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5
И.В. Демин
ПРОБЛЕМА ИДЕОЛОГИИ В
ПОСТМЕТАФИЗИЧЕСКОМ
КОНТЕКСТЕ:
ФИЛОСОФСКИЙ И
СОЦИОЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ
АСПЕКТЫ*
Аннотация
Проводится различие между двумя ракурсами рассмотрения феномена идеологии - философским и социологическим. Необходимость такого различения связывается с терминологической путаницей вокруг понятия «идеология» в области не только философии, но и социальных наук. Для описания философского аспекта проблемы идеологии вводится термин «идеологическая парадигма». Показано, что различие между идеологией как конкретным социально-историческим комплексом убеждений и идеологией как парадигмой социально-политического мышления имплицитно присутствует как в тех концепциях, которые видят в идеологии по преимуществу социально-когнитивный феномен, так и в тех, которые рассматривают её как феномен дискурсивный. Это различие сохраняет свое значение применительно к любому подходу и исследовательскому направлению, независимо от того, в к а-ком ключе рассматривается идеология - критическом или нейтральном. Показано, что некоторые ключевые проблемы современной теории идеологии (основания различения идеологических и неидеологических способов социальной идентификации, соотношение идеологических убеждений и общезначимых социальных знаний, ошибочная идеологическая самоидентификация групп и индивидов) не могут быть решены без обращения к понятию «идеологическая парадигма». В отличие от конкретно-исторической идеологии, представляющей собой фактор формирования и сохранения групповой
I. Demin
THE PROBLEM OF IDEOLOGY IN THE POST-METAPHYSICAL CONTEXT: PHILOSOPHICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS
Abstract
The article focuses on the difference between the two perspectives of considering the phenomenon of ideology: philosophical and sociological. The need for such a distinction is associated with the terminological confusion around the concept of "ideology" in the field of not only philosophy but also the social sciences. To describe the philosophical aspect of the problem of ideology, the term "ideological paradigm" is introduced. It is shown that the difference between ideology as a specific socio-historical complex of beliefs and ideology as a paradigm of sociopolitical thinking is implicitly present both in those concepts that see ideology mainly as a socio-cognitive phenomenon, and in those that consider it as a discursive phenomenon. This distinction retains its significance in relation to any approach and research direction, regardless of whether ideology is viewed in a critical or neutral way. It is shown that some key problems of the modern theory of ideology (the basis for distinguishing between ideological and non-ideological methods of social identification, the ratio of ideological beliefs and generally significant social knowledge, erroneous ideological self-identification of groups and individuals) cannot be solved without recourse to the concept of "ideological paradigm". Unlike concrete historical ideology, which is a factor in the formation and preservation of group identity, the ideological paradigm cannot be unambiguously tied to any social group or structure. Its function consists in ordering, structuring the entire semantic field of politics, mapping the "territory of the political".
идентичности, идеологическая парадигма не может быть однозначно привязана к какой-либо социальной группе или структуре. Её функция состоит в упорядочивании, структурировании всего семантического поля политики, картографировании «территории политического».
Ключевые слова:
идеология, теория идеологий, критика идеологии, идеологическая парадигма, язык идеологии, лингвистический поворот, социальная идентичность.
Key words:
ideology, theory of ideologies, criticism of ideology, ideological paradigm, language of ideology, linguistic turn, social identity.
* Статья подготовлена при поддержке Совета по грантам Президента Российской Федерации, проект МД-2252.2021.2 «Политический язык российского консерватизма: культурно-семиотический анализ».
The concept of ideology is one of the most frequently used and at the same time among the least clear and precise ones. According to G.I. Musikhin, ideology is "one of the most common terms in the world of politics and simultaneously one of the most disputed notions in the field of political theory" [13, p. 9]. Despite omnifarious criticism of the concept, it still retains its meaning giving rise to new conceptualizations and provoking scientific and pseudoscientific discussions.
The methodological basis of the research is the semiotic concept of culture developed by E. Cassirer, K. Geertz, U. Eco, Yu.M. Lotman and other theorists.
The research is based upon the following methodological principles:
- semiotics is not a separate area of scientific research but a universal science and a universal method of studying any communicative practices. The essence of this method consists in the functional assimilation of any object to a text written in a certain language. In the system of social sciences and humanities, semiotics occupies an inter- and supra-disciplinary position and performs the function of methodological support for various studies dealing with understanding, interpretation and communication.
- ideology is a special language of culture (political language) capable of generating an unlimited number of political texts. Ideology is the structure of political discourse; it "maps" the space of the political, making the world of politics understandable, meaningful, and intelligible.
- ideology cannot exist in the singular, the semantic space of politics is heterogeneous and multilingual; it is always the battlefield of various competing ideologies (interpretation strategies, interpretation schemes). The language of a particular ideology can be dominant precisely because it is not the only one.
- the semiotic understanding of ideology as a cultural-symbolic system and political language is not necessarily connected with any of the traditional approaches to defining the essence of politics developed in political science and political philosophy. Regardless of whether politics is viewed as the implementation of power, the activity of state institutions, the struggle for power, the limited use of power, the search and finding of social compromises, or otherwise, it is a space of social communication in which different languages-ideologies collide, coexist and confront.
At the beginning of the 21st century, as O.Yu. Malinova rightly noted, the concept of ideology "is used in such different senses that there is no hope of giving it a clear and unique definition" [10, p. 30]. Modern research literature offers a plethora of interpretations and definitions of ideology. These interpretations are associated with various philosophical and methodological schools (Marxism and post-Marxism, sociology of knowledge, structuralism and poststructuralism, philosophical hermeneutics, semiotics of culture). Ideology is reflected on in different disciplinary and interdisciplinary contexts (political philosophy, history of ideas, political sociology, cultural studies, political linguistics). Therefore, it is instrumental to develop a typology of "id e-ology" interpretations. Within the framework of this article, it seems appr o-priate to restrict ourselves to two variants of the typology of interpretations of ideology and approaches to its study.
1. The variety of approaches to understanding ideology and directions of its research can be streamlined, taking as a basis the criterion of the problem field. 20th century philosophy reveals two powerful poles of attraction (and repulsion), which largely determine the problems and research strategies of the social sciences and the humanities. These two poles are "co n-sciousness" and "language". To that end, in the theory of id eology, it is advisable to single out research approaches and directions that consider ideology primarily as a form of social consciousness, and approaches that involve the analysis of ideology as a form of language. In the first case, ideology is regarded as a social-cognitive phenomenon, and is conceptualized at the
junction of social philosophy, epistemology and the history of ideas. In the second case, ideology is thought of as a social-linguistic phenomenon, and its concepts lie in the problem field of the philosophy of language, semiotics and the theory of culture. Finally, there's a third group which embraces studies where ideology is viewed both as a socio-cognitive and as a linguistic (discursive) phenomenon.
2. The second type of typology is associated with the problem of assessing the socio-cognitive status of ideology. The broad variety of modern philosophical, socio-political, psychological, historical and linguistic studies of the phenomenon of ideology falls into two approaches - critical and neutral [2].
Within the critical approach, which goes back to classical Marxism, the cognitive task of studying ideology is subordinated to the practical, that is, the political one. Such a strategy of ideology criticism can be called ideological. Unlike scientific (scientific-philosophical) criticism, which requires the researcher to be "equidistant" in relation to all meaningfully specific ideolog i-cal viewpoints, ideological criticism is always the "exposure" of one ideology from the viewpoint of another (Peter Sloterdijk aptly called this phenomenon "mutual stalking of ideologies" [14, p. 7]). Ideological criticism of ideology, strictly speaking, turns out to be beyond the bounds of scientific rationality (at least in its classical sense).
Whatever methodological presumptions and research strategies the supporters of the "critical approach" adhere to, they inevitably encounter the notorious "Manheim paradox" [8]. The essence of this paradox is as follows: since ideology is a function of the social being of the subject and there can be no non-ideological position in the political space, any criticism of ideology inevitably turns out to be ideological criticism (that is, criticism of one ideology from the viewpoint of another). The task of developing a non-ideological (non-judgmental) concept of ideology, therefore, not only remains unresolved, but turns out to be unsolvable.
Following the neutral approach, the term "criticism" in relation to ideological consciousness is used in the Kantian sense: criticism is the clarification of foundations and the establishment of boundaries. E.Yu. Solovyov in the article "Philosophy as a Critique of Ideologies" criticizes the neutral approach and re-actualizes the Marxist understanding of ideology as "false consciousness". E.Yu. Solovyov sees the mission of philosophy in the
deideologization of social and individual consciousness. The term "criticism" in the title and text of the article is not used in the Kantian sense, but rather as a synonym for "overcoming" [15].
Supporters of the neutral approach aim to develop a non-judgmental understanding of ideology and research strategies adequate to such an understanding. The value-free concept of ideology is often erroneously confused with value-free attitudes towards particular ideologies. If the second is really impossible, then the first is not only possible, but even necessary. Clifford Geertz in his article "Ideology as a Cultural System" [6] made important clarifications on this subject.
The interpretation of ideology as a "false consciousness" and "illusory vision of social reality" (rooted in the Marxist tradition, but long gone beyond it) loses its legitimacy and is revised.
In this article I will focus mainly on the neutral approach, leaving out a number of modern trends in which the study of ideology is replaced by its exposure, while social science and politically engaged practice form a bizarre symbiosis (a striking example of this kind are the post-Marxist concepts of E. Laclau [7] and S. Mouffe [11], S. Zizek [16], C. Castoriadis [3].
The purpose of the article is to substantiate the need to distinguish between two disciplinary contexts for the use of the term "ideology" and the corresponding angles of considering ideological phenomena. The significance of this task for social cognition is due to the fact that terminological confusion, which often accompanies not only political but also theoretical discussions around the concept of "ideology", often stems from the indistinguishability of two aspects (philosophical-paradigmatic and sociological) of the problem of ideology.
Methods employed in the course of the research include the comparative method and the issue based method of analysis and presentation of the material.
The phenomenon of ideology can be developed and presented in two perspectives - scientific-empirical and socio-philosophical. Each of these perspectives corresponds to a certain way of using the term "ideology". Let's consider them.
The fact that the term "ideology" acts as a characteristic of certain social groups or institutions is instrumental in understanding the phenomenon of ideology in the framework of sociology, political science, psychology, lin-
guistics and other scientific and empirical studies. This is perhaps the most general and, at the same time, the least substantively specific characteristic of ideology. Ideology understood in this way is a function of social existence, and this function always refers to a specific social subject ("ideology of the middle class", "ideology of ethnic minorities", etc.) or a structure ("ideology of modern Russia", "official ideology of the state"). Id eology as a "concrete historical ideology" is a meaningfully defined set of beliefs, values and attitudes, the carrier of which is some kind of social community of the past or the present.
Let us now consider the concept of ideology from a different - socio-philosophical - perspective. To denote this perspective we will use the term "paradigm". This perspective sets a different context for the use of the term. The word "ideology" in both scientific and political language is used to denote such constructions as "anarchism", "classical liberalism", "social-conservatism", "communitarism", "feminism", "ecologism", "solidarism", "Christian socialism", etc. Obviously, in all these cases, the term "ideology" has a different meaning than "the spectrum of beliefs and beliefs inherent in a social group." None of the given "isms" can be considered as an expression of the interests or identity of a particular social group. Each of these "ideological paradigms" claims to be something more and different than a system of collective beliefs of individual groups. What does the ideological paradigm "do", what is its function in the context of social life? Unlike "concrete historical ideology", "ideological paradigm" structures the socio-political space, makes it understandable and meaningful. This dimension of ideology structures the semantic field of politics, streamlines the territory of politics. Moreover, different ideological paradigms (liberalism, socialism, conservatism) do this in different ways.
What are the fundamental differences of the scientific-empirical and the socio-philosophical approach to ideology?
1. Ideology explored along the positively scientific (sociological, psychological, linguistic, etc.) lines appears as something local and particular, lacking in universalist claims. Ideology as guarantee (or opportunity) of the social identity of a social group cannot be regarded as something universal. In contrast to this, ideology viewed from a philosophical perspective contains universalist claims, that is, it claims to be a doctrine and a system of knowledge about society as such, the essence of law and state power, etc. In
other words, any ideological paradigm has an immanent tendency to self-hypostatization.
2. Specific historical ideology that provides group identity is usually eclectic and fragmentary in terms of content. Its internal organization resembles a patchwork quilt rather than a scientific theory or philosophical system. Ideology as a factor of group identity can include ideas borrowed from various ideological paradigms, metaphysical, ethical, political and legal doctrines, religious and ideological teachings. In other words, the content of concrete historical ideology is heterogeneous. Ideology viewed from a philosophical perspective is no longer an eclectic set of heterogeneous elements. It represents a conceptual unity, a systemic relationship.
Specific historical ideology is limited to those social functions that it performs in a specific era and in a specific socio-historical context. The main function traditionally performed by ideology is to ensure group identity. Ideologies, according to G.I. Musikhin, "organize the collective ideas of their su p-porters" [12, p. 129], provide "schematization of group identity" [12, p. 143]. Without questioning the significance of this function it is important to mention that ideology as a specific system of beliefs can set the scheme of social group identity because group members keep finding themselves in a social space ruled and structured by ideological paradigms.
This interpretation of "ideological paradigm" appears to completely blur the line between socio-philosophical and political-legal doctrines on the one hand, and ideologies, on the other. Philosophical interpretations of society, history, state begin to be viewed as conceptual foundations for ideologies, or even fully identified with the latter. This leads to habitual formulations that have found their way into academic literature, textbooks and dictionaries: "J.Locke is the founder of classical European liberalism"; "Ivan Ilyin laid the foundations of liberal conservatism in his doctrine of the state and law," and so on. The history of political philosophy here seems to finally merge with the history of ideologies.
Without delving into the problem of interrelations between philosophy and ideology (the problem of ideological bias of socio-philosophical knowledge), it should be noted that the mixing of philosophical teachings with ideological paradigms affects only the "dogmatic" ("metaphysical") type of thinking. Whenever philosophy assumes the function of forming a certain, meaningfully concrete worldview it cannot avoid confusion with ideology as a
paradigm of political thinking. However, the trends that throughout the XX century sought to distance themselves from the "worldview" understanding of philosophy are safe from this threat [1].
The difference between philosophical and political concepts and ideological teachings is not limited to the difference between "theory" and "practice". The point is not that "the world of philosophy of politics is associated with the search for truth, with the coherence and consistency of ideas," whereas "the world of ideology is associated with the application of ideas in practice, no matter how inconsistent, incomplete or contradictory they may be" [9, p. 15]. Focus on the search for truth did nothing to prevent quite a few philosophers from playing an important (if not defining) role in the history of ideologies (suffice it to mention the names of J. Locke, K. Marx and K. Schmitt). The historical development of philosophy provides many examples of teachings, in relation to which it is impossible to draw any distinction between "political philosophy" and "ideology" (and we are talking about thinkers belonging to different ends of the political and ideological "spectrum"). The key to solving the complicated issue of the relationship between philosophy and ideology, in our opinion, lies primarily in revealing the content of the concept of "ideological paradigm", and secondly, in distinguishing between two types of socio-philosophical reflection (metaphysical and postmetaphysical). In addition, it must be admitted that concerns over the confusion of political philosophy and ideology, the history of political doctrines and the history of ideologies result largely from the "relapse" of Marxist interpretation of ideology as "false consciousness".
If the task of the social sciences is to study ideology as a set of beliefs, views and values inherent in certain social groups, then the task of postmetaphysical social philosophy is to analyze and criticize ideological paradigms. However, there is no barrier between these two concepts of ideology. Historically specific ideologies include elements of various worldview paradigms, and the latter, in turn, are neither timeless formations nor divorced from social and historical life.
Substantive differences between ideological paradigms (for example, liberalism and conservatism) are more clearly manifested in treatises on philosophy of law or theoretical sociology than in party programs and leaflets studied by political science and political linguistics. This is due to the fact that the language of theoretical knowledge is more strict and reflexive than
the language of public policy. However, the fact that the paradigmatic order of social reality is more noticeable at the level of the language of philosophy does not mean that ideological paradigms are "philosophical abstractions" divorced from social life.
Despite the close relationship and interdependence of the socio-historical and paradigmatic aspects of ideological consciousness, it is important to avoid confusion between the two concepts denoted by the term "ideology".
I would like to address the most general objection that may arise in connection with the distinction between the two aspects of ideology presented in this article. The essence of this objection can be expressed in the form of three interrelated questions. 1. What significance can the concept of "ideological paradigm" have when universalist philosophical and ideological claims to a holistic, logically consistent vision of social life have been recognized as irrelevant and rejected? 2. Can the concept of ideological paradigm fit in the intellectual context formed by the methodological principles of constructivism and conventionalism, in which the thesis about the relativity of any ideological meaning (and even any social knowledge) has long been generally accepted? 3. Why is it impossible to confine oneself to a scientific-empirical analysis of the phenomena of ideological consciousness and completely reject "speculative" philosophical constructions?
Each of these questions deserves a detailed analysis and separate research. In this article I will just make a few general comments. First, the concept of ideological paradigm is quite compatible with the presumption of historicity of all ideologies and ideological meanings (and even with the presumption of historicity of ideology itself as a form of consciousness). Secondly, the proclamation of methodological principles (constructivism, conventionalism) is not always followed by their actual implementation in the practice of social research. Thirdly, any positive-scientific (sociological, political science, linguistic) interpretation of the concept of "ideology" inevitably bears the imprint of philosophical conceptualizations.
I will now analyze in more detail some of the methodological and epis-temological issues faced by social studies, which are based exclusively on the sociological interpretation of ideology and exclude the paradigmatic aspect.
I would like to refer to the article "Discourse analysis of ideology: opportunities and limitations" written by G.I. Musikhin [12]. Revealing the heu-
ristic potential of the discursive approach the author notes that interpretation of ideology as a discourse (and a structure that generates discourses) must be supplemented with a socio-cognitive component. Musikhin views ideology as a hybrid phenomenon that includes discursive, social and cognitive aspects. He defines ideology as "a collectively professed system of beliefs, the subject of which is necessarily a particular social group" [12, p. 128]. Here lies the first theoretical difficulty that the sociological concept of ideology encounters. How do you separate ideologized groups from other communities, how do you distinguish groups that have "identification ideologies" from communities that do not have such (cultural, linguistic, national, etc.)? What could be the basis for this division? These issues become especially acute in today's post-industrial society where social boundaries and identification strategies are blurred.
According to G.I. Musikhin, "ideologized group" is "a community united by common practice and common discourse, in which a common system of beliefs is manifested" [12, p. 132]. This definition, however, can cover many social communities that are not directly related to political life and are not ideological. The question of how ideological social groups differ from non-ideological ones refers to a more fundamental question - what is the difference between an ideological type of consciousness (or an ideological type of discourse) and a non-ideological one? If ideology is viewed solely in terms of socio-political, socio-psychological and socio-linguistic research, this question will remain unanswered.
Another theoretical problem arising in the process of studying the phenomena of ideological consciousness is the problem of assessing the cognitive nature of ideology. All political theorists, from Destut de Tracy to Slavoj Zizek, have been preoccupied with this problem to a greater or lesser extent. This problem is of particular relevance within the neutral approach to the analysis of ideology. The key issue here is the question of the relationship between ideology and science, ideology and public knowledge. With all the reservations about the mutual influence and interpenetration of scientific knowledge and ideological teachings, the very cognitive difference between ideology and science must remain immutable. This distinction retains its constitutive significance for social research as well. In this regard, the interpretation of science as "one of the forms of ideology" [5, p. 515] would mean the end of scientific rationality as such [4].
Musikhin interprets the distinction between "knowledge" and "ideology" as a sociological distinction, not an epistemological one. He opposes ideology not to knowledge as such, but to general knowledge. "If you look at the u n-derstanding of knowledge not semantically, but pragmatically, it turns out that knowledge is in many ways a consensus between the theory of knowledge and a specific set of information owned by this or that society. This turns true knowledge into relative and intersubjective (if you look at it as an outsider) and at the same time makes it "objective" on the scale of the social and cultural attitudes of a given society" [12, p. 140]. Knowledge u n-derstood in this way in spite of being relative "does not cease to be common for a given community, and thus is not ideological" [12, p. 140]. Let's pay attention to the author's line of reasoning: knowledge is regarded by the community as objective knowledge because (for a given community) it is common. This is not far from the argument that knowledge is (relatively) true on the grounds that it is general. This is, as we know, the point of view held by conventionalism.
Sociological understanding of ideology ("a set of collective beliefs of a social group") rests on the distinction between "shared beliefs", which can fulfill ideological functions, and "general knowledge" that is not related to political and ideological identification. "Common beliefs (including ideological ones)," notes Musikhin, "suggest the presence of common knowledge" [12, p. 141]. However, the author does not draw any clear boundaries between "knowledge" and "ideology". The complexity (or even insolubility) of this problem in the framework of social research is due to the fact that representatives of ideological groups often present their ideological beliefs as factual knowledge. "The ideological beliefs of this or that group," writes Musikhin, "are thought of as such only from external epistemological positions, but are perceived as common knowledge by the members of the group themselves" [12, p. 141]. In other words, social groups with different "identification ideologies" often assign different meanings to the concept of common knowledge; endow different (even mutually exclusive) sets of ideas with this status. How should the problem of "common knowledge" be solved under these conditions since "external" (epistemological) criteria of objectivity have been rejected? I believe that the answer to this question cannot be obtained as long as the terms "ideology" and "general knowledge" are used in their average conventional meaning. It is impossible to solve the problem of
the cognitive status of ideology while staying within the boundaries of the conventionalist and sociological understanding of knowledge.
Within the conventionalist interpretation of knowledge, the term "ideology" will always be used in a vague, indefinite meaning, which in the limit can be expressed using the infamous formula: ideology is what people interested in politics consider ideology.
The methodological limitations of conventionalism in ideology studies bring forward yet another theoretical problem. This is the problem of the discrepancy between the identity of the subject and their ideological self-identification. It is obvious that social subjects and groups can be confused about their own ideological identity. A person who is guided in political life by a liberal understanding of freedom, state and law can sincerely consider himself a conservative and identify his ideological identity as "conservative" (the opposite example is also possible). Within the framework of conventionalism, the opinion of this person will be recognized as erroneous on the grounds that it is at odds with the prevailing general average understanding of what "conservatism" and "liberalism" are. But here it is necessary to ask: can this general and average understanding itself be erroneous? If we stay within the limits of sociological understanding of knowledge and ideology, the answer is an unequivocal no. Do not in this case such terms as "ideology", "liberalism" and "conservatism" become deprived not only of their universal (non-contextual) meaning, but also of any meaning in general? Do they not become "signifiers without a signified"?
In substantiating the need for a philosophical theory of ideology, it is important to pay attention to yet another thesis presented in Musikhin's article. Noting the transformation of ideological meanings in the context of so-cio-historical life, Musikhin writes: "Initially defined ideological ideas are so widespread that they begin to be perceived as stable beliefs and social practices of the entire society of a particular country. Today, the equality of all people before the law is considered a generally accepted constitutional norm, although this was originally a requirement of liberal ideology" [12, p. 129]. In other words, ideological postulates as they become common property and acquire the status of "common knowledge" (or generally accepted principles and norms) cease to be ideological. But this reasoning can be continued in a key that is very unfavorable for conventionalism: a delusion shared by eve-
ryone (or the majority) ceases to be a delusion. The conventionalist interpretation of knowledge inevitably leads to such a paradox.
If social science accepts conventionalism as its basic methodological principle, it thereby deprives itself of the opportunity to "correct" a society that is "mistaken" about its own ideological identity. As soon as all philosop h-ical "universals" are rejected, historicized, there are no other criteria, except for public opinions functioning in the mode of "general knowledge", at the disposal of the social researcher.
The limitations of sociological analysis of ideology follow from the prevailing constructivist and conventionalist interpretation of knowledge in modern social research. None of the considered problems related to the functioning of ideologies (the grounds for distinguishing between ideological and non-ideological methods of social identification, the relationship between ideological beliefs and generally significant social knowledge, erroneous ideological identification and self-identification) is adequately resolved in the methodological context of social constructivism and conventionalism. This makes it necessary to turn to the philosophical origins and foundations of various interpretations of ideological consciousness.
Addressing the problem of ideology in a philosophical context, rehabilitation of the philosophical theory of ideology does not mean a return to the principles of essentialism, realism and universalism, and does not necessarily lead to "metaphysics". The possibilities and general outlines of non-metaphysical (post-metaphysical) political philosophy and the theory of ideology, free from the methodological extremes of constructivism and objectiv-ist realism, require special study and clarification. However, it can be noted in advance that the philosophical conceptualization of ideology is unlikely to ignore the differences between two aspects of ideology: a specific system of beliefs and values of a social group and the "ideological paradigm".
The distinction between two perspectives of considering ideology - sociological and philosophical (paradigmatic) - retains its significance in relation to any approach and research direction (regardless of whether ideology is viewed in a critical or neutral way). Moreover, the distinction between the two aspects of the problem of ideology is implicitly present and assumed both in those interpretations that focus on the problem field of "consciousness" and in those that describe the problem of ideology in terms of philosophy of language and semiotics.
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