly lead to the destruction of all types of traditionally formalized relations
(Myerson 2014, 175-180). It depends on many factors, such as the strength of the traditions of the subject peoples, the level of development of their spiritual culture, the degree of rootedness in the national consciousness and self-awareness of ideas about the significance of state and political entities in ensuring the self-preservation of the nation, the level of its spiritual and political maturity and activity. An example is, for example, the history of the Armenian people, which over the centuries has proved its ability to survive by enriching its spiritual culture and launching a national liberation struggle under conditions of the most severe exploitation by foreign conquerors. In such cases, it would be more correct to speak not about the existence of a society or a social community, but about a nation or a national community. It is these concepts that can be considered as initial in the process of studying the historical past of such peoples as the Armenian. It is known that in certain periods of history (Ayrarat Kingdom, Artashesians, Arshakuni, Bagratuni, Cilician Armenian Kingdom) Armenia was a strong centralized state (Payaslian 2007, 53-75, 77-100). It is clear that in this case I can confidently assert the existence of the Armenian society from the point of view of the sociological approach. In addition, it is known that after the loss of statehood, being part of the Roman, Byzantine empires, the Iranian kingdom and the Arab Caliphate, various parts of the former Armenia often enjoyed autonomy, and in some cases, complete independence. In a number of cases, these autonomies even acquired the features of statehood (as happened during the existence of the Zakarian principality). However, it is clear that in such cases, only with a high degree of conventionality one has to speak about the presence of an Armenian society and unequivocally use this concept to characterize the true situation of the Armenians.
In the development of all spheres of spiritual life, church, religious, politics and ideological activities of the Armenians, national life acquired great importance. However, at different stages of history, its significance was defined in different ways. In the period from the second century BC to 428, the concept of national existence, with some reservations, coincides with the concept of social existence, which is due to the presence of a centralized state. After the loss of statehood, national existence becomes decisive in the ideological activity of Armenian thinkers. In the first case, the main task and the prevailing idea was to preserve the integrity of the state. In the second, ensuring national unity as a necessary condition for the restoration of their statehood in the future.
The liquidation of the Armenian state forced the Armenian secular and religious figures to think about the preservation in the national consciousness of the desire to doom the new statehood and political independence. They associated the solution of this problem primarily with the assertion of linguistic, ideological and cultural independence and unity. Spiritual identification has become an indirect, and in some cases a direct factor in substantiating the idea of creating an independent state. In the works of Armenian thinkers of the early Middle Ages, for obvious reasons, the general philosophical system is not directly linked to the national existence of Armenians. It only indirectly contributed to the formation of social, philosophical and political views, which were already directly approaching national existence. The development of culture was perceived as an integral part of the general political program of national progress. Armenian thinkers and ideologists successfully used the spiritual factor to
resolve the cardinal problems of national existence, subordinating it to the fundamental national interests. Thanks to such a strategy, many national ideas were fixed in the national consciousness of the Armenian people for a long time.
The cultural and historical existence of each individual nation reflects both the general laws of the development of world culture and the national characteristics of the spiritual sphere. The history of the nation as a carrier of universal human values is likened to the process of enrichment, transformation and concretization of universal historical patterns. Each nation comprehends universal human values in its own way, which determines its place and role in the history of civilizations.
The role and significance of culture in the history of various peoples is immensely great. In the history of some peoples, the cultural factor can also perform such functions as political and ideological. We are talking about the transformation of the cultural factor into a state and political factor, and in the absence of statehood, into a national and political factor. What has been said primarily applies to those nations that have lost their statehood, and not to those who were generally deprived of the opportunity to enjoy political independence by creating their own state.
However, this circumstance is not decisive for the transformation of the cultural factor into a political and ideological one. It is necessary that a nation that has lost its statehood has a powerful spiritual potential that allows not only to fill the vacuum that has arisen after the liquidation of the state, but also to create values that enrich world culture. In this case, we are not talking about cultural policy, but about the political concept of culture. To develop such a concept, a nation must have a high level of social, cultural and political development, as well as a well-formed spectrum of forms of national and social consciousness. The emergence of the political concept of culture, in fact, means the creation of an appropriate national ideology. For a nation that has lost statehood, this means finding ways to give spiritual processes a political content, subordinating the spiritual sphere to the fundamental interests and goals of the nation.
The main goal in this case is to ensure the process of national identification and the assertion of political independence. Any ideology is an ideological system, which is a reflection and theoretical substantiation of reality. Therefore, there can be no eternally unchanging ideologies that, in different periods of history, must measure and update their basic provisions, based on the corresponding changes in real life. This statement also applies to national ideology. Without creative development and self-correction, it can cease to fulfill its main function and thereby lose its relevance or, worse, simply die. In such cases, the functions of ensuring the self-preservation and development of the nation in different historical periods are taken over by religion, or, in general, the culture of the people, with an emphasis on its political component. The thousand-year history of the Armenian people, filled with numerous ups and downs in the social and political life of the people, created the preconditions for such a spasmodic development of the national ideology.
When determining the essence of national ideology, one should also take into account the fact that each community, in the process of crystallization of self-consciousness, forms its own ideas about reality and its own system of values. Such an ideological system in the early stages of its formation cannot yet be identified with ideology. In the early stages of development, the community forms only its own vision
of the world and finds its own distinctive features and characteristics. Such representations are still static in nature, as they are based on the reflection of already established realities. However, in the end, they become constituent elements of the consciousness and self-awareness of the community and can later be transformed into constituent ideologies.
At the beginning of the process of national identification of Armenians, the first ideological ideas appeared, which divided the surrounding communities into friends and foes, and also substantiated the originality, distinctive features and characteristics of the Armenians. This can be judged from ancient Armenian literary sources, such as the legends about Hayk and Bel, Artashes and Artavazd, Ara the Handsome and Shamiram and others. However, this circumstance is not enough to assert the existence of a national ideology. Some researchers, taking into account the ethnic orientation of such works, unreasonably talk about the appearance of such an ideology even at the stage of tribal associations of people. This system, in our opinion, can only be defined as a static value system, emphasizing only the features of the Armenian community and contributing to the formation of the national consciousness of Armenians (Panossian 2006).
Tigran II Artashesyan made the first attempt to formulate a political concept of culture, designed to ensure the progressive development of the Armenian people. During the years of his reign, Armenia faced the following task: being in the area of the Hellenistic world and borrowing a lot from the culture of the Hellenistic countries, to preserve the spiritual and cultural identity of its people. In addition, it was necessary to unite on a single spiritual basis the various peoples and tribes of the sovereign kingdom and form on this basis a single ethno-social community. The way out was found in the creation of such a political concept of culture, which elevated the Hellenization of public life to the rank of state policy. Thus, not only the issue of uniting all the peoples of the kingdom around a strong centralized state was resolved, but also the social and economic progress inherent in all Hellenistic countries was ensured. Common lines of contact between the Armenian and Roman cultures were outlined, which should have contributed to the peaceful political coexistence of the two powers. In general, the policy of protecting Hellenism pursued by Tigran II became a political counterbalance to the expansionist policy of Rome, Romanization. But the main achievement lies in the fact that through the spread of Hellenism, Tigran sought to preserve the Armenian elements of spiritual culture. After all, the process of Hellenization also has the other side of the coin: the peoples involuntarily accentuate their features and differences with the epicenters of Hellenism. Something similar is observed at the present time in the modern world, which is undergoing the processes of globalization.
Unfortunately, Tigran II, like his followers, did not manage to fully realize the intended grandiose program. However, even what he did ensured the inclusion of the country in a number of developed Hellenistic states and completed the process of the formation of Hellenistic traditions in Armenia, which, in one form or another, survived over the following centuries, acting as one of the main cultural, educational and theoretical directions.
The confrontation between two neighboring powerful powers (Rome and Sasanian Iran) that began in the 3rd century AD for dominance in Armenia, which was
strategically important for them, the rooting of feudalism and its attendant fragmentation, the civil strife of the Armenian nakharars, etc. shattered the foundations of statehood. The only real force capable of deterring external aggression was national unity, which could be achieved through a single idea that protected national interests. Such a function could be performed by that ideological system that would combine the ideas of centralized power, state integrity and national identity. Christianity became a similar system for the Armenian people.
The adoption of Christianity in Armenia as the state religion created theoretical prerequisites for ideological distancing from both Iran and Rome, which was pagan at that time. This ensured the ideological and, indirectly, political independence of Armenia, such important conditions for maintaining an independent statehood. The political concept of the Christianization of Armenia was intended to strengthen the shattering state integrity on a single ideological basis and preserve the national identity of the Armenians in a hostile environment.
The political situation in Armenia changed dramatically in 387 after the partition of the country between Iran and Byzantium. Nominally, the kingdom existed in Eastern Armenia until 428. However, it was during this period that the threat of loss of state integrity became a reality. The problems associated with the strengthening of the central government gave way to the more difficult and fateful problem of preserving the identity of the national life, which was aggravated by the growing religious and ideological expansion from outside. The existing ideological system in the form of monotheistic Christianity has not yet had time to fully reveal its potential and has not become a national religion, a single spiritual and ideological force. The main obstacle to the fulfillment of this historical mission was that worship and even propaganda of Christian ideas were not conducted in their native language. In addition, after the division of Armenia, both Iran and Christian Byzantium resumed the policy of ideological and religious assimilation, and above all in the sphere of language policy (Ustyan 2009). Only the creation of national letters could strengthen the position of the Armenian Church. On the one hand, this would create a barrier to the ideological and religious expansion of Iran through the Syriac-speaking Church, on the other hand, it would strengthen the national character of the Armenian Church, providing an opportunity to draw a line on a linguistic basis that separates it from the Greek Church, supported by Byzantium (Ustyan 2009).
This task was brilliantly accomplished by the great educator Mesrop Mashtots in 405. When creating the alphabet, he took into account not only the phonetic features of the Armenian language, but also the ideological and political situation in the country. The alphabet created by Mashtots cannot be reduced to any of the used alphabets either in terms of paradigmatics, or in the sequence of sound units and alphabetic characters, or in the form of writing, or in the names of letters, or in numerical values. He synthesized various principles for constructing the alphabet and writing, creating a qualitatively new alphabet. The invention of the Armenian alphabet created a powerful foundation for the ongoing struggle for spiritual and cultural identity, and through this the struggle for the preservation or restoration of national or state independence (Arevshatyan 1973, 33-34). This cultural and historical act was mediated by the needs of the church and religion, which in turn were the product of a specific political and
ideological situation in the country, being, ultimately, subordinate to the national interests.
The creation of national scripts made it possible to get rid of the dominance of the Greek and Syriac languages, the spiritual, political and ideological influence of the respective Christian churches, which also meant the creation of a kind of cultural barrier to the political and ideological aggression of the powers of Byzantium and Iran behind them. Thanks to this, Christianity in a short historical period has become the dominant national religion, and the church has become the spokesman and defender of national interests. As a result, the further struggle of the Armenian people for the faith and the Christian church was rightfully identified with the struggle for national, state and political independence.
Since the time of Tigran II, the political concepts of Armenian culture have been completely subordinated to the solution of national problems, which, based on the existing realities, have undergone a significant transformation from an imperial orientation to the desire to recreate their statehood and preserve national identity. The significance of these concepts, from the point of view of the formation of a national ideology, comes down to the fact that for a long time they managed to solve a very important problem - to form the national consciousness of the Armenian people. The subsequent development of Armenian culture made it possible to formalize the national identity of the people, one of the manifestations of which is the national ideology.
With the appearance in the 5th century of the works of great Armenian historiographers such as Movses Khorenatsi, Pavstos Byuzand, Agatangeghos, as well as philosophers (Yeznik Koghbatsi and others), the foundation is laid for putting forward a more dynamic value system than the political concept of the culture of national ideology. A special merit in this matter belongs to Khorenatsi. He managed in a brilliant way to embody the idea of turning the cultural factor into a political and ideological one. The fundamental idea of his historical and political concept is the idea that the Armenian people are the same age as the most ancient civilized peoples of the world, the Armenian statehood was formed together with the first states on earth, and its restoration is the natural right of the Armenian people (Mirumyan and Arevshatyan 2007, 260-261).
In various ways and arguments, Khorenatsi proves that the origin of the Armenian people dates back to the Old Testament patriarchs. He tells the story of the heroic deeds of the ancient Armenian leaders and kings, who, at the cost of their own blood, won freedom for themselves and for their people. From them originates the Armenian kingdom, its moral and legal basis. And this means that the Armenian statehood, like the statehood of the most ancient civilized peoples, has a divine origin, fully corresponds to the highest divine law. Therefore, from the point of view of natural law, the Armenian state is lawful and eternal. From this Khorenatsi concludes that the current dependent position of Armenia, the loss of national sovereignty is a historical injustice. Therefore, the restoration of the lost political independence, national statehood is nothing but the assertion of natural justice.
Khorenatsi consistently holds the idea that patriotism and willingness to sacrifice oneself for the sake of the freedom of one's native land are the highest virtues both for leaders and for the whole people. Therefore, as one of the most ancient and civilized
peoples of the world, having won freedom and created its statehood at the dawn of human history, the Armenian people have a natural right to sovereignty and an existence worthy of sovereign peoples. Khorenatsi, in solidarity with the statement of the former Armenian Catholicos Sahak Partev, argues that it is better to have our own, albeit a bad state, than a good one, but someone else's: "Is it possible that I change my sick sheep for a healthy animal, whose very health is a scourge for us." (Khorenatsi 1990, 206).
The political concept of Khorenatsi is not limited to statements about the need to recreate the Armenian state. It also touches on such important topics of national self-preservation as the relationship between the state and the family, the political and legal basis of society, the relationship of the state and people with the church, the problems of war and peace. Khorenatsi is not limited to a simple narration of historical events in the life of the Armenian people. His merit lies not only in this, although many historians tend to consider Khorenatsi precisely as a chronicler, which significantly diminishes his role in the development of the spiritual life of the people.
The main content of his work is that he assesses historical facts through the prism of national interests, while using the historical memory of the people with the sole purpose of strengthening the national consciousness of the Armenian people and directing it to the future, aiming at solving specific national problems. In this regard, Khorenatsi must be considered the founder of the national ideology, which was to play the role of a vector in the development of political reality.
Throughout the history of the Armenian people, there has been a close relationship between the national ideology and the political orientation of the culture of the people, which was often compensated by the performance of ideological functions by the Armenian Gregorian Church. In certain periods of the further development of political reality, each of these phenomena assumed responsibility for the fulfillment of the most important task of the self-preservation of the Armenian people. During this period of Armenian culture, the church began to play the main role in solving this problem. After the abolition of the Armenian kingdom, she took over state and political functions.
For quite real reasons, church, religious, ideological and political relations acted as facets of a single process, which in a sense were identical. Moreover, in specific historical conditions, the ecclesiastical and religious factor often not only set off, but also replaced the ideological one. Ultimately, the position and status of the church itself depended on this. In specific historical conditions, this meant the need to develop an ideological and political doctrine that would not only ensure national and ecclesiastical independence, but also neutralize possible aggressive encroachments from neighboring countries. As a result, the entire medieval period of the history of the Armenian people was twice marked by the creation of the statehood of the kingdom of Bagratuni and the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia, and also allowed the Armenian people to preserve their national identity and not undergo assimilation.
The processes of secularization of public life in Europe in the 18th century influenced many other regions of the world, including the Armenians. In the 18th-19th centuries, the process of overcoming the traditional way of the church community and the self-consciousness of the Armenians inherent in it began and proceeded at an accelerated pace. Secular motifs, saturated with national interests, were introduced into
the national consciousness through the creativity of members of the Mkhitarist Congregation, Stepanos Nazaryan, Ghevond Alishan, Grigor Artsruni, Raffi and others. This process proceeded most intensively in the second half of the 19th century, when the traditional Armenian parties Armenakan, Gunchak and Dashnaktsutyun entered the political arena. Since that time, they have become not only the main actors in political life, but also the bearers of a new national ideology.
Their significance in strengthening the national self-consciousness of the Armenian people is so great that it leads many modern researchers to the idea that it is to these parties that the people owe the formation of the national ideology. However, it should be noted that the main role of the national parties is not to create an Armenian national ideology (this is the prerogative of the national intelligentsia), but to give it a new content, consonant with the historical period being experienced. The predominance of the role of the political concept of culture and the Armenian Apostolic Church during this period is obscured, and the political component of the national ideology comes to the fore.
With the formation of traditional Armenian political parties, the idea of the inevitability of the creation of a new Armenian state in the historical homeland and its transformation into a nation-state was strengthened in the national self-consciousness of Armenians. The substantiation of this idea by political parties was accompanied by a desire for a harmonious combination of national and universal values. Thus, an attempt was made to create the necessary prerequisites for the return of the Armenian civilization to its origins, that is, on the one hand, for the restoration of statehood, and on the other, for the transformation of the Armenian people into a particle of progressive humanity. This explains the fact that the programs of all political parties reflect the assertion of democracy, freedom and equality of all Armenians in demands that are in tune with the ideas prevailing in many European countries.
Since the end of the 19th century, many ideas of a religious-messianic nature have been ousted from the spiritual life of Armenians. This forced even representatives of the conservative trend, formed on the basis of the value system of the Armenian Apostolic Church, to transform their views. They switched to the positions of national conservatism, which no longer gave priority to the church, as the main bearer of national values, but to the Armenian nation itself. Similar changes have also been made to the liberal current, which has entered a period of crisis since the end of the 19th century, but since the first quarter of the 20th century, the Ramkavar-Azatakan party has acquired an ideological system based on the priority of national values.
Thus, since the beginning of the 20th century, the new national ideology has turned into a dominant value system, which, although it proceeded from various strongholds (socialist, liberal and conservative), was at the same time unified in its approaches to the political and national goals and objectives of the Armenian nation and the resolution of the Armenian question, that is, the liberation of Western Armenia and the restoration of Armenian statehood. As can be seen, with the advent of Armenian political parties, the national ideology of the Armenians acquires an offensive character. Its emphasis is shifting from the problems of the nation's self-preservation to the problems of conducting a broad national and liberation struggle and the final liberation of the entire Fatherland.
In this regard, one should especially dwell on the issue of the perception of the concept of Motherland by the Armenian national ideology. At various historical stages, commensurate with the realities of national life, it was of a variable nature. From the very beginning of the formation of the national ideology, Western Armenia was perceived as the Motherland. After the Armenian Genocide in 1915-1923 and the reestablishment of the Armenian state in Eastern Armenia in 1918, Armenian ideologists, speaking of the Motherland, already meant a United, Indivisible and Independent Armenia. As for the Armenian state, the provisions of the national ideology perceived it both as the main goal and as a means for the liberation of the people.
In any, including the Armenian, national ideology, the main political goal is the desire to form a national state. However, the political realities in the life of the Armenian people gave its ideology a certain peculiarity. The restoration of statehood only in the Eastern part of the historical Motherland forces the national ideology to consider it, including as a means to achieve the main goal of ensuring the organic political unity of Eastern and Western Armenia. After the Genocide of 1915, the problem of "Hay-Dat" (Armenian Court) was added to this task, that is, the restoration of the historical justice of the recognition of this fact by the world community, as well as compensation by Turkey for the damage caused by it during this tragic period for the Armenian people.
It seemed that the formation of statehood in 1918 would allow the Armenian people to fight for the solution of these problems. However, the life span of the First Republic of Armenia turned out to be very short. It gave way to the semi-independent Armenian Soviet Republic, which, in turn, became part of the Transcaucasian Federation, and later part of the USSR. Statehood and national independence of the Armenians was blocked in many ways (Payaslian 2007 171-198). Thus, a new period began in the shadow development of the national ideology, which began to be expressed in the form of a new political concept of culture.
The profound social and economic changes that took place in Armenia during the Soviet period significantly increased the well-being of the people. In a short historical period, Armenia has become an industrialized republic with a powerful scientific potential and a wide network of educational and cultural institutions. Spiritual culture began to develop rapidly. Through the efforts of many party and state leaders devoted to the national idea, it was possible to formulate a new political concept of the culture of the Armenian people. On the one hand, it supported and used in the interests of the Armenian people the stereotypes imposed on them, on the other hand, under the pretext of developing the culture of the national outskirts, it strengthened its national identity. In this issue, the Armenian Soviet intelligentsia was able to use even the class orientation of the culture of the peoples of the USSR (Payaslian 2007, 199-227). The Armenian Soviet intelligentsia directed its efforts towards the preservation of the Armenian peasant traditions, which was identical to the preservation of the traditional national foundations of the people in the conditions of the unfolding propaganda of internationalism. It was precisely the preservation of national identity that allowed the Armenian people to carry through the decades the age-old aspirations for the liberation of their historical Motherland, to maintain hope for the restoration of historical justice and the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by the world community, as well as the
entry of Artsakh into Armenia. In the 60s of the twentieth century, the people of Armenia experienced a period of their spiritual rebirth, which prepared them for a new phase of the struggle to solve these problems already in the period of the Third Republic (Mirumyan 1995).
The Soviet period in the development of Armenia is also notable for the fact that it ensured the implementation of state guardianship over the national system of values. In fact, the Armenian people throughout the Soviet era restored the long-lost ability to self-government. The functioning of the network of party and state bodies of the republic made it possible to introduce the Armenian people to the elementary norms of state building, the absence of which in 1918-1920 had a detrimental effect on the fate of the national state. The ideological and political system of values of the people, albeit indirectly, but oriented the Armenians to the need to assert political independence and create their own sovereign state. Thus, a holistic vision of the process of strengthening the self-consciousness of the Armenian people allows us to single out seven stages in the formation and development of the Armenian national ideology.
The first period can be called the initial stage of self-identification of the Armenian people, culminating in the adoption of Christianity in the 4th century.
The second period covers the 4th-5th centuries and basically completes the process of self-identification of the people with such important events in the history of Armenians as Christianization and the invention of the Armenian alphabet. However, the creation of the Khorenatsi national ideology of the Armenian people is considered an important result of this stage.
In the third period from the 5th to the 14th centuries, thanks to the functioning of the main postulates of the national ideology, as well as the active role of the Armenian Apostolic Church and the political component of the culture of the Armenian people, he twice managed to recreate his statehood.
The fourth period, covering the 14-19 centuries, can be characterized as a stage in the struggle of the Armenian people for the preservation of their identity. The main role in this struggle belonged to the Armenian Church, thanks to which the people managed to survive not only in the conditions of the loss of statehood, but also the change in the demographic situation in their historical homeland by the presence of a significant array of foreign population. Of particular note is the fifth period of the revival of the national ideology, which begins with the formation of the Armenian national parties and ends with the creation in 1918 of the Armenian independent state.
The sixth period covers the years of the existence of the Armenian Soviet Republic, during which the Armenian people, despite the loss of independence and other negative phenomena, received the opportunity for peaceful development, retained and developed the ability to self-government. During this period, the function of preserving national identity was taken over by the Armenian national culture and, in part, by the Gregorian Church.
Finally, the seventh period begins with the formation of a new independent state in 1991 and continues to the present. It can be noted as a stage in the renewal of the self-identification of the Armenian people as a civic nation, which should culminate in the formation of a modern national ideology.
Challenges of the formation of a new Armenian national ideology
As a result of the Karabakh movement that broke out in 1988, and later becoming the Pan-Armenian National Movement (PANM), for decades a rigid system of ideological postulates led to a sharp rise in national consciousness. Stimulating and unifying these processes at the first stage of the Movement were the ideas of historical justice coming from the depths of centuries, the requirements for the triumph of law and international legal norms for regulating national and social relations, and focusing on universal values and criteria (Ter-Petrossian 2018, 13-21). However, the lack of a developed ideological and political concept and program, the ideology of the PANM affected both the Movement itself and the behavior of various social groups. It is no coincidence that in connection with the first real threat of punitive sanctions from the side of the central authorities, some groups dissociated themselves, and, first of all, representatives of the intellectual and creative elite and the former party state nomenklatura from the Movement, which was gaining a new round of development (Ter-Petrossian 2018, 1321).
This was largely facilitated by the idea of creating the PANM as a political organization. Many citizens saw in this political act the claim of newly minted figures to political power. On the other hand, this led to a completely natural dissociation of the created party from the masses involved in the Karabakh movement (Ter-Petrossian 2018, 35-59). Since May 1988, the PANM tried to build on the Movement, which was no longer considered as a goal, but as a ready-made social base, or even a means for solving political problems. At the same time, there was a gap between political leaders and the movement itself. The gap deepened more and more and reached its climax in connection with the coming to power of the PANM and the proclamation of the independence of Armenia. This was largely facilitated by the fact that high expectations from the success of the PANM, its political victory, initially strengthened among the broad social strata. But the victory of the forces of democracy did not lead to rapid social changes, economic success, and the most complex and intractable problems appeared.
All this after 1990 gave rise to nihilistic moods and tendencies in the national consciousness, which is typical for crisis and transitional periods of social development. Such phenomena include, for example, the negative attitude of many citizens to the acceleration of state-building processes, to the political elite, to emerging social relations, to new value orientations, etc. It seemed that the national ideas that mobilized the Armenians in the initial period of the Artsakh movement were to be further developed in the future (Ter-Petrossian 2018, 35-59, 79-129). This would provide a real opportunity to transform the political concept of Soviet culture into a new national ideology. However, the further course of events turned the Armenian society off this path and slowed down the process of formation of the modern national ideology of the Armenian people.
The devaluation of ideas, slogans, under which the formation of the Karabakh movement took place, led some citizens to think about the wrongness of the chosen path. This path, littered with nationalist slogans, did not lead to the expected results. The consciousness of many members of society began to look for a way out of the
current situation in non-national, universal values. Some returned to the old idea of the saving mission of a strong personality, others to the revival of individualistic concepts, ultimately rejecting such traditional universals as the state, nation, national and state ideology, politics, religion, etc.
The statement of the First President of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan regarding the national ideology, which he called a fictitious phenomenon, a false political category1, is well known (Zolyan und Zakaryan 2010). Distancing from ideological postulates actually meant distancing from the previously dominant ideology of socialism and nationalism of the rival Dashnaktsutyun, but not ideology in general. There was a simple substitution of the named ideologies by another ideological system by liberalism. In fact, liberalism, regardless of the intentions of its promoters in Armenia, was objectively put forward as an alternative precisely for the national ideology, since the ideology of socialism had already discredited itself. However, despite the negative attitude towards the national ideology on the part of many leaders, the statements of the first president played a positive role in activating the scientific research of this phenomenon in Armenia, and also made other political forces of the country think about it and continue to search for a theoretical basis for the formation of a modern Armenian national ideology.
As discussed above, the process of liberal and conservative rapprochement is currently being updated. However, neither conservative liberalism, nor any of the other value systems in itself can be considered as a ready-made universal toolkit and serve as a tool for national and state development. No concept can be imposed on social reality, superimposed on it, it must be derived from the results of a deep and comprehensive, systematic study of real political processes. Each nation in its own way comes to universal human values and it is hardly correct to artificially introduce it into one or another given framework of the movement. In this regard, to consider this or that world model of national and social development as the only correct one, in my opinion, does not seem appropriate.
Neither the years of Perestroika nor the Karabakh movement, being saturated with new approaches to reality, nevertheless led to a reorientation of values and the formation of new values. Of no small importance were, firstly, the absence of national and political culture and thinking, sustainable traditions of national, historical and national and value creativity, and, secondly, the resulting vacuum in social and political consciousness due to stormy and, in a certain sense, destructive processes . In general, in Armenia, as in many post-Soviet countries, there was a process of socio-political and value disorientation of various social strata and groups. The country has established a situation that is characterized by the principle of social parallels. In conditions of indefinite balance in the transitional Armenian society, two systems of values, old and new, functioned in parallel.
Being formed for a long time not only at the level of consciousness, but also at the subconscious level, the area of value orientations during the period of social changes is relatively less subject to fundamental shifts. However, the old system of values, like
1 The Armenian Center for National and International Studies. 2021. "Ideology is a powerful political weapon." https://acnis.am/en/editorial/42-2021-en; MFA of the RA. 1994. "A referendum is the best way to adopt the Constitution." 25 April, 1994. https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/1994/04/25/ltp/1580.
many other things, did not work in the new conditions. In society, there was a need to form a new system of values, which should have been done first of all by representatives of the intelligentsia. However, the latter conceded, for a number of objective and subjective reasons, their traditional positions to other social groups and took a passive position.
Meanwhile, the newly appeared civil forces as a layer of business people and entrepreneurs, political parties, public and religious organizations began to put forward their own criteria for value systems, which gradually infiltrated the public and national consciousness, acquiring the significance of social norms. As a result, instead of the mono-value Soviet system, a multi-value system began to be created, the elements of which, although they existed earlier, did not possess intrinsic value. Nevertheless, in our opinion, it is the Armenian intelligentsia that should develop a new system of values. It will have to give a theoretical, methodological, ideological and political understanding of the transition to a new system of values, conduct a comprehensive analysis of it and identify the place and role of various social groups in its creation. Only after the formation of such a value system will it be possible to form a modern national ideology, because without a value orientation, any ideology loses its meaning. In this regard, the current situation in Armenia can be characterized as an internal fermentation of minds, or as a process of searches, a clash of principles and real life needs, a breakdown, a collapse of the usual value orientations, during which sprouts of new guidelines and principles, criteria emerge. and norms of activity, behavior, lifestyle, moral and professional values, etc.
Cultural, historical, spiritual, moral and psychological traditions and values created over millennia require appropriate understanding and inclusion in the system of modern knowledge, the establishment of norms, the creation of a powerful ideological, theoretical, cultural and spiritual basis for the further development of the nation. We are talking about the creative transformation of the system of values inherited from the Soviet system, but not from its indiscriminate criticism, but by considering the past, present and future of the nation as links in a single chain, from which not a single link can be removed mechanically. In fact, society is faced with the need not only to create a national ideology, but also to correct the self-consciousness of the nation, which appears before the world community in a new capacity as a politically self-determined community. The people of Armenia, like all Armenians living in many other countries, will have to realize and comprehend the fact of the creation of statehood and all the new circumstances arising from this. The completion of the process of such a transformation of national self-consciousness, which is not least connected with the formation of a new value system, will create fertile ground for the emergence of a phenomenon that is at a higher level of self-consciousness of the national ideology.
An appropriate ideology is necessary for the spiritual, linguistic and ideological unity of all Armenians in the world. Both state structures and all political and public organizations, including opposition ones, are obliged to participate in its creation. However, in the end, only the national intelligentsia can become the creator of the national ideology, and all social and political structures should be interested in strengthening their positions.
The presence in the public consciousness of individual national ideas, their mechanical addition does not give grounds for asserting the existence of a national
ideology. The latter should take the form of an orderly political concept that has a programmatic character. The development of such an ideological system requires a comprehensive and scrupulous study and analysis of the historical past and the present, a theoretical understanding of the spiritual experience of the past from the point of view of modern national and political tasks. The absence of such an approach is a great omission of the political forces of society and political science in general.
At present, the question of the correlation of national and state ideologies has become actual in Armenia. This problem is in the field of view of all political forces of the society. The national ideology can exhaust itself in the case when the nation is identified with society, or these two systems coincide in volume, but not in content. On the example of the history of the Armenian people, one can be convinced that in the history of mankind there are cases when there is a clear discrepancy between these two phenomena. After all, only one third of the Armenians managed to recreate statehood in a small part of their historical homeland.
On the other hand, with the formation of a nation-state, naturally, the national fades into the background, giving way to the public. This is especially true in the case of Armenia, where the majority of the population found themselves in a difficult social, economic, domestic and psychological state. This is evidenced by numerous public opinion polls in Armenia, which reveal the priorities of the majority of Armenians in public life. Among such priorities for the majority of Armenian citizens is the overcoming of social and economic problems. Naturally, these circumstances somewhat shifted the emphasis in political life towards resolving these problems, perhaps even to the detriment of national priorities. However, as the crisis phenomena in society are overcome, the probability of returning to the initial state will increase.
In general, the identification of the nation with society in practice means that with the declaration of independence, national tasks are considered solved, and needs are realized. According to this logic, in such conditions, the national ideology loses its relevance, and from this it follows that the nation no longer has national interests: they are replaced by state and public interests. And if we accept this point of view, it turns out that two-thirds of the Armenian nation mechanically drop out of the national process. It is clear what negative consequences such an approach can have for the ideological and political unity of the nation.
The Armenian people continue to have unresolved national tasks, in connection with which the issue of creating a system of ideas that makes it possible to comprehend the national existence and substantiate the next program goals of the Armenian nation is even more relevant. In modern conditions, the national factor again restores its shaken positions and gradually becomes dominant. This is evidenced at least by the fact that the Armenians of the world took an active part in the discussion of the issue of establishing relations with neighboring Turkey (Oskanian 2013).
In those historical periods when there is no state ideology, the national ideology assumes the function of a guide for the entire nation. It retains its functional significance as long as the state is not identified with the nation. The national ideology can function effectively even in the case when the state ideology, although it exists, is aimed at solving, mainly, purely social, economic and general political problems. However, in general, state and national ideologies manifest themselves at different
levels and can neither be identified nor, moreover, opposed. From this point of view, the approach adopted by many researchers, according to which the national ideology acts as a strategy, and the state ideology as a tactic, does not stand up to criticism. Both ideologies, one way or another, are called upon to comprehend both the strategic and tactical tasks facing the Armenian nation.
Until recent years, there is still an active discourse in Armenia about the absence of a democratic systematized state ideology, and the development of a national ideology is in its infancy. In this regard, they are approximately at the same stage of development. However, this does not mean that political activity in the country takes place without the presence of ideological guidelines. The emergence of a national ideology does not contradict the formation of a state ideology. Two options are possible here: 1) the development of a national ideology precedes the state one and becomes the basis for communicating national content to it, 2) the creation of such a state ideology that would include the main provisions of the national ideology, more precisely, the main ways and program guidelines for solving national problems.
Regardless of which of the above options may work, the decisive role of state ideology can be traced, which is a necessary attribute of any state system and greatly enriches and concretizes the national ideology. National ideology performs the functions inherent in any ideology. It should cover those practical spheres of the life of Armenians where it is needed. And the need for the existence of a national ideology arises both in the part of the Armenian people that has gained statehood, and far beyond the borders of Armenia in the Armenian diaspora. In the conditions of statehood, any political party involuntarily pursues mainly party goals. Other tasks, including national ones, are naturally relegated to the background or are subordinated to party interests, brought into line with them. In practice, this leads to their identification, as a result of which party interests are very often presented as national ones. Such manipulations, whether consciously or unconsciously, are usually accompanied by reference to the national character of the given political party. Parties can be considered as such only if they have a systematically developed national ideology and program. At the same time, the factor of the existing statehood should act as the initial and determining factor, and not the final one, which is legitimate for the previous stages of the history of the Armenian people.
The situation is somewhat different with traditional political parties, which over the course of decades, with varying degrees of intensity, have made great efforts to maintain the ideas of national unity and revival, the restoration of their own statehood in their historical homeland. However, from the moment of their creation, their activity proceeded mainly far beyond the borders of Armenia and in the absence of statehood. The factor of future statehood was the starting point, but at the same time the final one in the ideology of traditional parties. With the proclamation of the Republic of Armenia, a fundamentally different situation arose, requiring a rethinking, a revision of the previous attitudes. In particular, this concerns ensuring their influence on the territory of Armenia itself. The Dashnaktsutsyun party managed to correct its tactical tasks to the greatest extent. Although not everything went smoothly for her, as, say, in the mid-90s of the last century. At the present stage, this party almost always had 6-8 percent during almost all election campaigns.
With the formation and development of statehood, a new problem arose for all political parties to find their social base. In the past, it was of secondary importance, since then it was about the fate of the entire nation, and the parties had to fight for the realization of the age-old aspirations of the Armenian people. In the post-Soviet period, there was a strong differentiation of the country's population. There were many layers with their own needs and interests. Serious, sometimes insurmountable, contradictions began to emerge between different social groups. The activities of the parties in Armenia were gradually directed towards the search for those social strata of society on which they could rely in their political activities. Thus, the program guidelines of political parties were enriched with provisions covering the interests of an increasing number of citizens of Armenia. This circumstance makes it possible to enrich the national ideology with new elements and turn it into a dynamic system of ideas.
The transformation of some political parties into carriers of national ideology is largely hindered by the fact that they are still caste-based. Basically, they pursue narrow group goals and are focused on solving momentary problems. Opportunistic political games very often impede the serious ideological and political development of parties. Therefore, some of them slide into clan squabbles among themselves, where it is no longer law that rules, but elemental force.
Criticism of state authorities has become the main breeding ground for the activity of some political parties, the main means of their self-affirmation. In their activities, there is a lack of a constructively creative beginning, ignoring the positive results in the activities of public structures. The critical and nihilistic political attitude of some parties pours out on the pages of their printed organs, which in fact have become the main form of work with social strata and a means of influencing public consciousness. An accusatory and nihilistic attitude, as the main means of political struggle, can at best awaken only the instincts of people, but not their consciousness. For the proper impact on the public and national consciousness, reasonable means are needed. These can be detailed, substantiated general political concepts, scientifically verified national, political, social, economic, training, educational and other programs. The above concepts and programs should form the basis of the national ideology, and the role of opposition political forces in this matter is significant.
Modern democracy is characterized not only as respect for the rights of the majority, but also as respect for the rights of the minority. This perception of democracy includes both the idea of the necessity and legitimacy of the opposition, and certain requirements for it. The fair demand of observance of the proclaimed democratic principles on the part of the authorities no less presupposes the observance of the rules of the democratic game on the part of the opposition. First of all, this concerns a constructive attitude to the processes in society and a positive attitude.
The formation of the political identity of the Armenian people in modern conditions should contribute to the activation of the process of forming a new national ideology. After Armenia gained independence, the crisis of the former Soviet political identity began, and there was a need to choose a qualitatively new, alternative concept of society, basic principles and values. After the final approval, they should acquire a fundamental and lasting character, rather than the ideas formed by electoral cycles. Such an identity in Armenia began to lay the foundations only since the late 1990s,
when the Armenian society seriously thought about the effectiveness of Western liberal standards. The semantic and symbolic elements of patriotic content, which prevailed in society at the initial stages of the Artsakh movement and were somewhat forced out after the victories of the Armenian forces in the Karabakh war, again came to the fore. It can be argued that during this period a relatively holistic vector of understanding the past of the Armenian people appeared in Armenia. Pronounced anti-communism, largely implanted from outside, gave way to a more restrained attitude towards the former Soviet reality, which made it possible to more realistically assess both the Soviet and pre-Soviet periods in the history of the Armenian people.
Since the beginning of the 2000s, there has been a change in attitude towards the first post-Soviet decade, which in itself has become history and the subject of interpretations. The costs of political, social and economic transformations were recognized as unjustified: degradation of public authorities, falling living standards, etc. On the other hand, such recognition did not mean that the state should return to the institutions and practices of the Soviet era. The main achievement of the first postSoviet decade was the course taken by society towards the democratization of public life. Thus, the new symbols (anthem, coat of arms, flag, national holidays, state awards, and others) began not only to emphasize the national and patriotic components, but also continuity with all the historical stages of the development of the Armenian nation, and in no way any ideological components.
After the declaration of independence of Armenia, the issue of merging the absolute values of the national ideology, which are the nation and the Motherland, was not completely resolved. The idea of the incompleteness of the national and liberation struggle, the ultimate goal of which is the reunification of all parts of the historical homeland of the Armenians, crystallized in the minds of the Armenian people. However, another idea of building a strong state capable of counteracting modern challenges has acquired no less importance. The consideration of the state as a means to achieve the ultimate goal of the national liberation struggle of the Armenian people at the present stage is losing its relevance. The modern national ideology of the Armenians is aimed at the all-round social, economic and political development of statehood, which will allow Armenia to take its rightful place in the world community.
This circumstance no longer allows us to consider the Armenian state both as an end and a means of the national and liberation struggle of the people, that is, as a core element of the national ideology. The formation of a state, even in a small part of the historical homeland of the Armenian people, forces us to transfer the consideration of this factor to a different plane. The actual provisions of the national ideology are those ideas that give the Armenian people the status of the bearer of one of the oldest civilizations in the world. Thus, a kind of transformation of the system of national values from negative to positive takes place. The Armenian people no longer appear as being subjected to constant trials and ready for various retaliatory measures, but as a nation that has reached a normal political state, striving to realize its positive role in the development of mankind (Holslag 2018; Kambeck 2014). It will have to appreciate the value that it can give to the world, and in return receive an adequate attitude from the community of nations. Such an orientation of the national ideology makes it possible to
unite not only the citizens of the Republic of Armenia, but also all Armenians living in other countries of the world.
The theoretical basis for the formation of a new Armenian national ideology can be various concepts put forward by prominent representatives of the Armenian national and liberation movement. They can be used by modern intellectuals to formulate national ideas, designed to form the basis of the future national ideology. It is necessary to identify those urgent real, not imaginary tasks that are capable of uniting all representatives of the Armenian nation, citizens, the diaspora, civil society, public authorities and the opposition (Paturyan and Gevorgyan 2021). Ideas about the need to resolve them must penetrate deeply into the consciousness of Armenians, affect the deep layers of national psychology and function up to the mass and everyday consciousness. Only such penetration of ideas into the public consciousness, in which all the aspirations of the Armenians will be subordinated to the solution of crucial problems, will become evidence of the formation of the main provisions of the national ideology.
Ideology or concepts of national development Garegin Nzhdeh
To solve this problem, an increasing number of Armenian researchers have recently turned to the concepts put forward by Garegin Nzhdeh (Hovsepyan 2007). The main provisions of Nzhdeh's concept of national development boil down to the affirmation in the minds of Armenians (especially young people) of faith in the strength and heroism of the nation, a sense of dignity and pride in their people, an unshakable desire to restore historical justice and recreate the Armenian state in its historical homeland, emphasizing the uniqueness of Armenian culture, made an invaluable contribution to the development of world civilization (Nzhdeh 2006). According to Nzhdeh, the history of the Armenian people is rich in examples of nobility, heroism and self-sacrifice of the representatives of the nation, and the Armenian culture, both Christian and pre-Christian, has repeatedly saved the people from assimilation and physical destruction. This is the uniqueness of the cultural factor of the people, to which it is necessary to attach the Armenian youth in every possible way.
The concept of Nzhdeh was developed in the historical conditions when the people did not have their own national state, when the nation was divided, and a significant part of it was scattered in many corners of our planet. In addition, there was no unity of national ranks in the communities of the Armenian diaspora. In such a situation, naturally, the question arose of the need to protect the Armenian people from the loss of their historical memory and assimilation. According to Nzhdeh, a people that does not honor their ancestors cannot exist independently for a long time (Nzhdeh 2006, 249-250).
It should be noted Nzhdeh's special attitude to liberal values, which, in his opinion, consigned to oblivion the national foundations, values and traditions of the Armenians. The meaning of Nzhdeh's teaching is to enable an Armenian living in a foreign land to remain an Armenian. In general, it can be seen that the implementation of Nzhdeh's concept in countries with a presence of the Armenian population preserved her national identity.
The propaganda of the idea of the uniqueness of the Armenian nation by Nzhdeh is in no way identified with its superiority over other peoples. Or the idea of returning their historical homeland does not mean the capture of living space for the Armenians. Such comments on Nzhdeh's concept were especially common in Soviet times. Soviet researchers almost always put an equal sign between fascist Nazism and the nationalism preached by Nzhdeh. There were, of course, good reasons for this. It is well known that he collaborated with the ruling fascist circles in Germany for a fair amount of time. However, it should be noted that the concept of Nzhdeh has nothing to do with fascism. His theory is not directed against anyone, but stands up only for the spiritual and physical liberation of the long-suffering people. In general, Nzhdeh's concept is defensive and by no means offensive.
Defining the uniqueness of the cultural and value system of the Armenian people, Nzhdeh did not oppose it to world values. In his opinion, a true patriot and nationalist cannot disrespect the results of the creativity of other peoples; a true patriot cannot divide peoples into value-forming and culture-destroying peoples, realizing that only through the mutual enrichment of cultures is progress possible for both the whole of humanity and a particular nation. His teaching is deeply national in content, and therefore carries universal human values.
In addition, Nzhdeh considered fascism to be the ideology of the weak and intoxicated by the anger of people, while he presented his theory as the religion of the strong. The main content of Nzhdeh's concept is not to promote the exclusivity of the Armenian nation, but to the need to form a spiritually and physically strong nation, whose eyes are confidently turned to the future and which is able not only to stand up for itself, but also to serve as an example in creativity and in spiritual activity for others.
Nzhdeh and his associate Hayk Asatryan brought to the fore, in my opinion, a very important factor for the formation of a new national ideology of the Armenian people, the need to reveal the positive components of the Armenian value system, which allows not only to deepen the processes of national identification of the Armenian people, but also to comprehend the possibility of building a strong statehood. Armenianness should be understood as the ability to perceive the Armenian civilizational type and its inherent positive role content. Armeniancy is not purely national, or, moreover, narrowly national. It was inherent in the Armenian people from the very beginning and was a synthesis of the national with the universal. However, it was confused after the liquidation of statehood and the subsequent self-isolation, dictated by the need for self-preservation of the nation.
In former times, Armenian political thought did not address this topic, not because it had a poor idea of the history of its own people and its culture, but because it did not have the favorable ground of an independent state (the First and Third Republics of Armenia). Its creation is not only a manifestation of the self-organization of the nation and its highest form, but also the conquest of its developed self-consciousness (Khudinian 2002). This is what makes the Armenians restore their historical memory and realize their place in the world community. According to Hayk Asatryan, future ideologists should deeply analyze the historical path passed by the Armenian people. However, according to him, history should be considered not as a simple narration of
facts and events, but to try to reveal its soul, and this should become the cornerstone in revealing the essence of Armenianness (Asatryan 2004, 99). Obviously, many provisions of Nzhdeh's concept are still relevant and can be used to create a new Armenian national ideology. This is largely facilitated by such factors as the persistence of tension both in the Caucasus region and in the world as a whole, the still unsurmounted post-Soviet ideological vacuum in Armenia, the contradictory processes of globalization, the reassessment of values in society, the outflow of the population from the country, the ongoing disunity of the Armenian diaspora and other reasons. However, one should also take into account the fact that in the world and, in particular, in Armenia, such realities are being established that should leave their mark on many ideas in Nzhdeh's concept. In particular, we are talking about changes in the public consciousness of Armenians that have affected the deep layers of social psychology, the deepening of international integration processes that relate to almost all spheres of public life, Armenia's involvement in the international legal system that determines the scope of its duties, the low standard of living of most citizens of the country, an unenviable demographic situation and, finally, twenty years of experience in state building. In this regard, the main theses of Nzhdeh's concept, which is certainly useful for the formation of a national ideology, should be slightly corrected.
Firstly, it concerns the idea of the revival of the national state in the historical homeland of the Armenians. In my opinion, in this case, the question should be on a somewhat different plane than the re-creation of the state within the former historical borders. The problem of preserving in the memory of the people its former greatness and dignity comes to the fore, and the ultimate goal can be considered the recognition by the world community of the legitimate rights of the indigenous population regarding their former homeland. It is necessary to somewhat distance the ideological and political components of this problem from each other. After all, in the conditions of an aggravated demographic situation, even a limited expansion of borders at the expense of Western Armenia may cast doubt on the very existence of the modern Armenian republic. Therefore, the emphasis in such an approach should be placed on issues that contribute to the deepening of the process of political self-identification of the Armenian people through the restoration of historical justice.
Many modern political scientists tend to consider the Karabakh problem as one of the most important ideologemes of the future national ideology. However, in my opinion, this problem fully fits into the idea of the legitimacy of restoring historical justice in the life of the Armenian people. In general, the desire to achieve this goal will allow the people to get rid of the dominance, the inferiority complex that manifests itself in them, psychologically cleanse themselves, believe in themselves and take their rightful place in the world community of nations.
Secondly, the idea of the moral and moral values of the nation prevailing over the material ones will help to protect the younger generation of Armenians from turning into a pragmatically thinking consumer basket. However, in the process of implementing this idea, several problems may arise. First of all, such an attitude to reality should be expected from those representatives of the bureaucracy who for a long time were mostly engaged in illegal enrichment. Or another circumstance in world practice, the emphasis of ideological work on spiritual and moral values, is very often
used by the ruling circles to channel people's dissatisfaction with their social position along the channel they want. This has already happened in the former USSR, when social and economic problems were smoothed over with patriotic slogans. It is also necessary to somewhat soften the anti-Western accents of Nzhdeh's concept and direct the theoretical provisions of the future national ideology to exclude simple copying of Western standards in public life and preserve its national image. Therefore, in general, the priority of the spiritual principle in practical politics requires a more subtle and balanced approach than simple propaganda of national, moral and ethical values.
Thirdly, it is necessary to creatively develop Nzhdeh's idea of the cultural and national uniqueness of the Armenian people in relation to modern conditions. On the one hand, the integration processes unfolding in the world, the restoration of a multipolar world order do not allow this idea to be absolutized, which in fact will lead to the self-isolation of the Armenian nation. Moreover, in the conditions of the existence of an independent state, the ideas of integration are of paramount importance. On the other hand, the active promotion of national values and the inculcation of the national spirit among the Armenian youth in no way contradicts the development of international integration. Such work is intended to create an organic link between the world and Armenian civilizational factors. Be that as it may, ideologues should beware of the dangers of isolationism, which are already strongly encouraged by Turkey and Azerbaijan (Aleksanyan 2016, 22-43). Moreover, the neutralization of such aspirations can be achieved by expanding Armenia's involvement in various integration projects. Any national ideology is impossible without defining the unique role of this community in world history. For example, political Zionism for the Jewish nation, which allowed it not only to maintain its physical existence, but also its identity, and eventually create a statehood (Avineri 1981; Don-Yihya 1998). It was this ideology that became the ideological basis for the leading political forces, regardless of their location in Israeli political life (Doron 1983; Reinharz 1993).
The uniqueness of the fate of the Armenian nation lies in those constants, the inviolability of which allowed it to go through a very difficult, in many respects similar to the Jewish, historical path. In my opinion, the disclosure of the uniqueness of the Armenian nation is associated with the identification of precisely the civilizational factors of the identification of the people.
Today, the world community wants to see in every nation a positive partner who brings more benefits than problems. Of no small importance for the formalization of such an approach is the pragmatism prevailing in Western countries in relations between countries and peoples. The attitude of the world community to this or that nation largely depends on what it can give to the world, be it material or spiritual values. In the modern world, factors such as the size of the territory of the state, or the size of its population fade into the background, giving way to quality resources. These include not only technological, but also spiritual resources.
The Armenian society, as well as the whole nation, faces the task of harmoniously fitting into the general civilizational world processes. Before humanity, the Armenian people should appear not as a nation that is notorious and focused only on its own problems, but as a creator, a creator, bringing to humanity its values and ideological guidelines that helped it not only survive, but also make a great contribution to the
treasury of world culture. This approach, in my opinion, should become the core of the Armenian national ideology.
Meanwhile, the scientific research of some researchers leads to the opposition of national ideology with globalization. Very often they advocate the construction of so-called fortresses in the face of the danger of unfolding globalization processes (Lalayan 2008, 9). At times, they are dominated by the propaganda of the ideas of the exclusiveness of the nation. It is especially unacceptable that the philosophical concept of Nzhdeh is given as the ideological basis of such theoretical constructions. However, when considering any concept, it is necessary, firstly, to take into account the peculiarities of those historical periods when they arose, and secondly, not to deviate from the general context of the concept and not violate the interconnection of its provisions.
Recognition of the priority of national values, moral and moral norms and traditions can be achieved by no means by self-isolation. As discussed above, there are no antagonistic contradictions between nationalism and globalization. Moreover, there are no contradictions between national and universal values. At the same time, it is the general civilizational language and its categories that are understandable to the world community. Therefore, the ideological and political substantiation of the significance of the special features of the civilizational content of the spiritual life of Armenians can become a decisive factor in the formation of a new national ideology of the Armenian people and the allocation of a special place for it in the world community of nations.
The thesis put forward by some researchers about the existence of the phenomenon of Armenian civilization deserves attention. Currently, it is under development and, of course, is more related to the field of cultural studies. However, regardless of the degree of development of the idea of Armenian civilization, it helps to understand and evaluate from a social and political point of view those aspects of the history of the Armenian people that allowed it not only to preserve its originality, but also surprisingly form a civilizational community of all centers of the Armenian Diaspora, regardless from their location. Armenian civilization is the longest civilization in time, immanently oriented towards social harmony, justice and wisdom.
The promotion of the cultural and civilizational factor in the national ideology in no way contradicts the desire rooted in the national consciousness to restore historical justice regarding the lost Motherland and the condemnation of the Armenian Genocide by the world community. On the contrary, these problems receive a new sound and stand on a civilizational basis, more understandable and acceptable for developed countries, directly or indirectly influencing the formation of norms of relationships for modern humanity. The solution of these problems is linked not with the manifestation of indulgence towards the miserable and offended Armenian people, but with the observance of the elementary norms of the world community's coexistence and the creation of conditions for preventing such uncivilized and barbaric steps from any member of this community from now on. Thus, the age-old resilience of the Armenian people is directly linked to the establishment of a just and democratic new world order, that is, it acquires a positive character and is entirely directed to the future. The resolution of pan-Armenian problems, in fact, enriches the normative, legal and political base of the future human civilization.
Conclusion and discussion
The cultural and civilizational aspect of the national ideology incorporates the understanding of both the culture and history of Christian Armenia, as well as pre-Christian. Naturally, the Christian religion is given its due, the historical role of which in the fate of Armenia can hardly be overestimated. However, this cannot detract from the significance of those traditions that were laid down in the period of Antiquity or long before it. It was they who ultimately determined the vector of development of the Armenian civilization. Such an approach helps not only to preserve and develop the millennium-old traditions of the Armenian people, but also to pass them on to a new generation, looking to the future with confidence and rightness.
This approach largely unites the aspirations of the citizens of Armenia with the Diaspora. At first glance, it seems that it is the Armenian diaspora that seeks to focus on the historical past of the Armenians, and is also determined to restore historical justice. However, the bulk of the Armenian diaspora is concentrated in industrialized countries with effectively functioning democratic institutions. They, like many citizens of these countries, deeply understand the civilizational motives in the relationship between peoples. Therefore, in the minds of Armenians living outside of Armenia, the desire to appear before fellow citizens as representatives of a worthy nation that has made a significant contribution to the development of world civilization remains.
Of particular importance in the national ideology should be the idea of ensuring a high level of well-being for Armenians, regardless of their place of residence. The set of measures aimed at solving this problem should include both the establishment of free competition in market relations within the Armenian society and the principles of mutual assistance among Armenians all over the world. In addition, raising the standard of living is closely linked to the problem of democratization of the political life of Armenia. It is this circumstance that is designed to ensure the disclosure of the creative abilities of individuals, instill in them a sense of dignity and pride in the Fatherland, and also turn the eyes of many foreign Armenians and arouse their interest in their historical Motherland.
It is impossible to achieve in public life the priority of the moral principle over the material one by propaganda alone for a long period. Otherwise, a new generation of citizens will be brought up with a slavish psychology and servile moods, incapable of heroism, courage and self-sacrifice. History knows many facts when, for ideological reasons, citizens were ready to lose even elementary living conditions. However, the same history, at least of the former USSR, proves that the people are not able to drag out a miserable existence for a long time, even for the sake of lofty ideas. First of all, the political elite of the country should be ideologically convinced and ready for self-sacrifice, which should mobilize the nation by its example. The Armenian people often proved their wisdom and ability to unite around worthy leaders. According to Nzhdeh's fair expression, the assertion that the Armenian does not trust the elite is not true, on the contrary, he is inclined to trust only fair, honest, sincere, not in words, but in deeds, leaders devoted to the Motherland and people.
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