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Zymenkova Violetta, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, PhD student, Institute of International Relations, Ukraine
E-mail: v.zymenkova@gmail.com
The U. S., China, and Russia in Central Asia
Abstract: This article will examine the geopolitical environment in Central Asia and provide an overview of the interests and objectives of the most significant actors present in the region: the U. S., China and Russia. It will also look through the recent developments and the changing degrees of influence of each actor.
Keywords: Central Asia, Heartland Theory, The United States, Russia, China, New Silk Road.
The demise of the USSR in 1991 led to dra- these regions is Central Asia, which comprises five
matic changes in the global strategic environment newly independent states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and had a major impact on the formation of a new Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Region is
system of international relations in the world as a geostrategically important for its location at the in-
whole and in different regions particularly. One of tersection of communication lines and large depos-
its of natural resources. Post-Soviet space of Central Asia became an arena of struggle of such influential states in world politics as the United States, Russia and China.
In a 1990 document for National Security Strategy, the first Bush administration noted that 'for most of the century, the United States has deemed it a vital interest to prevent any power or group of powers from dominating the Eurasian landmass' [1]. This statement is closely aligned to the geopolitical paradigm of Halford Mackinder's 'Heartland Theory', which states that the power that controls Central Asia — the great pivot — would eventually emerge as the most powerful state in international politics. The basic premise of the theory is as follows: 'Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; Who rules the World-Island commands the World' [2].
The U. S. was one of the first states to realize the importance of Central Asia and establish diplomatic relations with the new states. The main U. S. concern in the region in the early 1990s was nuclear weapons on the territory of Kazakhstan, capable to become the 'Islamic nuclear bomb'. In this regard, the primary objective was to get rid of the Soviet nuclear legacy in Kazakhstan through its j oining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was successfully achieved in 1993 [3]. Another key aspect of U. S. policy in that time was to find ways to strengthen the statehood and independence of the Central Asian countries.
But by the mid-1990s the Clinton administration, recognizing the 'oil importance' of the Caspian Sea basin, began to actively promote the penetration ofAmerican companies in the post-Soviet republics and tried to break up Russia's monopoly over the pipelines and transit routes for Central Asian oil and gas [4]. Washington quickly turned into a powerful geopolitical player in the region. Though, the U. S. has always stated that it is seeking not for dominance in the region, but for the establishment of the regime of free access to energy resources. In other words, the ideal situation for the United States is a kind of a 'free trade federation' or 'common market' in Central Asia and the Caspian region, dominated by multinational oil and gas corporations and with the Americans setting the rules of the game.
At the same time, the main component of the Clinton administration's strategy was an active opposition to possible integration of CIS countries around Russia. The United States pursued its traditional main geopolitical goal — to avoid recreating of a superpower or a strong union of states that could compete with the U. S. on the world stage.
However, by the end of the last century, Central Asian problems were not of a high priority for the United States. The turning point came after September 11, 2001, when U. S. announced Global War on Terrorism and launched the Operation Enduring Freedom on 7 October 2001 [5]. U. S. opened military bases in Central Asia: 'Khanabad' in Uzbekistan and 'Manas' — in Kyrgyzstan. The U. S. Air Force also received the right to use the airports for transit purposes in Tajikistan (Dushanbe, Kurgan-Tyube) and Kazakhstan (Meadow) [6]. The U. S. military presence appeared in the region associated with the deployment of U. S. troops in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
A new look at the role ofCentral Asia was assigned to the U. S. National Security Strategy 2002: Eurasia and the Middle East have been announced in its priority regions in terms of the national interests of the United States. That means that military and security considerations became more important factors in U. S. engagement in Central Asia. The document stated that there are 'challenges and opportunities' in Central Asia for America in the new century. The former include transnational terrorism, radicaliza-tion of Islam and drug trafficking. The second — the presence of large hydrocarbon reserves and the ability to limit Chinese influence [7]. At the turn of 2001-2002 American experts talked about the fact that for the first time in the history America has become a 'Eurasian power' [8].
In the current decade there are three important objectives in Central Asia for the U. S.: strengthening partnerships to advance mutual security, forging closer economic ties, and advancing and advocating for improved governance and human rights.
In 2011 U. S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented the new plan, called the New Silk Road Initiative [9]. The initiative is designed to maintain regional security by linking Central and South Asian countries through trade and economic integration
after the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. There are ambitious projects within the framework of the New Silk Road, such as electricity transmition and trade project CASA-1000, which stands as one ofAmerica's foremost efforts at regional integration, and the TAPI gas pipeline. They are expected to be operational by 2018 and 2019 respectively [10; 11]. U. S. has achieved progress in the spheres of trade and transport, customs and border operations, but still there's a long way to go.
China has been increasingly active in Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Like the U. S. China has both commercial and strategic interests in Central Asia.
Beijing sees the region as fragile, with significant potential for instability, and fears that instability in Central Asia could destabilize China's west. The threat to China's security lies in the Uighur ethnic group, living in the Chinese largest administrative region Xinjiang and bordering Central Asian states. Since the 1990s acts of protest and violence by Uighur militants have raised the most serious specter of ethnic dissent and terrorism for Beijing [12]. Fighting the instability coming from the Uighur Diaspora and Islamic radicalism has been the main focus for China in the first decade of 2000s.
In addition, as U. S. troops prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan, Washington is looking for stable governments in the region to share the burden of trying to contain terrorist groups. If China wants to play that role to advance its regional ambitions, the United States would welcome these efforts. 'We welcome China's engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which we see not as competitive but complementary to our own efforts', Dan Feldman, the U. S. special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, told an audience in Washington in 2015 [13]. In this regard, U. S. and China are aligned in the desire to limit the spread of militant Islam.
Chinese security activities are channeled through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes 4 Central Asian states, China and Russia as members, and was established in 2001 on the basis of the 'Shanghai Five'. Though it's not a military or security alliance, it's main objective is to combat terrorism and ethnic separatism. Chinese understand that they can't rely fully on Rus-
sia to maintain security in the region. In this view, it's likely that they would militarly intervene in the region to secure their investments or work together with the U. S.
Nevertheless, the major interests of China in the region are economic and predominantly to ensuring access to oil and gas supplies. China explored the region as a crucial source of energy. Beijing has skillfully used economic instruments — a foreign aid, investments and loans — with each of its Central Asian neighbors. In 2009, it signed loans-for-energy packages with energy-rich Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan [14]. These loans secured supplies of oil and gas or equity in local producers. Beijing has also undertaken major new oil and gas pipelines to take the Central Asian energy eastward.
Central Asia is projected to supply 20 percent of China's gas consumption, and this share is expected to grow as China continues to expand its pipeline network in the region [15].
In the first decade of the 21st century, bilateral trade — primarily in the form of Chinese imports of energy and exports of consumer goods and finished products — witnessed extraordinary growth, totalling over $40 billion in 2014 [16]. China overtook Russia to become Central Asia's leading trade partner.
It should be noted, that the Chinese leader Xi Jinping during his visit to Central Asia and Southeast Asia in September and October 2013, unveiled the initiative of jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt — a nearly $46-billion infrastructure project — and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, called together as One Belt, One Road [17]. This is an ambitious Chinese initiative that proposes to enhance interconnectivity and economic cooperation across the Eurasian continent by building an extensive infrastructure network. This initiative promises much investment in the region, unlike the U. S. project, which is not ready to give much financial support in the region. In the poor countries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Beijing has become a major investor and development assistance provider, focusing on power generation, transmission, and transport, including roads and railways.
Neighboring powers such as India and Russia are alarmed at Beijing's growing presence in the region.
At the same time for U. S. officials, China's Silk Road ambitions can contribute to those of the U. S. and help improving cross-border links by developing in-frastucture. The Chinese leaders remain in some way conspicuous about such Washington's statements, as for the last two decades they had the impression that the U. S. is seeking to contain China from the influence in the region.
However, since the beginning of the century China's economic, diplomatic and military influence in the Central Asia has increased dramatically. Over the last decade, China has emerged as the leading economic power in Central Asia. China has become a key actor in the region and an important partner for regional states. At present China appears the most powerful geopolitical player in Central Asia, mainly in the economic and energy fields. Although Russia remains an important player, its monopoly on trade and access to markets were affected by Beijing, as well as Russia's ability to set the rules in Central Asia was broken.
After the Soviet Union dissolved, Russia took little interest in Central Asia and concentrated on its internal issues, while the leaders of the 5 Central Asian states had to look for their own ways to overcome the inner crisis and build their sovereign states. Russia started to reevaluate the significance of the region in the mid- 1990's. As Vladimir Putin took office in 2000, he has placed significant emphasis on 'Russia's Near Abroad' which includes Eastern and Southern Europe as well as Central Asia, and started to regain influence in the region. The Kremlin sees the post-2001 role of the U. S. in Tajikistan and Kyr-gyzstan especially, as inimical to Russian interests.
Russia is trying to reintegrate the former Soviet states, find new trading partners in the face of EU and U. S. sanctions and get a foothold in Central Asia through economic and geopolitical association — the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), established in 2014 on the basis of the Customs Union. The EEU now includes Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan [18]. The other Central Asian states showed little interest in joining the EEU. Since the Union Member States still don't feel any benefits of membership, there's a fear that EEU doesn't perform its functions as well as the Customs Union didn't. It is noted that the volume of trade between
the Member States and Russia even declined in 2015.
Central Asian states understand that Russian financial of military assistance comes at a high price: increased dependance on Russia and the inadmissi-bility of having close ties with other regional players. Moscow has tried to prevent the Central Asian governments from signing pipeline deals that moved gas or oil without going through Russia. Also the Krem-plin has pressed on the regional leaders to align with Russian position even if it's unacceptable for them. Russia has closed its borders and introduced more stringent visa regulations for migrants, creating an economic problem for Central Asian countries that are remittance-dependent [19]. Russia hopes that such pressure will compel the Central Asian states to join the EEU, as the citizens of any member state are allowed to work in any country in the union without a work permit.
The Central Asian states have demonstrated a greater willingness to reject demands of Russia. Thus, in 2012 Uzbekistan withdrew from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization [20], giving Russia no longer access to the air base.
It should be noted that U. S.-Russian relations got worse during Obama administration, mainly in view of the Russian military invervention in Ukraine and Syria. As the West has imposed sanctions on Russian individuals and businesses [21], it has affected the economic situation in Russia together with the collapse of the Russian ruble, which has fallen nearly 100 percent against the dollar in the past year. Given the inner economic problems, Russia probably will not continue to be able to financially support many Central Asian states. The weak Russian economy forces Central Asian states to look for a more stable partner — in particular, China. Though the growing Chinese influence in the region represents a great geopolitical concern to Russia, in view of the Western sanctions, Russia itself is looking for closer ties with China, which could affect it's ability to dictate its rules in Central Asia.
However, Russia has always been a significant partner for Central Asia in security. Russia's largest external military presence is still in Tajikistan. The key driver for the Russian military presence in the region is the threat of Islamist terrorism, instability and
drugs traffic spreading from Afghanistan. Though it's clear that the true goal of Russia is to assert its influence over the region. But even in the security sphere, prospects for Russia to keep its leadership in the region do not look optimistic. Undoubtedly, the conflicts in the Eastern Ukraine and Syria is a heavy burden for Russia, leaving Moscow fewer resources to address security issues in Central Asia.
From a political point of view, even if the crisis in Ukraine is solved, Russia is unlikely to be an attractive partner for Central Asian neighbors that fear Russia's territorial claims, military nationalism and oppressive approaches to weaker states. Even Russia's allies and members of the EEU are concerned that friendship with Russia may be dangerous and try to show more independance in their decisions. Therefore, it is likely that the Central Asian countries will look elsewhere to help balance its northern neighbor.
In addition, there may be several states in the region that want to see the U. S. as a balancer against Russian and Chinese influence. Since the volume of Central Asian-Chinese trade has unprecedent-edly grown and the regional markets were invaded
by Chinese goods, regional states fear the 'Chinese expansionism' as it can damage the national production.
At the same time, less powerful states — India, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran — have some ambitions in Central Asia and are eager to increase their influence in the region. They see an opportunity for this after the U. S. and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. According to the Stratfor's article 'Central Asia: A Different Kind of Threat', Turkey is likely to become an important actor in the region in the next 25 years together with China [22].
It's not clear what role would the U. S. play after the withdrawal of troops, but probably in the security sphere Washington would stay focused on countering Islamic militant groups. It would be mutually interesting for U. S. and China to work together in spheres where they have common interests. With American expertise and China's investments it could turn into an effective partnership within the New Silk Road initiatives and developments in security sphere. It's likely that the U. S. would try to restrain Russia's influence in Central Asia and focus on closer ties with China in the region.
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