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Mehdi SANAIE
Graduated from Tehran University, where he majored in international relations and received his doctorate degree in political sociology at the RF Academy of Sciences. From 1999 to 2003, he was a professor at Moscow University of the Humanities. In 2003, he began teaching at Tehran University; in 2004, he became Director of the Association of Iranian-Russian Studies. One of his latest books Russia's Foreign Policy: Nationality and Identity appeared in 2005 in Persian.
THE “QUIET” REVOLUTIONS AND THE RULING POLITICAL STRUCTURES
Abstract
The article looks at the specific features of the velvet revolutions that took place in 2003-2005 in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. After comparing
them with the existing theoretical models, the author concludes that they are very different from all the earlier studied and well-known varieties.
In 2003, Georgia and, a year later, Ukraine became the scenes of nearly identical political events: the republics lived through so-called color revolutions which brought new political leaders to power. These coups were very much in line with the list of bloodless regime changes that started in 2000 in Yugoslavia, where a new president replaced Slobodan Milosevic. In 2005, the quiet revolution in Kyrgyzstan was added to the list of the developments that inevitably riveted the attention of political analysts. As distinct from the previous regime changes, the Kyrgyz revolution was less predictable and more dynamic. We are obviously witnessing a new type of rearrangement of forces taking place during or after elections on a wave of wide-scale rejection of the election results rather than because of them.
These events can be analyzed from different points of view:
• causes;
• essence;
• the extent to which external factors affected their emergence and course;
• their regional and worldwide echo.
The author revealed the essence of these events and analyzed their relation to the specific features of sociopolitical development in the Central Asian and Caucasian states and the regions’ political regimes. He hypothesized that despite the discontent obvious in all these countries and the external influences, these developments were possible only in countries with a republican government. His analysis and conclusions are far from exhaustive: the phenomena under study are too recent, while sources are too scarce.
The events in Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, and Georgia cannot be assessed within the well-known theories related to revolutions. For this reason, many regional politicians are convinced that it was bloodless coups that brought new people to power. Despite the fact that the very term “democratic revolu-
tion” is self-contradictory, there is the opinion that the term aptly describes what happened: after all, the events brought the opposition to power bypassing the election procedure. At the same time, we cannot deny that every theory describes revolutions as a fundamental, and often violent, change of intellectual, political, economic, and cultural structure. Democratic, velvet, or Color Revolutions change power in a non-violent way and without dramatic social changes.
In-depth study of all the revolution-related theories suggests that the events that took place in some of the former Soviet republics cannot be described as classical revolutions. These theories view revolutions as the highest point of accumulated social discontent, which heralds a new phase of historical development. This is clearly seen in the theories that deliberate on the “totalitarian movement,” Samuel Huntington’s theory of “uneven development,” and the well-known commonalities conception Crane Brinton deduced from his analysis of the revolutions in America, England, France, and Russia, as well as the structural-functional theory that contradicts the Marxist theory of revolutions.1
At the same time, certain theorists who have undertaken an analysis of the causes, factors, and goals of revolutions, as well as the social specifics obvious in the countries with revolutionary experience, describe phenomena obviously similar to those that form the subject of the present article.
In his Anatomy of Revolution, Crane Brinton identified certain similar features displayed by the British, American, French, and Russian societies: they were changing societies with developing economies, financial deficits, impotent governments, and corrupt ruling circles. The social classes could no longer live together in one state, while the use of force ended in unexpected failures, etc.2 The societies that lived through the Color Revolutions displayed three of the above-mentioned specific features: a changing and developing economy, class incompatibility, and unexpected failures in the use of force.
The structural-functional theory also describes certain features similar to those observable in the seats of the Color Revolutions: due to changes in the system of values and the rules of social conduct, the changes within the unevenly developing social regime cause disharmony.3
On his part, Samuel Huntington believes that a revolution is a form of radical change that not every society must necessarily experience and not every historical period bring about. At the same time, he agrees that a revolution means a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and governmental activity and policies.4
It seems that Samuel Huntington’s “uneven development” theory belongs to the rare class of conceptions that, together with analyzing causes, factors, aims, and motives, explain the meaning of revolutions and comment on their importance. This fills part of his book Political Order in Changing Societies, in which he asserts that a revolution is one of the methods employed to renovate traditional societies. He says that such renovation is possible if most groups are alienated; they become revolutionized when their demands are rejected and they themselves are deprived of the possibility of participating in ruling the country.5
Mr. Huntington is convinced that both the democratic and the communist political regimes can attract social groups and avoid revolutionary developments. This will be impossible only if these groups are left out in the cold. The traditional definition of a revolution cannot describe the events that took place in the three republics and were called Color Revolutions, even though the causes and aims and the specific features of the post-Soviet societies were theoretically close to the classical formula. These incidents were free from “roughness,” a birthmark of any revolution; in this way they differed from the “traditional” revolutions.
1 See: M. Melikian, Revolution-Related Theories, Gamus Publishers, Tehran, 1997, p. 77 (in Persian).
2 See: C. Brinton, The Anatomy of Four Revolutions, Transl. by M. Salasi, Nashre Nou Publishers, Tehran, 1987 (in Persian).
3 See: Ch. Johnson, Revolution and the Social System, Hoover Institution Studies, Stanford, 1964, p. 76.
4 See: M. Melikian, op. cit., p. 133.
5 Ibid., p. 134.
The governments of Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia, Leonid Kuchma in Ukraine, and Askar Akaev in Kyrgyzstan were deposed without bloodshed. The former leaders, in turn, refrained from alerting the armed forces and using force to stem the revolution: they proved to be experienced politicians. On the other hand, prior to the revolutions, there were no serious symptoms of a profound crisis and social discontent. Normally, revolutions take place when social discontent reaches enormous proportions and develops into a long string of protest rallies that bring together huge groups of dissatisfied people.6 Quiet revolutions happen quickly, they are not predated by obvious symptoms of a power crisis, and in this way they differ from “traditional” revolutions.
If we take into account that all the Color revolutions were prepared within a very short period of time and carried out according to a preliminary scheme and that they involved external forces, we should admit that we need to move away from the “traditional” model in order to correctly understand them. At the same time, the active involvement of large population groups (young people in particular and even their educated members) does not allow us to describe these events using the term “coup.”
There is no doubt that the regime changes in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan constitute a new type of political change in the newly independent states no matter what labels—either revolution or coup—are attached to them. Democratic aims in closed societies cannot be achieved by other methods. Similar events might also take place in other countries and regions.
We cannot deny the obvious: the Color Revolutions in Yugoslavia and the three Soviet successor states were brought about by their social and political specifics. It is the current international situation that makes such developments possible: they are triggered not only by social discontent, injustice, and economic insolvency, but also by regional and international processes and, therefore, should be analyzed within the framework of the Big Global Game. In the wake of 9/11, the Middle East and Eurasia underwent numerous changes, which, in the final analysis, proved to be mutually complementary within the Big Game complex.7 Speaking of the regime changes in the three republics, I would like to say that even if internal factors did play the main role in the process, no good results would have been possible without preliminary planning and serious support from the outside.
At the same time, when analyzing the factors conducive to the coups’ prompt success, we should pay particular attention to the political structures in these countries and their specific features. For several years analysts have been engaged in an in-depth study of the build-up of people’s power and statehood development in the post-Soviet countries. I am convinced that the regimes’ rapid downfall testifies to the fact that these processes were slack in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan: statehood development was painful there—transfer from the communist regime to a new state built on people’s power was accompanied by obvious failures responsible for the destabilization.
Soviet power looked at the process of social formation based on the new, socialist model as the nation’s important social and political program. In the post-Soviet period, the former Soviet constituents lost their pride as citizens of a great state, while it proved hard to cover the distance that separated them from a new, “illusive” status of their states with clear-cut borders. On the one hand, the process of acquiring a new national status was hampered by numerous domestic problems, inadequate material and moral resources, and ethnic strife; on the other, the leaders were still living in Soviet times. Global processes worsened the situation. From this it follows that Islam, ethnic diversity, and historical traditions, which, in turn, are elements of national status, played both positive and negative roles.
As a rule, factors criminalizing the situation were also responsible for the national crises; this, naturally, could have deprived the leaders of their control over society. Instability may help when it comes to planning a regime change. Any attentive analyst of the history of the Soviet successor states will easily detect the weak points of their state structures. All the local leaders (with the exception of Akaev) were former C.P.S.U. functionaries raised in the Soviet school of management. Their sincere
6 See: A.S. Kohan, Theories of Revolutions, Transl. by Ali Reza Tayeba, Gamus Publishers, Tehran, 2001, p. 35 (in Persian).
7 See: F. Fukuyama, “ABC of State-Building and Governance,” Transl. by Modjtab Amir Wahidi, Politics-Eco-nomics, No. 8, 1988, p. 4 (in Persian).
wish to achieve sovereignty, progress and prosperity of their countries notwithstanding, one could hardly expect them to destroy the structures they themselves had set up. They found it hard to grasp the skills of meeting popular demands and satisfying new requirements. In the process of nation- and state-building, they relied on traditional, clan, and family relations, which, in turn, affected to a no mean degree the local political systems. In some cases, their reliance on the linguistic culture and national traditions scored them political victories that triggered more conflicts and destabilized the regime still further. In some republics, the political system looked very much like the party system of Soviet times diluted with clan and kindred relations. From time to time, the local leaders had to bow to external pressure by making democratic gestures.8
In other words, the Soviet successor states were confronted with the uneven development problem. Their economies were moving away from the socialist regime and state monopoly to the market, and radical changes were being accomplished in the sphere of culture and education, while their political regimes were trailing behind. If we accept the idea that “market development” and “democratization” were two major trends of the systemic changes encouraged by the international institutions in relation to Central Asia and the Caucasus after 1990, a sober analysis of the local conditions suggests that the transfer to the market, privatization, and attracting foreign investments were more or less successful. However, it should also be said that the democratization project based on free elections, freedom of speech, and a civilized society was carried out with great difficulty.9
In the context of freedom of speech and building civilized societies, some of the republics have made quite good progress compared with Soviet times. We should bear in mind, however, that the policy of preventing crises and instability caused what can be called “negative progress,” where the change in political elites is concerned. Uneven development and lack of coordination among different spheres weakened the states; in Central Asia and the Caucasus these problems were also connected with security issues.
It is very hard to classify the local political regimes—this is one of the most important problems the analysts have to cope with. It is much easier to describe them beyond the scope of the classical and contemporary political theories, in which the state is discussed as an integral whole immune to internal social challenges.
This is especially obvious in the theory of political realism, which views the state and its national interests as homogeneous and internally compatible. Realism stems from the thesis that states (very much like billiard-balls) have homogeneous firm shells (their governments), which seek self-preservation as their main aim. States function in an anarchic milieu, while their responses are mainly directly proportional to the force with which they are attacked. This is especially obvious in the conceptions of neo-realism. However, as the ideas about the role of political sciences and international relations changed and as sociology came to the fore in their subject range, analysts likewise re-adjusted their ideas about the category of “state.” They are also discussing the role of history and culture, as well as the nations’ collective memory and experience. Those who study states pay particular attention to their historical, tribal, and cultural specifics.
Contrary to their realistic and even liberal conceptions, the policy of states and their conduct at home and on the international arena obviously continue their past. According to this viewpoint, the state of the post-Cold War period is a much more complicated social phenomenon than that described by the realists. In any case, the conception of post-modernity suggests that the country’s domestic specifics and the stages of its history deserve special attention if we want to analyze such political phenomena as revolutions, wars, peace, etc. connected with the state.
8 See: F. Atari, “Nationalism and National Governments in Central Asia,” Studies of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Foreign Ministry publication, Tehran, No. 44, Winter 2003 (in Persian); M. Aydin, The New Geopolitics. Caucasus and Central Asia, Ankara University, 2001, pp. 6-13.
9 See: V. Popov, “Lessons from Transition Economies,” Paper for the UNRISD Meeting on the Need to Rethink Development Economies, South Africa, 7-8 September, 2001.
The countries described here became independent less than two decades ago, therefore they can be described as “newly independent” states. The process of their nation-state development created numerous problems that significantly affected the competence, legitimacy, and cohesion of their political regimes. External factors build up pressure. Under such conditions, the state and its relationships with neighbors become an “object of rivalry” of larger actors.
Political stability in the Soviet successor states is further undermined by lack of transparency when it comes to changing leaders. Nearly all of them were over 60 (before the Color Revolutions) and nearly all of them were at the helm for over 15 years. There was no rotation mechanism, while everything was done to cement the positions of the old local leaders. The seemingly strong regimes are in fact enfeebled by their own monopoly on power: in the process of concentration of power the mechanisms of identifying the “successor generation” lose part of their functions.
Political longevity is justified by the need to avoid crises and preserve stability; all large powers have tacitly accepted that, some of them even support the situation. In some of the republics, a younger generation of politicians cannot come to power through fair elections—a process the current regimes have monopolized.10
The system of traditional, family, and clan ties that has struck root in some of the post-Soviet republics, as well as the “instability potential” obvious across the post-Soviet expanse require stable and continued leadership of the same people. We should not forget, however, that the people, the younger generation in particular, expect that power will be changed through transparent procedures and that new leaders will be brought to power.
There is the opinion in the expert community that after 9/11 the United States concluded that the old post-Soviet leaders should be replaced. The tragic events of 11 September, 2001 convinced America that it would not be able to achieve its long-term goals by supporting undemocratic regimes. For this reason, the United States relies on the generation that thinks in democratic terms and acts accordingly. In this way, while pursuing its national interests, the United States becomes convinced of continued regional stability.
Anyone wishing to understand the causes of the Color Revolutions in the post-Soviet republics should pay attention to the weakened ties between the political structures and the public; on the other hand, this speaks of certain shortcomings in the development of statehood. In Soviet times, the communist parties kept the region’s political regimes in constant and close interaction. No similar system was created when the Soviet Union fell apart. Since the political regime (and the entire state-nation system, for that matter) includes the entire complex of political, economic, and cultural ties and relationships, this special feature can be explained within the systems analysis framework.
The “delimitation of regimes” plays a special role in systems analysis. The political regime uses certain institutions and data to establish contact with the social regimes and till the soil of exchange between the regime and its environment. In principle, the nature of the data and institutions describes the limits of the political regime using them. The institutions are formed by demands and support; it is very important to ensure support and meet demands that, more likely than not, were inspired by the shortcomings of the external milieu. Adequate support of the political regime creates the energy the regimes need to continue functioning.
Any political system regards the channels that help study social demands and prepare materials needed to meet them as being as important as the measures needed to support the actors and internal groups operating within the system. The above means that any political system should monitor the situation on a permanent basis, study the demands, and enlist support, in order to avoid crises of legitimacy that might rupture its contact with society.11 The Color Revolutions in the three republics demonstrated that their political regimes proved incapable of regulating the processes described above,
10 See: I. Romer, “Leadership Change in Central Asia,” Studies of Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 45, 2004, p. 171 (in Persian).
11 See: A. Gavami, Politics of Comparison, Senate Publishers, Tehran, 1994, p. 31 (in Persian).
while their contact with the public, and the man in the street especially, was weakened. The people irritated by their hard economic conditions and stimulated from the outside took to the streets to fight the political regime: they had lost their contact with the existing political structures long ago.
The problems of the post-Soviet political structures can be fairly effectively analyzed within the structural functionalism theory, which looks at society as a single organism. Talbott Parsons, one of the authors, believes that a compromise with the environment and the creation of social cohesion are two key functions of any society.
Gabriel Almond believes that any regime can survive if society accepts it, and that correct execution of definite functions helps political regimes overcome crises.12 An analysis of the post-Soviet political structures reveals that they are pestered by all sorts of problems related to national and statehood development, power change, the advance of political regimes, and improvement of their functional nature, which weakened the ties between the political structures and society, thus undermining the former’s ability to withstand crises.
It would be wrong to underestimate the contribution of the first post-Soviet leaders to the republics’ independence and the process of setting up new political structures. We should not forget, however, that the current events and the current situation are the direct outcome of changes that took many centuries to be completed. At the same time, transformation of the political structures and balanced development of the political regimes, as well as other phenomena in these countries are inevitable. All possible repercussions should be taken into account to prevent these republics from falling victim to confrontation with influential external forces much mightier than any of the domestic factors.
12 See: A. Gavami, Politics of Comparison, p. 49.
Mustafa AYDIN
Professor of International Relations at the TOBB-Economy and Technology University; as well as at the Turkish National Security Academy. He was UNESCO Fellow at the Richardson Institute for Peace Studies, UK (1999); Fulbright Scholar at the JFK School of Government, Harvard University (2002); Alexander S. Onassis Fellow at the University of Athens (2003); and Research Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris (2003). His most recent works include Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present, and Future (ed. by C. Erhan, 2004); Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis (in English and Greek, 2004); and Central Asia in Global Politics (ed. in Turkish, 2004).
TURKEY AND THE CAUCASUS
Abstract
The emergence of newly independent Turkey, while enlarging its role. The col-
states in the Caucasus at the end of lapse of the Soviet Union removed the cen-
the Cold War presented challenges to tury-old Soviet/Russian threat, while at the
