The Role of Civil Society in Liberal Democracy. The Czech Republic Thirty Years Down the Road Текст научной статьи по специальности «Политологические науки»

Karel B. Muller

O

The Role of Civil Society in Liberal Democracy. The Czech Republic Thirty Years Down the Road

Abstract. The major dilemma of the post-communist countries in Central Europe (CE) is epitomized by the tension between democratic transformation as an attempt to build civil society and to foster the rule of law within the nation state, on one level, while on another level, Europeanization as both a consequence of globalization and a reaction to it, which made the nation state obsolete. Thirty years have passed since the beginning of democratic reforms. We are halfway through to completing our democratic transformation, if we look to the famous prophecy of R. Darendorf, who said that we need at least 60 years to build a civil society. At the moment, in terms of creating liberal and democratic institutions, we can see among the post-socialist countries of the Visegrad Group a worrying backlash and decline. I believe that this decline is the main threat to democracy in the CE countries (and beyond), which is heading towards what political scientists call institutional or even state capture.

Key words: civil society, Central and Eastern Europe, Czech Republic, Visegrad group, liberal democracy.

© Karel B. Muller - Ph.D., Prof., Head of the Department of Political Science Faculty of International Relations, University of Economics in Prague. E-mail: karel.muller@vse.cz

1. Values of Civil Society1

In my paper, I follow (and combine) two perspectives (Müller 2006).

2 Firstly, Giddens's approach of reflexive modernization. Secondly, Tocqueville's

^ approach to the theory of democracy, according to which civil society is a

§ prerequisite for the existence of liberal democracy and performs four vital

m functional dimensions. These are the defensive, legitimizing, participative,

and integrative dimensions. These four functional dimensions are cited with

5 varying degrees of emphasis by all authors dealing with the issue of civil

< society (Cohen, Arato 1999; Keane 1988, 1998; Seligman 1992; Shils 1992;

i Taylor 1990; Tester 1992). Below we will look at these individual dimensions i ii

in greater detail.

The main value of civil society lies in its extra-political nature and its independence from state power, and in its ability to maintain this independence. Civil society should above all be capable of acting as a defense against the potential expansionism of state power (Cohen, Arato 1999). It is a part of the European historical experience that every power, often in the name of efficiency and the ability to mobilize itself, tends to gravitate towards centralization, this increases the risk of the abuse of power. This is where the defensive function of civil society comes into play.

The legitimizing function of civil society is based on the fact that it is civil society that, through its independence and autonomy, creates the social resources of political power and gives the state and its government legitimacy (Tester 1992). The power of the state or the government is only legitimate when it can enjoy the trust of its citizens. The extra-political status of civil society guarantees, among other things, that political power is executed 'rationally', as civil society establishes public opinion independently of political power. Nonetheless, for political power, this public opinion has a binding and normative character. It is not possible in any democracy to rule for any real period if the government conflicts with public opinion. But for it to be possible to form public opinion, civil society must constitute a relatively large structure within which social interests and priorities that condition and substantiate the democratic state and the policy of the government are consistently articulated, agreed upon, and verified.

A third dimension is a participative function (Fullinwider 1999). Civil society ought to facilitate the more effective involvement of citizens in the o public sphere than established political parties. If someone wants to block the construction of a gas station or promote the construction of a children's < playground, they don't need to enter into politics to do so — say, at the com- ¡^ munal level, attending party meetings and paying membership fees — nor is

1 This and the next chapter are based on my earlier work (Müller 2006).

it necessary, at the opposite extreme, that they wait for the next elections.

Broadly based civic participation may consist of the massive mobilization of

2 resources that is facilitated by the widespread dissemination of information

^ and knowledge, which helps ensure that the process of democratic political

§ decision-making is of higher quality. Instead of political centralization, civil

m participation involves multi-levelled decentralization, which provides citizens

with an unobstructed link to public administration and, potentially, access to

5 the process of political decision-making. It leads to the more economical and

< more effective use of material resources. The nature of interest groups, and

i specifically their focus on a particular problem or issue, means that they are i ii

generally able to recognize or identify serious risks or dangers much sooner than political parties are, and they are also able to propose useful solutions. It is then up to the public and the politicians to assess this group action and how they react to it.

Last, but not the least important, expectation associated with civil society is the fact that within its relationships of affinity and loyalty are formed, and this is civil society's integrative function (Seligman 1992). From our repeated involvement in the goings-on of civil society, we eventually come to realize that for our voice to be heard and our interests to be considered we need to join forces with someone else. In an egalitarian and democratic society, if we want to be of influence and effect change we must work together with others. This in turn engenders a sense of belonging to or affinity with an interest group. More broadly there then emerges a sense of belonging to the society as a whole and identifying with the given political system. Civil society creates room for the reproduction of shared symbols, values, and norms. But it is not about everyone being able to achieve their interests. It is necessary to consider the character of the political process, not just its outcome. The feeling that our wants or requirements are being heard is important, and even if they are not being acted on at the moment, it is possible to try and assert them again any time in the future (Taylor 1990).

Inspired by Giddens' approach (Giddens 1990) to an analysis of the nature of contemporary modern societies, I define the functional dimensions in relations between civil society and the democratic state as depicted below in Figure 1. 2

The above-mentioned functions can be plotted in Figure 1 as follows. o In this figure, the outer circle represents the whole of the civil public and the small circle around the center of the sphere of political power. At the top end of the vertical axis is the protective function, which is an analogy of the con- ¡^ cept of "negative freedom" (Giddens (1990) speaks of emancipatory politics). At the opposite end of the vertical axis is the participative function, which, conversely, corresponds to the concept of "positive freedom" (corresponding

O

u <

1= O

< I

<

I LU

3

Figure 1. The functional dimension in relations between the civil society and democratic state

Drntnrt I ri

Legitimization

Participation

Source: Müller 2006

to Giddens' "life politics"). The legitimizing function of the civil public is at the right end of the horizontal axis, the entire right half of which indicates the mutual dependency and interconnectedness of civil public and the liberal and democratic state. At the left end of the horizontal axis is social integration, the value that expresses the fact that the civil public is capable of reproducing and integrating itself as a society, but also illustrates the fact that civil public is integrated within the framework of a single political system. The process of democratic decision-making, as Taylor argues (1990), cannot take place in a society in which the members do not see themselves as members of one society. Two axes represent stronger links, and dotted lines represent weaker links, nevertheless, all four dimensions form the content of the shifting dynamics in the relationship between civil public and their political institutions.

Silhouetted against this Figure 1 it is possible to detect two of the key-value dimensions of liberal democracy: human freedom and security. The vertical axis represents the values of human individuality, freedom, and particular interests. In the social sciences, these issues tend usually to be the o subject of research focusing on the agency (the agency approach). The horizontal axis represents the value dimensions of social cohesion and shared < norms. In the social sciences, this level of research tends to be the subject of ¡^ macro-theoretical analyses focusing on society as a whole and its structural nature and aspects. The social sciences usually refer to this analysis as the structural or the structural-functional approach. It may perhaps be said that

• Figure 2. Values of Modern Democracy

Ds

Actor / Activity

the vertical axis represents the more liberal values, while the horizontal axis represents rather republican values and convictions (Figure 2).

2. Risks of Democracy

The level of utopianism that is present in Figure 1 is reduced and a dose of skepticism or realism is added to the configuration to produce the image in Figure 3. This figure represents a configuration of the serious risks and causes that are connected to the failure of the process of democratic political decision-making and which can occur in the relationships between civil society and the democratic state and seriously threaten their cohesion and reciprocal dynamics. This refers to the loss of legitimacy of political institutions, a decline in political participation, uncontrolled growth of state surveillance, and finally the threat of social atomization or even anomy. There are certainly numerous connections that exist between these risks, and in this respect, Figure 3 may offer a new cognitive tool for use in both theoretical and empirical o analyses. Let us take a brief look at each of the dimensions.

One of the most serious hidden dangers in the democratic political < process is the excessive centralization and concentration of political pow- ¡^ er, which is accompanied by an increased risk of its abuse. As Tocqueville (Tocqueville 1968) convincingly demonstrated, democracy, owing to its

Figure 3. The risks in modern democracies

O

u <

1= O

< I

<

I LU

3

State Surveillance Bureaucratization Centralization

Fragmentation Anomy

of Legitimacy /

Civic Apathy

Source: Müller 2006

love of equality, is particularly susceptible to succumbing to this danger. The formation of democratic mechanisms aimed at protecting inequality and at the elimination of privileges — in the name of equal treatment and equal material security — leads to the gradual accumulation of power in the hands of the centralized state. To achieve democratic equality, the state becomes regulator, advisor, teacher, and judge, a kind of shelter for a forming power that presents itself less and less as the source of violence and more and more as the guarantor of public interest. The power of civil society that is democratically entrusted in the state then turns against the freedom of civil society. While the growth of state power for the efficiency and alertness of the state is a tendency that may at first glance appear commendable or even necessary, its consequences can be social atomization, the loss of legitimacy, and even a decline in social cohesion.

The legitimizing function of civil society also serves to counter yet another risk — the danger of the loss of legitimacy on the part of the state and 2 its political institutions. The democratic state loses the trust of its citizens o when it is incapable of apprehending their interests. Without the trust of the citizenry, the state and political institutions cannot effectively and demo- < cratically operate and govern, the laws of the state cease to be effective, and ¡^ the entire political system is put in jeopardy. But to establish and maintain the necessary ties of trust between citizens and the state, political parties are inadequate. The low level of trust in political institutions among citizens is

cited by many as the main obstacle in the democratic transformation of the post-communist CE states. If political institutions lose their legitimacy the 2 probable consequences are a decline in political participation, the unregulated ^ growth of state power, the deterioration of social cohesion, and the emergence § of social cleavages.

go The third risk of modern democracy is a decline in political and civic par-

ticipation and a reduction of the public's ability to influence the processes of 5 public decision. This may of course be a result, for example, of alienation from < political institutions owing to their loss of legitimacy. Declining participation i establishes generally inauspicious conditions, which tend only to be favorable

LU

to the reinforcement of oligarchic tendencies. The fewer acute problems that civil society is capable of solving by itself through the active participation of its members, the more the state must intervene. Furthermore, if what Giddens says is true (Giddens 1990: 156), that a sign of modernity is the fact that self-realization becomes a fundamental factor in the formation of individual identity, then there is a direct link between civic participation and group or individual identity, and a decline in civic participation can thus ultimately lead also to the serious erosion of social cohesion.

Finally, there is also the danger of social fragmentation, which may result from both centralization and a decline in political and civic participation, as well as from the concomitant increase in political alienation. Development in the CE countries under communism is a good example of this. It was Putnam (Putnam 1993, 2000) and Fukuyama (Fukuyama 1995) who focused the discussion about the quality of civil society in the direction of issues regarding the relationships between interpersonal trust and so-called social capital, which today dominate the discussion of civil society in the United States2. The danger of social atomization, as Tocqueville (Tocqueville 1968) again demonstrated brilliantly, is particularly characteristic of egalitarian societies, and it can produce a tendency towards anomy, the loss of social values and norms, the disintegration of the moral code, and the overall loss of a sense of moral direction. If we speak of a loss of social cohesion, according to Putnam (Putnam 2000) we are referring not only to a decline in the quality of the social environment but also to a decline in the quality of public administration — it

is therefore a matter of a political loss. 3

i= o

a. cn

LU

Os

Among the many ways of distinguishing social capital Putnam (Putnam 2000: 20-23) ^

considers one to be the most important - bridging and bonding social capital, which refer ^ to a certain kind of inclusion and exclusion, in which the former produces a specific type of 2 reciprocity and strong group solidarity, but may also give rise to strong group antagonisms, and the latter creates a more general understanding of reciprocity and identity and may produce more positive externalities. However, according to Putnam it is not a question 'either or', but rather more or less of one or the other.

Social disintegration tends to escalate, and it may result in society finding itself in a vicious circle. A weakened sense of mutual belonging can be both a 2 result and a source of the loss of shared norms, values, and symbols, and the ^ decline in the capacity for self-restraint. Self-restraint is exercised in exchange § for the recognition of the common interests of the whole, of which I am a part m and whose interests are therefore also my interests (Taylor 1990). The development of a moral vacuum and the disintegration of social norms and shared 5 values can be considered among the greatest risks to the democratic political < process. This kind of threat may also be added to the danger of society break-

i ing up into political cleavages and the risk of a significant segment of society i ii

becoming alienated from the political system.

Clouding the normative perspective further beneath the proposed configuration, which puts the state and civil society in a somewhat unequal position (civil society-centered analysis), it is possible to silhouette against the basic figure yet another group of four serious risks that pose a threat to the dynamics of civil society and the state. Concerning the protective functional dimension in the relationship between civil society and the state, it was Mill and Tocqueville who first pointed out that just as it is necessary to protect civil society against state power it is also necessary to protect the individual against the will of the majority. As stated above, within the framework of civil society itself serious conflicts can emerge, and not all interests formulated by an independent public are necessarily desirable and beneficial. In sum, it is not within the power of civil society to safeguard the rights of the individual without effective state power. A danger for civil society and democracy therefore also lies in the weakening of the strength and independence of state authority and the deterioration of the effectiveness of public administration and its capacity for action. A weak state cannot lead to anything other than the colonization of state institutions, at best by political parties (partocracy), and at worst by influential interest groups; and most likely by both at once. Pervasive clientelism and the rampant spread of corruption are the only alternatives to the incapacity of the state.

Proceeding along the vertical axis the next risk that can be formulated is that of overloading the process of political decision-making with an excess weight of civic participation. Particularly in the case where the decision-making mechanisms have been weakened this risk can evoke serious problems.

At the right end of the horizontal axis, there is the danger of 'too much trust', to the point where civil society is uncritical of state institutions and where the rational discourse within civil society itself is weakened (Habermas 1989). This can be both a result and a cause of the weakening of rational discourse in the sphere of political power. At the left end of the horizontal axis, there is a danger posed by a highly integrated social system, which suppresses

O

u <

1= O

< I

the internal pluralism of civil society. Although from a historical perspective it is erroneous to contrast the civic ethos and the national ethos as two contradictory principles, there is no question that for civil society and democracy exalted nationalism represents one of the most serious dangers.

3. The Guarantees of the Functional Dimensions in the Relationship between Civil Society and the State

In conclusion let us attempt to address the question that forms the basis

< of the current discussion in the social sciences: how does one build a civil

i society? Is it at all possible or even desirable to strive for the advancement of i ii

this kind of creative chaos' — which emerged in the West and is the product of poorly transplantable historical experience? In my opinion, the former question is fully justified, and however much some authors may argue that civil society as a concept in unnecessary (Kumar 1993), it is no accident that today it represents one of the most influential concepts in the social sciences. It attempts to approach the contemporary problems of post/modern society with greater sensitivity than other well-known concepts, and it tries to analyze these problems in mutual relationships and their entire complexity.

If we are willing to accept the Marxist principle that the route to desired social change has a little practical effect if it is not accompanied by the possibilities of institutionalization (Giddens 1990: 155), then in Figure 4 we can re-draw the configuration to incorporate the institutional guarantees of the above-mentioned functional dimensions and the institutionalized prevention of the above-mentioned risks. It is, however, clear that the institutional expression of the functional dimensions in relationship between civil society and the democratic state is itself influenced by the counterfactual character of modernity, and therefore, even in this case, a strict division between realistic and utopian thought is, as Giddens notes, impossible3.

For each of the four relationships mentioned above, it is possible to distinguish two, often unbalanced, counterpoints, which enter into the relationship and guarantee its vitality and advantageousness. Starting at the top end of the vertical axis, the institutional prevention of the risks of centralization, bureaucratization, and the growth of state power can be found in the active control of political power by an independent public. This requires, among other things, the active development and support of the public sphere by the o

<

In this connection Giddens (Giddens 1990: 154-157) mentions the requirement of so-called utopian realism, with reference to the fact that too much utopianism without a foot in social < reality can potentially be quite dangerous, while, conversely, too much emphasis on realism can hinder productiveness and innovation if it is not balanced with a certain amount of utopianism and moral conviction.

O

u <

1= O

< I

<

Figure 4. Guarantees of the functional dimensions in the relationship between civil society and the state

Public Control

Division of Power

Social Integration Social Capital Political

Integration

Respect to Trust Facilitating Trust

Ontological Security

Administration

Autonomy of Public Growth of Participation

Source: Müller 2006

public itself, including actively cultivating the quality and development of the public space (Shils 1992). A key requirement is the guaranteed independence of the media and a pluralist media market, and the establishment of the appropriate mechanisms of public control over the media, especially television.

Moving further along the vertical access of 'freedom', the guarantee can, on the one hand, be the existence of a widely decentralized system of public administration, or, on the other hand, the introduction of particular measures, such as provisions for ensuring transparency and openness of information in public administration. This signifies the direct involvement of the public in public administration and the establishment of new institutional mechanisms aimed at facilitating this. In this connection, Giddens (Giddens 1998) refers to the democratization of democracy. A positive role could also be played in this by the active participation of the state in the protection of small and middle-sized businesses and the promotion of programs of corporate social responsibility. It is the task of governments to actively protect the market o environment and to ensure that global corporations become responsible members of civil societies. <

At the very bottom of the vertical axis is the existence of an autonomous ¡^

<c

civil society with a strong capacity for communication. Among concrete proposals for ensuring this, it is possible to cite the development of a good education system, which is capable of apprehending and cultivating the many varied

* interests and outlooks of children and students. It is also essential to build up educational democracy and promote literacy in democratic intercourse at 2 schools at all levels. As Putnam claims (Putnam 2000: 186), the more education ^ there is in general, the more civic participation.

§ Let us now look at the horizontal axis in Figure 4. Many psychologists

m claim that the conditions for establishing relationships of trust, which are

more of an emotional than a cognitive phenomenon, are formed as part of

5 the primary socialization. Erik Erikson, who is cited by Giddens (Giddens

< 1990: 92-99), points to the connection between relationships of trust and

i the sense of so-called ontological security. A feeling of 'ontological security', i ii

which develops during early childhood, is by definition the precondition for personal integrity and healthy mental and personality development. Ontolog-ical security represents a sort of trustfulness in the permanence of one's own identity and in the stability of the social and material environment in which we act, a sort of elemental sense of the reliability of persons and things. Erikson considers a sense of ontological security to be a fundamental precondition for establishing relationships of trust in the more complex sense of the word.

Moving along the horizontal axis towards the center we can turn the discussion towards the number of guarantees that can be indicated as the state's means of protecting and maintaining relationships of trust. Among the forms of state protection and cultivation of public trust, it is possible to include the maintenance of professional and moral integrity at 'access points' (Giddens 1990: 83-88, Sztompka 1998: 208), i.e. where the citizen is directly confronted with the state. Further could be mentioned the protection of children and the provision of a quality system of children's social aid. While the state cannot secure children's sense of 'ontological security', it can attempt to protect the 'less fortunate' from needless deprivation by, for example, actively working to prevent domestic violence.

We procced further along the horizontal axis to the left and towards the integrative dimension. Among the many tools of systemic integration are an affirmative action and, where appropriate, the introduction of elements of 'consociational' democracy. Again, it is important that there is institutional progress in issues of education, and that the state takes an active role in fostering tolerance and an understanding of the plurality of opinion (Cohen < 1999: 72). o

Finally, moving further left along the horizontal axis to the outer edge we come to social integration, the formation of social cohesion, and the quality of social interactions. Of course, no reliable guidelines exist on how to produce ¡^ the social capital and thus also social solidarity and cohesion. The quality of social interactions depends on numerous factors, among the most important of which is without question the role of the family. Putnam (2000: 277) has

concluded that the family (and its transformation) probably holds the key to

how social capital is formed (and has declined in its power). While a well-func-

2 tioning, democratic family is something hard to achieve, even so, it is for all

^ that the most reliable remedy for strengthening social capital. Therefore, the

§ state should strive to promote an active policy concerning this issue.

m There exist numerous ties and repercussions among the four functional

dimensions discussed above. It is not always possible to determine without

5 question which risks represent the causes and which the effects of a breakdown

< in the functional dimensions in the relationship between civil society and the

i state. It is, however, certain that all of the risks can pose a serious threat to i ii

the security and stability of democracy and represent a threat to the level of freedom that has been achieved in the West. The concept of civil society is not motivated by anything less than the effort to seek the guarantees of democratic development. The proposed configuration of this entire issue represents an attempt to grasp the relationship between civil society and the democratic state in all its complexity. It has been inspired by a long list of authors, all of whom more or less draw on Tocqueville's legacy and Giddens' complementary approach to the theory of reflexive modernity. The latter is also the source of the effort in this article to formulate a complementary theory of civil society, i.e. both with a view to the manifestly utopian normative perspective and empirical account with its sense for factuality and readiness to operationalize subject within adequate limits.

4. Conclusions: Thirty Years Down the Road

Let us look briefly at each functional dimension of civil society. Let's start with the integrative dimension. An extremely important factor for all post-socialist countries is a low level of social cohesion and a low level of interpersonal trust. Interpersonal trust in some western countries is 2-3 times higher than in CE. This foretells a major challenge for civic participation, since a low level of interpersonal trust translates into a low level of trust in effective collective action.

Regarding the legitimacy of institutions, all of the post-socialist countries are characterized by a low level of trust in the legislative branch, and a relatively high level of trust in "single person" institutions. The Czechs show a relatively high level of trust in the president, although he is a weak political o figure. Regrettably, the credibility of parliament in all CE countries remains very low, which is not changing much. Also, if we compare the CE countries with some western democracies, we can see a clear inverse relationship be- ¡^ tween trust in parliament and trust in government. In the CE countries, people tend to trust in the government more than in parliament, while in most western countries (and in the Nordic countries in particular), it is the other way

around. In parliamentary democracies, the legitimacy of parliament is direct and primary, whereas the legitimacy of government is mediated and secondary. 2 The question then is, what does it mean if the people of a parliamentary

^ democracy do not place their trust in their most important institution? The § situation seems unsustainable, like a perfect storm looming above the horizon. m And why is this the case? Of course, the institutions very often fail or under-perform, but if we face a low level of public institutional trust, as a stereotyped 5 pattern of political behavior, we find ourselves in a vicious cycle.

In 2016, we surveyed three "happy" Czech towns that demonstrated

i fairly effective governance and very progressive political leadership. Even i ii

here, we discovered a relatively low culture of discussion", the prevalence of protest-like participation based on negative feedback only, and an extremely negative attitude towards politics, which we did not expect at the local level (Müller 2018). The level of stigmatization of politics in all CE countries remains high, and the specially elected institutions are still perceived as forms of repression and treated with disrespect. But in liberal democracies, institutions are treated with respect and perceived as protective and supportive. People should not rebel against established institutions, but rather act (and, of course, also protest) within an established institutional and legal framework. Citizens need to identify with their institutions, and they should feel responsible for the shape they are in and how they perform. And if they are not happy, there is a spectrum of guaranteed rights and freedoms with respect to how to call their institutions to account. I know that this is an idealistic view, but the stereotypical "post-authoritative" perception (and treatment) of institutions as mere platforms for the abuse of power and repression undermines institutional openness and flexibility. Simply put, it undermines institutional reflexivity.

The public image of "being a politician" is not getting any better. According to the results from our study (Müller 2018), you can see that half of the respondents are convinced that "politics is a dirty business", and if we look at the situation on a larger scale, we can see that over the last 25 years, a member of parliament is seen as having the lowest level of professional prestige, on par with, for instance, janitorial staff.

The stigmatization of politics goes hand in hand with a very low level of interest in politics and public affairs as a whole. According to the OECD (2006) survey, young people in post-socialist countries are among the most apolitical o youth in the EU, with the Czech Republic holding the second-to-last position, and only Lithuania placing lower.

The abuse of political power is an increasing problem for many Czechs. According to the Corruption Perception Index conducted by Transparency International, the Czech Republic, along with Hungary and Slovakia, are char-

acterized as countries with quite a high level of corruption, scoring below the EU average.

2 We can of course dismiss empirical indices, but the political reality can-

^ not be so easily disregarded. Since 2013, the Czech Republic has been facing a

§ harsh challenge with the corporate mogul Andrej Babis, who served as finance

m minister, and since 2017 has even risen to the position of prime minister. There

is striking evidence that he has been using and abusing the state to further

5 his private economic interests, and to do so, he is willing to undermine the

< authority of any liberal principal or control mechanism, most worryingly the

i rule of law, the principle of checks and balances, and the separation of pow-i ii

ers. He is also undermining the role of the independent media, since after his entry onto the political stage, he bought a large chunk of various media outlets to provide backing for his political maneuvering. He is undoubtedly in a paramount conflict of interest, and by denying this, he is discrediting the legitimacy of liberal democracy in the Czech Republic altogether.

To understand the essence of his conflicts of interest, we can use the approach of Niklas Luhmann (Luhmann 2006) to modernity. His concept addresses the separation of "means of power" in modern societies. In modern societies, we can distinguish four autonomous spheres — market, civil public, politics, and the sphere of intimacy and family. Each of these spheres is based on (or established around) a different "media of power": the market on money, civil public on knowledge, politics on reputation or trustworthiness, and the familial sphere on love. Many people consider money to be a universal measure of influence, and they are also trying to apply such means of money in those spheres where they should not. In other words, these spheres (public, politics, and family) are based on principal and values, which cannot be bought or sold, and where "power" is organized, mediated, accumulated, etc. by different logic and dynamics. If we let money massively interfere with the sphere of public and politics, we are risking the devaluation of trust and knowledge. This is exactly what the current Czech prime minister is doing.

What should be done? Of course, to defend the already existing foundations of Czech liberal democracy, we need to look after those foundations, no matter how shallow they seem. Politically speaking, Czechs need to improve the cooperation of opposition political parties to effectively defend the existing buttresses of liberal democracy, and ideally to win the next general o election, and to oust Andrej Babis from executive power.

To conclude on a more positive note, I do like the slogan: "V4 — Rea- < sonable Europe", which the Czech Republic chose to herald the start of its ¡^ presidency of the Visegrad Group. I fully support it, but if we want to build a "reasonable Europe", we must first learn how to reason, how to discuss problems, and to confront the plurality of interests. The Czech Republic and other

O

u <

1= O

< I

<

post-socialist countries of CE face a lack of a conflict resolution culture, and this resonates throughout society in its entirety. They need to learn how to manage their political (and civic) conflict more productively, which would qualify these countries to become fully-fledged members of the EU.

REFERENCE

Cohen, J. (1999). American Civil Society Talk, in: R. Fullinwider (ed.) Civil Society, Democracy and

Civil Renewal. Lanham/New York : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 31-54. Cohen, J., Arato A. (1992). Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge, MA : MIT Press. Dahrendorf, R. (1990). Reflection on the Revolution in Europe. London : Chatto and Windus. Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. NY : The Free Press. Fullinwider, R. (ed.) (1999). Civil Society, Democracy and Civil Renewal. Lanham/New York :

Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Giddens, A. (1990). Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge : Polity. Giddens, A. (1998). The Third Way. Cambridge : Polity.

Habermas, J. (1989). Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge : Polity. Keane, J. (1988). Civil Society and the State. New York : Verso. Keane, J. (1998). Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions. Cambridge.

Kumar, K. (1993). Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term, in: British

Journal of Sociology. № 44 (3). pp. 375-379. Luhmann, N. (2006). Socialni systemy. Brno : CDK.

Müller, K.B. (2006). The Civil Society-State Relationship in Contemporary Discourse: A Complementary Account from Giddens Perspective, in: The British Journal of Politics & International Relations. № 8(2). pp. 311 - 330. Müller, K.B., Skovajsa, M. (2009). From Reflections on Post-Communism to Perspectives on Europeanization: Democracy and Civil Society in Central Europe, in: International Political Science Review. № 30(5). pp. 501 - 517. Müller, K.B. (2018). Dobre vladnuti ve verejnem nezajmu. Sociologicke nakladatelstvi (SLON) : Praha.

Putnam, R. (1993). Making Democracy Work. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press. Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York :

Simon & Schuster. Seligman, A. (1992). The Idea of Civil Society. New York : Free Press.

Shils, E. (1991). The Virtue of Civil Society, in: Government and Opposition. № 26(1). pp. 3-20. Sztompka, P. (1998). Mistrusting Civility: Predicament of a Post-Communist Society, in: Alexander

J. (ed.) Real Civil Societies. Sage. pp. 191 - 210. Taylor, Ch. (1990). Modes of Civil Society, in: Public Culture. № 3 (1). pp. 95-117. Tester, K. (1992). Civil Society. London : Routledge. Tocqueville, A. de (1968). Democracy in America. New York : Doubleday.

< o

ck <

u <

о i_ ш

и

Роль гражданского общества в либеральных демократиях. Чешская республика спустя 30 лет

Автор. Карел Мюллер, Ph.D., профессор, заведующий кафедрой политических наук факуль-

< тета международных отношений, Экономический университет в Праге.

о

££ Аннотация. Главная дилемма посткоммунистических стран Центральной Европы заключает-

^ ся в создавшемся противоречии между демократическими преобразованиями как попыткой

< построить гражданское общество и укрепить верховенство закона на национальном уровне, ¡¡5 с одной стороны, а с другой - европеизацией как следствием глобализации, делающей

< национальное государство устаревающим явлением. Спустя 30 лет после демократических ^ реформ страны ЦЕ находятся на полпути к завершению демократических преобразований, если отталкиваться от знаменитого пророчества Р. Дарендорфа. Он сказал, что этим государствам необходимо не менее 60-ти лет, чтобы обустроить гражданское общество. На данный момент, с точки зрения создания либеральных и демократических институтов, среди постсоциалистических стран Вишеградской группы можно наблюдать тревожные тенденции и отход от предшествующих достижений. По мнению, автора статьи подобный отскок является главной угрозой демократии в странах ЦЕ (и за ее пределами), где по словам политологов наблюдается «институциональный захват» (institutional capture) или «захват государства» (state capture).

Ключевые слова: гражданское общество, Центральная и Восточная Европа, Чехия, Више-градская группа, либеральная демократия.