The Russian foreign policy toward Central Asia in economic, security and social spheres: a view from Uzbekistan Текст научной статьи по специальности «Политологические науки»

ТЕМАТИЧЕСКОЕ ДОСЬЕ:

Центральная Азия: безопасность и развитие

The Russian Foreign Policy toward Central Asia in Economic, Security and Social Spheres: a View from Uzbekistan

V. Paramonov

Central Eurasia Analytical Group, Tashkent, Uzbekistan

Abstract: After the accession to power of Vladimir Putin and his team in 2000 Russian foreign policy toward Central Asia began to be more clearly focused. Clearly Moscow has brought to its Central Asian policy more flexibility, pragmatism, stability and consistency. This has been made possible largely by its growing understanding of the strategic importance of the region and by the allocation of more funds for foreign policy purposes. As a result, Russia has succeeded in putting the brakes on the centrifugal tendencies of the region, in strengthening its own position and in overcoming the lack of trust. What have been and what will be the effects of all of these? In an attempt to answer this complex question, it is necessary to assess the major elements of Russian foreign policy toward Central Asian. An interdisciplinary approach with the methods of dialectic and structural-functional analysis has been used to achieve this goal. The uniqueness of the ongoing (since 2003) research, which serves as the basis for this article lies within a systematic evaluation of the growing influence of numerous factors (both external and internal) due to which Central Asia is becoming one of the most important geo-economic and geopolitical regions for Russia. The article concludes that Russian foreign policy toward Central Asia can be characterized by certain positive dynamics. Nevertheless, it is still too early to talk about the long-term trends and significant success of Russia. This is due to the rather dynamic processes and internal transformation of the region as well as the growing external impact. Primarily, it is related to the situation in/around Kazakhstan and continued activation of the international policies of Uzbekistan. On the other hand, it seems that Russia still has not employed a unified long-term strategy in Central Asia and has not been able to fill the geopolitical vacuum in the area, still less the geo-economic one. The impression is growing that it continua consider the "strategic importance" of the region mainly in terms of its own revival as a "great power". However, it is essential to stress that in the post-Soviet space only Russia, with its geo-economic and geopolitical strength, could take the role of locomotive for the regional security, economic development, cooperation as well as integration.

Keywords: Russia, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, economy, trade, oil and gas, investments, security, military cooperation, labor migration.

Российская внешняя политика в Центральной Азии в сферах экономики, безопасности и социального взаимодействия: взгляд из Узбекистана

В. Парамонов

Аналитическая группа «Центральная Евразия», Ташкент, Узбекистан

Аннотация. После прихода в 2000 году к власти Владимира Путина и его команды внешняя политика России в Центральной Азии стала ориентирована на более конкретные цели. Очевидно и то, что Москва привнесла в свою центральноазиатскую политику больше гибкости, прагматизма, стабильности и последовательности. Это стало возможным во многом благодаря выросшему пониманию стратегической важности региона и выделению больших финансовых и иных ресурсов на цели внешней политики. В результате России удалось замедлить развитие центробежных тенденций в Центральной Азии, существенно укрепить свои позиции и преодолеть недоверие, сформированное в 1990-ые гг. Каковы современные и будущие последствия этого? В попытке ответить на столь сложный вопрос необходимо оценить основные элементы российской внешней политики в Центральной Азии. Для достижения этой цели использован междисциплинарный подход с применением

методов диалектического и структурно-функционального анализа. Уникальность проводимого (с 2003 г.) исследования, которое служит основой для статьи, заключается в системной оценке растущего влияния многочисленных факторов (как внешних, так и внутренних), благодаря которым Центральная Азия становится одним из наиболее важных геоэкономических и геополитических регионов для России. В статье делается вывод, что внешняя политика России в Центральной Азии характеризуется определенной положительной динамикой. Тем не менее, пока преждевременно говорить о неких долгосрочных тенденциях и значительных успехах России. Это связано с довольно динамичными процессами внутренней трансформации региона, а также растущим внешним воздействием на него. С одной стороны, многое определяется ситуацией в Казахстане и вокруг него, а также продолжающейся активацией международной политики Узбекистана. С другой стороны, похоже, что России до сих пор не удалось выработать долгосрочную и объединенную единым планом стратегию в Центральной Азии. К тому же она так и не смогла заполнить ни геополитический вакуум в регионе, ни тем более геоэкономический. Создается впечатление, что Россия продолжает рассматривать "стратегическую важность" региона главным образом через призму возрождения своего статуса "великой державы". Тем не менее, несмотря на все это также следует признать и тот факт, что на всем постсоветском пространстве только лишь Россия, обладающая соответствующим геоэкономическим и геополитическим потенциалам, способна играть роль локомотива региональной безопасности, социально-экономического развития и интеграции.

Ключевые слова: Россия, Центральная Азия, Казахстан, Кыргызстан, Таджикистан, Туркменистан, Узбекистан, экономика, торговля, нефтегазовый сектор, инвестиции, безопасность, военное сотрудничество, трудовая миграция.

Introduction

The accession to power of Vladimir Putin and his team in 2000 was a turning point for Russia. Russian foreign policy began to be more clearly focused on making Russia one of the centers of modern international relations. The concept of the "multipolar world", propounded by former prime-minister Yevgeny Primakov, remained at the heart of this.1 Moscow realized that recovering Russia's positions in Central Asia2 and other parts of the

1In 2000 the Ministry for Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, which really only existed for presentational purposes, was disbanded and replaced by a Directorate within the Foreign Ministry, headed by the former head of the Foreign Intelligence Agency Vyacheslav Trubnikov. This department was made responsible for coordinating the work of various Russian authorities, notably the Foreign Ministry and the security organizations, in deciding the direction of future Russian policy towards the post-Soviet countries.

2"Central Asia" is taken to mean the area in central

Eurasia comprising five states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) that emerged as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. This definition is somewhat provisional, as there are some geographical peculiarities as well as demographic and other complications in the region. On the other hand, it is a useful label to cover five countries with similar socio-political systems and economies which retain close links with each other and have a great

post-Soviet area was an indispensable step in strengthening Russia's international status. From this point of view, Central Asia began to be considered as a place where the new elements of foreign policy, such as pragmatism and flexibility, could be put into practice.

All this is reflected primarily in economic, security and social spheres.

Economic sphere

Compared with the 1990s, there is now noticeably more activity by Russian business in the economic sphere in Central Asia. Moscow's main strategic interests are in the oil and gas sectors, where most of the Russian investments are. The biggest activity is in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Here Russia's efforts are directed towards location of deposits and transportation of oil and gas. Russian companies, especially Gazprom and Lukoil, are also increasingly active in developing the market for petroleum-based products. Other than in the oil and gas sectors, however, Russia's activity in the economic sphere has not changed very much since the 1990s. One of the main indicators of the extremely low level of Russia's economic activity is the state of trade relations, which

influence on each other in internal and external affairs, in economics, politics, and of course in matters of security.

although they have developed over the course of the last years are still at a low level

Diagram № 13

Trade turnover between Russia and Central Asia, mln. dollars

70000 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 0

After the global financial crisis and sanctions imposed on Russia, which negatively affected Russian-Central Asian economic relations, there was some success of Russia in pushing forward the economic integration in the post-Soviet space in the frames of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). In addition, in recent years there has been a certain tendency to strengthen Russian financial policy, as well as project implementation activities.

According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russia information, the Russian investments in Central Asia already amounts to around 20 billion dollars, and there are about 7500 Russian companies and joint ventures in the region. Based on the same data, for the period from 2007 to 2017, the amount of "financial assistance" of Russia to the Central Asian states (both bilaterally and multilaterally) exceeded 6 bln dollars. Also, the debts of Kyrgyzstan (488 mln dollars) and Uzbekistan (865 mln dollars) were relieved [Lavrov 2017].

3 Sources: Data for 1991 - World Bank: (1997). Kazakhstan: Transition of the State.; (1993). Kyrgyz Republic: The Transition to a Market Economy; (1993, August). Tajikistan: Country Economic Memorandum. Report No. 12692; (1994, May). Turkmenistan; (1996). Uzbekistan: Transition of the State.; data for 1992-2001 period - Asian Development Bank with a reference to the national statistics of CA states: (2002). Indicators of Developing Asia and Pacific Countries; data for 20022018 period - International Trade Centre, calculated based on Federal Customs Service of Russia statistics and UN COMTRADE statistics.

compared with where they were in Soviet times (Diagram № 1).

Furthermore, significant volumes of individual foreign exchange earnings from the Russia to the Central Asian states remain,

primarily as a result of the labor activity. Thus, according to the official Russian data, only for the period 2013-2016, labor migrants - citizens of the Central Asian states transferred more than 37 billion dollars from Russia to Central Asia [Lavrov 2017].

In its turn, only in 2018, both Russian and non-Russian citizens transferred about 10 billion US dollars to Central Asia: about 4.1 to Uzbekistan, 2.5 to Tajikistan, 2.4 to Kyrgyzstan, 0.8 to Kazakhstan and about 0.05 to Turkmenistan4. Considering other forms of money transfers from Russia to the countries of the region, it seems that the volume of financial receipts from individuals can be even higher.

Security sphere

Development of cooperation with the countries of the region in security sphere is probably regarded by Russia the main vehicle for projecting its influence in the region, which is in line with the Kremlin's foreign policy objective to raise its global status. Russia today is pushing even harder for both bilateral and multi-lateral forms of cooperation, with Moscow assuming the role of coordinator in the process of setting up a regional security system. The first step Russia took to implement its policy of practical cooperation was the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) regional anti-terrorist centre for Central Asia in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan)

4 Central Bank of the Russian Federation. (2019). Money transfers from Russia to Uzbekistan in 2018.

in August 2001, which was staffed by personnel from the security services of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Multilateral cooperation. Russia pursues multilateral cooperation primarily within the framework of such organizations as the CIS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Most important of these institutions in the context of Central Asian security is the CSTO. Significance of the CSTO for Russia and the post-Soviet countries is that at present it is the only institution which has a specific military dimension. The most activity in the security sphere today is seen in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Moscow has learned its lesson from its mistakes in the 1990s, which led to an almost complete cessation of activity under the Collective Security Treaty signed in Tashkent in 1992 and has begun to pay far more attention to encouraging the cooperation of the states of the region with Russia.

In 2002 Moscow offered CSTO member countries favorable terms for training their military personnel in Russian military training establishments. They were also offered the chance to acquire Russian weapons and military equipment for CSTO units at internal Russian market prices. Soon after that, in 2003, Russia opened a military air base in Kant (Kyrgyzstan). This base became a component of the CSTO's collective rapid reaction force.

From 2004 onwards Russia stepped up its cooperation activities within the CSTO and put them on a more systematic basis. Thus, at the CSTO summit meeting in Dushanbe in 2007, at Moscow's initiative, two packages of documents were signed which laid the foundations for the creation of a mechanism for CSTO peacekeeping.

In 2004 the annual "Rubezh" ("Frontier") exercises started, aimed at countering threats to regional security. The first joint "Rubezh" exercises were conducted in 2004 in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Subsequent exercises were in Tajikistan (2015, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2018), Kazakhstan (2006), Armenia (2008), Russia (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014), Kyrgyzstan (2016). Moreover, in parallel to the "Rubezh" exercises, since 2012 the exercises "Nerushimoye Bratstvo" ("Unbreakable

Brotherhood") began. The first "Nerushimoye Bratstvo» exercises were conducted in 2012 in Kazakhstan. Subsequent exercises were in Russia (2013 and 2018), Kyrgyzstan (2014), Armenia (2015), Belorussia (2016), Kazakhstan (2017), and Tajikistan (2019).

Bilateral cooperation. There is an acute dependence of the Central Asian countries on Russia, particularly in terms of military security, as well as on military-technical cooperation. The relationships between Russia and the individual countries of Central Asia are generally characterized by mutual trust. This avoids the international squabbles and ambitions which come to the force in more multilateral contexts. Furthermore, bilateral cooperation includes more specific and practical forms of interaction. Particularly, the Russian-Central Asian bilateral military relationships have deeper and closer forms of cooperation and include the following specific features:

-military cooperation (conduct of regular joint exercises; training for military personnel from Central Asian countries in Russian military training establishments; Russia's use of military and research facilities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan);

-cooperation in the field of military equipment supply (Russia's supply of military equipment and provision of services and aftersales service);

-cooperation on issues of defense research, development and manufacturing (Russia's placing of orders for military equipment in Central Asian companies, establishment of joint ventures for the manufacture and repair of military equipment, conduct of the joint research and development work);

-cooperation in space activities (primarily between Russia and Kazakhstan).

For instance, Russia leases about fifteen major military facilities in Central Asia (in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), among which the following major military facilities stand out:

*The "Baikonur" cosmodrome (5 State Trials Range of the Russian Ministry of Defense);situated in the Qyzylorda region of Kazakhstan; there are also several areas in the republic, where the first stages of Russian rockets can land; this is still the only

cosmodrome for launching Russian large manned space rockets of the "Soyuz" or "Proton" types to put orbiting objects into orbit;

*929 State Flying Trials Centre of the Russian Ministry of Defense (named after V Chkalov);the headquarters of this unit is in Akhtubinsk in the Astrakhan oblast' of Russia, but the trials ranges (numbers 85, 171 and 231) are in Atyrau and in the West Kazakhstan region; this centre is used for trials of new weapons and for weapon firing training for Russian Air Force and Naval aviators;

*The "Sari-Shagan" Range (10 State Trials Range of the Russian Ministry of Defense);the polygon is situated in the Qaraghandy, Zhambyl, Aqtobe and Qyzylorda regions of Kazakhstan; it occupies an area of 80,000 square kilometers, extending more than 250 km from north to south and 600 kilometers from east to west; this range is used for trials of air defense (anti-missile and anti-aircraft) missiles and strategic ballistic missiles; a specially-equipped route (the "Kapustin Yar-Sari-Shagan" route) was set up for ballistic missile flights;

*"Balkhash-9" - Independent Radar Node of the Third Independent Missile and Space Defense Army of the Space Forces of the Russian Armed Forces is part of an integrated missile-attack warning system; located in Priozersk, by Lake Balkhash; this facility is also used for recording technical data from trials of missile systems on the "Sari-Shagan" range;

*"Kant" Air Base (999th "Kant" Air Base of the 5th Army of the Russian Air Force and Air Defense Forces);it is located in the town of Kant in the Chuy region of Kyrgyzstan, 20 kilometers from Bishkek; this base accommodates a Group from the Russian Air Force, which is capable of carrying out a wide range of missions, in the event of a serious external threat to a Central Asian country;

*338th Communications Centre of the Russian Navy, in Kara-Balta (Chaldovar) in the Chuy region; this centre enables the headquarters of the Russian Navy to communicate with submarines and surface ships patrolling in the Pacific and Indian Oceans; it is also used for electronic surveillance activity by the headquarters of the Russian Navy;

*954th Anti-submarine Weapon Trials Establishment "Koi-Sary" of the Russian Navy, located in Karakol in the Ysyk-Kol region, on the eastern shore of Lake Ysyk-Kol;

*17th Radio-seismic Laboratory (and 1st Automatic Seismic Station) of the seismographic service of the Russian Ministry of Defense; these are located in the Tian Shan mountains in the Ichke Suu and Majluu Suu districts; they monitor nuclear weapon trials activities; both these units are part of the verification regime for the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty;

*201st Military Base (formerly 201st Division) in Tajikistan; this comprises the following units: Headquarters, 92nd Motor Rifle Regiment, 998th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, 1098th Air Defense Missile Regiment, 783rd Independent Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare Battalion, 1058th Communications Unit, 212th and 252nd Independent Communications Battalions, 295th Psychological Operations Unit, Military Hospital and a number of auxiliary detachments, stationed in Dushanbe; 670th Air Group and 303rd Independent Helicopter Squadron, based at Aini airfield near Dushanbe; 191st Motor Rifle Regiment, stationed in Bokhtar (former Kurgan-Tyube); 149th Motor Rifle Regiment, stationed in Kulyab;

*1109th Independent Electro-optical Unit of the "Nurek" Space Surveillance system (Object 7680)5; this unit is located in the Sanglok mountains near Nurek at a height of 2200m above sea level; its task is to detect ballistic missiles when they are launched and to track them on their trajectories at all altitudes above Eurasia, North and Central Africa and the adjoining waters of the Indian, Pacific and Atlantic Oceans [Paramonov 2008a; Paramonov 2009b]. (Map № 1)6.

5 Kommersant Power Magazine - Russia. (2017, June). Russian military infrastructure in Central Asia. № 23.

6 Ibid.

Social sphere

In recent years there has been a certain tendency to strengthen Russian social policy. This was made easier by the fact that traditionally, the population of Central Asia gravitates towards Russia, Russian culture and the Russian information space. Human contacts between peoples of Russia and Central Asia are well-developed. Even though there is several growing barriers between Russia and Central Asia such as linguistic, cultural, mental, transportation, visa and registration problems, they are still comparatively weak.

For many years, most dynamically developing relations between Russia and the countries of Central Asia have been related to the segment of labor migration. According to the official Russian data of May 2019, at least 4.5 million citizens of Central Asian countries were in Russia, the vast majority of whom were labor migrants:

-from Tajikistan - about 1 million 255 thousand;

-from Uzbekistan - approximately 2 million 99 thousand [Maleva 2019]; according to other sources, their number by the end of 2018 - the

beginning of 2019 could be even higher and reached 2 million 644 thousand people1; -from Kyrgyzstan - about 713 thousand; -from Kazakhstan - approximately 480 thousand [Maleva 2019].

At the same time, the number of Turkmenistan citizens temporarily staying in Russia, and specifically those engaged in labor activity, is relatively small (measured by tens of thousands of people only). For example, in 2018, 98 thousand representatives of Turkmenistan were registered at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and 74 thousand in 20172 The significantly low labor activity of Turkmenistan citizens in Russia is evidenced indirectly by rather small volumes of remittances from the Russian

1 Ministry of Labor of the Republic of Uzbekistan. (2019). The number of labor migrants in Russia.

2 Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2018, January). Some indicators of the migration situation in the Russian Federation for January-December 2017 with a distribution by country and region; Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2019, January). Some indicators of the migration situation in the Russian Federation for January - December 2018 with a distribution by country and region.

Federation to Turkmenistan, measured only in hundreds of thousands of dollars per year1.

Most likely, all of this can be explained by the fact that there is a visa regime between the two countries. This, undoubtedly, complicates the departure of Turkmenistan's citizens to Russia. It is also important to highlight that most Turkmenistan labor migrants are in Turkey, a country with which Turkmenistan does not have a visa regime.

Yet, in recent years there has been a certain tendency towards an increase in the number of labor migrants from the states of the region, primarily from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. This is indicated by the results of a study conducted by the Institute of Social Analysis and Forecasting of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. According to the Institute that refers to the Russian Federal Migration Service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as of May 1, 2019, the number of citizens of Central Asian countries temporarily staying in Russia increased by at least 450 thousand people:

-from Tajikistan - by 171 thousand; -from Uzbekistan - by 173 thousand; -from Kyrgyzstan - by 73 thousand; -from Kazakhstan - by 25 thousand [Maleva 2019].

As of Turkmenistan, according to the results of 2018, the number of its citizens temporarily staying in the territory of Russia increased approximately by 24 thousand people compared to the previous year2.

Relations between Russia and Central Asian countries have recently been developing quite dynamically in the educational segment, too. The evidence shows a steady increase in the number of students from the states of the region studying in Russia. According to the Russian Federal State Statistics Service, there were at least 130 thousand people at the beginning of the 2017 academic year:

-from Kazakhstan - more than 64 thousand; -from Uzbekistan - more than 24 thousand; -from Turkmenistan - more than 21 thousand;

-from Tajikistan - more than 16 thousand;

1 Central Bank of the Russian Federation. (2019). Money transfers from Russia to Uzbekistan in 2018.

2 Ibid.

-from Kyrgyzstan - more than 6 thousand.

As a result, the number of students from Central Asian countries increased by about 8 thousand compared to the previous academic year3.

However, the abovementioned information might be somewhat inaccurate, and the number of students from Central Asian countries located in the Russian Federation maybe even more. This can, particularly, be supported by the Russian Foreign Ministry data, according to which, at the end of 2017, about 150 thousand students from Central Asia were studying in Russia, about 46 thousand of whom received scholarships from the Russian federal budget [Lavrov 2017].

Some statements of the Russian officials, responsible for the development of educational contacts, also justify a steadily growing number of the Central Asian students in Russia. Thus, according to their information, about 15 600 students from Kyrgyzstan were studying in Russia in 20194 that indicates more than a double increase compared to 2017.

However, the number of Central Asian students in higher educational institutions of Russia may be even greater, considering the distance learning mode. Some evidence with a reference to the Russian Ministry of Education indirectly shows that the number of students from Kazakhstan studying in Russia was about 100 thousand people (and not 61 thousand) in 2017-2018, "many of whom are studying remotely"5.

Conclusion

After the advent to power, Vladimir Putin and his team adopted a new Russian policy towards Central Asia, which became more clearly focused on cooperation, especially in economic, security and social spheres. Compared with the 1990s, Russia's foreign policy activity in Central Asia was much more vigorous, and the multiple declarations about the "need to develop closer ties of cooperation"

3 Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation. (2018). Russia in numbers: official publication. Brief statistical compilation.

4 Sputnik Information Agency - Russia. (2019, March). Interview with Eleanora Mitrofanova, the head of the Federal Agency for CIS Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation.

5 Today.kz Information Portal (2018, May). How many Kazakhstan students study abroad?

began to be matched by action for the first time. Besides, during the last years, Russia has succeeded in putting the brakes on the centrifugal tendencies of the region, strengthening its positions and in general, overcoming the lack of trust which had accumulated during the 1990s. In turn, the Russian direction gradually became a priority in the policy of all Central Asian countries. This was made easier by the fact that since the collapse of the Soviet Union the Central Asian countries had maintained, overall, friendly relations with Russia.

As a result, Russia operates in Central Asia independently and without watching the reaction of other force centers, and there is some tangible success in the development of numerous joint integration institutions with their interaction being grounded. It is worth to mention the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization among them. It seems, that relations between Russia and Central Asia have been strengthening in all spheres due to the historical community, geographical neighborhood, social-cultural closeness, and common institution grounds. Moreover, having not fully destroyed the soviet heritage, Russia reserves the privileged right to be the chief foreign partner of the Central Asian countries.

Nevertheless, despite all these changes, it is still too early to talk about certain stable trends and significant success of the Russian foreign policy toward Central Asia. On the one hand, it is linked with rather dynamic internal transformation processes, taking place in the states of region, as well as the growing influence of China, of the Islamic world and, somehow, of the West. The Central Asian countries, for their part, continue with their efforts to diversify their foreign connections, contributing to increasing competition in this geo-economic and geopolitical space.

On the other hand, it looks like Russia has not yet developed a coherent strategy, defining the position of the region with respect to its long-term national interests. There is an impression that it still understands the "strategic importance" of Central Asia mainly in terms of its "great power" revival. Furthermore the extreme tardiness, caution and lack of initiative

by the Russian foreign ministry, analytical/research organizations (and there are very few of them in Russia focusing on Central Asia), and the lack of analytical studies of the region or any demand for them, have also contributed to the failure of Russia to form a coherent policy towards Central Asia.

Overall, however, the Central Asian dimension was and remains a secondary matter in the Kremlin's list of strategic priorities. Moscow has still not understood that Central Asia is important not only for raising Russia's status in the world, but even more importantly for the effective and comprehensive economic and social development of Russia itself. More than anything, this is about maintaining and advancing its abilities in industrial innovation in a globalized economy. The most glaring evidence of this is the fact that the Eurasian Economic Union still has not achieved its main aim: the creation of a fully-developed economic community.

It seems, Russia increased political and security activities in the region, however, unsupported by adequate development of economic integration, is unlikely to guarantee that the process of rapprochement between Russia and Central Asia, observable today, cannot be reversed. Furthermore, if economic links stay at the present low level, the Central Asian countries are will be bound to develop links with global centers of economic power other than Russia. The rich mineral resources of the region will be a magnet for much fiercer competition between external powers and economic groupings than there has been so far. It is not a foregone conclusion that Russia, with its raw material based export economy and its weakened industrial and technological position, would win this competition.

However, it is also essential to stress that in the post-Soviet space only Russia, with its geo-economic and geopolitical strength, could take the role of locomotive for the regional development, cooperation as well as integration. But Russia's role can only be heightened in Central Asia if it is as active in developing the region's economic, security and social progress in the 21st century as it was from the later 19th century until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The more this is recognized the more we shall be able to talk about

fundamental changes in Russian foreign policy in Central Asia.

References

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Paramonov, V., Strokov, A. (2004). New Strategy of Russia: Regionalization versus Globalization.

Swindon: Conflict Studies Research Center of the Defense Academy of the UK. Paramonov, V., Strokov, A. (2006). Russia and Central Asia: Current and Future Economic

Relations. Swindon: Conflict Studies Research Center of the Defense Academy of the UK. Paramonov, V., Strokov, A. (2007). Structural Interdependence of Russia and Central Asia in the Oil and Gas Sectors. - Swindon: Conflict Studies Research Center of the Defense Academy of the UK.

Paramonov, V., Strokov, A. (2007). The Evolution of Russia's Central Asian Policy. Swindon:

Advanced Research and Assessment Group of the Defense Academy of the UK. Paramonov, V., Stolpovsky, О. (2008). Russia and Central Asia: Bilateral Cooperation in the Defence Sector. Swindon (UK): Advanced Research and Assessment Group of the Defense Academy of the UK.

Paramonov, V., Strokov, A. and Stolpovsky, O. (2009). Russia in Central Asia: Politics, Security and Economics. New-York (USA).

About the autor: Paramonov Vladimir, Ph.D., D.Sc. Coordination Methodological Center on the Contemporary History of Uzbekistan under the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Founder of the Central Eurasia Analytical Group and Internet Project [www.ceasia.org] (Tashkent, Uzbekistan), (v_paramonov@yahoo.com).

Об авторе: Парамонов Владимир, кандидат политических наук, доктор философии / Ph.D., D.Sc. докторант Координационно-методического центра современной истории Узбекистана при Академии наук Республики Узбекистан, основатель Аналитической группы "Центральная Евразия" и одноименного интернет-проекта [www.ceasia.org] (Ташкент, Узбекистан), (v_paramonov@yahoo.com).