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The role of «guardian-spender» framework within the budgetary approach Myasnikova G. (Russian Federation)
Роль модели «guardian-spender» в контексте бюджетного подхода Мясникова Г. В. (Российская Федерация)
Мясникова Галина Вячеславовна /Myasnikova Galina - магистр, кафедра «Менеджмент организации», факультет международного промышленного менеджмента,
Балтийский государственный технический университет «ВОЕНМЕХ» им. Д. Ф. Устинова»,
г. Санкт-Петербург
Abstract: the article considers the «guardian-spender» framework by Aaron Wildavsky. The «guardian-spender» framework allows analyzing the relationships among parties of interest involved in the budgeting process. Аннотация: статья рассматривает модель «guardian-spender», описанную А. Вилдавски. Модель «guardian-spender» позволяет проанализировать взаимоотношения сторон, вовлеченных в процесс бюджетирования на государственном уровне.
Keywords: budgeting, institutional theory, changes in budgeting practices, «guardian-spender» framework. Ключевые слова: бюджетирование, институциональная теория, изменения в бюджетных практиках, модель «guardian-spender».
Budgeting nowadays is not only an economic but a political tool [5]. Wildavsky proposed a concept of the budgetary process where behavioral expectations depend on institutional positions, and the participants of the budgetary process play two basic roles: treasury guardians and spenders (program spending advocates). The «spender-guardian» framework defined the way in which many academics conceptualized budgeting since 1964 [1].
The Treasury Board with its secretariat and the Ministry of Finances represent the guardians as they control and coordinate the budget process in accordance to the schedule, while the program agencies that are responsible for such fields as education and health program are the advocates of program spending [2]. Guardians and advocates interplay in a complex manner: administrative institutions (agencies) act as advocates of enlarged expenditures as they know that the center will impose the limit, and the central control organs operate as guardians of the treasury knowing that agencies push expenditures in a hard manner [4]. Guardians oversee the whole budget and try to ensure that total of all budget allocations does not lead to overexpenditures, unwanted deficit, or unsustainable debts, while spenders anxious about providing programs and services with the sufficient quantity and the quality to meet the growing demands of citizens they serve [1]. Spenders are not preoccupied with the budget as a whole because they know guardians are, and guardians do not develop and protect expenditure programs because that is spenders» job [1]. Wildavsky states that there is an inherent conflict resulting from «spender-guardian» interactions as necessary for budget decisions resolving; but their functions separation allows to minimize the contradictions in views, because without a cooperation between actors, there would be no agreements and hence no budget [1]. Despite the conflict, they must also cooperate [4].
The Department of Finance»s budget function include: responsibility for budget preparing; developing tax and tariff policy legislation, administering main transfers of federal funds to regions, managing financial borrowings of financial markets [1]. Good also describes the budget functions of Treasury Board that include: responsibilities for managing the governments financial, personnel and administrative responsibilities [1].
Wildavsky argued that budgetary outcomes could best be described and examined by examining the interactions of budget players that perform stylized institutional roles of guardians and spenders [4]. This behavioral framework established reasonably flexible to account for the differences in budgetary performance across various political systems and explaining the role of budgetary reform and divergent economic environments on budget politics [3]. Sometimes, however, some actors can perform multiple functions at the same time at different stages of process [3]. For instance, the Department of Finances may be spenders because they design some expenditure as tax expenditures and at the same time they ration limited funding among a few competing departments [1]. Or at the early stage some department heads can be spenders and advocate for funding from central guardians, but then become guardians at later stages as they allocate funding within their departments and agencies [1]. So the roles can remain the same, but the functions can differ. The «guardian-spender» framework has become accepted by parties in international bodies such as OESD, World Bank, IMF and national governments for describing the budgetary process [1].
Different researches corroborate the continued relevance of the Wildavsky «guardians-spenders» framework for studying budgetary reforms, because it provides a diagnostic methodology for New Public Management impact evaluating [3]. Despite the actor’s roles in Wildavsky’s model are imprecisely defined, it could vary in according to the budgeting systems in different countries and allows to analyze budget reforms because of its breadth and width.
References
1. Good D. A. (2007). The politics of public money: spenders, guardians, priority setters and financial watchdogs inside the Canadian government. University of Toronto Press Incorporated, Canada.
2. Imbeau L. (2006). Are Wildavsky’s Budgetary Roles Still Relevant: A content analysis of policy speeches in Quebec, 1980-2004. / Paper presented at the annual conference of the Canadian Political Science Association, Toronto, June. 2006.
3. Kelly J., Wanna J. (2000). New Public Management and the Politics of Government Budgeting, International Public Management Review, 1(1): 33-55.
4. Wildavsky A. (1986). Budgeting: a comparative theory of budgetary processes, by Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
5. Wildavsky A. B., & Swedlow, B. (2001). Budgeting and governing. New Brunswick, N. J., U.S.A: Transaction Publishers.
