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provide Russia of the new century with additional chances, which Russia will use with success.
"Vostok: vyzovy XXI veka", M, 2010, p. 247-251.
Sergey Slutsky,
political scientist
THE TERRORIST UNDERGROUND IN INGUSHETIA
The terrorist underground finally was formed in Ingushetia for the beginning of the XXI century. Although Ingushetia was subject to significant ordeal for the 1990s, terrorism in the forms characteristic for the contemporary North Caucasus actually was absent within the limits of the republic itself. At the same time, the destabilizing impact of the adjacent separatist Chechnya as a mighty hotbed of tension should have been felt in all main spheres of social life in Ingushetia. For the beginning of the 1990s, there occurred the peak of the Ossetian-Ingushi opposition - the central conflict, which to a large extent determined the social-political life of the Ingushi Republic and the main zones of conflicting capacity.
Thus, the first post-Soviet decade may be relatively defined as a "pro-native" period in development of the republican underground, like the underground in Dagestan. However, the rigid territorial conflict with North Ossetia-Alania pre-determined the essential specificity of the Ingushi variant of formation of the terrorist complex. The situation in the social-economic spheres of both republics differs greatly.
The economic potential of Ingushetia originally was rather insignificant. Within the Soviet Checheno-Ingushetia (not at all the advanced regions of the national economy) the "Ingushi" districts
represented the agrarian periphery. At the same time, the economic crisis of the 1990s in the newly established republic was greatly aggravated by the fact that the industrial structures, located in the Ingushi districts of Checheno-Ingushetia, after its division and rapid separation of Chechnya turned out to be fragments of the demolished republican industrial complex. As a result, the fall of industrial production in the republic grew to catastrophic scales: for the period of 1980 it made the size of 14% of the level of 1990 (the maximum indicator for the regions of the RF, except Chechnya).
But the economic "specificity" of Ingushetia consisted even not in this fact (the reduction of production in other republics of the macro-region was also impressive). The significant circumstance was as follows: in the beginning of the XXI century after "pacification" of Ichkeria, against a general background in the RF and the North Caucasus of political and social-economic stabilization, the sustainable rise of economy (including the industrial sector) did not started in Ingushetia. In 2009, the amount of industrial production made 48% of the level, existed in 2000 (in 2008 it accounted for 84%). The situation in the republican agriculture, which lacks big market production, was not better. The detailed study of economic problems is not within the framework of the present study. But it is important to find out the stage of chronic stagnation of local economy, which is able to transform into terrorist activities.
The high unemployment and decrease of level of living of the population were two phenomena accompanying the social-economic crisis. The level of unemployment in Ingushetia, equally with Chechnya, was the highest in the RF (for the last decade, it made in Ingushetia 45-65%). This unprecedented indication would have testified to a catastrophic situation, incompatible with preservation of the main social institutions in society with contemporary productive
economy, since it would have been connected with the deep mass impoverishment of the population. The preservation of this level of unemployment for many years shows that local society has adapted to its extreme surplus of the labor force.
The system of diverse social financing for the benefit of the population in the republic (pensions, various subsidies, grants) is one of the reasons of such situation. And the other reason of this situation is the high level of subsidies, received by the republic, since 95% of its budget is formed at the expense of the financial means, transferred by the federal center. The republic actually depends on the Russian budget. At the same time, if in relation to adjacent Chechnya there exist at least two objective reasons (two devastating military campaigns) for a great support given to the social-economic sphere of the republic by the federal center, in case of Ingushetia there are no reasons for such support.
The stable federal financing is the main reason of the situation, when the long-term economic stagnation and the highest level of unemployment are not accompanied by the rapid fall of the level of living and impoverishment of the population in the republic. The incomes of the latter actually are lower than the average per capita incomes of the population in other republics in the North Caucasus. However, they do not fall and do not rest at the former level as it could have been without the stable "external" financial support. The dynamics of incomes of the population in the republic demonstrate a sustainable rise. For the period from 2005 to 2009, they raised by 2.3 times (like in other republics of the North Caucasus, except Dagestan, where the incomes of the population grew by 2.8 times). For the period from 2000 to 2009, the average per capita income rose ten times (from 0.6 to 5.8 thousand rubles). Thus, demonstrating minimal successes in the economic sphere, comparing with other republics, Ingushetia is not
behind them in terms of growth of the material level of living. There is no reason to speak about "impoverishment" of the population.
In other words, there are no significant reasons for the rise of "social-economic" protest movement in Ingushetia. There is no link between economic dynamics and rise of incomes of the population in the republic. For many decades, it is possible in a stable way to raise the level of material conditions of living against a background of economic stagnation. It is quite possible that the protests on the part of population would rather be provoked by the need to get rid of the shaped way of existence.
Thus, the republican underground only to a lesser extent is supported by the economic conditions of life in the republic.
One of the main reasons of the rise of the protest potential in the republic is the low qualitative level of local authorities, characterized by the typical list of "vices", particularly high level of corruption, clanship, lack of professionalism. The comparative analysis of "moralprofessional" qualities of the local bureaucracy with the officialdom in other republics is a complicated study. It is not excluded that the Ingushi administrative apparatus in terms of these indications occupies a separate place in the North Caucasus. However, all failures inherent in the Ingushi officialdom were shaped since the beginning of the postSoviet period.
It is possible to put a question: has the efficiency of the republican bureaucracy taken a turn for the worse for the last years? The negative answer should be rather given to it. The failures of the local authorities do not show a definite negative dynamics, able to provoke a rise of social protests in the republican society. Certainly, like in Dagestan, one should take into account the factor of public "patience": even the level of a long-term sustainable "vice" is being perceived by society with growing irritation. Nevertheless, it is evident
that the protest potential, accumulated along this channel, maybe a significant but not the sole factor of the terrorist activities.
The confessional factor. The dissemination of Islam was terminated in Ingushetia only by the middle of the XIX century. The post-Soviet period in the republic (like in the North Caucasus as a whole) was connected with "renaissance" of Islam": the rapid rise of the number of active believers, the multiple rise of mosques and house for praying, establishment of religious educational institutions (including institutions, financed by foreign Islamic sponsors); appearance of religious radicalism. However, despite existence of adjacent Ichkeria as a main stronghold of wahhabism in the North Caucasus, for the 1990s pure Islam did not attain definite success of its development within the limits of Ingushetia (at the same time, already for the period of the first Chechen campaign there were registered the attempts of wahhabies to recruit young people).
The ideological "enlightenment" of the Ingushi national society was repeated from the territory of Chechnya for the second half of the 1990s. The first measures against dissemination of wahhabism were taken not by the federal center but by the republican authorities and the local traditional clergy, worried by this situation. For summer of 1998, by their joint decision, the functioning of wahhaby organizations was forbidden on the territory of the republic. However, such measure was not always successful and able to stop dissemination of pure Islam. But in Ingushetia this decision actually succeeded and demonstrated primarily the sustainable orientation of local population to traditional Islam and Sufi values and practice, severely criticized by wahhabies. The constant outflow of local religious radicals to Chechnya also played its role in this respect.
In the beginning of the XXI century the situation started to change. Islamic radicalism becomes in the republic the ideological
cover for different protest movements, based on various ancient social forms of life. From the definite time, the situation in Ingushetia was characterized by the return inflow of Ingushi and Chechen people to the country.
However, already in 2005, estimating the number of wahhaby communities in some republics of the North Caucasus, K.M. Khanbabayev, a known expert in religion, omitted in his review Ingushetia and Adygeya, and only stated that adepts of pure Islam in these republics were rather active. One may suppose that the question is that Ingushi wahhaby community is rather closely connected with the Chechen wahhaby community and that it was difficult to analyze its own quantitative characteristics.
The sphere of inter-national relations and the Ossetian-Ingushi conflict. Since the beginning of the post-Soviet period, within the limits of the republic, the reasons for inter-national conflicts were minimal: according to the census of 1989, in the Ingushi districts of Checheno-Ingushetia the dominance of Ingushis was evident (76.6%), making 86% of the population, including Chechens, on these territories. Thus, the greatest part of the Russian speaking population of Checheno-Ingushetia lived in its Chechen part, mainly in Grozny. In the non-Ingushi part "non-Vainakh" made only 14% (including 1.8% of "non-Russian non-Vainakh"), while in the Chechen part these groups accounted correspondingly for 32.2% and 7%.
The social processes of the beginning of the 1990s promoted creation of mono-ethnic districts in Ingushetia. The Russian population left the republic actually without demonstrated protests, which might have become the conflicting pivot between Russians and the title population. By the middle of the 1990s, Ingushetia lost the main mass of its Russians and Russian-speaking residents. Should the mass inflow of Chechen refugees in time of military campaigns did not enter the
republic, it could have become the most homogeneous ethnic region in the RF. According to the census of 2002, Ingushis made 77.3% of the population in the republic (97.7% with Chechens).
Following the gradual return to Chechnya of the main part of refugees (2002-2007), the share of the title population of Ingushetia had essentially increased. However, the percentage of the "non-Vainah" population in the republic in any case was minimal and without federal servicemen may account at present 1.5-2%. It is evident that the mono-ethnicity of the republic will be kept for a long-term perspective. It is actually impossible to imagine a scenario of development, when Ingushetia becomes a territory of migration inflow of the non-title (non-Vainah) population. In other words, the program adopted in 2005 and intended to realize the program of return to the republic of Russians represents a pure bureaucratic utopia even in its reduced variant (the return of one thousand people for 2005-2010, while for the 1900s 17 thousand Russians left the republic).
Nevertheless, the sphere of inter-national relations became almost the main source of concentration of the conflict capacity, which played a significant role in formation of the situation in the republic. The central (Ossetian-Ingushi) conflict in the post-Soviet Ingushetia was and is not only the conflict between two republics but also between two nationalities.
The events, connected with deportation in 1994 of Ingushis from the territory of the Prigorodny district and its inclusion in North Ossetia, usually are considered as the beginning of the conflict. As a "compensation" for this loss, three districts of Stavropol krai in 1957 were transferred to Checheno-Ingushetia, where they were included, however, in the system of ethnic settlement of Chechens and not Ingushis. Thus, the roots of the inter-ethnic tension between Ossetians and Ingushis should be found in the second half of the 1950s (the return
of Ingushis from deportation to the North Caucasus). This latent conflict repeatedly emerged in public life even during the stable 1960s-1970s. For this period of time, this conflict was suppressed by the Soviet authorities, which perceived all displays of inter-national animosity as survivals of "pre-socialist" past. The situation was changed for the second part of the 1980s. The struggle for "return" of the Prigorodny district became for Ingushis the ethnic-consolidating (partially also a "state forming") idea on the eve of the 1990s.
Thus, the formation of Ingushi statehood from the beginning turned out to be connected with the territorial issue and in existing circumstances objectively and inevitably led to escalation of international tension between two peoples. The inter-republican conflict with North Ossetia, as a matter of fact, turns out to be the conflict between two national communities. The Ingushis in their consciousness regarded as their "offenders" to some extent the federal center too, since the federal center, to the mind of Ingushis, in this conflict supported Ossetians (via the federal center this offense was projected to Russia as a whole). However, this offense was in deep contradiction with "pro-Russian" position of Ingushi society. In this case, the pro-Russian position means the interest of national community in its Russian status, the conceived by this community dependence of its functioning on the complex (financial, material-technical, organizational etc.) support by the federal center. Thus, the question is a kind of public "reckon", which often turns out to be a more powerful neutralizer of internal ethnic radicalism and separatism than the ethnic-cultural closeness or even psychological computability of peoples. The Ingushi society did not want to go the way of separatist Chechnya.
The accumulated conflict energy of the national community, being unable to realize itself in the main direction (against North Ossetia and to some extent also against the federal center), was looking
for itself more accessible objects of forceful action. They were found in the republic itself. One of them (probably, the main one) was its own republican power - the administrative-bureaucratic apparatus, the law enforcement bodies and the groups of the population, connected with them.
The republican power might be regarded as a projection of the federal center - its protégé (particularly after M. Zayzikov occupied the presidential post). The strokes, delivered against it, allowed partially splashing out the anti-Russian, anti-feudal "energy". But it was possible to incriminate to the republican authorities also many other things: for instance, the unpardonable compromise, the lack of will in defending national interests during negotiations with the Ossetian party.
There existed also quite objective already mentioned claims: corruption, clanship and lack of professionalism; pursuit of vested interests accompanied by the low level of efficiency in administrative sphere. From the beginning of the 1990s, the functioning of the republican authorities was characterized by such failures. But just comprehension in the beginning of the XXI century by the radical wing of Ingushi community of impracticability of the strategic task of its national "project" made the official power intolerable for this part of Ingushi society.
Since the middle of the 2010s, the extreme radicals' energy gradually changed the main direction of its realization from the Ossetian (local clashes on the inter-republican border territory) direction to the internal republican direction against the administrative apparatus and its "guards" - the law enforcement bodies. The responsive repression arranged by the authorities led only to the conflict's growth. Thus, in parallel grew the potential of the terrorist underground, which extended its demographic basis in the republic and escalated the spiral of reciprocal forceful actions. Since that time, the
terrorist actions were intensified due to intensification of activities carried out by radical elements of Ingushi national community, who more often did not leave for Chechnya and had to concentrate in Ingushetia, greatly raising the cadre capacity and general conflicting potential of local extremism.
The republican terrorist complex, which was formed in the republic, was characterized as follows: existence of the social system, where the main structural element was a group of people, concentrated in terrorist activities, able in a sustained way to compensate the cadre losses and to function chiefly at the expense of their own (internal-republican) organizational means, infrastructure and, probably, financial resources. The external assistance gradually moved to the background. At present, the republican underground, having been isolated from external "injections", is able, however, to compensate its
losses, in spite of rigid pressure of the law enforcement bodies.
* * *
Thus, the terrorist activities in the republic is the consequence (and simultaneously) of the civil opposition - the rigid counter-struggle between the republican power and the radical part of Ingushi national society. But the central axis of civil conflict is often supplemented by many other axes essentially complicating the scene of civil antagonism and to some extent transforming it. Ingushetia is not the exclusion. Taking into account additional conflict axes, the situation is similar to the situation in Dagestan (inter-clanish wars, criminal conflicts, emergence of a common field of activities and probable reciprocal actions of separate power groups, the criminality and the underground).
However, it seems that this complex of reciprocal actions in Ingushetia did not result in emergence of a criminal-corrupted-extremist complex, analogous to the situation in Dagestan. The power clans in Ingushetia are rather numerous. This fact promotes rivalry
among them. However, unlike, for example, the situation in Dagestan, they represent the sole national community. The common space in Ingushetia is much less for economic mutual activities of power clans, the criminal and the underground. The dynamic and the large-scaled (in terms of republics in the North Caucasus) economy of Dagestan represents much greater chances for joint activities (rivalry/cooperation) than economy of Ingushetia. Thus, given the evident systemic resemblance of situations in Dagestan and Ingushetia, the Ingushi terrorist underground (TU) did not become (at least for the present time) an element of the united complex, combining power, criminality and underground.
Unlike the terrorist underground in Dagestan, TU in Ingushetia is much more mono-ethnic. On the other side, comparing with Chechnya it is more compact thanks to the small territory of the republic itself. These two factors contribute to centralization of TU in Ingushetia. They at least facilitate coordination of activities of various groups of fighters from one central point, despite its primarily communication and not centralizing role. The other aspect of the problem is essential. The map of TU activities in the North Caucasus for 2007-2009 fixes the common and not split area from Nazran to Vedeno - the wide belt, cutting in two Ingushetia and Chechnya. This common space, ethnic-cultural and social-psychological closeness of two peoples pre-supposes a rather extensive cooperation of terrorist groups of both republics, which may be reflected in their organization.
On the other side, the operation advantages of terrorist activities, carried out in the autonomous and semi-autonomous regime (network organization) should be a natural limitation of any form of rigid centralization and definite hierarchic structure of TU. Besides, TU of Ingushetia, like TU of Dagestan, lacks "famous" leaders, capable by
their authority to unite at least a considerable part of local terrorist community.
The number of fighters in Ingushetia rarely becomes subject to comments on the part of politicians or officials. One may mention the remark, made by A. Edelev (January 2009) on 120 fighters in Ingushetia. In February 2010 Yu.B.Evkurov at the press-conference, held in Magas, said, that "according to current information, three groups from three to five people each arrange shooting, but in some case criminal elements commit their acts under the cover of TU". So, the president of the republic spoke about 10-15 republican fighters.
However, Ingushetia for the last years (2008-the beginning of 2010) in a sustained way occupies the first place in the North Caucasus in terms of terrorist acts and, according to I.V. Pashchenko, is comparable with Chechnya and Dagestan, taken together. The materials of the international report on the forceful actions in the North Caucasus published in 2009, present a different comparison among these three republics. But the first place of Ingushetia in terms of terrorist intensity for 2008-2009 is unquestioned. If the group of 10-15 fighters were responsible for it, one should admit their "productivity" to be phenomenal (succeeding the "average" indexes for TU in Chechnya and Dagestan many times). It is much more probable that this level of activities is ensured by the number of fighters comparable with other "eastern" republics of the North Caucasus (it should be hundreds of fighters). Since TU in Ingushetia rather easily compensates its losses, it means that the number of fighters is rather great.
At the same time, the limited demographic capacity of the republic should be taken into account. The national community of Ingushetia accounts for 300-320 thousand people. Occupying the first place in terms of number of terrorist acts, the republic is behind Chechnya in terms of their intensity. The Ingushi fighters, probably due
to their smaller capacity, prefer shooting and attacks and avoid direct contacts. It may be said that the fighting component of Ingushi TU is smaller than that of TU in Dagestan and Chechnya. It should be recalled that the format of the fighting nucleus - the number of armed fighters could be changed several times per year.
Like the number of fighters in TU itself, the number of its supporters in Ingushetia may be inferior in Ingushetia than in Dagestan and Chechnya. It might be caused by the smaller number of Ingushi national community. In the contrary case, one should suppose that 12% of the population participate in TU (many times more than in Chechnya and Dagestan). Given the compact republican settlement of the population, the correlation between composition of settlement and intensity of terrorist actions evidently exists. Nazran and the Nazran and the Sungen districts may be called the epicenters of TU activities (the great part of the population is concentrated there).
The stratum of sympathizers to some or other extent may include all protest groups of national community. Taking into account a rather great percent of the people dissatisfied with various aspects of life in the republic, it is possible to appraise it minimum in several percent of the republican population (15-20 thousand people), representing all districts of the republic and social groups of all ages (including several
thousand young people at 18-25 years of age).
* * *
The rapid rise of terrorist activities in Ingushetia for the last years to some extent was unexpected for the expertise. The internal tension/conflict in the beginning of the XXI century at least did not diminish. But the direction of the main conflict changed: it moved from "external" (inter-national and inter-republican) social space to the republic itself and within national community. This process resembled the events in Chechnya but was determined by the other complex of
factors and was going on under other political and social conditions. Like in Dagestan, the central axis of Ingushi opposition in the republic was complicated by many other conflicts, composing the republican "Gordian knot". One of the factors, which neutralize support, given to TU, is (except forceful "measures") solving of "territorial" problems, as well as social-cultural and social-economic modernization of Ingushi community and the rise of quality of the republican power. The real decision of the territorial question supposes for Ingushi national community the change of the administrative status of the Prigorodny district or the comparative territorial compensations. However, the probable "transfer" of the Prigorodny district to Ingushetia is actually impossible. The republic is unable to get any territorial-administrative compensation from the federal center. In the existing situation in the North Caucasus, as the events confirm, the center will not make administrative "presents" to regional republics in any circumstances. The program of social-economic development of Ingushetia, which costs billions of rubles, actually is a kind of "compensation", although a single politician did not make (and could not make) it public.
The question is whether the national community, including its radical elements, responsible for terrorist actions, is ready for such "barter". And especially in the situation as this reciprocal exchange is not formulated as such. The great part of Ingushi society perceives the social subsidies to the republic as a due, as a "liability" of the federal center, which does not suppose any obligations in response.
The social-economic and social-cultural modernization supposes the inflow to the republic of additional financial means, which should come to it and which will come. It the financial means are used for the fixed purposes, if even not at once, for the middle-term perspective, some modernization steps forward in the republican community will be
achieved, in parallel with certain transformation of the ways of "external" realization of its conflict potential.
If one proceeds from the existing (and rather extensive) postSoviet experience, the most probable variant is realization of the conservative-pessimistic development of the republic. Money will come, but not in full amount of them, prescribed in the corresponding program documents. The republic will get undoubtedly considerable sums of money. The social-economic output will be much less than it was expected. The reasons of this are numerous and well known (corruption at all levels - from the federal to the municipal - of distribution, low level of qualification of executive officials etc.). Nevertheless, some results in the sphere of social-economic and social-cultural modernization of republican society will be achieved. The level of living will rise, and there is a chance for certain improvement of local authorities' functioning. But will these steps forward be sufficient to put social protests into "civilized" channel and will it be possible to reduce the inflow of new cadres in the underground, minimizing its activities?
For the nearest decade, it is almost impossible. There is only a small probability for this in the perspective of 10-20 years. By 2030, though, Ingushi national society will be rather more educated and urbanized (the stratum of "indigenous" city residents may definitely rise); their families will have 2-3 children. However, the modernization will be still far away from its termination.
Up till present, there is no perspective of solving the youth problem - "getting professions" and work by a great part of young Ingushis, having only high education (including ten years). In 2008, only 52% of Ingushis, graduated from high school, entered the specialized education institutions. This group of young people is subject to easier dissemination of radical ideas and extremist practice
(i.e. the source of cadres for TU), and it is the fore-ground for the social-cultural traditionalism and religious fanatic ideas for many decades in the future. The large-scale inflow of young people into the group of youth subjected to religious fanatic ideas prolongs the period of social-cultural and social-professional modernization of the national community; young Ingushis without professional education will constitute a considerable part of the able-bodied republican population till the middle of the XXI century.
At present, a great part of the population in the republic, evidently, lacks the need in qualitative education (consequently in further professional carrier) of the young generation. The lack of the aspiration means the lack of the corresponding social need. The mentioned reasons are as follows: "archaic" characteristic of the republican economy and the developed system of "subsidized" financing, decreasing the value of professional qualification (the comparable sum of money may be earned not by work but via numerous channels of the state social financing or by work in household). At present, this problem has not been solved in the republic. And even efficient ways of its solving have not been "touched".
Thus, the main factors of protests (conflicts) of the national community and "nourishment" of the republican underground in all likelihood will remain also 10-20 years later. However, taking into account the whole complex of dynamic trends in economy and social-cultural sphere, it is possible with good reason to make the prognosis about certain reduction of the protests' "energy" scale. It means that by the period of 2025-2030 a significant rise of terrorist activities seems to be hardly probable comparing with the last two-three years. There are some rather significant circumstances, which prevent a great spread of TU in the republic. One of them is the reduced demographic capacity of
the national community, which is several times less than the number of the Chechen people and of the three main peoples taken together in Dagestan, which participate actively in extremist activities. A certain role is played by the birth rate, which was characterized by sustained reduction in Ingushetia from 1995 to 2005 (if for the first part of the 1990s it made 2.4-2.5% per year, in the second part of the 1990s it diminished to 2.1% and accounted for 1.4% by 2001). Taking into account that the main backbone of bandits' groups is formed by young people at the age of 18-25 years, the demographic resource group will start to reduce essentially already since 2012-2013. The early generation, attaining its majority in 2020, will be inferior by 1.5 time to the present level. The birth rate reduction will continue further in the republic. By 2030, its level will be almost the same like the average Russian index in case of actually any scenario of demographic dynamics in Ingushetia.
The birth rate reduction is only an external display of rather deep and various modernizing progresses, changes in psychological stereotypes and social practices of society. As the number of children in families reduces, the forms of socialization of the new generation change themselves. They attain greater personal feature, orient more to the good education and professional carrier. With due account of significant problem in Ingushi society, it is almost no doubts that the Ingushi youth, attaining its majority in 2020 or in 2030, will be not only much less numerous but also more modernized in terms of its world outlook and life aspirations, than the youth of today.
This educated and less numerous new generations of young people will reduce essentially the chance of the underground to replenish its losses after military actions. Therefore the more probable scenario of republican TU for the next decades will be gradual diminishing of its format and general activities. The variant of total
liquidation of TU for the perspective of 10-20 years is perceived to be unlikely due to preservation for this period of the main factors of conflicts/protests of the national community.
Finally, it should be repeated, as it was said about TU in Chechnya and Dagestan, that even a significant reduction of potential of Ingushi terrorist complex will hardly make it unable to commit terrorist acts in the republic and outside its borders. The people "full of hatred" will appear and be at the disposal of TU for many decades. And the problem of republican terrorism will be present to some extent at this time.
And the last remark should be made. The probable correlation of enumerated dynamic scenarios of TU proceeds from a rather sustainable political and social-economic development of the RF. A significant destabilization of Russia is able to raise "vital" resources of the underground in the republic, will provide it with additional historic chances.
Sergey Slutsky."Terroristskoe podpolye na vostoke Severnogo Kavkaza", R-na-D, 2010, p. 161-186.
O. Khushkadamova,
orientalist
THE WOMEN IN THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL
POWER AND MANAGEMENT IN TAJIKISTAN
The new concept on integrated approach was approved at the forth World Conference of UNO on the women problems and approved in Action program being adopted upon completion of the Conference work. The Peking framework for action (1995) gave a definition of a gender problem, i.e. this is equality of men and women in all the
