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This author analyses the 2013 Lithuanian presidency of the EU in the context of the Ukrainian crisis and evaluates the contribution of Latvia and Estonia (the former Soviet republics set to preside over the EU in 2015 and 2018) to the shift in the power balance in the post-Soviet space. Through assessing the actions of small countries in promoting the Eastern Partnership programme with an emphasis on the anti-Russian agenda, the author concludes that they will inflict harm on the EU in a long-term perspective. These former Soviet republics no longer rely on mere diplomacy, but resort to a whole new problematic narrative, where Russia is described as an "aggressive and unpredictable neighbour" that poses the "threat from the East." Being more mobile, small countries are able to concentrate power and resources in one or several key areas. This makes it possible for these countries to take advantage of international politics (even if the consequences of such steps are miscalculated) and "feed" on it through — sometimes consciously — creating "conflict nodes" in the relations between major players. This is especially true in the case of states that do not bear responsibility for global stability.
Key words: Baltics, Eastern Partnership, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, small states.
The crisis in Ukraine has questioned the efficiency of the existing system of checks and balances in international relations. Unlike major geopolitical actors playing in the Ukrainian field, the actions of small nations in the
Baltic region. 2014. № 4 (22). P. 42—50.
THE ROLE
OF SMALL COUNTRIES IN POST-SOVIET TERRITORIAL RESTRUCTURING: THE BALTIC CASE
V. Smirnov*
* Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University. 14 A. Nevski St., Kaliningrad, 236041, Russia
Submitted on August 5, 2014 doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2014-4-3 © Smirnov V., 2014
current situation in Ukraine usually remain unnoticed by researchers. This holds true for the three Baltic states, after the EU presidency of one of which — Lithuania — the Ukrainian situation entered its acute phase. Lithuania was the first former Soviet Republic to preside over the EU. Can the situation in Ukraine developing during the Lithuanian precedence be interpreted as a precedent? Answering this question requires analysing the prospects of the other "post-Soviet" presidencies: Latvia will head the EU at the beginning of 2015 and Estonia in 2018.
The Ukrainian "fire," which followed the Lithuanian presidency, calls for meticulous attention to the role that the Baltics strive to play in the postSoviet space — a territory that remains unsteady a quarter century after the collapse of the USSR.
The status of a "small power" (as interpreted by R. Rothstein)1 determines the capabilities of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The Russian political scientist M. Ilyin — the author of a state typology based on J. Colomer's ideas [5] — defined small powers as follows: they have a small territory and population, a pronounced dependency complex (however, in some cases they can strive for a relatively independent foreign and domestic policy), whereas their priority function is "adjusting" international relations [16]. However, the currently increasing interdependence makes it possible to speak not only of "adjustment" but also of a significant impact on the decisions and actions of larger states. However, Ilyin argues small powers are incapable of taking an independent position: situated along the axes of mega- and macro-state, small powers can move away from these axes and create more or less wide belts, arcs, and nodes [15].
The leading states have a wide range of tools to achieve their foreign policy objectives based on military, socio-political, economic, and ideological resources. M. Lebedeva stresses that great powers, nevertheless, cannot use the whole range of resources at a time (at least, due to their high cost).
1 R. Rothstein defined a small power as a state that "recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power's belief in its inability to do so must also be recognized by the other states involved in international politics" [12]. It can be juxtaposed with Lithuania's position on the eve of accession to the EU: "Lithuania as a small country with limited economic and demographic resources is not able to implement its foreign and security policy globally alone." For more detail, see [8]. L. Linkevicius was Minister of National Defence at the time and Minister of Foreign Affairs during Lithuania's presidency in 2013.
Further, she identifies a drift towards socio-political and humanitarian resources, which are less costly and can be disseminated using modern technologies. Also, she emphasises the ongoing process of the fragmentation of resource potential. Therefore, if the whole range of resources is unavailable to a certain "player," they focus on one of them [18].
The range of small states' functional capabilities is limited to acting as a buffer zone, diplomatic mediator, barrier state, geopolitical gateway, or periphery [7]. Due to the peripheral and transit position of the country, the set of functions will be determined by the actions of leading states. This idea corresponds to the thesis advanced by A. Bogaturov that the Baltics did not become major players in global politics but rather strived to accumulate their political, ideological, and financial-economic capital through playing on the relations between Russian and the West, and Russia and the USA, actually, "feeding" on them [14] by taking advantage of "conflict nodes."
In the conditions of absent or limited resources for promoting their interests in the international arena, small states concentrate on diplomacy. The most efficient tool is to form coalitions based both on the territorial principle (for instance, the Nordic and Baltic minister (NB6) working breakfast before each meeting of the EU's Foreign Affairs Council) and the problem-based one [13] (it is small powers that insist on keeping the Eastern Partnership2 at the top of the EU agenda, they also united against the appointment of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs F. Mogherini the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in July 2014).
Motieka and Statkus stress that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia adhere to a pro-US geopolitical agenda considering the US the major guarantor of the country's sovereignty, since (1) the USA did not acknowledge the legitimacy of incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the USSR, and (2) the country considers the US a counterbalance to Russia's geopolitical ambitions in the Baltic region. For the US, the Baltics are a "wedge" between Europe
2 The Eastern Partnership was initiated by Poland and Sweden in 2009. Moscow was given the role of an observer that can make comments but cannot affect the process. The need to create the EP was explained by the 2008 conflict in Georgia and the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine. The programme is aimed at further restructuring of the post-Soviet space, and accelerated political rapprochement and economic integration between the EU and Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The Russian leadership regards projects based on the "zero-sum game" logic as unproductive one interpreting them as interference with integration processes with Russian participation.
and Russia, as well as "agents of influence" in the EU (alongside other countries of Central and Eastern Europe). Despite the possible cost of playing this role, Lithuania's elite consider the pro-American agenda a better scenario than its absence or replacement thereof with an exceptionally pro-European one [9].
The problem of "double allegiance" [4] (the need to act in line with the common European policy developed by the major European powers and to display loyalty to the Atlantic foreign policy vector3) shapes a specific style of behaviour in the political elite of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in the international arena, which can be described as regression from the status of a buffer area to the role of provocateurs in the post-Soviet space. This became especially evident in the course of the Ukrainian crisis, which followed the unsuccessful Eastern Partnership summit in November 2013. "The Vilnius summit became the trigger of a gun that fired a shot on the squares in Ukraine's capital" [21].
The thesis of the EU's Eastern policy as "a geopolitical battle with Russia over the common neighbourhood" [11] had been adopted by Lithuania long before it assumed presidency over the EU. The Lithuanian political elite, that has undergone little change since the days of Saudis, shows an alarmist attitude towards Russia, which is based on equating the notion pro-European and anti-Russian. This is multiplied by that Lithuania sees itself as a "missionary" of transformations in the post-Soviet space. For example, one of the leaders of the major Lithuanian political party Lithuanian Christian Democrats, the longstanding Prime Minister A. Kubilius presented in 2007 the Russia Containment Strategy (in 2014, he published an upgraded version). In particular, it relies on the thesis that the increased presence of the US in Europe will drive Russia away and the belief that Lithuania in collaboration with its neighbours and the US should become an architect of a new neighbourhood policy. In 2004, when Lithuania acceded to the European Union, an agreement endorsed by the major parliamentary parties was reached. It formulated the goals of Lithuania's foreign policy until 2008, including the launch of democratic processes in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the states of the South Caucasus, as well as the Kaliningrad region [2]. In a cross-party agreement for 2008—2012, Lithuania sets the target of becoming a hub for joint regional initiatives and a centre for promoting Euroatlantic values. The first priority on the list of key foreign policy objectives is facilitating the further enlargement of the EU and
3 A characteristic example of such policy is a meeting of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian leaders with President Obama in August 2013 in Washington, which stressed the "geostrategic importanc" of Ukraine's Eurointegration and the success of the Vilnius summit. For more detail see [10].
NATO focusing on Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and the countries of the South Caucasus. It also stresses the significance of the Eastern vector of the European neighbourhood policy and makes it clear what neighbour poses a threat to security [3]. The most recent document of this kind is dated March 29, 2014. It raises the issue of Stalin's rule, condemns Russia for aggression against Ukraine, and attempts to revise the history of the 20th century and destroy the system of international relations, etc. Such "minor details" as democracy in the Kaliningrad region are not mentioned — this is a document of a different scale: Lithuania aims to bring the Eastern Partnership target countries close to the Euroatlantic community as soon as possible. Official Vilnius aims to achieve this target until 2020 [1].
Latvia and Estonia pursue a similar policy. However, they do not strive for a leading position in developing scenarios for the post-Soviet space. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia constantly portray Russia as threat. The Baltics regret that the did not manage to open the eyes of Europe4 to "Russian aggression" against Georgia despite their overall support for Saakashvili's regime (several years later, he was accused of a series of criminal offences, repressions, and fraud; however the Baltic leadership turned a blind eye to these facts). The Estonian political scientist A. Kasekamp believes that the Georgian conflict was a paradigm shift for Estonians. Nevertheless it did not have the same effect on the major European actors, which interpreted the attempts of Baltic politicians to strengthen support for Georgia as encouraging imprudence. However, he stresses that the work with the target Eastern Partnership states should be continued. To this end, the Estonian Centre of Eastern Partnership has been operating in Tallinn since 2011 under the umbrella of the Estonian diplomatic school and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Centre focuses on training officials and diplomats from the EP countries [6].
According to experts, the annual losses of the Baltics, associated with the politicised relations with Russia, account for 9—10 % of the countries' GDP. Over the last four years, Estonia and Latvia have lost approximately 10,100 m USD. In the case of Lithuania, which strives to set the tone for the Baltic foreign policy, losses amount to 15,000 m USD. Using the fear of Russia, the Baltics generate distrust not only of the countries neighbouring the EU but also of fellow EU members (despite that the Union is based on the principles of trust, interconnection, and interdependence) [19].
4 The Baltics took a more aggressive position during the Ukraine crisis driving the EU to the maximum deterioration of relations with Russia and NATO to an "adequate response."
It is worth noting Lithuania's initiative for reforming the Eastern Partnership programme which had been announced a year before the country assumed presidency over the EU. Riga does not seem to have realised that the Eastern Partnership is turning from a programme aimed at the stability and prosperity of target countries into a source of geopolitical turbulence and a direct threat to the stability of target countries' statehood. On the contrary, the country is following the example of the Lithuanian elite who contributed to the maximum deterioration of relations between their state and Russia in the course of their EU presidency. Riga suggested naming the US a key partner in the EU's Eastern politics and turning the Eastern Partnership into the Euroatlantic Eastern Partnership offering the target countries the prospect of full membership in the EU [20]. The USA entering the Eastern Partnership as a key partner will significantly increase the conflict potential of the programme driving the EU to the periphery of political activity in the post-Soviet space.
A lack of deliberation and haste5 characteristic of the actions and statements of Baltic politicians in the international arena (some of them are intentionally arrogant, aimed to create "conflict nodes" rather than solve problems and use simplified ideological schemes) show that the perception of diplomacy as a resource can be rather distorted, which points to the mediocrity of the elites6 of these peripheral states.
One can expect that the further "post-Soviet" EU presidencies will increase the level of toxicity of the Russia containment policy against the background of ongoing attempts to restructure the post-Soviet space using the Cold war techniques. In the end, it will contradict the strategic interests of Europe. Such ac-
5 One can recall the hasty support of the US military strike against Syria in September 2013.
6 In this respect, M. Kaveshnikov is right to mention that "the system problem that small powers pose for the world order relates to the gap between the increased capabilities of small powers and a lack of strategic vision and responsibility, consumer attitudes, and a low quality of political elites characteristic of small states." Defining provincialism as a "state of mind" of the ruling elites of a number of small power, he stresses that Polish and Baltic politicians - while understanding the limits to their influence in the EU - use a simple way to increase their significance. Presenting the EU-Russian relations as constant escalation of a conflict, they claim the status of the first "defence line" in the fight with the "evil from the East [17]. This observation is rather accurate; it is sufficient to acquaint oneself with the statements of key Baltic politicians made over the recent decades. There is no need to give any remarkable examples - all of them are rather similar and boil down to the idea that "the enemy is at the gate."
tions of small powers can create new risks to the European security system. It becomes increasingly possible as the international system loses its stability. Small powers are mobile. They are capable of rapid concentration of forces and resources in one or several key areas. Therefore, they can take advantage of the international political situation using the "seesaw" of "double allegiance". Moreover, they strive not only to "feed on" it but also to be pr0active (even if the consequences of such actions are not accurately calculated), thus sometimes creating "conflict nodes" in the relations of major players. It is especially true for states that do not bear responsibility for global stability. In their case, the line between a rapid response to changes in the global arena and an evident provocation becomes so thin that it can be easily disregarded.
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About the author
Dr Vadim Smirnov, Senior Research Fellow, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Russia.
E-mail: [email protected]
