CC BY
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Nazim MUZAFFARLI (IMANOV)
Editor-in-Chief, The Caucasus & Globalization (Baku, Azerbaijan).
Eldar ISMAILOV
Director,
Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus
(Baku, Azerbaijan).
THE REHABILITATION OF THE POST-CONFLICT TERRITORIES
Abstract
This article deals with matters of reconstructing areas devastated by armed conflicts. It examines a wide range of problems associated with post-conflict reconstruction planning: from basic planning assumptions to the management of risks typical of large-scale government programs. In particular, it analyzes the economic aspects of restoring life support systems, infrastructure and the economy. Much attention is paid to matters of post-conflict economic restructuring, identification of areas of poten-
tial competitive advantage and their promotion with direct government support, and provision of incentives for active private sector involvement in rehabilitation works.
Theoretical propositions are illustrated by examples drawn from areas adjacent to the Nagorno-Karabakh Region of Azerbaijan, but many recommendations formulated in this article are of a universal nature and, the authors hope, can be used in reconstructing other post-conflict areas as well.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
A number of regions in today’s world are engulfed in various kinds of armed conflicts. They lead to human losses, leaving behind them maimed people and broken lives. Armed conflicts also entail destruction of the environment, life support systems, infrastructure, economy and social facilities. Most of this kind of damage can be compensated, although it requires the concentration of vast material, energy, financial and labor resources.
Even with active and large-scale support from the world community, the rehabilitation of postconflict areas and their reintegration into political, economic and cultural life is mainly the responsibility of the state that has internationally recognized sovereignty over these areas. Its duty is not only to fully reconstruct the post-conflict area, but also to provide a level playing field for the activities of all communities involved in the conflict, regardless of whether the conflict was provoked by ethnic, political, religious or other reasons.
Such tasks will have to be addressed by two (of the three) Central Caucasian states that have ethnopolitical conflicts in their territory: Azerbaijan and Georgia. At present, it is hard to suppose when exactly they will be able to get down to practical rehabilitation work. But there is no denying that any state should prepare for post-conflict reconstruction in advance, prior to the achievement of a political agreement on resolving the conflict in its territory. It is essentially important to note that forward planning of rehabilitation work is not only the state’s inalienable right, but also its direct responsibility.
In this article, the methodology, principles and economic aspects of post-conflict reconstruction planning are considered based on a case study of areas adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh. A step-by-step settlement, which is now the only subject of negotiation (probably having no alternative), provides that these areas will be liberated in the first place. At the same time, it is quite obvious that from both an urban-planning and a socioeconomic perspective Karabakh has always been a single region, while its division into a highland (Nagorno) and lowland parts is a matter of convention.
Basic Planning Assumptions
Drafting a comprehensive post-conflict reconstruction and development plan whose component parts are consistent with each other in both spatial and functional (sectoral) terms is an extremely difficult research task in itself. But it is further complicated if the initial planning parameters, which are usually of a political nature, are not determined (or insufficiently determined). In most cases, the validity of the basic assumptions boils down to how realistic they are, i.e., to their practical feasibility under the most favorable conditions.
The actual content of the basic assumptions of a rehabilitation program depends on a number of factors. The most important of these are the specific features of the conflict and the proposed ways of its resolution. It is necessary to obtain basic answers to certain questions, including: will the conflict be resolved by peaceful means or by force of arms? How is the time frame for reaching a final peace settlement to be set? Will the conflict resolution process involve third parties (states, international organizations, peacekeeping forces, etc.)? These circumstances are so important that they themselves can be regarded as separate basic assumptions.
Next, the development of a rehabilitation program implies the need for a realistic assessment of the state’s economic capacity. It is a question of determining the amount of resources the state will be able to mobilize and use for post-conflict reconstruction and development. This includes not only the state’s own resources, but also potential international assistance. The program time frame is determined precisely by this financial resource capacity (all other things being equal, the larger this capac-
ity the shorter is the projected rehabilitation period). This capacity also determines the qualitative level of rehabilitation and reconstruction toward which the program can be geared.
The third factor influencing the basic assumptions is the internal political situation in the country. In particular, it is necessary to take into account the level of public confidence in the government: the higher this level the wider are the opportunities for the government to take unpopular measures without fear of potential social discontent. Besides, the implementation of large-scale programs inevitably leads to a sharp increase in the movement of material-commodity, financial and human resources, and the government (especially its security and law enforcement agencies) should be able to control and regulate these flows, ensuring their transparency and preventing such negative phenomena as corruption. An important factor is the presence of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs): the larger their number and the less favorable the conditions of their temporary residence, the higher will be the social pressure on government agencies involved in postconflict rehabilitation.
The basic assumptions should be formulated as briefly and clearly as possible and should be given in the preamble to the program. If the program is developed before the parties reach a political agreement on resolving the conflict, they can be formulated in the form of several simple assumptions. For example, in planning the reconstruction and development of post-conflict areas adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh, one can start from the following assumptions:
■ after the achievement of a political decision on a step-by-step settlement of the conflict, seven areas around the administrative boundaries of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (Agdam, Fizuli, Jabrayil, Qubadli, Zangilan, Kalbajar and Lachin) have been liberated in the first place;
■ the occupation forces have withdrawn from the conflict zone, and illegal armed formations have been disarmed;
■ the initial measures required to ensure the safety of the population, and also of production and infrastructure facilities have been taken;
■ a new border security system is being created;
■ the process of voluntary repatriation of displaced persons to their place of permanent residence is underway; it is assumed that 60-80 thousand will return to the region during the first conventional period, 90-100 thousand each during the second and third periods, 100-110 thousand during the fourth period, and 110-130 thousand during the fifth period (a total of 450520 thousand returnees).
The assumption on the number of people returning to the post-conflict area is a necessary condition for reconstruction planning, because the subsequent restoration of all life support systems and infrastructure, production and sociocultural facilities should be “tied” precisely to this figure. The conventional period can be equated to one or two years or to another time interval depending on the concrete conditions at the start of rehabilitation work. But it should be borne in mind that a shortening or lengthening of the time scheduled for post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction is of great importance for the whole process, particularly from the standpoint of financial costs.
The assumption on potential inflation, which can be included among the basic assumptions of an economic nature, is of high importance for developing the financial aspects of post-conflict reconstruction. This assumption should be based not so much on current macroeconomic parameters as on inflation forecasts.
For example, Azerbaijan’s financial expenditures under a post-conflict reconstruction program for the next five years should be calculated based on an annual inflation rate of 18-20%. Such was the inflation limit projected by the Central Bank for 2009. Since the end of 2008 inflation has somewhat declined as a result of the global financial and economic crisis, which has reduced aggregate demand.
But there is every reason to suppose that when the crisis is over, inflation in most countries of the world, including Azerbaijan, will almost immediately return to pre-crisis levels. The best alternative of “financial linkages” for such a program would be to make calculations both adjusted and unadjusted for inflation.
Long-term discount coefficients making it possible to take into account the decline in the value of money over time (time value of money) and usually approved by governments are another basic assumption of an economic nature. In many countries, the use of these coefficients in analyzing and evaluating long-term projects is a mandatory procedure. As regards post-conflict reconstruction in Azerbaijan, it is difficult to take this factor into account because, regrettably, its use in long-term economic planning is still insufficient. Nevertheless, in some cases this factor can be taken into account, particularly where certain costs are calculated based on technical and economic parameters used in current projects developed by international consultants (these include, for example, expenditures on restoring drinking water supply and sewage systems).
It is clear that, first, the later the post-conflict rehabilitation begins and, second, the longer it lasts, the stronger will be the influence exerted by the decline in the time value of money and by inflation on its final financial parameters.
Some of the basic assumptions are both political and economic. The most important of these is the orientation toward a certain reconstruction standard. In cases where a conflict has been “frozen” for a long time, an orientation toward pre-conflict standards is unacceptable in principle. On the other hand, post-conflict planning will inevitably cease to be realistic if it is oriented toward the highest world standards in the development of life support systems, infrastructure, production and social facilities. The target level of post-conflict rehabilitation should be attainable and should correspond to the country’s financial, material, technical and personnel capacity.
In reference to Azerbaijan’s post-conflict areas, the goal can be formulated as their reconstruction at a level slightly above the average indicators achieved in the country’s regions outside the capital by the start of rehabilitation work. The size of this margin should be determined based on the state’s economic capacity.
The standards providing the basis for post-conflict planning also depend on the extent of damage. Reliable (as far as possible) information on the actual state of the program area is a key prerequisite for post-conflict planning. The lower the extent of damage the smaller is the amount of resources required for reconstruction, on the one hand, but the harder it will be to reorient the program from previously existing standards to higher ones.
Unfortunately, there is no reliable comprehensive information on the state of Azerbaijani territories subject to post-conflict rehabilitation. Limited information received through various channels and the experience of earlier liberated population centers show that all life support systems and the economic and sociocultural infrastructure in the occupied territories outside the administrative boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh have been almost entirely destroyed. That is why post-conflict reconstruction in this case will amount to a virtual recreation of the region’s infrastructure, economic and other systems. This will significantly increase the amount of required resources, although in some cases new construction is economically more efficient than reconstruction, especially from the perspective of minimizing future operational costs. Another “advantage of total destruction” is that it allows greater freedom in planning rehabilitation works without the need to tie them to old systems.
Methodological Principles
Building on international experience. Many states have faced the challenge of reconstructing post-conflict areas whose economy and infrastructure were destroyed as a result of armed conflicts. In
the 20th century this included Europe, the Russian Empire and the U.S.S.R., and also Japan (after the first and second world wars), Lebanon (Beirut), Vietnam and Iran, and at present, the Russian Federation (Chechnya), Georgia, Azerbaijan, the Balkan countries, Afghanistan and Iraq. The use of international experience in the reconstruction and development of devastated areas is an essential condition for post-conflict planning, including in Azerbaijan.1
At the same time, a return to normal life in Azerbaijan’s post-conflict areas has its difficulties and differs in this respect from many other similar problems in the above-mentioned countries, because it goes far beyond the performance of purely material, technical and financial tasks. It is necessary to reintegrate the currently occupied areas and their population (the Armenian population in the first place) into Azerbaijan’s political, economic and cultural life, and this is just as difficult as addressing the first group of tasks.
Reasonable cost minimization. Full-scale post-conflict rehabilitation, as noted above, requires vast resources. In such relatively small states as Azerbaijan, the amount of required funds may well be comparable to the scale of the whole economy. That is why cost minimization is an essential attribute of post-conflict planning. At the same time, resource saving should not be allowed to turn into the cornerstone principle dominating over the objectives of post-conflict rehabilitation. Cost minimization that leads to a decline in the quality of work and thereby poses a threat to public safety is unacceptable in principle. As for Azerbaijan, its current and expected near-future financial capacity is sufficient for an orientation toward relatively high post-conflict rehabilitation objectives (standards).
Dual approach: restoration of the old and creation of the new. Post-conflict reconstruction should always combine new construction with restoration of previously existing facilities. The quantitative proportion between these two forms of post-conflict rehabilitation depends on a number of factors. Some of them were already mentioned above: the actual state of infrastructure, production and sociocultural facilities in the post-conflict area, the objectives (standards) of reconstruction,2 the state’s resource capacity, and the time interval between the destruction of the area and the start of rehabilitation work. Even when there is an opportunity to restore old facilities, new construction based on advanced technologies is often more effective. This applies not only to information and communication systems (their rehabilitation based on old technologies is evidently unacceptable) but also to traditional elements of infrastructure such as roads.
Flexible spatial planning, primarily settlement network planning. It can be regarded as a special case of the application of the previous principle, but is also important in its own right. On the one
1 There are many works on the socioeconomic aspects of post-conflict reconstruction in different countries, for example: H.P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, Imprint, Harper Perennial, 2001; P.F. Schaefer, P.C. Schaefer, Planning for Reconstruction and Transformation of Japan after World War II (Case Study), available at [http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=ESDP&fileid=898B2CE0-A37F-EC5D-CA30-FC23 8207A1CD&lng=en]; I.D. Turner, Reconstruction in Post-War Germany, Berg Publishers, 1992; Lebanon in Limbo: Postwar Society and State in an Uncertain Regional Environment, ed. by Th. Hanf, N. Salam, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden, Baden-Baden, 2003; Recovering Beirut: Urban Design and Post-War Reconstruction, ed. by S. Khalaf, Ph.S. Khoury, E.J. Brill, Leiden-New York, 1993; R.S. Jennings, The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq, US Institute of Peace, 2003, available at [http://origin.usip.org/pubs/ peaceworks/pwks49.pdf].
In addition, significant experience in this area has been accumulated by international organizations and IFIs (see, for example: Post-conflict Reconstruction in Japan, Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan, ed. by N. Rham-Azimi, M. Fuller, H. Nakayama, Geneva, United Nations, 2003; World Bank Group Response to Post Conflict Reconstruction in Kosovo: General Framework For an Emergency Assistance Strategy, available at [http://www. worldbank.org/html/extdr/kosovo/kosovo_st.htm]; Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996-1998 Lessons and Accomplishments: Review of the Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program and Looking Ahead Toward Sustainable Economic Development, Working Paper prepared by the European Union and the World Bank, for the May 1999 Donors Conference, World Bank, 1999).
2 Unless otherwise specified, the term “reconstruction” is used in this article to designate both restoration of the old and creation of the new.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
hand, there are serious arguments in favor of restoring the pre-conflict settlement network. First, this approach obviates the need for additional urban and landscape planning, and second, it ensures the legitimate right of each displaced person to return to their own home or at least to their own population center. The private property rights of displaced persons to real estate are among the conservative factors of settlement patterns. On the other hand, the creation of a new settlement structure opens additional opportunities for reintegrating the post-conflict areas into the country’s political and economic structure, although improper implementation may involve an infringement of returnees’ property rights; moreover, the second approach requires a great deal of preliminary work. Evidently, it makes sense to combine these two approaches.
The creation of a new settlement pattern should be analyzed in a wider context than actual postconflict reconstruction. For example, in Azerbaijani territories awaiting liberation such a pattern can be created only based on the unity of the entire Karabakh region. This circumstance should be taken into account in determining the settlements that can become the pivotal elements of the new settlement system and act as an engine in the revival of the region. As earlier research shows,3 in the foreseeable future none of the cities of Nagorno-Karabakh or adjacent areas taken separately can aspire to this role. Hence the proposal to develop the Shusha-Khankendi-Agdam axis as a consolidating center and to turn it into a tripolar agglomeration.
Step-by-step approach. Post-conflict reconstruction ranks among large-scale projects whose effective implementation necessitates a division of rehabilitation works into distinct stages. We can assume the following stages typical of most post-conflict areas regardless of the country to which they belong.
■ The initial (preparatory) stage includes, in the first place, the drafting of a state program for the reconstruction and development of post-conflict areas. At this stage, it is necessary to conduct a set of analytical studies in planning and designing infrastructure, production and sociocultural facilities and to draft recommendations for stimulating local and foreign investors to take part in rehabilitation works, especially in reviving the economy. The government should hold consultations with international financial institutions (IFIs) and other potential donors in order to attract additional resources. In countries where areas subject to reconstruction make up a significant part of the country’s total area, it is possible to set up a special body (ministry or agency) responsible for their rehabilitation and reintegration.4
■ The second (“pre-basic”) stage includes a direct (on-site) inspection of post-conflict areas, whereupon the State Program is duly adjusted with subsequent approval by the country’s political leadership. At this stage, initial measures are taken to create a border security sys-
3 This applies, in the first place, to: Tekhniko-ekonomicheskoie obosnovanie programmy vosstanovlenia i rekon-struktsii territori Azerbaidzhana, postradavshikh ot vneshnei agressii, Vol. 1 (Abstract), Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Azerbaijani Territories, Baku, 1998; i§galdan azad olunmu§ drazildrin “Boyuk Bdrpa” proqrami, Azerbaycan Respublikasi i§galdan azad olunmu§ erazilerin berpasi ve yenidenqurulmasi uzre Dovlet Komissiyasi, Baki, 2005.
4 An analysis of international experience can be of great assistance in determining the mission, tasks and powers of this body. It even makes sense to consider the activities of government bodies set up not by the post-conflict restoration country itself but by other interested states or international organizations. For example, serious lessons can be drawn from an analysis of the work of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction set up by the U.S. Congress in 2004. Administratively, it is subordinate to the departments of state and defense, but presents periodical (quarterly and semi-annual) reports directly to the U.S. Congress, open to the local and foreign public. The latest report at the time of writing this article is dated 30 April, 2009 (see: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction: Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, available at [http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/default.aspx]). Apart from control over the use of funds allocated for Iraq support and reconstruction, the Office of the Special Inspector General coordinates work in implementing post-conflict reconstruction programs, develops recommendations for their improvement, analyzes the effectiveness of Iraq’s public administration agencies, takes part in drafting and examining laws and regulations, and performs other functions.
tem, to ensure public safety and to decontaminate priority areas (including staging areas for “pioneer teams”). An important task at this stage is the reinstatement of local civil administration.
■ The third stage is the basic one and provides for the recreation of life support systems throughout most of the post-conflict area. This includes water and energy supply, telecommunications and postal services, the start of wide-ranging work to restore housing, emergency social security services, transport communications and other infrastructure facilities.
■ At the fourth (repatriation) stage, displaced persons return to their place of permanent residence. Mass repatriation should be accompanied by the creation of new jobs and of a particularly favorable environment for private enterprise. This is an indispensable condition for the gradual conversion of the post-conflict area into a self-organizing regional entity capable of independent economic development.
■ Finally, the fifth stage, which can be called a stage of adaptation, is characterized by the final settlement of returnees in their place of permanent residence, with the formation of viable communities and productive forces. The emphasis shifts to tasks associated with the restoration of sociocultural and sports facilities. The process of creating locally elected government bodies (e.g. municipalities) is intensified.
This division into stages (like any other) is only conceptual. The inclusion of various kinds of rehabilitation works within a certain stage simply means that they are prioritized. In actual fact, all post-conflict reconstruction activities are “through” activities and are conducted at virtually every stage of the rehabilitation period.
Continuous improvement of post-conflict reconstruction programs. All spheres of post-conflict reconstruction are influenced by the time factor. The means of communication are undergoing particularly rapid and radical changes, with a very high rate of technological renewal. Significant changes are taking place in technologies and materials prevailing in civil construction, energy and gas supply, and also in the construction and renovation of transport infrastructure.
At the same time, the sequence and nature of rehabilitation works are significantly influenced by the political and economic terms of settlement of each particular conflict. For example, virtually all reconstruction and development works in Azerbaijan’s post-conflict areas have to be tied in with the repatriation schedule, which is very difficult to compile prior to the adoption of political decisions on the forms and order of the liberation of the occupied territories. That is why after the final approval of the resettlement schedule it will be necessary to make additional adjustments to the program.
On the whole, work on the program should continue until the full completion of post-conflict rehabilitation. The expert group working on the program should maintain a constant exchange of views with the general public in its own country, with local and foreign specialists, and also with IFIs and foreign donors.
Other principles. Apart from the universal principles listed above, there are specific principles applied in post-conflict rehabilitation with due regard for country specifics, the nature of the conflict and the terms of its settlement, and also the peculiarities of the situation in the post-conflict area. For example, the powers and duties of the central and local authorities should be divided depending on the country’s peculiarities, with additional powers conferred on the local civil administration (within certain limits), especially in the matter of ensuring public safety.
An indispensable condition for post-conflict planning is the holding of a set of opinion polls among potential returnees in order to determine their needs and expectations, while surveys among private businesses can play a significant role in determining the sufficient conditions for their involvement in commercial rehabilitation projects.
At the stage of planning post-conflict measures, cooperation between government and independent experts could be very fruitful, as well as cooperation between local and foreign experts, which makes it possible to analyze the problem from different angles.
Restoration of Life Support Systems and Infrastructure
Repatriation of refugees and displaced persons is among the key components of post-conflict reconstruction, simultaneously serving as a criterion for assessing the effectiveness of the rehabilitation effort. It should be carried out on a voluntary basis: tough administrative measures in this matter are not only undesirable, but also impossible in principle.
At the stage of preparatory measures, special surveys (primarily public opinion polls) should help to determine the lower and upper limits of the number of potential returnees. The program should be drawn up based on the upper limit. For example, such studies show that the number of returnees in Azerbaijan will be within the range of 450-520 thousand (85-90% of the total number of IDPs), so that post-conflict rehabilitation should be planned based on the figure of 520 thousand.5 But even with such a high “natural” repatriation potential the authorities should provide for special measures to simplify mass migration. Apart from legal guarantees for the entire range of returnees’ property rights, an exceptional role could be played by direct incentives: material compensation, social security benefits, reimbursement of transportation costs, etc.
Reconstruction of housing usually consists of two components: first, the construction of temporary dwellings for the first groups of returnees, and also for “pioneer teams,” in which it would make sense to include some of the returnees themselves, who can take part in the reconstruction work. These dwellings (possibly of a container type) can be located in base centers in the form of small settlements. The second component is the renovation or construction (depending on the extent of damage) of houses for returnees. Housing standards in the post-conflict area can be based on average floor area per urban and rural dweller in the country (as a rule, excluding the capital) immediately before the start of repatriation.
A basic solution of the housing problem in post-conflict areas is a function of the state, which should cover a significant part of the expenses involved. Nevertheless, it is advisable to combine various forms of financing: with the participation of government agencies, returnees, private businesses, and international and local donors.
Restoration of energy supply is among the components of post-conflict rehabilitation that are “country specific.” Depending on the peculiarities of its energy system, on its existing and projected energy generation sources, each country itself determines the energy supply sources and schemes specific to its post-conflict areas, seeking to reduce production costs and transportation losses. As basic information in post-conflict planning it is necessary to use average energy consumption indicators for households in the country (outside the capital) recalculated in accordance with the upper value of the number of potential returnees. The requirements of other entities can be easily calculated by extrapolating the ratios recorded in other regions of the country.
The choice of a basic model for rehabilitating the power supply system (restoration of the preconflict system or construction of a new one) depends on the performance characteristics and effi-
5 Azerbaijan’s official statistics provide fairly detailed information on the demographic situation in projected postconflict reconstruction areas (see: The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Population by Economic Regions at the Beginning of the 2008, available at [http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/demoqraphic/az/012.shtml#s13]).
ciency of the pre-conflict energy system and the extent of its destruction, on the country’s economic capacity and other factors. In Azerbaijan, these two approaches will have to be combined. The restoration of pre-conflict networks could be relevant to lowland areas: their connection to the country’s integrated power system does not involve great difficulties, while financial expenditures will not exceed allowable limits. In mountain areas it is more advisable to choose the second option, building local power networks (with due regard for settlement patterns) based on damless small and mini hydro plants.
Drinking water supply is among the priority projects and should precede mass repatriation. In cases where the restoration of pre-conflict water sources and water distribution networks is impossible or takes a long time, it is necessary to create new local water supply systems. It is preferable to use underground sources and springs (if any), which do not require additional expenditures on purification. During post-conflict reconstruction in Azerbaijan, it will be necessary to restore and drill artesian wells, to build water conduits and distribution networks to public standpipes in “pioneer” settlements; to reconstruct and build new water intakes, pumping stations, water storage facilities and water mains; to connect (where necessary and possible) the water facilities of central settlements to water mains; and to restore kariz.6
Serious attention should be paid to restoring sewage systems and treatment of waste (industrial and household) in the cities. The peculiarity of this problem in Azerbaijan is that it will have to be addressed almost from scratch, because there were no modern sewage systems in this region even in Soviet times, while treatment of waste boils down to its “stockpiling” on the ground surface with subsequent burning. A feasibility study for several mini waste treatment plants should be carried out in the post-conflict region. These plants could be commercial, although they could be created with government support.
Gas supply in post-conflict areas is not among the top priorities, because delays here do not limit either repatriation or the initial economic recovery of the region. But gas supply in Azerbaijani postconflict areas will be of great importance from the perspective of economic (and, indirectly, political) reintegration of the highland and lowland parts of Karabakh. Gas supply should also be arranged in Karabakh population centers that are (or will be) mainly inhabited by citizens of Armenian origin. It is quite possible that after the achievement of political decisions on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh the question of Azerbaijani gas exports to Armenia will come on the agenda as well. The gasification of post-conflict areas could technically simplify the solution of this problem.
In planning the reconstruction of infrastructure for local civil administration bodies, the assumption is that they should be relocated to the post-conflict areas even before the start of repatriation and large-scale rehabilitation work.7 At the initial stage, they can be housed in any premises fit for this purpose in base centers of reconstruction or, in their absence, in temporary container modules. The construction and equipment of special buildings for them can be included among the tasks of the second conventional period, while their equipment with telecommunications and special transport should be a matter of priority.
In most cases (at any rate in Azerbaijan), it is preferable that elected municipal bodies (district, village and settlement), however important for democratic development, should begin operating after the completion of basic post-conflict rehabilitation works. This is explained by the need for the maximum possible concentration of authority, whose diffusion would inadmissibly complicate the rehabilitation process.
The general approach to restoring transportation infrastructure depends,
■ first, on its actual state;
6 Kariz is a traditional source of drinking water in a number of currently occupied population centers, an upstream underground gallery (shaft) for collecting groundwater and bringing it to the surface by gravity flow.
7 In some countries (as in Azerbaijan), the local civil administration authorities of conflict areas are not disbanded and continue to function in places of concentration of displaced persons.
■ second, on the degree of obsolescence;
■ third, on the size of the post-conflict area;
■ fourth, on the area’s functional purpose (its place in the national and regional division of labor); and
■ fifth, on the state’s medium and long-term economic priorities.
The rehabilitation of roads is usually higher on the agenda than other tasks in the field of transport rehabilitation. The first thing to do is to assess the rationality of previously existing routes. But even where these routes are deemed to be optimal at the current stage, it should be borne in mind that the economic costs of restoring old roads are often comparable to the cost of construction of new ones.8
The conflict specifics have a significant influence on goal setting in this field. For example, a step-by-step solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem implies a situation where road access to some areas of the region, especially to the Kalbajar District, will be complicated because before the occupation road traffic passed through Nagorno-Karabakh territory. That is why in order to ensure direct road traffic to the Kalbajar District it will be necessary to build a tunnel from the north at the Murovdag Pass along the Khanlar-Kalbajar highway.9
Road transportation should be restored in the following order:
(i) highways connecting post-conflict areas (their base centers) with the country’s transportation infrastructure;
(ii) local roads connecting district base centers with each other;
(iii) street networks in cities undergoing reconstruction; and
(iv) highways whose reconstruction will come on the agenda after the final settlement of the conflict (in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, this includes the rehabilitation of roads between Azerbaijan’s heartland and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic through Armenian territory).
In contrast to roads, virtually all rail infrastructure facilities are the responsibility of the state, although some of them can be subsequently transferred into the hands of private managers. It is necessary to reconstruct (construct) railway stations, switchyards, sidings, loading terminals, and also track and rolling stock maintenance services. After the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it will be necessary to rehabilitate the Azerbaijani rail section that connected Azerbaijan’s heartland with Nakhchivan. This will make it possible, first, to ease the almost 20-year transport blockade of Nakhchivan and, second, to restore rail communications along the entire Baku-Sadarak route, which will have a positive effect on expanding trade and economic relations of the Central Caucasus with Turkey and Iran.
A priority task in the field of air transport is to restore helicopter services, which do not require a costly infrastructure and can be arranged right after the settlement of the conflict. In Azerbaijan, helicopters will be of special importance in reconstructing the Kalbajar District, because before the opening of the Murovdag Tunnel they will be the only mode of transport connecting this district with the rest of the country.
The reconstruction of the telecommunications network should be geared to the task of full-scale integration of the population of post-conflict areas into the country’s single information and communication space. This task should be addressed in the following order:
8 The approximate cost of work and its scope can be determined based on the length and quality (surfacing) of roads in the pre-conflict period. In particular, the relevant information on the currently occupied Azerbaijani territories is to be found on the website of the State Traffic Police (see: [http://www.dyp.gov.az/?/az/content/145]).
9 A project for a 3 km tunnel at a cost of about AZN 80 million ($100 million) has already been developed by Azerbaijan specialists (see: i§galdan azad olunmu§ drazildrin “Boyuk Bdrpa”proqrami).
Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009
(i) providing “pioneer teams” with mobile communications;
(ii) restoring radio relay services;
(iii) restoring postal and telegraph services;
(iv) restoring reliable telephone services;
(v) ensuring reliable television relay services; and
(vi) creating local television and radio broadcasting.
In Azerbaijan’s post-conflict areas, the rehabilitation of the telecommunications network is significantly simplified by the projected launching of two national satellites.
Telephone and fax services, as a rule, should be recreated on a new basis using modern technological equipment. In order to accelerate this process, it would make sense to combine electronic exchanges with the use of the Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) system. This system can be created by private companies as well. In Azerbaijan, for example, there are two private CDMA operators evidently prepared to tap into new markets. But in post-conflict areas such a system can also be created by a new, resident operator or by the government itself, with subsequent privatization. The problem of providing the population in post-conflict areas with mobile communications can be solved in a similar way, i.e., on a commercial basis and without additional government spending.
The restoration of television and radio broadcasting in post-conflict areas, while being mainly the responsibility of the state, does not take a long time or require large amounts of resources. In some cases, a state regional broadcasting company can be established in one of the post-conflict cities in order to cover, among other things, the course of repatriation and rehabilitation work and provide returnees with the necessary information, say, on available job openings.
The postal service should be restored in all population centers. Initially it should perform, along with traditional functions, such functions as providing financial services to the population (utility and other similar payments, money transfers, issue of pensions, grants and other financial assistance). The restoration of postal services usually requires the construction and equipment of new buildings: head post offices in district centers, post offices in settlements and large villages, and agencies providing postal services in relatively small communities or several communities at once.
Post-conflict rehabilitation of the social sphere includes the restoration of healthcare, educational, cultural and sports facilities.
The healthcare system should combine
(i) regional medical treatment and diagnostic centers,
(ii) district and specialized hospitals (including maternity homes, children’s hospitals, centers for rehabilitating disabled people, TB and dermatovenerologic dispensaries),
(iii) district polyclinics (including children’s),
(iv) outpatient clinics and first-aid stations,
(v) emergency stations,
(vi) sanitary and epidemiological stations, and
(vii) pharmacies.
Most of the personnel for these medical institutions should be recruited from among the returnees, who should undergo training or further training (in the event of a long break in professional activity) as a precondition for medical practice.
The schedule for restoring educational facilities should be matched with the repatriation schedule. This component usually includes the rehabilitation of
(i) preschool institutions,
(ii) primary and secondary schools,
(iii) vocational training schools,
(iv) specialized secondary educational institutions, and
(v) children’s post-conflict psychological rehabilitation centers.
In contrast to other educational institutions, secondary schools are invariably in demand from the very beginning of repatriation to the post-conflict zone. Moreover, in the first few years they should also function as community centers, performing cultural and educational work and providing information services, and are indispensable as support centers for local self-government. In addition, some school premises should be adapted for simultaneous use as centers of social and psychological rehabilitation, primarily for children.10 According to our preliminary estimates, it is necessary to build a total of 450 general education schools in Azerbaijan’s post-conflict zone.
Cultural and sports facilities to be rehabilitated include:
(i) district houses of culture (recreation centers),
(ii) village clubs,
(iii) public (including central district) libraries,
(iv) sports complexes, and also
(v) museums and
(vi) historical monuments.
The rehabilitation of most cultural and sports facilities, however important, is among the tasks of the adaptation stage.
Economic Reconstruction
Selection of goals and principles. Post-conflict economic reconstruction always involves a multiple choice in terms of both strategy and tactics. In this case, the selection of long-term economic goals is not so much a question of scientific research as a political question. Nevertheless, it is possible to formulate at least four universal basic principles of post-conflict economic restructuring.
■ First, the choice of sectoral policy in post-conflict areas is a derivative of the state’s general long-term economic goals. In Azerbaijan, for example, one of these goals is the development of the country’s transit transport potential. This implies the need, on the one hand, to comply with high quality standards in rehabilitating transportation infrastructure, and on the other, to ensure priority development of transport service enterprises.
■ Second, both the very process of post-conflict economic recovery and the subsequent operation of production facilities should be oriented, in the first place, toward local resources. In all post-conflict reconstruction works, including recruitment of management personnel, priority should be given to returnees, even where this requires additional (reasonably acceptable) expenditures on retraining or further training.
10 Appropriate international organizations can and should be invited to take part in children’s psychological rehabilitation. For example, UNICEF has wide experience of such work in Azerbaijan. The results of its activity have already been validated in 26 districts of the country.
■ Third, at the stage of intensive reconstruction of life support systems and infrastructure, despite mass involvement of private companies in these works as subcontractors, state-owned companies can dominate. But the philosophy of post-conflict rehabilitation should be based on the idea that the private sector will ultimately become the key sector of the economy.
■ Fourth, in selecting enterprises to be reconstructed or constructed, the authorities should be guided by the level of their potential competitiveness:
> top priority: enterprises whose products are competitive in the international market, including the markets of neighboring countries;
> high priority: enterprises whose products are competitive in the national market;
> medium priority: enterprises whose products are competitive in local and regional markets.
At the same time, some enterprises whose products are designed for the local market can be given higher priority (especially at the first stage of repatriation) if they are associated with local life support systems.
Selection of sectors that can exploit the comparative advantages of the post-conflict region is an indispensable condition of effective post-conflict planning. This selection should be made with due regard for the long-term competitive advantages of the country as a whole and is specific to each particular region.11
As for Karabakh, one can identify (as a preliminary recommendation) the following sectors that could potentially constitute the backbone of the economy:
> In agriculture: grain production (with focus on food grain), horse breeding (breeding of Karabakh racehorses), livestock production (especially sheep breeding), and possibly winegrowing;
> In industry: carpet weaving (manufacture of Karabakh carpets), leather industry, building materials industry, meat and dairy industry, and possibly winemaking;
> In the service sector: tourism (especially recreational, health and culinary) and music (the prospect of turning the region into a world center of mugam music is quite realistic).
Of great importance for post-conflict economic recovery is government support for the region’s competitive advantage sectors. In the agricultural sector, the main incentive measure is to transfer land parcels to returnees into private ownership free of charge.12 The government should support returnees’ farms, providing them with equipment, agricultural implements, livestock, seeds, fertilizers, fuel and other resources, and also with advisory services. This support could include such forms as government purchase guarantees for their products.13
Some sectors, such as horse breeding or carpet weaving, require specific forms of government support.
11 For detail, see: N. Muzaffarli, Reiting Azerbaidzhana v mezhdunarodnykh sravnitelnykh issledovaniakh, Kavkaz Publishers, Baku, 2006.
12 The possibility of land privatization in proper legal form even before the achievement of a political settlement should be studied separately. This action can have both positive effects (time saving, additional incentives to IDP repatriation, etc.) and negative effects (possible social tensions among IDPs even before repatriation), while such effects as rising public expectations about the resolution of the conflict may turn out to be either positive or negative, depending on how soon a political settlement is reached.
13 In Azerbaijan’s post-conflict areas, the stimulating role of such guarantees would mainly boil down to a psychologically comfortable environment for farmers, because the market of agricultural products it is planned to cultivate will be quite large.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
> In the first case this implies direct government enterprise at the early stages of development, and
> in the second, a lifting of all nontariff restrictions and maximum simplification of export rules.14
Private company motivation. The private sector should be drawn into virtually all types of rehabilitation work, and in such sectors as agriculture, trade and services it should dominate. In sectors where the amount of start-up capital is relatively small and is coupled with quick returns, there is no need for special incentive mechanisms to attract private sector entities. Such mechanisms will be necessary to stimulate more capital-intensive and less profitable types of business.
There are several universal (non-sectoral) mechanisms capable of increasing the motivation of private enterprises.
■ First, provision of financial assistance on a grant basis (government grants only in cases where private enterprises implement particularly important low-margin projects mainly at the initial stages of post-conflict rehabilitation). Apart from ensuring full transparency, it is necessary to set a limit on the size of the grant that can be awarded to one enterprise.
■ Second, fiscal benefits. In particular, Azerbaijan has gained significant experience in providing tax breaks to private agricultural enterprises, including tax holidays and preferential prices. In the post-conflict zone, such benefits can and should be granted to enterprises in all sectors of the economy. But the government should set the time interval for fiscal benefits in advance and make an announcement to that effect.
■ Third, soft loans. In Azerbaijan, institutional problems in this area can be regarded as solved: the Enterprise Development Fund and the State Investment Company have already financed hundreds of commercial projects and have gained sufficient experience. An important role in providing soft loans can also be played by national commercial banks, for which purpose it is necessary to open a special credit line at the Central Bank using, along with its own resources, funds received by the state from IFIs and partly from foreign donors.
In granting benefits and where tender offers are identical, preference should be given to enterprises owned by returnees and then to enterprises already implementing large investment projects in post-conflict areas, followed by enterprises that had close cooperation and partnership relations with the region in the pre-conflict period.
Foreign investors can in principle take part in all types of rehabilitation work, but in practice the political risks related to mini projects will probably prove to be unacceptable. That is why foreign companies can be expected to show the greatest interest in projects directly sponsored or guaranteed by the state, namely, in the reconstruction of certain life support systems (housing stock, water supply and energy systems), transport and production infrastructure, and the creation of new telecommunications systems.
During the preparatory period, the government has to develop its own plan of cooperation with foreign investors in the field of post-conflict rehabilitation. The plan should determine the sectors that are potentially most attractive to foreign investors; it should contain a list of projects in which foreign investors will be invited to take part and their technical and cost parameters; rank these projects by the level of their priority for the country from the perspective of the earliest possible and effective performance of reconstruction works; and provide for additional incentives in order to attract foreign investors.
14 Additional incentives for carpet exports to international markets could be provided, in particular, by a system of bonuses for earnings credited to special export accounts of companies in this industry.
Post-Conflict Reconstruction Financing
The main financial burden of post-conflict reconstruction, as noted above, is borne by the state. There are two kinds of public financing of post-conflict rehabilitation. The first kind is indirect financing, which implies the provision of various benefits and preferences, especially fiscal and price benefits, to foreign and local (state and private) companies. Cost estimates here are quite difficult to make without a knowledge of the actual content of the benefits established by law.
Direct public investment in post-conflict rehabilitation is more predictable. Nevertheless, projections of public funds required to reconstruct post-conflict areas in Azerbaijan differ widely: from $20 billion to $60 billion. The final figure depends on the basic assumptions and methodology of research, on the formulation of the ultimate goals of post-conflict rehabilitation, on the economic forecasts (including inflation forecasts) used in such calculations, and on a number of other factors.
Our investigation, based on the parameters given in this article, shows that total requirements for centralized public investment in post-conflict reconstruction in Azerbaijan (adjusted for inflation) could reach AZN 22.7 billion or $28.4 billion, excluding border and other security costs and decontamination (including mine clearing) costs. Moreover, this amount includes expenditures only in the so-called initial period of rehabilitation work. Out of the total amount of the state’s potential financial expenditures, 56.4% will go into the rehabilitation and reconstruction of life support systems, 41.0% into infrastructure, and 2.6% into the creation and development of enterprises with direct public investment. It should be borne in mind that a significant part of investment in life support systems and infrastructure facilities is simultaneously investment in production infrastructure.
Any grouping of industries and sectors subject to reconstruction is naturally tentative. For example, matters of repatriation and housing construction
> can be included in the first group, restoration of energy, water and
> gas supply in the second group, infrastructure of local civil administration, telecommunications network and
> social facilities in the third group, and
> the economy and transport in the fourth group.
Expenditures calculated based on these groups and their changes over the years15 are shown in the chart.
An increase in required public investment over time is a common feature of most post-conflict rehabilitation spheres.
■ The first reason is associated with a gradual increase in the number of returnees.
■ The second is a step-by-step expansion of the scope of rehabilitation work as new areas and population centers are drawn into the orbit of reconstruction. And the third reason is related to inflation.
In some cases, inflation is a more important contributor to the increase in rehabilitation expenditures than other factors.
An analysis of Azerbaijan’s economic development prospects for the next 10-15 years shows that despite the colossal resource intensity of post-conflict reconstruction the country is quite capable of implementing it. In recent years, the Azerbaijan economy has demonstrated unprecedented growth
15 Each of the conventional periods mentioned above is equated with a year.
Diagram
Direct Public Spending on Various Spheres of Rehabilitation Work by Year (adjusted for inflation, AZN million)
6.500 6,000
5.500
5.000
4.500
4.000
3.500
3.000
2.500
2.000
1.500 1,000
500
0
I~1 Economy and transport
■ Civil administration,
telecommunications
and social facilities
|_| Energy, water and gas supply
I~1 Repatriation and housing
1 1 1 i
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year
rates, while the country’s strategic foreign exchange reserves ($18.2 billion as of1 January, 2009) are already close to 40% of GDP. It is safe to say that as the global financial and economic crisis subsides, the increase in the country’s international reserves will accelerate.
There are at least two other factors that will have a beneficial effect on Azerbaijan’s capacity to invest in post-conflict rehabilitation. The first of these is associated with the peculiarities of the world financial crisis, which will be accompanied by an increase in uncommitted funds accumulated by banks. In their desire to revive the economy by financial infusions, most governments and central banks in the world, including Azerbaijan, issue additional credit resources while lowering discount rates or reduce the amount of bank liabilities, including required reserves. These and other similar measures will expand lending opportunities for commercial banks. However, the latter try to limit their lending in view of the crisis-generated increase in credit risk. This is why we can assume that when the global economic recession eases and the world economy enters the phase of post-crisis depression, most of the world’s “surviving” financial institutions will start looking for areas of safe and effective investment of their resources.
The second factor is that the mechanisms of effective cooperation between Azerbaijan and international financial institutions have been fully formed in recent years. Azerbaijan has every reason to count on material and organizational support from IFIs, foreign states and donor organizations in post-conflict reconstruction.
Risk Management
Large-scale programs providing for the use of significant financial resources within a short period, especially those geared to overcome the consequences of armed conflicts, are associated
with certain risks. Risks threatening post-conflict reconstruction can be either external or inherent in its very nature. Both kinds of risks can be either universal (i.e., characteristic of most similar programs) or specific (i.e., created by the peculiarities of the conflict and the post-conflict situation).
External risks include, in the first place, the threat of renewed military action. An analysis of the ways to reduce this threat is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, it is obvious that in order to reduce this risk it would make sense to declare the post-conflict area a demilitarized zone, to draw a demarcation line that could be controlled by international peacekeeping forces, and to restore the regime of legitimate border controls along the border between the post-conflict area and neighboring states. It is important to arrange effective interaction between all forces whose mission is to ensure internal security in post-conflict areas (in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, between Azerbaijani, Armenian and international forces).
Some specific risks can be due to deficiencies in the political agreements governing the resolution of the conflict. They can arise, in particular, where the status of transport corridors between countries and parts of post-conflict areas is unequal.
For example, it is important that the so-called Lachin Corridor connecting Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, on the one hand, and the Megri Corridor connecting Azerbaijan with its Nakh-chivan autonomy, on the other, should have roughly identical status. If a special operating regime is established for the Lachin Corridor (as a condition of security for the Armenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh) while the Megri Corridor remains closed, thereby dooming Nakhchivan to a further transport blockade, proper regional (pan-Caucasian) integration will be impossible. This would not only complicate post-conflict rehabilitation, but would rule out the possibility of restoring interstate transport communications in the region, which would be at variance with the interests, in the first place, of Armenia itself, depriving it of the opportunity to take part in international projects in the field of transcontinental communications.
There is also a special group of risks that can be generated by unresolved intercommunal contradictions. It is known, for example, that during the years of hostilities and in the subsequent period the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities of both highland and lowland Karabakh have become almost entirely isolated from each other. This circumstance will significantly complicate post-conflict reconstruction, because each new step will have to be balanced from a communal standpoint as well. Neither community should feel that its rights have been infringed in the process of recreating infrastructure networks, routing roads, distributing energy supplies, etc. Many of the region’s inhabitants will regard reconstruction works as a form of direct assistance to the population, and such assistance should be distributed equitably.
There is also a risk of sabotage and provocations by extremists and local criminal groups. Such attempts should be ruthlessly suppressed by joint police forces, and this in conditions of full transparency that would rule out the possibility of interpreting such punitive measures as actions directed against one of the communities.
The most dangerous universal internal risk is possible corruption in the use of funds, regardless of whether they are allocated by the government or provided by international organizations, and also of who precisely misappropriates the funds (local or foreign participants in postconflict reconstruction). In order to reduce this risk it is necessary to take all the traditionally applied anti-corruption measures. During post-conflict rehabilitation, the central place among them belongs to:
(a) close coordination of the activities of the government, the private sector, civil society and foreign partners, and
(b) measures to ensure the maximum possible transparency of financial interactions, especially in holding tenders, most of which should be open.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Unconventional measures should also be used. One of these could be the attraction of foreign companies or organizations to take part in various projects as operators or “co-operators.”16 This form is particularly relevant in cases where the project is wholly or partly financed from foreign sources. In this field, Azerbaijan could draw on its own experience (with certain modifications) gained in managing oil contracts.
A typical risk for large-scale government programs is over-bureaucratization of management decision making. It is expressed in interagency barriers, the predominance of sectoral interests, red tape, etc., all of which may not only slow down the reconstruction works, but also reduce their efficiency. It is important to bear in mind that bureaucratization can also be caused by positive aspirations, such as the government’s desire to insure itself against ineffective decisions and processes. That is why one of the methods to mitigate this risk is project management jointly with international organizations, because this reduces the possibility of ineffective management and partially relieves the government of the duty to coordinate decisions. Ultimately, it is necessary to achieve an optimal balance between rapid adoption of management decisions and guarantees of their required effectiveness.
Special mention should be made of the possible risk of a shortage of managers, highly skilled management personnel capable of acting in extreme situations. In order to cover this shortage, a purposeful effort should be made already at the stage of preliminary measures: by training specialists in the field of strategic spatial planning and nationwide reconstruction management, by organizing short and medium-term courses and training sessions for officials and staff of local civil administration bodies of the occupied areas, and also for technical and engineering personnel. The most effective way to resolve such problems is to set up a special agency as noted above, tentatively, a Ministry for Post-Conflict Rehabilitation.
The risk of a shortage of funds appears to be less relevant to Azerbaijan than to many other countries in view of its significant international reserves. Another important point is that many states, interstate associations and IFIs have expressed their readiness to support post-conflict rehabilitation after the achievement of a political agreement. This risk can be reduced by cost minimization and correct planning of rehabilitation works, including their roughly even time distribution. At the same time, it is necessary to continue consultations with IFIs, foreign donor organizations and potential foreign investors on their participation in financing post-conflict reconstruction. The possibilities for local private sector participation in reconstruction works should be explored as well. In particular, the government could conclude a set of agreements with local businessmen in the form of protocols of intent.
A fairly serious risk is associated with faster inflation as an inevitable result of the inflow of large additional financial resources into the economy. The measures required to reduce this risk should be determined immediately before the start of rehabilitation, with due regard for the adjusted amount of funds required for reconstruction, the total amount of money in circulation at that time, the rate of inflation, and external economic factors.
All the external and internal risks described above are manageable, which should be seen as an argument in favor of an early start on post-conflict rehabilitation.
By Way of Conclusion
Post-conflict reconstruction in a relatively short time, for all its complexity and colossal resource intensity, is a perfectly feasible task for modern society. Azerbaijan has the necessary and
16 One could suggest several ways of addressing this problem. First, the government can simply appoint a particular international organization as the operator of a particular project. Second, the government and its foreign partner (partners) can set up a special joint venture that will subsequently be entrusted with managing a particular project (projects). Third, the government can include representatives of its foreign partners in project steering committees. Finally, it is also possible to set up international steering committees for rehabilitating territorial units (such as districts).
sufficient intellectual and economic potential to quickly reconstruct its post-conflict areas, with active support from the international community, after the achievement of a political agreement on resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. This will make it possible to reintegrate the occupied areas into the legitimate political and economic space, while their economic revival will play a very positive role in improving the well-being of all citizens in the region regardless of their ethnic origin, and also in the overall socioeconomic development of the Central Caucasus.
Kenan ALLAHVERDIEV
Ph.D. (Philos.), associate professor at the Department of Political Science and Political Administration, Academy of State Administration under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Baku, Azerbaijan).
HOW THE KARABAKH CONFLICT FITS THE NEW GREAT GAME CONTEXT
Abstract
The author has selected a novel and most promising approach to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the oldest and hard-est-to-resolve of the Caucasian “frozen” conflicts. He has placed it into the New Great Game context, a recent coinage of geopo-
litical parlance. The forces involved in it are seeking effective control over a vast territory stretching from the Middle East to the Central Eurasian fringes by changing the geopolitical balance of forces together with the political and geographic borders of the states inside this vast macroregion.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
The August 2008 war in Georgia, when everyone could see Russian tanks moving across Georgian territory on their TV screens, revived the old fears of the Cold War period and created a wave of interest in all sorts of conceptions and analytical models that systematized in one way or another a new round of geopolitical confrontation involving the global and regional actors.
The academic community has not yet reached an agreement on many related issues: Is the unfolding geopolitical confrontation a new one; which forces are involved in it and what strategic plans are they nurturing and what outcomes are they expecting; how will this affect the Greater Caucasus and the so-called frozen conflicts?
Below is my humble contribution to the academic community’s all-out effort.
