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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Jannatkhan EYVAZOV
Ph.D. (Political Science), Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Central Asia and the Caucasus
(Baku, Azerbaijan).
THE REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE: POLITICAL STRUCTURE, ENVIRONMENT, AND TRANSITIVITY
Abstract
This article is an attempt to assess the extent to which the key structural specifics and political environment of the Regional Security System (RSS) in the postSoviet space are responsible for its development and transitivity.
The author concludes that the scrutinized political space is structurally highly
unstable. It is a negatively asymmetric RSS, which stipulates for the possibility of its transit to more stable structural conditions. At the same time, its development and transformation are greatly affected by its active political environment composed of the most influential powers in the contemporary world.
KEYWORDS: the regional security system, post-Soviet space,
Post-Soviet Security Macrocomplex, political structure, structural instability, system transitivity, political environment, powers.
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Introduction
Early in the 1990s, the political space that at one time was united within the Soviet Union was transformed into an anarchically organized RSS: fifteen Soviet republics became independent states, which changed the key vectors of the security relations among them.
The regional system of the post-Soviet space has a very specific political structure and environment that, together with other factors, ensure its stability/transitivity. Its evolution in the 1990s-2000s has supplied us with enough empirical material to acquire a clear understanding of the above.
Polarity of the post-Soviet RSS has been determined by the power potential of the Russian Federation (RF), which is much more superior to the power potentials of the other newly independent states (NIS). Russia, in fact, has preserved the status of the only power across the post-Soviet space. At the same time, the processes that are unfolding in this space are accompanied by the increased activities of extra-regional powers, the nature of their activities speaking of the involvement of their security interests in the region.
The article is an attempt to identify the extent to which the RSS, with its present political structure and environment, functioning in the post-Soviet space is tending toward transit. What are the key structural conditions that contribute to the system's transitivity? What is the extent of structural stability/instability of the post-Soviet RSS? What are the main specifics of its political environment and how do they affect the system's development? I will try to answer these and related questions in this article.
My analysis of the post-Soviet RSS is based mainly on the theoretical and methodological instruments of the theory of regional security complexes (TRSC),1 which describes the region as a centered great power regional security complex.2 The newly independent states, which detached themselves from the former metropolitan country, formed local interstate systems, that is, regional security sub-complexes that appeared in the European part (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova), in the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia), and in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Even though these regional subsystems are relatively autonomous, Russia has preserved the function of a center that ties them together in a web of security interdependence of the RSS.
As distinct from the early (1990s) development stages of the system of the post-Soviet space, today any assessment of its present state requires an account of the structural changes caused by the unification of the three Baltic republics (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) with the institutional RSC in Europe (the European Union).3 From this it follows that the present Post-Soviet Security Macrocom-plex (PSM) consists of twelve elements: RF + 11 NIS in three sub-complexes (Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine; Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia; and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).
1 The TRSC is based on the works of Barry Buzan and other representatives of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. In 1983, Buzan formulated the conception of the regional security complex in his People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1983). This, as well as the second edition of the same work (B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Second Edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, Colorado, 1991), demonstrated a classical approach to the security complex conception. Much later, he, together with co-authors (B. Buzan, O. W^ver, J. De Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis, Rienner Publishers Boulder, London, 1998; B. Buzan, O. W^ver, Regions and Powers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), made an attempt to go beyond the limits of the classical conception of the security complex. To remedy the main disparities between their present approach and the classical conception of the security complex (concentration on the military and political spheres of interstate relations and insufficient attention to the non-state actors, the conduct of which creates additional vectors of intersectoral interdependence), the authors postulated two types of security complexes—homogeneous and heterogeneous—as well as the securitization conception.
2 B. Buzan, O. Wffiver, op. cit., pp. 55, 62, 343.
3 In 2004, these three former Soviet republics joined the EU and NATO, which speaks of their inclusion in the structure of the institutionalized RSC in Europe.
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Russia is the only geopolitical actor within the PSM able to sustainably project its influence on the regional scale. At the same time, it is the key security factor for the NIS in all subsystems. This means that the development of the local complexes, the dynamics of the security relations among the states involved and their contacts with external powers along with endogenous factors were formed and depended on Russia's geopolitical activeness. However, as PSM developed, other powers became involved.
In my previous work,4 I touched upon the parameters and types of power's involvement in PSM; to remain within the limits of the present article I will merely point out that Russia, Turkey, Iran, China, the EU, and the U.S. are the power centers involved in PSM. So far, Russia remains the only power fully involved in this regional system, while all the others being partially involved form its political environment.
The above points to the main specifics of PSM's political structure and environment: it is a unipolar RSS with an active political environment; taken together these specifics greatly affect the RSS's stability/transitivity.
Structural Factors and the System's Transitivity: Theoretical Aspects
As the key factor of functionality of any system, stability should remain in the center of any discussion of the specific features of any RSS, the political structure of which is responsible for many of its phenomena and processes; it also determines the degree of its transitivity.
Kenneth Waltz's neorealism describes the "distribution of capabilities" as the main structural parameter of the international political system; this means that its transformations are connected with the changes in this parameter: "In a multipolar world, one great power, or two, or three in combination, can eliminate other states as great powers by defeating them in war. Reducing a multi- to a tri- or a bipolar world would change the system's structure."5
A war between powers as the main holders of capabilities cannot be the only means by which the system is transformed; contemplated in the framework of realistic tradition, it looks like the key indicator of structural changes. Wars are less possible in systems where the distribution of capabilities is balanced out. A war among the main actors (either aggressive or defensive) means that the balance is tipped and the system is moving toward redistribution of capabilities.
Barry Buzan has offered a more detailed concept of a system's transformation. As distinct from Waltz's concept, his is geared at explaining the regional level—the RSC. Besides, he has not limited himself to contemplating the material aspect represented by the distribution of capabilities; he associates the possibility of changes with changed perceptions, that is, the "patterns of amity and enmity" among the actors. These two components, he writes further, constitute the "essential structure" of the RSC,6 while any changes in them lead to the RSC's transformation.
The changes in both components of the "essential structure" that lead to the system's overall transformation are caused, first and foremost, by the impact of powers. When looking at the distribution of power, Buzan identifies two factors that cause transformations: external and internal. In the former case the matter concerns the shifted polarity of the regional system as a result of internally
4 See: J. Eyvazov, "Powers and Regional Security Systems: Parameters and Types of Involvement (Post-Soviet Space Case Study)," Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 14, Issue 1, 2013, pp. 36-56.
1 K.N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill, Boston, 1979, p.199.
6 B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 211.
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determined processes (disintegration of powers or shifted distribution of capabilities due to the technological progress of some of them and the technological backwardness of others)7; in the latter case, the transformations are caused by the involvement of external forces in a local conflict in the form of military assistance.8
Transformations that occur in a system under the pressure of "patterns of amity and enmity" may, in principle, be connected with activities of powers, albeit to a lesser extent than in the cases of distribution of capabilities. The amity/enmity relations among regional actors depend not only on the structural factors; this means that the political balance between them does not guarantee a consistent shift from enmity to amity. The developments in the post-Soviet space confirm that even suppressed local dynamics and very long coexistence of local actors within a single state system (the Soviet Union in our case) proved not enough to remove, for instance, the Caucasian NIS from the pre-Soviet amity/ enmity patterns. With respect to Russia, they remain one of the causes of instability in the Northern Caucasus fraught with bloodshed.
The assessment of an RSS from the point of view of its transitivity presupposes that we use a much wider interpretation of the structural factors. This means that we should take into account and assess the stability/instability of the RSS political structure9 based on three components: internal weakness/strength of the states belonging to the regional system; (a)symmetry of strength and (a)symmetry of vulnerabilities; and (im)maturity of relations among them.
Within the classical RSC concept, the level of sociopolitical cohesion serves as the criterion of the state's strength/weakness. What looks like an oversimplification of the key strength/weakness criterion, as applied to the postmodern states,10 does not devalue its importance when applied to a discussion of PSM far removed from postmodernity. Applicability of this criterion to an assessment of strength/weakness of these states as the main criterion fully corresponds to the present level of their development.11 This is not the only criterion, however. When talking about the type of contemporary state, we should probably discuss its other (classical) parameters such as economic and military potential: the ability to support and defend itself cannot and should not be removed from the security agenda of the states, even those that have moved into postmodernity.
The weakness of any state and its flawed ability to support and defend itself make it more aware of its vulnerability: in a weak state, the process of securitization is determined by the conceptualiza-
7 See: B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, pp. 211-212.
8 See: Ibid., p. 213.
9 In my other works I made an attempt to reveal the meaning of this parameter and demonstrate, in particular, its impact on the conflict dynamics in the post-Soviet Caucasus (see: J. Eyvazov, "Structural Factors in the Development of the Regional Security Systems (A Post-Soviet Central Eurasia Case Study)," Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 13, Issue 1, 2012, pp. 79-102); J. Eyvazov, "The Regional Security System in the Central Caucasus: Political Structure and Conflicts," The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 6, Issue 1, 2012, pp. 8-21).
10 When assessing the sociopolitical development of contemporary states, Buzan and W^ver have identified three types/ levels—premodern states (low development level of inner sociopolitical cohesion and state organization, weak governmental control over the territory and population); modern states (strong governmental control of society; limited openness, the sanctity of sovereignty and independence and its attributes, including territory and borders, placing the stakes on self-sufficiency, self-reliance, and national identity); and postmodern states with relatively moderate sanctity of sovereignty, independence and national identity, economic, political and cultural openness to the world (for more details, see: B. Buzan, O. W^ver, op. cit., pp. 23-24).
11 On the whole, the strength and weakness concepts are fairly abstract and too relative to provide a criterion of their assessment for all cases. What may be considered as a strength in one state could be felt as a weakness in another. This relativity rests on the objectively different development levels of states and regional interstate systems. The types of postmodern and modern states differ greatly. For example, in a postmodern state, decentralization of power and federalization are no longer its weaknesses, but rather a condition of domestic policy which feeds dynamic and balanced economic growth and, therefore, the state's inner strength. The same phenomena in a modern state might breed, at least in the short term, political fragmentation and separatism and, by the same token, make it weaker and more vulnerable. This means that Buzan's criterion looks somewhat oversimplified when applied to the postmodern standards. In our case, however, the gist of these criteria is totally applicable to the internal sociopolitical, economic, and sociocultural structure of the post-Soviet states.
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tion of its vulnerabilities. Indeed, the greater their number and intensity and the more obvious their nature, the greater their impact on the way this state behaves in the security sphere; at the regional level, this stirs up negative dynamics of the security relations. This happens because, having realized its weakness, the state starts acting according to the well-known logic of neorealism: in the context of anarchy and self-reliance, the state has no choice but to exploit the vulnerabilities of its neighbors to prevent them from becoming strong enough to pose a threat to the state's own security. This invariably invites a reaction, which usually leads to open conflicts.
There is also a domestic political context: the low level of social and political cohesion in a weak state means instability between political institutions and society and, hence, the practical inability of the former to govern the latter. In these conditions, the political elite has no choice but to use the state's objective vulnerabilities for political purposes at home to regulate, in particular, its relations with all sorts of political groups. In other words, by politicizing its vulnerabilities the elite is striving to achieve the sociopolitical cohesion the objectively weak state does not have, which, quite obviously, increases the securitization of these vulnerabilities. The aims of social and political consolidation can be achieved through identifying in the first place the external sources of threats.
There is nothing new in the efforts to achieve sociopolitical consolidation by identifying external enemies and placing the responsibility for domestic problems on them. This method is normally used by internally weak states; the examples are numerous: suffice it to mention North Korea, Syria, and Cuba. In the majority of cases, such states find themselves in isolation at best, while an armed conflict with neighbors is the worst of the possible scenarios. There is a comparatively favorable option: sustained tension in the regions of weak states.
This means that strong states are more inclined toward positive dynamics of security relations in the region. Their social and political stability, adequate military and economic resources, and, hence, a much lower level of anxiety about their vulnerability lead to more predictable and less conflicting relations with neighbors, which leads to cooperation in regional dynamics.
The impact of strength/weakness and vulnerability/invulnerability of states on stability/instability of the RSS political structure also depends on the degree of symmetry in their distribution among the region's states.
Any RSS is based on a close interdependence of its elements; in other words, we are talking about the security interdependence of states within one region generated either objectively or subjectively (perceptually). In the classical conditions of an anarchic regional political system and geographic proximity of its states, strength and weakness, as well as vulnerability and invulnerability, for that matter, turn out to be the key security factors that tie them together materially and perceptually within the system we call RSS.
At the same time, an assessment of these parameters in the security context is relative: any state assesses its strength and vulnerability as correlated with the corresponding degrees of its neighbors and chooses an adequate security strategy. Proceeding from the principles of system and interdependence, the neighbors respond with corresponding perceptions and conduct. This makes stability/instability of the region's political structure mainly dependent on the extent to which the states and their strength/weakness and vulnerability/invulnerability differ from each other, that is, on the degree of asymmetry in the strength and vulnerability of the region's states. Accordingly, the symmetry of the regional security system in these terms is responsible for stability in the relations among the states and, hence, of the regional political structure.
The arguments related to the interconnection between regional strength and vulnerability asymmetry, on the one hand, and instability of the RSS structure, on the other, can be easily developed into a discussion of how perception by any state of its relative weakness and vulnerability might affect its relations with its neighbors. This situation is best described within the framework of four conventional models of regional security systems with different degrees of symmetry/asymmetry of strength and vulnerability of the comprising states:
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
■ First, a positively symmetrical regional security system, in which all states are more or less equally strong with almost the same mutual vulnerability level.
■ Second, a negatively symmetrical regional security system, in which all states are more or less equally weak with a more or less equal level of mutual vulnerability.
■ Third, a positively asymmetrical regional security system, in which some states are strong and others are weak, while the degree of vulnerability of the former to the latter is much lower than the degree to which the latter are vulnerable to the former. Furthermore, the stronger states predominate both numerically and qualitatively (they can maintain moderation and cooperativeness in the dynamics of regional security relations).
■ Fourth, a negatively asymmetric regional security system, in which some states are strong and others are weak, while the degree of vulnerability of the former to the latter is much lower than the degree to which the latter are vulnerable to the former. The weak states outnumber the strong ones, while the qualitative capabilities of the strong states are not sufficient to maintain moderation and cooperation in the regional security relations dynamics.
The first model can be described as the most stable regional political structure, at least because its members are less exposed to the acute securitization of their own relative weakness. A strong state implies the low level of its security vulnerabilities, hence the low capabilities for its neighbors to capitalize on them. This means that within a region such states, if they are in the majority or dominate (very much as in the positively asymmetric RSS), have less opportunity to manipulate the vulnerabilities of their neighbors: contributing to moderation and cooperation in the regional relations it stabilizes the region's political structure. Even if we surmise that this region's states have high vulnerability, the fact that these vulnerabilities are symmetrical decreases the possibility of them being exploited by the states against each other. Parallels are found in international trade, in the practices of so called trade or tariff wars or in the economic phenomenon Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have described as "symmetrical interdependence."12 Mutually dependent and mutually vulnerable states are less inclined to exploit vulnerabilities than the unequally (asymmetrically) dependent ones. The logic is obvious: if you exploit the weaknesses of your neighbor, it might reciprocate by doing the same to you, which makes the damage to both sides practically identical.
The negatively asymmetrical regional security system is less favorable when it comes to political structure's stability. The arguments are the same: on the one hand, the weakness of the majority of states leads to over-securitization of vulnerabilities and preventive aggressiveness; on the other, the asymmetry of vulnerability among the states tempts the stronger states to exploit the vulnerability of their weaker neighbors. The second model—the negatively symmetrical regional system— also cannot be described as conducive to political structure stability. The equal (symmetrical) dependence of states on one another for their security restrains them, however their general weakness and individual high vulnerability level prevent them from moving toward moderation and cooperation and, therefore, toward stabilizing relations inside the region.
The immature relations among states is another factor of instability of a regional political structure. It basically arises from the absence of shared interests and cooperative practice in interstate relations.
In the absence of cooperative practice, regional relations become highly unstable for the simple reason that the response of the opponent(s) to any of the common problems is unpredictable. This situation can be viewed through the prism of a structuralist interpretation of states' conduct (in particular through a mechanism of security dilemma). The situation does not relate to the classical Walt-
12 The parameters of asymmetry/symmetry belong to those according to which the stabilizing effect of economic interdependence between states is assessed (see: R.O. Keohane, J. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Third edition, Longman, Boston, 2001, p. 157).
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zian formula13; it fits more to Buzan's structuralism, which looks at the anarchical nature of a structure and its impact on states' conduct, while anarchy develops from immature to mature one.14 Though this is an insufficient explanation at the theoretical level and calls for specification of the practice of inter-societal relations.
The social-constructivist approach may supply an important specification: it concentrates on practice, which creates "social structures," the security dilemma being one of them. According to Alexander Wendt, "processes of interaction produce and reproduce the social structures—cooperative or conflictual—that shape actors' identities and interests."15
Even though the maturity of interstate relations is connected with states' strength/weakness, it remains a very specific parameter of structural (in)stability. (Im)maturity of relations is not a direct product of states' strength or weakness; it is determined by a socially and practically confirmed bias toward exploiting (manipulating) the weaknesses (vulnerabilities) of the opponents for the sake of its own political interests.. Maturity is, therefore, a quality of state dyads (systems), in which the level of confidence is sufficient for cooperation among states, at least in the solution of common security issues. The highest degree of maturity is reached when a state is prepared to sacrifice its sovereignty for the sake of a common political entity, that is, for political integration.
Mature relations are not necessarily limited to strong states. States can have different degrees of military and economic capabilities as well as sociopolitical cohesion and be at the same time close allies. Today, however, mature relations between strong states are much more frequent than between weak ones. It proceeds from the above evaluated impact of strength/weakness on vulnerability perceptions and corresponding behavior of states.
The maturity level of interstate relations is determined, first and foremost, by the social affinity/ difference of states and the practice of their relations. The former is rooted in the ethnic, linguistic, and confessional specifics and shared political values (institutions and ideologies) of states. The latter is created by the states' history—what prevails in the history of their relations—amity or enmity. In other words, confidential relations among states, the predictability of their conduct and, therefore, their cooperative relations depend on their social affinity, friendly relations, and the absence of conflicts in the past.
Structural Instability across the Post-Soviet Space
The PSM is obviously asymmetrical in terms of the strengths/weaknesses, threats and vulnerabilities; it consists mainly of weak states with inadequate cooperative experience in regulating the security dilemmas present in their relations. The numerous conflicts still broiling in this space are the best evidence of the above.
The following table offers a glimpse of some of the qualitative and quantitative descriptions of the countries on which the structural specifics of PSM depend.
The figures graphically illustrate the current specifics of PSM's political structure. A glimpse into its initial period, the early 1990s, will supply us with an integral picture of its structure's development.
13 Waltz treats the anarchic nature of the structure of the international political system (its maturity levels, in particular) as universalist, that is, he does not distinguish between the maturity levels of anarchy and the specifics of the impact of different maturity levels on the way states behave.
14 See: B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, pp. 174-181.
15 A. Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security, Summer 1995, Vol. 20, Issue 1, p. 81.
Table
Certain Economic, Military, and Sociopolitical Descriptions of the PSM States as of 2012
10.6
3.9
3,568
391.0
48,850
110
104/136
239
15/22
Territorial claims which cause open and latent conflicts in relations with neighbors— Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), Turkey (Eastern Anatolia), Georgia (Javakhetia)—and the resultant isolation from the main economically profitable regional energy and transportation projects (BTC, BTE, KATB); dependence on external actors (Russia, the diaspora).
<u
N <
71
3.9
7,479
1,770.0
66,950
339
111/575
458
44/38
18/-
Conflict with Armenia, occupation of southwestern regions and related sociopolitical and economic problems; potential threat of separatism in the areas where ethnic minorities live in compact
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
communities, tension with some of the neighboring powers (Iran, Russia) caused by their regional and ethnic policy; strong economic dependence on fuel exports.
3 Belarus 58.2 4.3 6,035 547.0 48,000 — 515 1,111/264 1,003 93/69 — Inflexible (Soviet-style) regime, repressive methods of governance which caused international isolation (mainly by the U.S. and EU) and pro-Russian orientation, resulting in considerable economic dependence on Russia for export of consumer goods and energy resources.
4 Georgia 15.8 6.5 3,457 391.0 20,650 — 93 63/137 185 12/- 18/- Conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Tbilisi no longer controls; forced migrants; separatist threats in other places where ethnic minorities live in compact communities; continued tension with Russia and its military, political, and economic repercussions (the August 2008 war; recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia; the increase and legalization of Russian military presence in these regions and the loss of the Russian market for Georgian products).
Still unregulated legal status of the Caspian; dependence on
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
5 Kazakhstan 200.6 5.5 11,451 2,270.0 39,000 — 300 602/350 602 123/40+ 17/- external actors (Russia) when it comes to transporting energy resources to the world markets; latent conflicts with Uzbekistan— border issues and rivalry for regional leadership. Strong economic dependence on fuel exports.
6 Kyrgyzstan 6.2 1.0 1,128 105.0 10,900 — 150 320/35 246 33/2 — Weak system of state governance, political instability inside the country responsible for the violent regime changes in 2005 and 2010; this and relatively poor natural resources are responsible for the country's poorly developed economy. Unsettled contradictions with Uzbekistan—border in the Ferghana Valley, water resources, trans-border activity of radical Islamic structures; economic dependence on external actors (Russia, China, and Kazakhstan) and dependence in the security sphere (Russia).
7 Moldova 7.6 3.0 2,078 17.0 5,350 — — 44/164 148 -14 — Continued split of the country because of the Transnistrian conflict; economic decline and dependence on external actors (Russia and the EU) caused by the conflict and lack of natural resources.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
8 Russia 1,950.0 3.7 13,683 59,900.0 845,000 + 2,800+ 7,360+/5,700+ 5,436+ 1,462/378+ 270/64 Continued instability in the Northern Caucasus— separatism and an increase in religious extremism accompanied by the two Russian-Chechen wars and continued armed activities in Daghestan, Ingushetia, and other republics of the North Caucasian Federal District, which makes the "southern Muslim belt" of Russia vulnerable; an acute demographic crisis that has already developed into concern over the decreasing number of ethnic Russians and illegal immigration of Muslims and Chinese; material growth in the 2000s, mainly thanks to the export of energy resources, which did not encourage technological progress; this ensured Russia's long-term dependence on world raw material prices accompanied by numerous socioeconomic problems, the acuteness of which became especially obvious in 2008, when the world economic crisis began. The situation is further worsened by consistent confrontation with the NATO countries and international isolation and
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
economic sanctions caused by the annexation of Crimea in March 2014.
9 Tajikistan 7.3 6.8 935 164.0 8,800 — 37 23/23 23 -14 — The still unresolved repercussions of the civil war of 1992-1997; weak state governance, political instability, economic decline; continued economic (labor migration and investments) and security dependence on Russia; weak control of the Afghan border and destructive impact of Afghan instability—radical Islamic groups and drug trafficking; continued tension with Uzbekistan caused by the unsettled border and water-use issues, trans-border activities of radical Islamic organizations. Economic and security dependence on external actors (Russia).
10 Turkmenistan 33.5 8.0 6,621 210.0 (2011 r.) 22,000 — 680 942/829 564 94/10 10/- Inflexible closed political regime; continued tension with Uzbekistan over the use of water of the Amu Darya and with the Caspian states over offshore oil and gas fields.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
11 Ukraine 180.2 3.0 4,017 2,050.0 129,950 — 1,110 3,028/1,432 3,351 221/139 21/1 Internal instability, which resulted in the Orange Revolution in 2004; continued political and religious split. At the end of 2013, a new wave of political instability that caused a regime change; the loss of the Crimea, annexed by Russia in March 2014; the rise of armed separatism in the southeastern regions (Donetsk, Lugansk); partial loss of control over these regions; wide-scale clashes with separatists; continued tension in relations with Russia, and dependence on it for fuel supplies.
12 Uzbekistan 51.6 7.4 1,818 1,420.0 (2011 r.) 48,000 — 340 399/309 487+ 135/29 — Inflexible closed repressive political regime which found itself in political isolation (maintained mainly by the U.S. and EU); economic problems; active radical Islamic organizations and tension with neighbors over water use, borders, radical Islamic groups, and refugees.
Figures from: The Military Balance 2013, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2013.
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On the whole, the entire PSM was engulfed by a wave of armed conflicts among the states or within them with greater or limited outside involvement. This can be described as the starting point of an understanding of the earlier development level of this political structure and as an important indicator of its stability/instability. In the early 1990s, the vehemence of the conflicts and their dynamics differed from one post-Soviet region to another.
Ethnopolitical conflicts demonstrated the highest dynamics in the Caucasus, which associates them with the internal weaknesses of the post-Soviet states that recently regained their political independence.
The post-Soviet independence of the Caucasian states (1991-1994) is best described as the period of their greatest internal weakness. It was at that time that the regional security relations reached the peak of their negative intensity. Internal weakness and political instability were largely the product of objective specifics of the sociopolitical, economic, ideological, and axiological context created by the Soviet Union's unexpectedly fast disintegration. The states still lingering at the beginning of a long road of post-Soviet development had to deal with social and economic problems created by their transfer to a market economy, considerable inequalities in the distribution of economic resources within society, the quest for national identity, exacerbation of ethnopolitical problems, inadequate legitimacy, de facto impotent central governments, and a new generation of political leaders who lacked indispensable political skills. It was at this stage of the region's post-Soviet independence that the Armenian-Azeri war, as well as the civil war and armed ethnopolitical conflicts in Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) reached their highest intensity.
In Russia, these factors stirred up political instability that culminated in two bloody Russian-Chechen wars. Armed activities remain a prominent factor in the Northern Caucasus that even today allows us to characterize Russia using Buzan's classification as "weak as a state."16
In the European part of PSM, only one of the conflicts, in Moldova, developed into armed clashes. The latent confrontation in Crimea (until its annexation by Russia in March 2014) and the internal weakness of Ukraine remained functionally interconnected. In the first and second cases, the conflicts reflected, among other things, the low level of sociopolitical cohesion. In both cases, there were not only endogenous political factors, but also an exogenous factor, viz. Russia's indirect presence.
Irrespective of the answer to the question of whether the conflicts in these regional sub-complexes were caused by endogenous or exogenous political factors, one thing is clear: weakness and the low level of sociopolitical cohesion of states made external geopolitical impacts effective. This is true of the entire post-Soviet space; this conclusion is amply confirmed by the comparison between the Caucasian and European sub-complexes of PSM and the Baltic states, another post-Soviet area.
The three Baltic states are fairly heterogeneous in the ethnic and confessional respect, their large communities being tied, ethnically and linguistically, to Russia.17 All NIS felt the economic and so-ciocultural repercussions of the disintegration of the single state, while Russia's motivations of geopolitical domination in the Baltic region were as substantiated as in Moldova or Georgia. This means that if exogenous political factors are most important, then coupled with the ethnic and confessional structure of the post-Soviet space, they should have raised the conflict level in the Baltic countries to the level observed elsewhere across the post-Soviet space. Reality, however, is different. The three Baltic states sailed through the transition period without conflicts; in 2004, they were admitted to the EU and joined NATO. All other parts of the macroregion are living under the pressure of external factors, which are actively manipulating the conflict potential of the regional states.
16 Buzan extends his strength/weakness assessments to the powers: a state can be (1) strong/weak as a state and (2) weak/ strong as a power (see: B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 97).
17 In 2009, ethnic Russians in Estonia comprised about 26% of the total; in 1989, on the eve of the Soviet Union's disintegration, 30% of the population were Russians. The figures for Latvia were about 30% in 2009 and 34% in 1989; and in Lithuania, they amounted to about 6% in 2009 and 9.4% in 1989.
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This comparison confirms that the internal strength/weakness of states in the dynamics of the security relations within corresponding RSSs plays an important role. At the same time, no matter how obvious this conclusion is, even if coupled with all other factors (ethnic, confessional, and economic), it is necessary, but not sufficient, for a complete understanding of how any RSS functions and develops. We should also take into account how these factors are arranged in any given space and the impact produced by political impulses (connected with the activity of the other PSM elements and external poles of power).
High instability of a political structure is not necessarily accompanied by dominating conflict dynamics of interstate relations. This parameter greatly depends on exogenous political factors. Indeed, despite the far from simple ethnoterritorial specifics, the Baltic region can be described as a relatively stable political structure. The region's geopolitical openness, ensured, in particular, by its closeness to the Western centers of power and their interest in the region, is balancing out the exogenous impact. This was responsible for their relatively fast, painless, and symmetrical transformation, strengthening, mature relations, and stability in the Baltic region's political structure.
In the PSM's Central Asian sub-complex, the transfer to anarchy (caused by the fast disintegration of the U.S.S.R.) was, likewise, accompanied by the weakening of its political units. Still, its influence on the security relations and the potential conflict intensity differed greatly from what happened in two other PSM sub-complexes.
The events in Uzbekistan of the late 1980s (in Ferghana) and the civil war in Tajikistan in the early 1990s were the most obvious outbursts of conflicts in post-Soviet Central Asia. At the same time, both were much more localized than the events in the Caucasus and, therefore, did not develop into permanent and open seats of interstate conflict in the region. As distinct from conflicts in two other RSM sub-complexes, they were finally settled with the active involvement of other states/powers (especially in the domestic conflict in Tajikistan).
The role of neighbors and external poles took different forms (for example, Uzbekistan latently supported the northern Khujand (Leninabad) group),18 while Russia openly helped stabilize the situation by transferring power to Emomali Rakhmon.19
The situation around Tajikistan, or, to be more exact, the country's internal weakness, threatened to undermine the stability of the developing regional political structure in Central Asia. This destabilizing effect is explained not only by Tajikistan's internal weakness but by the republic's geographic location of strategic importance for Russia (among other things) as the southern frontier of the so-called near abroad.
The republic's weakness, bordering on its complete collapse as a state, would have attracted stronger states striving to fill the political vacuum. The powers (or the states willing to acquire this status) looked at control over Tajikistan as a strategic advantage created by the country's geographic location.
In fact, starting in the early 1990s, this Central Asian state has been developing into an arena of rivalry between external forces seeking domination over Tajikistan, a country of huge strategic advantages. This could have destabilized the relations between the external actors. In particular, the conflict-
18 The northern part of Tajikistan (Khujand, formerly Leninabad Region) with a predominantly Uzbek population was much more advanced economically (during Soviet power) than the rest of the republic. This part of Tajikistan was ethnically and economically closer to Uzbekistan. Under Soviet power, the republic was ruled mainly by people from Khujand. In postSoviet times, the South tried to remove people from the North from their commanding posts. Together with other regions, this contributed to the confrontation in the republic. In fact, Emomali Rakhmon's ascent to power from Kulob meant that the Khujand groups suffered a political defeat (see: K. Martin, "Dobro pozhalovat v Leninabadskuiu Respubliku?" Tsentralnaia Azia, No. 10. 1997; Ch. Fairbanks, C.R. Nelson, S.F. Starr, K. Weisbrode, Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia, The Atlantic Council of the United States, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C., 2001, pp. 14, 21).
19 See, for example, L. Jonson, "Russian Policy and Tajikistan," Central Asia, No. 2 (8), 1997, available at [http://www. ca-c.org/dataeng/st_03_jonson.shtml].
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ing political interests in Tajikistan caused tension, to say the least, between Russia and Uzbekistan in the mid- and late 1990s,20 and forced the latter to seek closer relations with and support of the West.
Besides, these specifics of Tajikistan's internal development made it the main corridor between Central Asia and instability in Afghanistan. From the very beginning, the states of the Central Asian RSC looked at Afghanistan as a source of existential threats to their security. Tajikistan became the main transit territory across which drugs and religious radicalism were spreading throughout the postSoviet space. When dealing with Tajikistan, all the external actors, Russia and Uzbekistan in particular, never lose sight of the Afghan factor.
The republic's weakness created conditions for Russia's continued military presence in its territory,21 explained, to an equal extent, by Russia's regional geopolitical approaches and by Tajikistan's political weakness and vulnerability. If we exclude the possibility that Russia provoked confrontation inside Tajikistan for the sake of control in the near abroad, we should admit that its military presence stemmed the conflict. At the same time, the meaning of this involvement (in the context of the (un)stable political structure in the Central Asian sub-complex) was and is highly ambiguous, to say the least.
On the one hand, first, Russia's military contingent helped concentrate political power in the country, which was rapidly falling apart; second, the country became less vulnerable to the negative activity of external forces (not only neighboring states, but also all sorts of criminal and radical religious groups that used Tajikistan to move drugs across its territory and spread political Islam). This stabilized the region's political structure, but we cannot help but wonder how long Russia's military presence will stabilize the situation inside the country and around it?
Its continued military presence does not guarantee that this model of Tajikistan's national-state development will strengthen the country socially, politically, and economically. In fact, the opposite is true: from the very beginning Russia's military presence protected the pro-Russian regime of President Rakhmon and, in full accordance with Realpolitik, the main function of this sort of protection is stemming all forces and processes (both inside and outside the country), which might distort the present political orientation.
Since Russia's military presence is primarily explained by Tajikistan's internal weakness and vulnerability, we can conclude that its continued military presence is explained by the fact that the state remains weak and vulnerable. When Tajikistan becomes stronger and less vulnerable, it will no longer need external guarantors of its security; this will deprive any foreign state of convincing arguments for its military presence in Tajikistan. In other words, Russia will preserve its military contingents in Tajikistan because of its geopolitical interests in Central Asia,22 if, first, the country's internal sociopolitical cohesion remains weak while society and the political institutions remain loosely interconnected and if its economy remains inadequate and the country remains dependent on Russia; and second, if the tension in its relations with neighbors, Uzbekistan in particular, continues. It should be said that the above fully describes the real situation.
In the mid-2000s, Kyrgyzstan became an epicenter of political instability in Central Asia. Albeit there were numerous conflict-intensive factors in the republic (ethnic and confessional diversity, economic decline, and dependence on raw materials), the 1990s were a time of its relatively peaceful and stable existence under President Askar Akaev. The next decade saw two revolutions (in 2005 and 2010), as well as a violent regime change and bloody ethnic clashes in the south in 2010.23 It seems that along with the exacerbation of domestic social, political and economic factors
20 This was the time that Tashkent left the Collective Security Treaty and joined GUAM in 1999.
21 This brings to mind the situation in Georgia in the early 1990s.
22 In October 2004 the Russian 201st motor rifle division deployed in Tajikistan was transformed into a military base.
23 According to different sources, the clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the Osh Region of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 caused between 400 and 2,000 deaths.
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certain role in this situation was played by the counterterrorist operation of the United States and its allies in Afghanistan.
The operation in Afghanistan transformed Kyrgyzstan, under an intergovernmental agreement, into one of the outposts of the Western coalition: in December 2001, the Manas airport was transformed into an American airbase used to move supplies to the international forces in Afghanistan. By the mid-2000s, the Russian-American thaw, based on the two powers' shared desire to bring down the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, had ended. The relations between Washington and Moscow are going from bad to worse which adds importance to America's continued presence in the region. The Declaration of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization adopted by the 2005 Astana Summit, which insisted that the coalition identify the final dates for stationing their military contingents in the territories of the SCO members, proved this beyond doubt.24 In other words, as distinct from the 1990s, the counterterrorist operation made Kyrgyzstan an area of American-Russian rivalry. Moreover, the new people in power, President Kurmanbek Bakiev in particular, tried to capitalize on these contradictions by frequently changing their demands when dealing with the rivals. This explains Moscow's response to the coup of 2010, which removed Bakiev from his post. At that time both President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin were the most scything critics of the Kyrgyz president; they supported the opposition because they were very displeased with the republic's leaders: indeed, after acquiring a Russian loan of $1.7 billion as payment for the removal of the American base from the republic, President Bakiev never fulfilled his obligation.25
Despite the obvious power imbalance between the Russian Federation and the other NIS, the repercussions of the disintegration processes across the post-Soviet space were no less painful for Russia than for the other post-Soviet states. In the 1990s, Russia lived through acute challenges to its sociopolitical cohesion. Its semi-ruined economy and profound ideological crisis, which hit the society of this once leading world power, were further exacerbated by chaos in the political system and the obvious inability of people in power to maintain law and order in the country.
President Yeltsin's two presidencies are remembered for their weak control over the developments in the country and the absence of a clear-cut strategy for recovering from the crisis. In fact, each general election caused acute political crises. During the so-called constitutional crisis of October 1993, the Supreme Soviet was disbanded on Yeltsin's initiative, armed forces were moved into Moscow, the building of the Supreme Soviet (the so-called White House) was stormed, and street fighting caused a lot of bloodshed. This is the best illustration of the stormy events of the 1990s.
These factors added dynamics to the centrifugal trends in the national republics of the Russian Federation. In Tatarstan26 and, especially, in the republics of the Northern Caucasus, there was a lot of talk about national sovereignty and independence from Russia. In the former case, there was no bloodshed or protracted opposition. In the Northern Caucasus, on the other hand, separatism exacerbated, by regional extremism, developed into wars and the still smoldering terrorist activities.
In December 1994, in an attempt to regain control over the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (1991), Russia moved its armed forces into Grozny. This triggered a bloody armed conflict known as the first Chechen war (1994-1996). The Khasaviurt Agreements, which ended it, made the very painful defeat of the Russian authorities and independence of Chechnia a fact.
24 See, for example: Declaration of the Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Astana, 5 July, 2005, available at [http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-rasia.nsf/3a0108443c964002432569e7004199c0/432569d8002198 5fc32570350038d121!0penDocument]
25 See, for example: "Kyrgyzstan: Rossia poobeshchala kredit, novaia vlast demosntriruet prorossiyskuiu orientatsiiu," available at [http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=14451&mode=snews].
26 On 30 August, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar A.S.S.R. adopted the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan; in March 1992, Kazan organized a referendum on the status of the Republic of Tatarstan; over half of the republic's population voted for sovereignty (see: "Rezultaty referenduma Respubliki Tatarstan 21 marta 1992 goda," available at [http://www.kcn.ru/tat_ru/politics/pan_for/wb77.htm]).
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Under Putin, the disintegration of the Russian state was stemmed. Irrespective of the long-term results of his policy, it proved fairly effective at the initial stage of his activities as prime minister in 1999 and his first presidential term (2000-2004).
Power in Russia was centralized under the slogans of strengthening the vertical of power and thwarting the oligarchs. The same logic was behind the second Chechen campaign initiated in 1999. The economic policy of the new Russian administration proved very fruitful. The country had finally left the 1998 crisis behind; the high world prices for energy resources filled its budget.27
No matter how successful in the short-term perspective, Russia's policies of the early and mid-2000s look doubtful in the long-term perspective. Vladimir Putin stemmed the seemingly inevitable disintegration of the Russian state, yet the post-Yeltsin's administrations have failed to successfully address many problems that are growing more and more urgent in the new macro conditions.
In the course of the second Chechen campaign, the federal troops established control over the entire territory of the republic, but the Northern Caucasus was not integrated into the political and economic structure of the Russian Federation. The region, which swallows huge financial sums of budget money every year, remains a source of separatism, religious extremism, and armed activities against the federal powers, especially obvious in Daghestan, Chechnia, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.
At the very beginning of Putin's presidency, the state established control over the influential group of oligarchs, a product of the 1990s: some of them were imprisoned (Mikhail Khodorkovskiy), others fled Russia (Boris Berezovskiy and Vladimir Gusinskiy); the larger part, however, accepted the new rules of the game. However, corruption in the higher echelons of power proved more resistant: the rule of the oligarchs was replaced with the unlimited arbitrariness of bureaucrats and new forms of merging power and business. The Rosoboronservis Case (2012) and embezzlements among those involved in the preparations for the Sochi 2014 Olympics were the prominent corruption scandals of recent times.
In the mid-2000s, economic development allowed the Russian Federation to pay off its huge foreign debt and build up impressive international reserves; the country, however, remained technologically backward and dependent on energy exports. The world economic crisis of 2008 laid bare its vulnerabilities; the lower oil prices and flight of foreign capital decreased incomes and made it much harder to meet social obligations (which increased in the prosperous 2000s) and invest in other spheres, including the military-industrial complex. The Ukrainian crisis of 2014, the American and European sanctions, and the related negative macroeconomic conditions present more gloomy prospects for Russia's economy.
The social effect of the above, as well as the worsened macro conditions of the late 2000s, strongly affected the stability of the Russian political elite. Elections brought to mind the Yeltsin era. The elections to the State Duma in December 2011 and the presidential election of May 2012 brought the lowest share of votes for Edinaia Rossia as party in power (52.8%) and for Putin (63.6%). The parliamentary elections stirred up mass protests against falsifications, including huge manifestations in Moscow.28
The Table above shows that the states of the PSM are characterized by a relatively low level of social and political cohesion; there is also an obvious asymmetry in the economic and military components of strength/weakness.
Russia is the only power fully involved in the PSM; this means that it should be regarded as an asymmetrical RSS. It is even more important to bear in mind that this is related to an obvious power
27 In July 2008, Russia's gold and currency reserves amounted to $595.6 billion (see: Zolotovalyutnye rezervy RF, available at [http://capital.ru/macro/zvr.php]).
28 According to certain sources, the meeting of the opposition on Bolotnaia Square, which took place on 10 December, 2011 was the largest since the beginning of the 1990s (see: "A Russian Awakening," The Economist, 11 December, 2011, available at [http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/12/protest-russia-0]).
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asymmetry: there is a huge gap between the key parameters of the national power of Russia and the other PSM states. The quoted figures provide an idea of how wide the gap is.
The far from simple post-Soviet transit did not deprive Russia of its power status, even though exacerbated vulnerabilities do not allow us to describe it as "strong as a state." I have already described Russia's post-Soviet social, political, and economic problems. It is, however, less vulnerable to other PSM members, which are, on the contrary, more vulnerable to it. This means that the asymmetry of power is complemented by an asymmetry of vulnerabilities, which affects the way states perceive each other and their conduct within the system. This means that PSM is a negatively asymmetrical RSS. The same fully applies to its three sub-complexes.
Belarus stands apart in the European sub-complex where social and political cohesion is concerned; the threats to its internal stability are much more subdued than in the two other states. The relatively conflict-free post-Soviet development supplies additional empirical arguments to this opinion.
Ukraine and Moldova differ greatly from Belarus: social disintegration in both is very obvious as a security threat. In Moldova, the conflict in Transnistria ended with a de facto separation of the population living in about 12% of its territory. This can hardly be exhaustively explained by ethnic terms since about 30% of those living in the self-proclaimed Transnistria Moldavian Republic are ethnic Moldovans, the titular ethnicity in the Republic of Moldova.
Until the events of the spring of 2014, Ukraine remained politically united. It should be said that the situation in Crimea might lead to a much more impressive split along the West-East line; this is confirmed by present armed separatism in Donetsk and Lugansk.
Very much like in Moldova, the Ukrainian spilt cannot be assessed within one, say, ethnic parameter. In Ukraine it is diluted with political and Church segments.
In both states, a big part of their populations wants closer ties with Russia or even integration with it. In 2005-1010, under Yushchenko when the country was clearly moving to NATO and the European Union, the protest activity of ethnic Russians as well as Ukrainians was very high. The Yushchenko presidency was dotted with practically never ending anti-government rallies. Early in 2014, when pro-Western politicians (campaigning for European integration and NATO membership) came to power in Kiev tension in the pro-Russian Southeast increased. The protracted church crisis in Ukraine caused by a split in Ukrainian Orthodoxy into supporters of the Kiev and Moscow patriarchates has acquired obvious political hues.29
In Moldova and Ukraine the unfavorable social and political context, as compared with Belarus, will extend into the near future. Despite the very specific regime of President Lukashenko in Belarus which invites internal and external pressure, the challenges to cohesion in this country are less acute than in its neighbors in the PSM's European sub-complex. Combinations of endogenous and exogenous factors produce different effects. No destabilization of the Belorussian regime or even social and political split will be burdened by an ethnic split as in Moldova or ethnic and Church complications as in Ukraine.
Moreover, the external factor will have a different effect on any developments in these countries. In view of the relatively stable pro-Russian political identity of Belarus,30 Russia will move in to help it in the event of any danger. This cannot be applied to "Russian geopolitics" in similar situations in Ukraine and Moldova, which are striving for European integration.
The structural asymmetry in the PSM's European sub-complex is reflected in the states' different economic and military parameters of national strength. The table shows that these differences between Ukraine, on the one hand, and Belarus and Moldova, on the other, are very noticeable and
29 Kiev wants to make Ukrainian Orthodoxy autonomous; it is believed that a unified local Orthodox Church (Viktor Yushchenko spoke about it in July 2008 at the celebrations of the 1020th anniversary of the Christianization of Rus) will decrease the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church and increase the religious distance between Russia and Ukraine.
30 Throughout the post-Soviet period, Belarus was and remains the most Russia-oriented of the post-Soviet states. It participates in all the key Kremlin-initiated reintegration projects (the CIS, the CSTO, the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the EurAsEC, the Customs Union, the Common Economic Space, and the Eurasian Economic Union).
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look more favorable for Ukraine than for the two other countries. At the same time, the military-political configuration in this triad is largely generated from the outside. The TRSC's logic of the regionally concentrated interdependence within this RSC suggests that the main line of competition should run between Ukraine and Belarus, the strongest states in the complex. But this is true only within the RSC investigated outside the PSM system. This means that in reality the competition within the dyad is supported by the relations between each of the states and the Russian Federation. According to the integrated indices of national power, Ukraine is Russia's most important rival in the post-Soviet space. In fact, Ukraine and Moldova have acquired a fairly strong perception of Russia as a negative factor to their security.
A no less obvious structural asymmetry is present in two other PSM sub-complexes— in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In this case, too, the different levels of sociopolitical cohesion of the states complement the unstable structure of the regions with different military and economic parameters of their national strength.
The three states of the PSM's Caucasian sub-complex remain aware of the vulnerability of their sociopolitical cohesion associated with their neighbors' purposeful activities. As a result of the armed conflicts in the early 1990s, Georgia and Azerbaijan lost control over parts of their territories populated by ethnic minorities. In Georgia, internal tension is maintained by its relations with Russia, which in August 2008 developed into military action. Georgia's relatively weak economy is another potential source of internal conflicts. This means that its sociopolitical cohesion faces much graver challenges than that of its two neighbors.
Armenia is less vulnerable socially and politically than Azerbaijan because, among other things, it is relatively more homogenous ethnically and religiously. However, the two countries are negatively interdependent regarding the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh; this and Armenia's scanty economic potential and its dependence on external actors equalize the instability potential in the sociopolitical sphere of these states.
As a result of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan lost about one fifth of its territory (the part, which is very important in the cultural-civilizational respect). During the war of 19911993, each of Armenia's military successes plunged Azerbaijan into a grave political crisis and regime change. Today, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue remains the most important factor of the split/unity of Azerbaijani society.
Armenia, which established its de facto control over this region of Azerbaijan with its predominantly Armenian population, has to spend more on the unfolding arms race with Azerbaijan very much in line with the logic of the security dilemma. Moreover, it has become much more dependent for its security on external actors (Russia); it is excluded from all the economically profitable transportation and energy trans-regional projects and is living in anticipation of renewed armed combat with its economically stronger opponent. For obvious reasons, this cannot be regarded as a positive factor in Armenia's social and political sphere. And the presidential elections of 2008 and 2013 demonstrated the split in Armenian society.31
The Nagorno-Karabakh issue, which keeps the security spheres of both states intertwined, affects the dynamics of their military-political rivalry in the region. This phenomenon also explains the asymmetry of strength between them.
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan regard this territory as a vitally important component of their national security. Azerbaijan treats it as part of its territory according to international law; its loss might
31 At the 2008 presidential election, the protest electorate voted for Western-orientated Levon Ter-Petrosian, who wanted to decrease the country's dependence on Russia. According to the official figures, he received 21.5% of the votes, while Serzh Sargsian, who ran for the ruling party, received 52.8%. The opposition accused the government of falsifications and staged massive protest rallies across the country. Their suppression cost ten people their lives; a state of emergency was declared. At the 2013 presidential election, the ruling party represented by Sargsian received 58.6% of the votes, while the opposition candidate, R. Ovannisian, who ran with slogans of integration with the West and less dependence on Russia, received 36.7%.
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weaken its position in the regional balance of power. Given the military-strategic specifics of Azerbaijan's central and western parts and Armenia's military-technical capabilities, Armenia's continued military control of Nagorno-Karabakh (even if Azerbaijan restores its sovereignty over the valley regions of Karabakh) will threaten a large part of Azerbaijan's territory (crisscrossed by Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelines and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline—the main sources of the republic's income).
At the same time, as most other multinational states, Azerbaijan cannot relinquish part of its territory in order to avoid a possible domino effect; other compact ethnic communities might try to detach themselves from Azerbaijan. In 1993, the country found itself on the brink of similar developments when there were attempts to set up a Talysh-Mugan Republic in the southeast of Azerbaijan.
Armenia, in turn, is seeking control of Nagorno-Karabakh because of its mainly Armenian population, which fears continued Azeri sovereignty over this territory.32 There is another, structural-political explanation of Armenia's continued occupation of the southwest of Azerbaijan. According to the aggregate indices of its national power (territory, population, and resources), Armenia is much weaker than Azerbaijan. To compensate for the imbalance and in view of the far from simple previous relations, Armenia needed military-strategic advantages in the form of control over the strategically important Nagorno-Karabakh with its predominantly Armenian population.
Today, the Armenian-Azerbaijan dyad demonstrates the region's severest security dilemma accompanied by the biggest, at the regional level, arms race. The strength asymmetry between them is most acutely felt in military and economic disparities. According to the official figures (see Table), Azerbaijan outstrips Armenia in all the indices related to armed forces. However, the real correlation calls for keeping in mind the potentials of the Armenian armed units in Nagorno-Karabakh and around it.33 This makes the situation very different: the Armenian side has many more tanks, armored vehicles, and guns; the numerical strength of the sides' armed forces is more or less equal. The logic of geography suggests that these components are of key importance in the real military balance between these two states.
Economically, Azerbaijan is much stronger. Its military budget is four times larger than Armenia's; the gap will probably widen thanks to Azerbaijan's faster economic growth. However, in the future, the reliance of Azerbaijan's economy on the revenues from the export and transportation of energy resources might develop into a problem.34
What is more, relations within the Armenia-Azerbaijan dyad and the balance of military power among them cannot be correctly assessed without taking into account the Russian factor. It figures prominently at all stages of the conflict and not necessarily as a peaceful factor. This was true of the Russian Empire (the events of 1905), after its disintegration and the emergence of independent states in 1918, after the Soviet Union's disintegration, and at present. In fact, the former metropolitan country took advantage of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem to keep both independent states at its side. This largely explains Azerbaijan's military defeat in the early 1990s and remains prominent in Armenia's huge military-technical and economic dependence on Russia, de facto payment for the security guarantees Russia provides.
This side of the military-political confrontation between the two states is rarely mentioned in official political rhetoric; however, Baku must take it into account when planning military expenditures. This explains, to some extent, the huge sums Baku spends on military buildup.
Burdened with economic problems, Georgia also spends a lot on military purposes; as in the states of the PSM's European sub-complex, this is caused not so much by its neighbors in the sub-
32 See, for example: H. Tchlingirian, "Nagorno-Karabagh: Transition and the Elite," Central Asian Survey, No. 18 (4), 1999, p. 445.
33 This assessment of Armenia's military potential should be complemented with informal military units in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan presented as the "self-defense forces of Nagorno-Karabakh:" there are about 18 thousand people, 316 tanks, 324 armored vehicles, and 322 guns.
34 According to official statistics, in 2012 the share of the oil and gas industry in Azerbaijan's GDP was 43.2% (see: The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, available at [http://www.stat.gov.az/source/azfigures/indexen.php]).
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region as by its relations with Russia, or, rather, the separatist regimes of South Ossetia and Abkhazia supported by the Russian Federation. At the same time, it is wrong to exclude possible complications of structural asymmetry in the other dyads in which Georgia is involved: we cannot exclude complications in the Georgia-Armenia dyad over the continued disagreement in Samtske-Javakheti with its Armenian population and, at the same time, the development of mutually advantageous economic cooperation with Azerbaijan.
The Table demonstrates that Kazakhstan occupies the most favorable position in the PSM's Central Asian sub-complex. The state's highest ethnic and confessional heterogeneity is downplayed by the economic factor and the predominantly cooperative relations with the external powers. The unregulated legal status of the Caspian and the resultant vagueness of the marine borders between the five Caspian states (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan) are the sources of the main challenges. The same can be said about its border disputes and struggle for regional leadership with Uzbekistan.
The global economic crisis that began in 2008 hit Kazakhstan; if negative scenarios prevail, the country might lose the economic mechanisms that allow it to "defuse" the objective social tension; this will widen the range of real threats to the country's social and political stability.
Some of the states of the Central Asian sub-complex have their own economic mechanisms they use to deal with internal problems. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan rely on the export of their oil and gas resources as the easiest way to defuse domestic tension.35 In both cases, the situation is complicated by their harsh and relatively isolated political regimes and the problems of fair distribution of social boons (corruption being one such problem). Both states, very much like Tajikistan, have common land borders with Afghanistan, which makes them vulnerable to Afghan instability.
In this respect, Turkmenistan enjoys much better internal and external conditions.
■ First, in terms of the volume of extracted and exported natural gas, it, along with Russia and Uzbekistan, is one of the leaders among the post-Soviet states. Its small population is another advantage, especially in comparison with Uzbekistan: despite its energy exports, its population, the largest in Central Asia (it is five times larger than the population of Turkmenistan), makes it much harder to cope with the numerous internal problems.
■ Second, Turkmenistan's foreign policy course is much more consistent: it remains loyal to its neutral status, recognized by the world community in 1995; its relations with the strongest powers are balanced and relatively stable. Uzbekistan can be described in opposite terms: throughout the short history of its independence, it has performed several U-turns: in 1999 and in 2005, it changed its foreign policy orientation from pro-Russian to pro-Western and back. Both have learned to look at Tashkent as a whimsical ally. Besides, this is the only Central Asian state that has security problems with all the region's states.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are trailing behind the others in terms of building strong states. They have lived through the most serious civil crises. The civil war in Tajikistan and two revolutions (in 2005 and 2010) in Kyrgyzstan are the most glaring examples of the statehood crisis. There are many other internal and external factors that complicate the situation still further.
■ First, as distinct from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, they have fewer potentially profitable natural resources that could be quickly exploited without big investments.36
■ Second, they are much more affected by radical religious trends, which, in the past, have caused armed conflicts: the civil war in Tajikistan with its prominent religious factor and the Batken events in Kyrgyzstan.
35 Turkmenistan owns 9.4% of the world's explored reserves of natural gas, while Uzbekistan owns 0.6% (information as of the end of 2013) (see: BP Statistical Review of World Energy. June 2014, p. 20).
36 Hydropower is the main energy resource of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, yet it is less profitable than oil and gas.
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■ Third, they are easily affected by external political impacts because of the factors enumerated above and their economic and military dependence on external actors.
The general picture of structural asymmetry within the Central Asian sub-complex is further affected by the states' very different military and economic strength. This means that all the regional dyads demonstrate the functionality of the security dilemma to different extents. At the same time, the states are demonstrating more restraint in their conduct than the countries of the Caucasian sub-complex. One can connect this with the region's much more homogenous ethnic, linguistic, and confessional structure, which plays down enmity in the security relations of the regional states.
The Uzbekistan-Tajikistan dyad demonstrates the most obvious elements of interstate conflict potential. Tajikistan, which is inferior to Uzbekistan in terms of most of the national strength parameters, has had to move closer to or, rather, agree to accept Russia's protection, which caused concern in Uzbekistan. The agreement of April 1999 between Russia and Tajikistan on the legal status of the Russian units stationed in Tajikistan invited accusations from President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov, who insisted that Moscow had to coordinate this with all the other Central Asian states.37 The same year, Uzbekistan left the CST and moved closer to the West, a shift probably caused among other factors by the Russian-Tajik agreement. The moves within the Uzbekistan-Tajikistan dyad are also explained by ethnic and territorial disagreements and the transborder activity of radical Islamic organizations (the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and others).38
Relations between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are less vehement, but they are no less important for the region's structural (in)stability. Both countries can claim the role of regional leader in terms of their aggregate indices of national strength. What Kenneth Waltz has written about "the vicious circle of security dilemma" can be applied to relations in the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan dyad.
Oil and gas have made Kazakhstan the economic leader in the region, a process accompanied by strengthening the military components of its national strength. At the early stages, Uzbekistan, the economy of which was much weaker than Kazakhstan's, had several important advantages that allowed it to claim the role of regional leader. First, it is the only Central Asian state that borders on all the other states of the region and has no common border with any of the powers outside the region. Second, its population, the region's largest, is the most homogenous ethnically (it is nearly twice as large as the population of Kazakhstan; the correlation between the titular and non-titular ethnicities in Uzbekistan is more favorable from the point of view of ethnopolitical stability than in Kazakhstan, where the same factor is the region's least favorable).
These advantages are causing concern, sometimes justified by Tashkent's behavior, in its neighbors. This concern is further exacerbated by the huge number of disagreements over borders and water supplies.
While Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the region's poorest countries, confronted with a deficit of strength in their dealings with Uzbekistan, had no choice but to accept Russia's patronage and allow its military bases in their territories, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the richest states, placed their stakes on a qualitative and quantitative improvement of their military potentials.
The political system in the post-Soviet space has been developing in conditions that can hardly promote maturity of interstate relations.
This space is a melee of ethnicities and religions crossed by the dividing line between Orthodoxy, Western Christianity, and Islam (a clash of civilizations, to borrow the term from Huntington).
Relations between the political units of PSM did not promote their political maturity: as independent national states, the political units of its subsystems cannot boast any long experience of independent existence: throughout their histories, the local ethnicities were parts of different imperial
37 See: R. Burnashev, "Regional Security in Central Asia: Military Aspects," in: Central Asia. A Gathering Storm? ed. by Boris Rumer, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, p. 157.
38 Tashkent continues to accuse Dushanbe of transborder movements of radical religious groups from Tajikistan to Uzbekistan. This is the key issue on the agenda of their bilateral relations.
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systems. As the heartland (to borrow the term from Mackinder), they were a desirable target for several powers—Russia, Turkey, Iran, China, and the West. The mechanisms they used to achieve victory—migration, shifting borders, and manipulating the relations among the local ethnicities according to the classical divide and rule pattern—did nothing to promote good-neighborly relations in the regions. The aftermaths still figure prominently in interstate relations. In addition, in the postSoviet period, Central Eurasia remains a very attractive geopolitical aim and the local states are still targets of power projection by the strongest of the outside players.
Russia, the last of the powers uniting the now independent states as parts of its imperial system, and their relations are very much affected by historical memory and corresponding practices. Since the early 1990s, the Russian Federation has been talking about the region as a "zone of its influence," which causes apprehension in the independent states. The still unresolved conflicts in the post-Soviet space (Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria) and the recent events in the Crimea and the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine are being more and more frequently associated with Russia's geopolitics.
In fact, economic factors, in particular regional energy and transportation projects, brought the PSM states closer together, although this has not helped resolve the security dilemmas so far and has not been conducive to regional cooperation on the basis of economic interdependence.
Political Environment of the Negatively Asymmetrical Regional System
Any system presupposes that there is interdependence among its elements and that it should, first, incorporate all the essential aspects of these elements and, second, be stronger than the interdependence between these elements and external actors; this makes it possible to identify a structure, a system, and its environment.
I rely on the mechanism of powers' partial involvement in RSSs to explain why ties and relations with external actors are as important for some of the RSSs as those that exist among the RSS members. This mechanism makes it easier to understand the specifics of regionalization in the globalizing and increasingly interdependent world. In the international political system, the powers, as holder of the special interests and capabilities of projection, look like key centers that tie together all sorts of regional systems into a web of global interdependence. As part of one of the RSS, a power, being partially involved in other regional systems, joins its own RSS with all others.
At the same time, the concept of the system's political environment should not be limited to the influence of partially involved powers. The border between two RSSs can be formed by components described as an "indifference zone" in the TRSC. They may be either "insulator-states" or states of the second RSS, the geographic proximity of which to the first regional system is accompanied by a considerably lower level of interdependence with actors of the second RSS rather than with each other. In other words, the political environment of RSS may be formed by partially involved powers, "insulator-states", as well as states-participants of other RSS that are relatively indifferent to the security dynamics in the discussed regional system.
The partially involved powers are the most active components of the political environment of RSS, which means that the specifics of their impact should be assessed in the first place, while considering the ties between the system and its political environment
PSM is a unipolar RSS; this is the key description of structural asymmetry of the macroregion. Russia is the only power that is fully involved in PSM. But for all that, the post-Soviet space has an active political environment: there are five partially involved power centers—China, Iran, Turkey, the EU, and the U.S. The specifics of the PSM's political structure and environment allow us to discuss its tendency to transit.
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I have already written in the first section of my paper that armed conflicts are the key indicator of the system's instability, which is responsible for its transitivity. Throughout its history, PSM has been associated with armed conflict potential spreading far and wide beyond its sub-complexes (Transnistria, Southeast Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Ferghana and Tajikistan) to become more or less prominent in Russia (the Northern Caucasus), the only pole in the PSM's structure. There are other specific features (the economy, technology, and political regimes) of this macroregion, which describe it as a negatively asymmetric RSS.
The history of PSM is primarily the efforts of its only pole to preserve its control over its space. In the 1990s, Russia was not strong enough to restore the old forms of relations with the NIS. It could, however, contain the desire of the new states, which were even weaker than Russia, to move closer to alternative centers of power. The CIS was set up to outline the zone of Moscow's special interests in the new format of relations with the post-Soviet states.
A new post-Soviet configuration of ties in the political space and the processes going on in it inevitably attracted other powers. For some of them security-related re-conceptualization of the postSoviet space was based on geographic proximity and rooted in ethnoconfessional ties, historical memory, and geopolitical traditions (the history of relations with the region's peoples, control over them, and the related Great Power traditions); others securitized the region as a source of threats created by disintegration and lack of control (proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, armed conflicts, international terrorism, and drug trafficking). Over the course of time, the PSM acquired more sustainable contacts with external powers, which started expanding their spheres of interest, thus affecting their domestic political discourse and regional activity.
In the 2000s, the stronger vertical of power and greater petrol revenues stabilized the Russian Federation and made its policy in the Near Abroad more determined. To gradually reintegrate the post-Soviet space, Moscow initiated the EurAsEC in 2000, the Customs Union in 2009, and the Eurasian Economic Union in 2014. Its newly found determination to oppose those newly independent states that sought deeper relations with the external powers increased the tension in and around the macroregion. It is very obvious that there are the links between the developing integration dialog between NATO and the EU and Georgia and Ukraine, on the one hand, and the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, as well as annexation of Crimea and the wave of separatism in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions bordering on Russia in 2014, on the other. The continued confrontation between the RF and the West is one of the results.
It is absolutely clear that the independent status of the post-Soviet NIS is ensured not only by Moscow's internal weakness and deficit of necessary resources to be used for reintegration, but also by the involvement of other powers in PSM.
Nation-states emerged, first, in the space of the Russian Empire (the European part and the Caucasus) and then in the post-Soviet space (Central Asia) in the 20th century. These were periods of the regions' relative geopolitical openness. The logic is simple: the more open and more pluralistic the geopolitical space, the more opportunities it creates for the emergence of sustainable political actors and, most importantly, of mutual contacts and relations, and, vice versa, the fewer are the chances for its unilateral monopolization.
In conditions of PSM negative asymmetry, the activeness of its political environment becomes extremely important for its future.
The above descriptions of the negatively asymmetric systems mean that they cannot be regarded as a long-term sustainable type of the region's political order. These RSSs are moving toward more stable structural organization: either symmetrical or positively asymmetrical regional systems.
The movement of RSSs away from negative asymmetry to a symmetrical structure cannot be smooth. It presupposes disintegration and reunification of states, which, in turn, may, and probably will, be accompanied by armed conflicts. The movement toward positive asymmetry, for instance, preserves unipolarity (in the case of PSM), yet an evolution of security relations in this direction does not exclude the use of force.
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I have already written that in a negatively asymmetric RSS, its tendency toward conflict is generated not only by asymmetry of strength, but also by internal weakness of the states involved and their acute awareness of their vulnerabilities. This is the main driving force of rivalry, war and security dilemmas being its extreme forms. In the current structural conditions, to lower its vulnerability and neutralize what looks like external threats, the system's only pole should seek control of the system up to and including its strictly hierarchical arrangement. The history of this macroregion offers enough facts and arguments: the events of the 1920s, when Bolshevist Russia swallowed the states that emerged on the ruins of the Russian Empire, and the events of the 1990s and 2000s, when the Russian Federation tried to keep the CIS countries within its geopolitical orbit, the apogee of which was the events of August 2008 in Georgia and the spring of 2014 in Ukraine.
Integrated by force, a regional system might, for a certain period of time, demonstrate a lower level of conflict potential or even stabilization. The Soviet Union stabilized the system, but this revolutionary stabilization lasted as long as the center and its coercive force remained functional. Late in the 1980s, these potentials weakened; the region returned to the predominantly negative dynamics of security relations with the usual patterns of amity/enmity and conflict potential.
The European Union has demonstrated that amalgamation by force cannot be consistently stable. For many centuries, the peoples of Europe lived in different empires, but the hierarchical systems based on force did not made their relations mature or the corresponding political structure more stable. When moving toward cooperation, the sovereign European states took a path leading away from regional conflict formations to a security community.
PSM's active political environment is an important factor that makes it hard to stabilize the system by force as mentioned above.The involved powers balance out the system and help stabilize its structure, without which its evolution toward maturity, moderation and peaceful security relations among the involved states and, consequently, toward a positive RSS can hardly be possible.
Conclusion
When looking at the post-Soviet space as a regional security system, we wonder whether it is stable and, if so, to what extent. The answer will bring us closer to a correct understanding of not only its general prospects, but also of many particular problems, conflict potential dynamics being one of them.
The RSS political structures and environment are the most important, but not the only factors of its stability/transitivity. Here I have limited myself to an assessment (based on the post-Soviet space case) of how these factors influence the RSS's transitivity.
The Soviet Union's disintegration, which became increasingly obvious toward the late 1980s, ended in the early 1990s with a transfer to an anarchically organized RSS. Its political structure remained highly unstable; weak and vulnerable states, as well as the cardinal asymmetry in social, political, military, and economic components of their strength were supplemented by highly immature relations among them.
The extremely wide gap between the economic and military might of the Russian Federation and the other NIS made the system unipolar. At the same time, Russia's acute internal problems kept it close to the other socially and politically weak states. This exacerbated its awareness of vulnerability and conflict dynamics in relations within the macroregion. Therefore, the security system in the post-Soviet space can be described as a negatively asymmetric RSS. It started as such in the 1990s, and it is lingering at the same level today.
The armed conflicts (Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Northern Caucasus, Tajikistan, Transnistria, and Southeastern Ukraine) that accompanied the development of the PostSoviet Security Macrocomplex are the most obvious indicators of its structural instability. The conflicts of the 1990s have not been resolved, while new forms of conflict have appeared: the Georgian war of 2008; the annexation of Crimea; and the current armed confrontation in Southeastern Ukraine.
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PSM is an open RSS; its political environment consists of the most influential poles of power of the contemporary world. Their active involvement in the region is based on their security interests. From this it follows that the system is functioning and developing under strong external pressure.
The existing structural instability in PSM brings it closer to a transit potentially accompanied by changes both in the fundamental distribution of power and in the nature of the security relations among the states involved. In the former case, the range of possibilities offers either integration with the neighboring powers (in this case, the single pole engulfs the system) or its transformation into a symmetrical RSS. The latter case presupposes gradually maturing security relations among the system's members and preservation of power asymmetry, that is, evolution toward a positively asymmetrical RSS.
Evolution toward the positive RSS types is more desirable from the point of view of long-term stability. However, the 20th-century history of this space shows that the gradual maturing of security relations in the RSS might be disrupted by its enforced amalgamation. The power imbalance is too great, while the desire of the system's only pole to revive its Great Power status in the context of its weakness and acute awareness of its vulnerability is strong enough to initiate extraordinary, up to and including military, activity. The August war of 2008 and the events in Ukraine in 2014 (to which I have repeatedly referred above) are important not only to postulate the possibility of further similar developments, but also to point out that other powers should interfere for the purpose of containment.
PSM's active political environment, which balances out its structure, also limits the possibility of reintegration with the use of force; this provides conditions for its natural evolution toward maturity in security relations, a sine qua non of the development of positive RSSs.
